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ABSTRACT
The subject of this thesis is the history of British and French imposition of the 
Anglo-French inter-Cameroons boundary and the effects on the divided people from 
1916 to 1961. The focus is on border administration and the response of the separated 
border groups notably the Balong, Bakossi, Duala, Balondo, Bakweri and the Mbo. 
The work opens with post-war Anglo-French negotiations and the partition of the 
territory. These negotiations resulted to an unequal division of Cameroon between the 
British (1/5) and the French (4/5). After the partition on paper, the actual work of 
survey and demarcation began in 1937 from the coast and proceeded inland. The work 
came to a halt with the outbreak of the Second World War.
Establishing and settling their administration on an old German base was not 
an easy task for either administration, especially in a territory where there was a 
Germanophone educated group reluctant to sever links with the former colonial 
power. More complicated was the administration of separated ethnic groups who 
seized every opportunity to send an avalanche of petitions and complaints to first the 
League of Nations and later to the United Nations in protest of the boundary. While 
border people resisted the boundary, others who were smarter saw the boundary as a 
zone of limitless opportunities, which they did not hesitate to exploit.
It was in the early 1960s that following the plebiscite results in Southern 
Cameroons, the Trusteeship regime ended and the territory achieved independence on 
October 1st, 1961 by reuniting with an independent French Cameroon. Reunification 
changed the status of the boundary from an international to an interstate boundary yet 
the ghost of the defunct boundary has ever since continued to haunt Cameroon.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
This study looks at the origin, the function and consequences of the Anglo- 
French inter-Cameroons boundary from 1916 to 1961.1 It will explore the 
effectiveness of border administration and the views of the local people. The study 
makes no attempt to treat the subject of colonial boundaries exhaustively; its aim is 
simply to call attention to the Ajiglo-French inter-Cameroons boundary as a fertile 
field for investigation and to suggest some of the problems, which arise in connection 
with its history.
It was difficult to decide whether I wanted to carry out research on the entire 
evolution of the Anglo-French boundary or on a particular aspect or stage of its 
evolution. That is, deciding whether I intended to look at the entire life - span or 
specific periods of its evolution. It was also important to reflect on colonial 
governmental policies of boundary maintenance, population mobility across the 
boundary, trade and taxation. Of equal importance was the temptation to look solely 
at the consequences of the boundary for the border groups or maybe the post-colonial 
history of the boundary to see if its maintenance was a continuation of colonial 
policies or an abandonment of them. What seemed clear however in my mind was
1 The evolution of the name Cameroon started with the Portuguese who originally called it 
CAMAROES meaning prawns; then the Spaniards later called it CAMERONES. When it became a 
German Protectorate from 1884-1916, it was called KAMERUN but when the Germans were defeated 
and the country was shared between the British and the French, the British sections were called 
BRITISH NORTHERN and BRITISH SOUTHERN CAMEROONS. They were invariably referred to 
as the CAMEROONS. The French occupied sphere was called FRENCH CAMEROON or LA 
REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN. When British Cameroons voted for reunification with an already 
independent French Cameroon in 1961, they both formed the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
CAMEROON, comprising of WEST CAMEROON and EAST CAMEROUN. In 1972, there was a 
reunification of both the west and east to form the UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON. Seven 
years latter the name was changed to the REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON. For easy and acceptable usage 
it is today called either CAMEROON by English speakers or CAMEROUN by French-speakers.
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that I intended to explore the constant tensions between the different perceptions of 
the boundary from the point of view of the boundary makers and the divided people.
Deciding on the appropriate chronology for this study was also difficult. This 
is because the 45 years of history that the topic now covers actually seem a very long 
period yet this does not cover the entire life span of the boundary. The boundary 
actually functioned until 1972 when the government of the Federal Republic of 
Cameroon decided to end it in view of creating a United Republic of Cameroon.2 
The Anglo-French inter-Cameroons boundary was defined in March 1916 but the 
survey and demarcation of the portion under study did not start until November 1937. 
Work was halted in September 1939 due to the outbreak of the Second World War. 
This probably implies that the actual administration of the boundary, as an instrument 
for enforcing the colonial policy of boundary maintenance, could only have been 
institutionalised after the war. However, this argument could be shaky for during the 
war there were movements of persons and ammunitions from one side of the 
boundary to the other and this demanded the administrative attention of both 
governments. Colonial administration ceased in 1961 with the creation of the Federal 
Republic of Cameroon. Since my interest is to highlight the administration of 
borderlands, the time period could equally well run from 1939 to 1961. This of course 
would not exclude serious background work on its allocation, definition and 
demarcation.3 Eventually, I decided to examine both the administration of the 
boundary and the reaction of the separated people from 1916 to 1961. This I hope
2 From independence in 1961 to reunification in 1972, the boundary changed its status from an 
international to an inter-state boundary marking die limit between the East and West Cameroon 
Federated states. It was however, die highest policed boundary within the Federal Republic of 
Cameroon.
3 To allocate is to take a political decision on territorial distribution; to delimit is to select a 
specific boundary while to demarcate is to mark the boundary on the ground.
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would construct a historical portrait of state functions on an African colonial 
boundary and their effects on the divided people.
The Anglo-French inter-Cameroons boundary has been subjected to 
comparatively little research by comparison with other boundaries (notably the 
Cameroon-Nigeria boundary). My intention thus is to first of all contribute to the 
available literature on this boundary, and secondly to branch off from the over 
concentration of research in the past on border disputes and conflict resolutions. Most 
importantly, this research is intended to contribute to the development of border 
studies. Until recently, most studies have looked at boundaries as colonial impositions 
which artificially divided border peoples, and were therefore an impediment to their 
development.4 Others have argued that the boundary provided a framework for 
independent African nations, while recent treatments of the question take quite a 
different approach which outlines that border peoples were not all victims, that not 
everything they did at a local level constituted resistance as smuggling for instance 
was probably more an attempt to exploit new opportunities than to maintain existing 
links.5 As a result, some of the border people may have benefited from the border.
I do agree with Nugent and Asiwaju5 s observation that for the border people, 
the boundary was a paradox because it served as a barrier to some and an opportunity 
zone to others.6 But the central argument in this thesis is about the group of people 
for whom the boundary was a barrier or negative and they were reacting in several 
ways to dismantle the boundary and be reunited with their kin and property across the 
boundary. These were the people whose families and farmlands had been divided
4 A. I. Asiwaju, Partitioned Africans. Ethnic relations across Africa’s international boundaries, 1884- 
1984. London: Christopher Hurst, 1985.
5 J. C. Anene, The international boundaries o f Nigeria 1885-1960. The framework o f  an emergent 
African nation. Harlow: Longman, 1970. P.Nugent, Smugglers, secessionists & loyal citizens on the 
Ghana-Togo frontier. The lie o f the borderlands since 1914. Oxford: James Curry, 2002.
6 P. Nugent, and A. I. Asiwaju, (eds) African boundaries. Barriers, conduits and opportunities, 
London & New York: Frances Pinter, 1996.
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between the British and the French territories and they needed to pay and obtain 
official passes to be allowed to visit their relations or cultivate their farmlands. Even 
though I have adopted this approach, which rather looks like an older perception of 
colonial boundaries, I do agree with the newer historiography represented by Nugent 
that there was a second vested interest, which saw the boundary as positive for it 
provided them with the opportunity for increasing their wealth through lucrative 
smuggling. This smuggling industry was successful due to the ineffectiveness of the 
customs service and border policing which were in turn rendered hazardous by 
difficult terrain and changing weather conditions. It is to be recalled here that colonial 
states were seriously under-resourced making it easier for enterprising smugglers to 
operate along the boundary. On reflection, I would say that although the recent 
treatments of the question have forced me to rethink much of what I had previously 
taken for granted, in this study, I am more interested in the negative effects of colonial 
boundaries on separated border groups than the opportunities offered by the 
boundaries.
A HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE BOUNDARY
Although the periodisation and focus of this research proved problematic, the 
historical setting was clearly defined. The primary aim was not to analyse the 
different colonial encounter but to expose the historical background in which the 
boundary was drawn and administered. For even the most casual observer, relics of 
the Anglo-French inter-Cameroons boundary have remained a visible edifice of the 
history of the territoiy. Cameroon first felt the impact of European colonisation under 
the Germans through the introduction of Western economic, political and 
administrative institutions. It went on to experience the division of the territory (by
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the British and the French), which had been subjected to a single set of European 
influences for more than a generation.
To the purely physical or territorial aspects of this division, there must be
added the effects of allocating the individual parts of Cameroon to Britain and France.
The two new European powers which then ruled in their respective spheres had
distinctive cultures, political traditions and colonial policies which differed from one
another at least as each was different from those of Germany. The result was an
increasing degree of divergence between the territory under French administration and
that under British rule. Victor Le Vine says that “complexity” is the key word to
describe Cameroon’s political, social and economic configurations:
No other African country, save perhaps Nigeria, has had such an 
extraordinarily varied history of political experiences. It saw 
three direct colonial and two indirect tutelary powers work their 
will and influence: Germany, France and Great Britain; the 
League of Nations and the United Nations. Nigeria with which 
the British Cameroons were in administrative union might be 
added to the list.7
What were the particular circumstances under which the Anglo-French boundary in 
Cameroon was drawn?
After the Allied joint conquest of Kamerun in the First World War, they both 
had conflicting interests in their freshly conquered territory, which hindered any 
effective and smooth collaboration between them. The territory was carved into three 
main sections; those areas conquered solely by the French (placed under French 
command), those by the British (under British command) and the areas conquered 
under joint efforts by both powers (placed under the command of General Charles 
Dobell). Essentially, the war did reveal rather starkly the imperialist motives of both 
powers and provided a pretext for further colonial conquest and annexation. Lovett
7 V. T. LeVine, The Cameroon Federal Republic. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1971, p.xix.
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Elango says that both powers tried to disguise this fact when, early in the campaign, 
they agreed to establish a Condominium over the territories jointly conquered and 
occupied, but the projected Condominium never materialised.8 Also, differences arose 
over an acceptable formula for partition. With the failure of joint rule and a common 
formula for the partition of Kamerun, the Allied powers opened negotiations, which 
led to the partition of Kamerun and the birth of the Anglo-French inter-Cameroons 
boundary.
Those negotiations lingered on until 1922 during which claims and 
counterclaims were launched by both administrations leading to the final partition. 
The provisional Picot line of 1916 largely foreshadowed whatever adjustments were 
made later and the eventual partition. This partition was disproportionate as Britain 
got 1/5 while France had 4/5. It then became imperative that an Anglo-French 
boundary commission be set up to delimit and demarcate the boundary between the 
British and French spheres of Kamerun. An important aspect of the division accord 
was that both parties were given the possibility of slightly modifying the partition line 
in order to avoid dividing villages, ethnic groups, plantations and farmlands. In their 
work of delimitation and demarcation, both land commissions realised that it was 
difficult to divide the territory without separating ethnic groups, plantations and 
farmlands.
In their efforts to maintain the dividing line, both administrations generated 
both friction and understanding with each other; the boundary sometimes became a 
zone of amity and sometimes one of tension. Also, while each administration 
imposed customs formalities on their side of the boundary and put patrol guards to 
arrest and punish trespassers, the borderland peoples demonstrated their non­
8 L. Z. Elango, The Anglo-French Condominium in Cameroon, 1914-1916. History o f a 
misunderstanding. Limbe: Navi-Group Publications, 1987, p.8.
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acceptance of the boundary and their determination to remain unified and ignore the 
boundary. Independence and reunification in 1961 failed to solve the problem of 
division and inter-group reintegration; today, the psychological and linguistic scars of 
division still persist among Cameroonians. Why is the southern portion of the 
boundary an important field for investigation?
IMPORTANCE OF THE CHOSEN AREA OF STUDY
The section of the boundary under study is that which separated British 
Southern Cameroons from La Republique du Cameroun or French Cameroon in 1916. 
Along this section of the boundary, I have chosen to study the southernmost portion 
that runs northwards from the sea, around the mouth of the River Mungo (Moungo) to 
the summit of Mount Manenguba, a distance of about 135 miles. This section of the 
boundary is very special in many ways. First of all, the boundary here is of a dual 
nature, maritime and territorial. This difference warranted highly specialised 
technicians in the surveying, mapping and demarcating of the boundary. It also 
proved to be a very costly venture for both the British and the French administrations. 
This suggests how important they believed it to be.
Secondly, the topography and vegetation cover made the task of the Amglo- 
French Land Commissioners very arduous. During the rainy season severe rains 
caused heavy floods and high tides along the maritime boundary especially on the 
coastal swamps and mangroves, this rendered the work of the Boundary Commission 
very difficult. The southern section of the River Mungo, which was fixed as the 
natural boundary frequently overflowed its banks during the rains and made the work 
of surveying and demarcating very difficult. It was for these reasons that all work on 
demarcation was halted during this period of the year, making the task time­
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consuming. Tracing and demarcating huge expanses of thickly forested and hilly 
landscape was a painstaking venture for the Land Commission.
Thirdly, the southern section of the boundary fell on very fertile soils for food 
and cash crop cultivation, an advantage, which both the British and the French wanted 
to secure. This section of the boundary was also a mountainous area with three 
prominent peaks (Mounts Fako, Kupe and Manenguba) all of which offered good 
pasture for pastoral agriculture. Due to all these economic advantages, boundary 
delimitation and demarcation here was a very tricky and delicate process for it was 
impossible to satisfy the demands of both powers.
The abundance in natural resources was also reflected in human resources 
along this portion of the boundary. The area is inhabited by ethnic groups (Duala, 
Bakweri, Bakossi, Balong, Balondo and the Mbo) who were a reliable labour force for 
plantation agriculture, building of communication infrastructure, government 
residential areas as well as auxiliaries in the colonial administration and missionary 
societies. These activities made this southern section of the boundary very busy and 
popular thus its importance.
It was due to all the peculiarities of this section of the boundary and the 
difficulties both British and French administrations had in delimiting, demarcating 
and administering it that I consider it very important to research the effectiveness of 
states' functions along the boundary. This study will include an analysis of the 
problems and opportunities that both administrations encountered in their endeavour 
to maintain the dividing line.
The effectiveness of boundary administration, which this research seeks to 
highlight, is very important in the evolution of any boundary. This importance will 
depend on the characteristics of the boundary, the functions of the boundary, the
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availability of government resources to maintain the boundary, the economic and 
strategic importance of the boundary, and the readiness of the border peoples to 
maintain the boundary. There is therefore an urgent need for this and more studies on 
the application of government policies along border zones for they determine the 
relationship between governments and directly affect the lives of the border people. 
David Downing has underscored the point that government policies have always been 
at the root of border disputes in these words:
Border disputes rarely have an independent life of their own.
They resemble cases of high explosives left carelessly behind by 
the indifferent progress of human history. They need fuses to be 
dangerous, and someone has to light those fuses for them to 
explode.... Governments have become adept at providing both the 
fuse and the hand that lights it.9
This research on the tracing, administration and effects of the southern 
portion of the Anglo-French boundary on the divided people is important for its aim is 
to fill up a missing gap in the colonial history of Cameroon.10 It is hoped that the 
research will equip students with knowledge and skills on ethno-history that will 
prepare them for future careers as scholars and researchers on border studies. The 
work will also advance the frontiers of knowledge on border studies through the use 
of data collected from oral interviews, archival reports and other written sources. By 
exploring the functions and effects of the Anglo-French boundary in Cameroon, this 
research has exposed one of the divisive aspects of colonial rule in Cameroon in 
particular and Africa at large.
9 D. Downing, An Atlas o f  Territorial and Border Disputes. London: New England Library, 1980, p8.
10 There have been earlier works on the northern section of this boundary, by J. R. V. Prescott and 
Peter Yearwood, while V. G. Fanso has given a general analysis on the tracing and administration of 
the boundary. There has so far been no comprehensive examination of the demarcation, administration 
and response to the boundary by peoples of the southern portion of the boundary, hence the importance 
of this research.
9
METHODOLOGY
The bulk of the data used for this research has been drawn from various 
archives and libraries. In London, I worked in seven libraries: SOAS Library; British 
Library; Institute of Commonwealth Studies Library; Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies Library; Senate House Library; Institute of Historical Research Library and 
the Library of University College London. In France I did research in the French 
National Library {La Bibliotheque Frangois Mitterand in Paris) and the library of the 
Universite Aix-Marseilles I at Aix-en-Provence. Interviews conducted during 
fieldwork did provide important data for this research. Fieldwork was done in 
Cameroon and it enabled me to interview the victims of this boundary and was 
therefore better placed to appreciate the intensity of the effects of the boundary on 
border groups. I also took photographs of the relics of the boundary such as boundary 
pillars, the remains of destroyed boundary land marks, and of customs and police 
posts, the physical land limits of the old German plantations that straddled the 
boundary and the geographical features that were used at certain sections as the 
boundary line, for example the River Mungo. Due to problems of accessibility and 
poor visibility of the area during the rains, which start in early August and last till 
October, fieldwork was carried out from the beginning of April to mid August 1999.1 
conducted interviews in the hope of making a better assessment of the effects of the 
boundary on the divided peoples and their reactions to it. Informants for the most part 
were mostly people from the former border groups some of whom could supply 
eyewitness accounts on the nature, intensity and effects of boundary administration.
Archival research for this study was done at the Public Records Office (PRO) 
in London; the French National Archives - the Centre for Overseas Archives in Aix- 
en-Provence; the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris; the National
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Archives in Yaounde, and the Provincial Archives in Buea, Cameroon.11 All the 
archives in Cameroon, France and London provided valuable information on the 
different colonial administrations and their policies of boundary maintenance. 
Unfortunately, archival records on the Anglo-French boundary peter out after the 
Second World War. They convey little on the effects of the boundary on the divided 
people and attention is focused on nationalist and reunification movements on both 
the British and the French territories. It was, however, possible to complement the 
data collected from Colonial Reports with what was published by News Papers and 
Journals,
REVIEW OF SOURCES
A major realisation in connection with this research was the problem of 
sources and the inadequate attention given to the Anglo-French inter-Cameroons 
boundary. The lone database available in the internet is the International Boundary 
News Database, which is a project of the International Boundaries Research Unit 
(IBRU) at the University of Durham (England), and is supported by a grant from the 
United States Institute of Peace. This database provides over 10,000 boundary related 
reports around the world but the reports date from 1991. All that is available on these 
reports on Cameroon are the Cameroon-Nigeria border clashes since 1991, but this is 
of remote importance to my work.
Archival Sources
Archival research in London has been based largely on the Colonial and 
Foreign Office archives at the PRO.12 The bulk of the material needed for this work
11 The name PRO has now been changed to The National Arcliives, as a result, everywhere in this work 
that mention has been made to die PRO, this is referred to what is today called The National Archives 
located in the same holding at Kew Gardens, London.
12 Other relevant sources for colonial studies at the PRO have been records for the Colonial Office, 
Dominions Office, Commonwealth Relations Office and Commonwealth Office.
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is available in the Confidential Regional Prints for Africa (C0879) the “Q.v.” series 
and West Affica-Nigeria. For the Cameroons, the most important classes are files 
C0649, CO750 and C0751, running from 1915 to 1926. 13
In Aix-en Provence, I carried out research in the archives of lAjrique 
Equatoriale Frangaise (AEF) and VAjrique Occidentals Frangaise (AOF), 
particularly on Cameroon. In these archives there are files on political affairs (Aff. 
Pol.) for Togo and the Cameroons and various Annual Reports and Official Journals 
from 1916 to 1959. Of importance are the AF/CP series, which contain maps on 
Cameroon and the boundary. In Paris, research was done in the Archives of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Major files here are the K and AL series that cover 
general administration of Cameroon and AEF. There are also files on the Second 
World War and Vichy Africa (1939-1945) and on French and British Cameroon from 
1953 to 1959. Data on Vichy Africa is on microfilm. Files on boundaries in Africa 
(the Anglo-French boundary in Cameroon inclusive) are not accessible to the public 
until the year 2019.14 However, there is data on colonial administration, political
13 Documents for the Southern Nigeria Protectorate like Government Gazettes, Session Papers; 
Registers of out-going letters and Original Correspondence are found in CO520, CO590, C0591, and 
C0473. C0968 contains relevant information on Anglo-French colonial co-operation in 1944 and 
1945. The CO files were used in conjunction with the Foreign Office correspondence notably the 
F0371 series. These series of records, together with a number of other subject-based series are 
indexed in a contemporaiy card index held in the Research Enquiries Room (RER) which covers 1906- 
1919, and thereafter by printed indexes, also on open access in RER, for 1920-1951. F0912 consists of 
four files covering Foreign Office Correspondence with the Consulate in Douala, Cameroon from 1940 
to 1955.
141 am not quite sure why this is so but the Officer in Charge of the archives explained that files on 
boundaries are considered sensitive and cannot be released readily.
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parties and the independence movements in Cameroon. There are also cuttings from 
newspapers, which cover political events in French Cameroon from 1945 to 1960.
In Cameroon, research was done at the National and Provincial Archives of 
Yaounde and Buea. In the National Archives Yaounde, the Affaires Politiques et 
Administratives (APA) series provided both materials on the delimitation and on the 
administration of the Anglo-French boundary in Cameroon. In the Provincial 
Archives Buea, the qf/a series provided useful information on the Cameroon Anglo- 
French boundary notably files nos. 58,124,142, and 239. These archives also hold 
important data on the British and French administration in Cameroon.
Secondary sources
According to secondary sources, geographers first expressed the interest in 
boundary studies.15 Working from the general to more specific works, I have 
distinguished the very important from the general works in the various areas of
15 Frontiers and boundaries were initially of interest to geographers and geo-politicians who wrote at 
the end of the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries. The study later attracted students of 
international law who looked at die legal implications of boundaries. When a second group of political 
geographers began distinguishing between die zonal and linear characteristics and differences of 
frontiers and boundaries, the subject created serious reactions from historians and other social 
scientists. These scholars made a distinction between “frontier” as a zone separating two political 
territories and "boundary” as a line of demarcation within the frontier. Some of tiiese historians and 
social scientists whose works I have used are P. Nugent and A. I. Asiwaju, African boundaries. 
Barriers, conduits and opportunities. London and New York: Pinter, 1996. C. Anene, The 
international boundaries of Nigeria 1885-1960. The framework o f an emergent African nation.
Harlow: Longman, 1970. O. Adejuigbe, Boundary problems in Western Nigeria. A geographical 
analysis, Nigeria: University of Lagos Press, 1975. V. G. Fanso, “Transffontier relations and resistance 
to Cameroon-Nigeria colonial boundary”. Post graduate thesis (Doctorat d’Etat), University of 
Yaounde, Cameroon, 1985.
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research interest notably: colonial rule in Africa and in Cameroon, African colonial 
boundaries and the Anglo-French inter-Cameroons boundary.
British and French rule in Africa and Cameroon
This research will not narrate the British and French colonial administrations 
in Africa. For a proper understanding of the two colonial experiences, some works 
have been of tremendous value. For a discussion on the aims and differences in 
colonial policies in Africa, I consulted the companion volumes edited by Prosser 
Gifford and W.R. Louis.16 L. H. Gann and P. Duignan have explored the history, 
politics and economics of colonialism in Africa.17 Still on general works, I judged it 
necessary to read more on British and French colonial rule in Africa. Such an 
analytical and comparative study, I was convinced, would enhance my appreciation of 
the British and French administration of the boundary in Cameroon.18 I gathered from 
these sources that British administration during the Trusteeship period (this was when 
there was much resistance against the boundary) was a lot more relaxed than in the 
Mandate period, this was because the territory was moving towards self-government 
as reunification became a major political option in Cameroon. The general works I 
used on French colonial policy in Africa, revealed that the French colonial regime 
(like most other regimes) was despotic and their administration intimidating and 
oppressive.19 This explained the harsh system of border control exercised by French 
Police Officers and Border Guards along their side of the boundary. The burdensome
16 Prosser Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.) Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial rivalry and colonial 
rule and France and Britain in Africa: Imperial rivalry and colonial rule. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1967 and 1971 respectively.
17 L. H. Gann and P. Duignan in their four volumes of Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, vol. 1,1969; vol. 4, 1975)
18 R. O'Neil, Mission to British Cameroons London: Mill Hill Mission Press, 1991; D. Meredith, "The 
British government and colonial economic policy 1919-39", Economic Historical Review, 28,1975 and 
G. Padmore, How Britain rules Africa. London: Wishart Books, 1936.
19 J, Suret-Canale’s translated version of French colonialism in Tropical Africa 1900-1945. New York: 
C. Hurst, 1971 and Hardy's Histoire de la colonisation Frangaise .Larose, 1931. S. N. Roberts, The
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and oppressive French system of taxation for example caused the movement of many
French subjects to cross the boundary and take up residence and employment on the
British side of the territory. For a closer view of both administrations, I relied on the
interesting contributions of John Kent, which outline the various levels of Anglo-
French co-operation before and after the Second World War.20 Kent says that at all
levels, the war revealed difficulties in the way of closer Anglo-French relations in
Africa for both aimed at preserving their global interests but the means to achieve this
was hotly disputed. Where Kent's contribution ties in with my work is in his view that
by the early 50s, the question of commanding authority and territorial interests within
Africa tended to limit the extent of close Anglo-French relations in the same way as
2 |
divergent metropolitan policies.
From general works in Africa, I narrowed my research down to specific 
works on colonialism in Cameroon. This I presumed would give me a better 
understanding of the extent of successes and/or failures of the application of British 
and French colonial policies in that part of Africa. Cameroon has undergone a triple 
colonial experience, first German, then British and French simultaneously. For the 
German prelude, the major work used was Harry Rudin’s case study.22 Rudin’s case 
study reveals three important observations on the German period, which have been of 
interest to this research. Firstly, German colonial administration prepared the people 
of Kamerun for the later British and French experiences; secondly, under the Germans 
the territory was administered as a single political entity; and thirdly, German District 
boundaries respected as much as possible, the local ethnic boundaries.
history o f French colonial policy 1870—1925. London: Frank Cass, 1963.
20 J. Kent, The internationalisation o f  colonialism. Britain, France and Black Africa 1939-1956.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992 and his article "Anglo-French colonial cooperation 1939-49", 
Journal o f Imperial and Commonwealth History, 17, l(1988):55-82.
21 Kent, The internationalisation o f colonialism, p. 341.
22H. R. Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons 1884-1914: A case study in modern imperialism. New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1968,
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From general works on the British and French colonial administration in 
Cameroon,23 some specific works have provided important data on the making of the 
Anglo-French boundary.24 These works discuss the Anglo-French post World War 
One agreements, the division of Kamerun and the delimitation of the boundary. More 
importantly, they do discuss the British and French Mandates in Cameroon, and the 
terms on which Britain and France obtained confirmation of their partitions of the 
Kamerun. Whereas the British merged the administration of their sector with that of 
Nigeria, the French did not bring her own part of Kamerun into the Federation of 
French Equatorial Africa (A.E.F.). Some other sources have provided data on the 
relationship between both administrations and the various political parties in their 
respective territories.25 This relationship did affect the administration and control of 
the boundary. The tension between the French administration and the U.P.C. political 
party for example led to the influx of the party’s insurgents into the neighbouring 
British administered borderland towns from where they launched several attacks on 
the French administration across the boundary. I used the specific works of Victor 
LeVine, Mark Delancey and Richard Joseph because they give a critical analysis of 
colonialism and nationalist politics in the inter-war period as well as constitutional
23 V, J. Ngoh, Cameroon 1884-1985; A hundred years o f history Limbe: Navy Group Publications,
1987 and History o f Cameroon since 1800 Limbe: Pressbook, 1996; M. Njeuma ^ Introduction to the 
history o f Cameroon: Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989; V.G. 
Fanso, Cameroon history for secondary schools and colleges. Vol. 2: colonial and post-colonial 
periods. London: Macmillan, 1989; T. Eyongetah andR. Brain, A history o f Cameroon London: 
Longman, 1987 andE. Mveng, Histoire du Cameroun, Tommes 1 et 2 Yaounde: Societe des Presses et 
Edition du Cameroun SO.P.E.CAM. 1986.
24 L. Z. Elango, The Anglo-French Condominium in Cameroon 1914-1916. History o f a 
misunderstanding. Limbe: Navy-Group publications, 1987. L. Z Elango, “The Anglo-French 
‘Condominium’ in Cameroon, 1914-1916: The myth and the reality”, International Journal o f African 
Historical Studies, 18,4(1985):657-673. M. Essiben," France et la redistribution des tenitoires au 
Cameroun (1914-1916)", Afrika Zamani, 12&13, (1981):36-52. J. A. Osuntokun," Great Britain and 
the final partition of the Cameroons 1916-1922", Afrika Zamani 6 &7 (1977):53-71 and A. N. Njoya,
Le Cameroun dans les relations internationals. Paris: R. Pichon et Durand Auzias, 1976.
25 Mark Delancey’s Cameroon: Dependence and Independence. London: Westview press, 1989; David 
Gardinier’s Cameroon; United Nations challenge to French policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1970; R. A. Joseph’s Radical nationalism in Cameroon: social origins o f the U.P.C. rebellion.
London: Oxford University Press, 1977 and Victor T. Levine's Cameroons from mandate to 
independence. California: University of California Press, 1964,
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changes in Cameroon after the Second World War. The evolution of the political 
situation of Cameroon for example led to the UN organised plebiscites in both 
Cameroons and the dismantling of the Anglo-French boundary.
Of particular importance are both of the works of Leon Kaptue which discuss 
an aspect of the colonial administration of borderlands in French Cameroon and the 
control of the movement of people along the border. Kaptue focuses on the 
"Laissez-passer" which was an administrative document or passport needed to cross 
from the French to the British zone. His book which analyses the need for and use of 
labour by the French colonial administration proved very relevant to this research as 
labour was one factor which determined population mobility across the Anglo-French 
inter-Cameroons boundary during the period under study.
The concept of boundaries and African colonial boundaries
Even though many scholars have written on African colonial boundaries and 
boundary concepts, a quick examination of my references reveals my indebtedness to 
Anthony Ijaola Asiwaju. From the definition of key terms to the origin, role and 
effects of colonial boundaries in Africa, Asiwaju has been the main authority. A. 
Asiwaju and P. Adeniyi, suggest that in any work on border studies, it is important to 
make a clarification in the difference between the use of key terms like frontier, 
boundary and border zone. According to them, while frontiers are zones within which, 
boundaries are located or delimited, borderlands are lands close to the border or 
boundary.27 Their contribution gave me a clearer definition of the boundary under
26 Leon Kaptue, "L'adminstration coloniale et la circulation des indigenes au Cameroun. Le Laissez- 
passer 1923-1946",4/?7to Zamani, 10 &11,(1979) and Travail etmain d'oeuvre au Cameroun sous 
regime Frangais 1916-1952. Paris: l'Harmattan, 1985.
27 A. I. Asiwaju and P.O. Adeniyi, (eds.) Borderlands in Africa. A multidisciplinary and comparative 
focus on Nigeria and West Africa. Nigeria: University of Lagos Press 1989, pp.27-28.
France) for most of the period of this study, could also be described here as a frontier. This study 
however, highlights the boundary as an important feature in the frontier zone.
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study. Throughout this research, I have preferred to use the terms boundary and 
borderlands rather than frontier and frontier zones.28 Paul Nugent and Asiwaju define 
African colonial boundaries as territorial limits, which were drawn and sometimes 
redrawn from the end of the nineteenth century to the twentieth century with the 
intention of demarcating competing spheres of colonial authority (British, Belgian, 
French, German, Portuguese, Spanish and Ethiopian).29 This definition suits the 
Anglo-French boundary, which was drawn in 1916 and rectified several times in the 
hope of demarcating the British and the French spheres of colonial authority in 
Cameroon and meeting the requests of the border people.
J. Prescott and I. Brownlie have outlined an important aspect of boundaries, 
which is of interest to this research.30 I used their work because it discusses the 
evolution of boundaries in stages. While Prescott talks of three stages namely 
allocation (political decision on distribution), delimitation (selection of a specific 
boundary site) and demarcation (marking the boundary on the ground), Brownlie and
S. Jones add a fourth stage they call administration (policy provisions for supervising 
the maintenance of the boundary monuments and vistas).31 The Anglo-French inter- 
Cameroon's boundary, I deduced from these sources, outlived all of these stages and 
reached a terminal stage that can be called the extinction stage (when the boundary 
ceases to exist at least as a physical, political and administrative division). Such a 
boundary could be referred to as a relict boundary. Even though extinct, the boundary
28 Also, since the word frontier could be referred to the division between sovereign states or nations, 
the Anglo-French boundary, which was international (it separated two sovereign states, Britain and
29 Nugent and Asiwaju, African boundaries, p. 2.
30 J. R. V. Prescott in Boundaries and Frontiers. London: Cioom Helm, 1978 and in Political Frontiers 
and boundaries. London: Allan and Unwin, 1987. I. Brownlie in African boundaries. A legal and 
diplomatic encyclopaedia. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979
31 S. B. Jones Boundary-Making, a handbook o f  statesmen. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Division of International Law, 1945.
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under study has left social and psychological scars of division in the Cameroonian 
society.
In close association with territorial boundaries are maritime boundaries, which 
sometimes lead to disputes and claims. S. Boggs explains the difficulty of identifying 
"the middle" of the river or sea where the boundary should stand thus resulting in a 
wavering boundary causing disputes.32 This was a significant problem with the 
Anglo-French boundary, which led to problems of delimitation around the coastal 
waters at the mouth of the River Mungo. As a result of these difficulties, there were 
frequent tensions between the British and the French administrations as their 
respective patrol guards trespassed into each other’s waters sometimes without 
knowing where the boundary was.
Data on problems relating to partitioned border groups have been compiled 
from Asiwaju’s work on the partitioned Western Yorubaland.33 Asiwaju says that 
among other problems that arose in partitioned Western Yorubaland were those that 
resulted from difference in colonial policy operating at the boundary. This study has 
been helpful in a comparative examination of British and French colonial 
administrative policies that were applied to border groups in Cameroon as well. 
Cameroon's international boundaries and the Anglo-French inter-Cameroons 
boundary
The number of works (both published and unpublished) treating the inter- 
Cameroons or intra - Cameroons boundary, as it is sometimes referred to, is much 
smaller than those on Cameroons international boundaries. The reason for this
32 S. W. Boggs in International boundaries. A study o f boundary functions and problems. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1940.
33 A. Asiwaju, Western Yorubaland under European rule; 1889-1945. London: Longman, 1976 and 
0. Adejuigbe, Boundary problems in Western Nigeria. A geographical analysis. Nigeria: University of 
Lagos Press, 1975. Asiwaju says that these problems arose in Yorubaland because the British operated 
a more relaxed policy with respect to firearms and a more restrictive policy with respect to liquor than 
did their French counterparts, see Asiwaju, Western Yorubaland, p. 158.
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according to Prescott is clear.34 Prescott says that generally, there is increased
attention on international boundaries because they are the subject of dramatic 
conflicts between countries and thus attract much public attention. 35 Among all of 
Cameroon’s international boundaries particular attention has been given to the 
Cameroon-Nigeria boundary by both scholars and other interested people. Perhaps 
this is due to the fact that it is the longest (1600km) of all Cameroon’s 
international boundaries and the most active.36 Prescott and C. Weadji have discussed 
the evolution of the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary with special attention given to the 
terms of agreements, delimitation and demarcation of the boundary.37 The Cameroon- 
Nigeria boundary, which cuts across ethnic groups, has been a zone of co-operation, 
development and at the same time one of conflict.38
Cameroonian and Nigerian researchers have examined some of the causes of the 
frequent border clashes between Cameroon and Nigeria.39 Of significance is the 
border clash of May, 1981, over the Bakassi Peninsular was intense and took a deal of 
diplomacy to avoid war between the two countries. The struggle for control is still on
34 J.R.VJPrescott, Boundaries and Frontiers. London: Croom Helm, 1978, see chapter six.
35 Prescott, Boundaries and Frontiers p. 166.
36 There is a lot of officisl and unofficial trade transacion along this boundary. There are also frequent 
open clashed between military officials of both countries alon this boundary resulting from disputes 
over the ownership of certain portions of the boundary. There is the long-standing on-going dispute 
causing regular military clashes over the Bakassi Peninsular in Cameroon’s southwestern border with 
Nigeria.
37 J. V. R. Prescott, The evolution o f Nigeria's international and regional boundaries: 1861-1971. 
British Columbia Geographical series, no. 13, Vancouver, Canada: Tantalus Research limited, 1971. C. 
Weladji, "The Cameroon-Nigeria border 1914 and after (5th and last instalment)", Abbia 3-39,1982.
38V. G. Fanso "Transfrontier relations and resistance to Cameroon-Nigeria colonial boundaries 1916- 
1945". Doctoral thesis, University of Yaounde, 1985. J. Ekpenyong "Prospects and constraints for 
Cameroon- Nigeria socio-economic co-operation along the eastern border", in A. I. Asiwaju and B. M. 
Barkindo (eds.) Development o f border regions. National Boundary Commission Documentation 
Series. Lagos: National Boundary Commission, 1993.
39I. Modupe in Nigeria and Cameroon. An annotated bibliography. Lagos: Libriservice, 1984. H. N. 
Shey in his B.Sc. thesis "Colonial boundaries in Africa: A case study of the Nigeria-Cameroon border 
clash of 16th May, 1981".Zaria, Amadou Bello University, 1983.
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between the two countries. Much data on this and other disputes and clashes are 
available in both state and private owned newspapers and magazines in Cameroon and 
Nigeria. Even though this work is not focused on border disputes, the causes of these 
disputes are similar to those that caused periods of tension between the British and 
French administrations in Cameroon over the maintenance of the boundary between 
them. Examples of this include the flow of people in search of employment from one 
side of the boundary (Nigeria) to the other (Cameroons). Research on Cameroon's 
international boundary with Gabon and Congo has also been done.40
I decided to consult very important works on the ethnic groups that were 
separated by the southern portion of the Anglo-French inter-Cameroons boundary. 
This I hoped would enable me to understand both the effects of the boundary on the 
divided groups as well as the functions of the boundary within time. E. Ardener 
identified and characterised the border groups as the coastal Bantu groups of 
Cameroon. He puts the Bakweri and the Douala into one major group with common 
characteristics. Before the allocation of the boundary these groups interacted freely 
with each other. When the boundary was delimited, it cut across this group placing the 
Bakweri to the west and the Douala to the east.411. Dugast in her inventory of ethnic 
groups in Cameroon has grouped the Mbo, Bakossi and the Balong under another 
major ethnic group because of similar socio-cultural traits that they share 42 The 
boundary cut across these groups leaving portions of the group to the west and the 
other portions to the east. Clans, villages, families, farmlands, fishing, and hunting 
grounds were divided by the boundary.
40 A. Mangongo-Nzambi, "La definition des frontieres du Gabon"Colliers d'Etudes Africaines, 9,1 
(1969). E.Muoston "Petit journal de la mission de delimitation Congo-Cameroun. Mission Moll au 
Sangha-Tchad 1905-1906 l901",_Bulletin de la society desRecherches Congolaises, 19 (1933),
41 E. Ardener, Coastal Bantu o f the Cameroons. London: International African Institute, 1956.
421. Dugast, Inventaire ethnique du sud Cameroun. Yaounde: memoire de 1' I.F.A.N., 1949.
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For these separated border groups, boundary delimitation and demarcation 
entailed a very strained and stressful experience especially as it severed asunder 
relationships, links and interactions that had been nurtured over the ages. For a clear 
understanding of these long nurtured relations between all the ethnic groups under 
study, some studies have been helpful.43 But for V. G. Fanso's article there has been 
very little interest shown by researchers and scholars in establishing the historical 
connections and socio-cultural homogeneity among these or other ethnic groups 
divided by the Anglo-French boundary in Cameroon.44 This research does not explore 
those connections elaborately; as a result, there is an urgent need for research along 
those lines.
A point that Nugent raises in his recent work, which is of interest here, is 
about ethnicity and boundaries. He says ethnicity has not been a timeless constant in 
Africa nor in any other part of the world. He continues that before colonial conquests 
Africans occupied a universe in which there were a great variety of possible links, 
which were often cross-cutting. Colonial concept led to a reconceptualisation of space 
but these new conceptions should not be pushed back into the pre-colonial period. I 
would not probably want to go all the way with Nugent in his idea that “Tribal” 
ethnicity was a construct of the colonial period.45 In other words, he is saying that the
43 R. Bureau "Ethno-Sociologie Religieuse des Douala et apparentes" Recherches et Etudes 
Camerounaises, 7-10(1962); P. Moby-Etia "Les Pays du Bas-Moungo, Bas-wouri", Postgraduate 
thesis, (Doctoral de 3e cycle), Universite de Paris 1, 1976; S. N. Ejedepang-Koge The tradition o f a 
people: Bakossi. Yaounde: SO.P.E.CAM., 1986 and P. M. Kale, A brief history o f the Bakweri Lagos: 
Tika-Tore press, 1939.
44 V. G. Fanso," Inter-group relations and Cameroon unification: A prototype of Africa's frontier 
problem" in Annals o f  the Faculty ofLetters and Social Sciences, Human Science Series, 1,2(1985), 
37-52.
45 In his recent study of the Ewe people, Nugent outlines that ethnic consciousness may well be a 
product of the border for protests against the 1919 repartition marked the first time that the word “Ewe” 
was used by the people themselves, see chapter 4 on the issue of Ewe identity. Paul Nugent, Smugglers, 
secessionists & loyal citizens on the Ghana-Togo frontier: the lie o f the borderlands since 1914. 
Oxford: James Currey, 2002.
22
Ewe were all the more conscious of their shared cultural and historical heritage by 
virtue of being artificially separated.
The situation in Cameroon was different in that before the Germans annexed 
the territory in 1884, groups of people occupying the same space and speaking similar 
languages were named after either their founder, the geographical area that they 
occupied or after great events in their long migratory historical trail. Before and 
during the German administration of Cameroon, the various groups shared and 
maintained a common tradition and culture. These are the groups that were later 
called “tribes” or “ethnic groups” by Western scholars. It is true that the very 
definition and components of such groups have changed within time but they have 
kept their socio-cultural traits and claims to a common ancestry. These are the factors 
that helped to maintain the pre-colonial group coherence that was broken by the 
boundary.
Specific works on the Anglo-French inter-Cameroons boundary have been 
highly limited. Prescott seems to have been the first scholar to have shown interest in 
the study of this boundary as early as 1962 when he published his article "The 
evolution of the Cameroons inter-Cameroons boundary" The Nigerian Geographical 
Journal 5,2(1962). He based this work on the allocation and definition of the 
boundary with the techniques of its demarcation. The geographical and survey details 
were of more importance to him than historical and ethnological details. His work has 
been said to contain the defects of a pioneering study for it produces maps prepared in 
Nigeria during the First World War which were rightly criticised by the British 
Colonial Office as being seriously misleading.46 In a subsequent article, Prescott’s
46 Peter Yearwood, “ ‘ In a casual way with a blue pencil’: British policy and the partition of 
Kamerun, 1914-1919” Canadian Journal o f African Studies, 27(1993):218-44.
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approach and content were not very different except for the fact that he studied this 
boundary as one of the international boundaries of Nigeria which evolved normally 
until the outbreak of the Second World War when all works of demarcation ended.47 
It was important to know how the boundary was later administered and how the 
division affected the lives of the border people. These are the major concerns of this 
research.
Jide Osuntokun and Peter Yearwood have done much research on the politics 
of the partition of the Cameroons.48 Both authors have written extensively on the 
making of the Anglo-French boundary in Cameroon. What they both overlook is the 
administration and effects of the boundary on border people. The Northern portion of 
the boundary has received adequate attention through the works of Yearwood and B. 
M. Barkindo, this thesis aims at concentrating on the south.49
In his legal and diplomatic encyclopaedia on African boundaries, I, Brownlie 
dedicated eighteen pages to the description of the Anglo-French boundary, which he 
called “the Franco-British Frontier” in Cameroon.50 Brownlie also discusses the other 
boundaries of Cameroon and her neighbours notably Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria. In his contributions on the
47 J. V. R. Prescott, "The Anglo-French inter-Cameroons boundary" The evolution of Nigeria's 
international and regional boundaries: 1861-1971, British Columbia Geographical Series no.
13, Vancouver,Canada: Tantalus Research limited, 1971.
48 J. A. Osuntokun, “Great Britain and the final partition of the Cameroons, 1916-1922” Afrika Zamani, 
6 and 7 (1977) and in Nigeria in the First World War. London: Longman, 1979. J.A. Osuntokun, 
“Anglo-French occupation and the provisional partition of the Cameroons, 1914-1916” Journal of the 
Historical Society o f Nigeria, 7,4(1975):647-656. P. Yearwood, “ ‘In a casual way with a blue pencil’: 
British policy and the partition of Kamerun, 1914-1919” in Canadian Journal o f African
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49Peter Yearwood “The Reunification of Bomo, 1914-1919”, Borno Museum Society 
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Cameroon-Nigeria boundary, Weladji has discussed the making of the Anglo-French 
boundary.51 The importance of these articles is that the author displays in the 
appendices, some important texts on boundary description, and colonial 
administrative correspondences between the British, and the French governments 
about the boundary under study. Again, in both works, nothing is said about the 
boundary after 1939 or on its administration. Weladji seems to have been greatly 
influenced by the works of Prescott on the boundary description and the maps, which 
he uses, have the same errors as those used by Prescott. In his work, there is also 
nothing on the effects of the boundary on the border groups. A serious handicap that 
this research seeks to overcome.
Lucas Kouam in his post graduate thesis “La dynamique historique des 
frontieres du Cameroun: 1884-1916”(Maitrise) thesis, University of Yaounde, 1979, 
discusses in a general way the historical evolution of Cameroon's boundaries from the 
period of German occupation to the end of the First World War and post war 
agreements on newly defined boundaries by the British and the French. Much of 
Kouam's work has been used here as background material for he ends where this 
study begins and gives very little useful data on the Anglo-French boundary. His work 
however acted as one of the early sources on which I built the foundation of one of 
my postgraduate theses.52 Even though this study does not focus on the Anglo-French 
boundary, it examines the effects of colonialism on the local Bakossi ethnic group - 
their tradition, culture, language, philosophy and economy. It was from there that my 
interest on the Anglo-French colonial frontier took its roots.
51 See C. Weladji5s two articles published in Abbia notably "The Cameroon-Nigeria border (contd.) 
Abbia, 31-32-33 (1978) and" The Cameroon-Nigeria border 1914 and after (5th and last instalment)55 
Abbia, 38-39 (1982).
52 Anastasia Nzume, "Culture change in Mouamenam, 1916-1960. A background study"(Maitrise) 
thesis, University of Yaounde, 1983.
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I pushed forward the interest and research on this boundary in my doctoral 
thesis.53 This thesis is focused on the linguistic and socio-cultural effects of the 
Anglo-French boundary on the Bakossi, which like some other ethnic groups, were 
divided by this boundary. It was from this micro-perspective that I became curious to 
know if the function and effects of this boundary would have been the same with 
other ethnic groups that were also separated by the boundary. It was in the effort to 
get the answers to my inquiry that I carried out research on primary and secondary 
sources, and the resultant data has been arranged in seven chapters.
WORK OUTLINE
This first chapter is an introductory chapter, which has explored the 
research design, the methodology and some preliminary observations and terms on 
boundary. The historiography of the boundary has highlighted two points; firstly, that 
Cameroon had been a German Protectorate and was administered as a single unit, 
secondly; Cameroon was hemmed in on both sides by the British and the French who 
ended up sharing the territory between them after they got rid of the Germans. The 
Great War and the German defeat therefore provided a perfect solution. This 
introductory chapter has also given some of the major reasons for the choice of 
conducting research on the southern portion of the Anglo-French boundary in 
Cameroon. An important section of this chapter is the methodology and the review of 
sources for the section gives a selection and an examination of the major primary and 
secondary works that have been used and their relevance to the work.
Chapter two discusses the making of the boundary and is based on post- war 
Anglo-French agreements and the division of Kamerun. This examines the allocation, 
delimitation, and the demarcation of the Southern portion of the Anglo-French
53 A. Nzume, "The colonial frontier and bilingualism in Cameroon: The case of the Bakossi, 1916- 
1961 "(Doctoral de 3e Cycle) University of Yaounde, 1989.
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boundary. A historical survey of the boundary groups has been provided to give a 
clear understanding of the effects of the boundary on the separated people. Chapter 
three is lengthy and it analyses the British and French administrative policies and state 
functions at the boundary. It seeks to ask the question as to what were their 
administrative policies of boundary maintenance and how effective were they? The 
chapter highlights the differences in the exploitation of natural and human resources 
by both colonial administrations. Issues that stand out clearly are those on colonial 
policies and administration, boundary control and policing, taxation and labour. 
Attention has also been given to the 1929 World Crisis, World War Two and their 
effects on boundary movements.
Because they shared a common boundary, British and French 
administrations co-operated with each other some times but at other times, their 
closeness and boundary administrative policies generated friction between them. 
Chapter four examines the existing levels of co-operation between both 
administrations over boundary functions as well as the problems encountered by both. 
While British and French administrators exchanged official visits and held across- 
border meetings to seek common solutions for the problem of prohibited immigrants 
for example, increased co-operation was hampered by differences in their political 
systems, languages and currencies. The chapter closes with a description of the border 
zone as an area of high risk, constant mobility and terrorism.
How then did the people react to this boundary and why? This forms the 
core of chapter five. It was because of the traumatic experience the border peoples 
had that they ultimately rejected the boundary. This rejection took various forms, 
from the writing of petitions to the UN against the boundary, through crossing the 
boundary without an official pass to destruction of boundary landmarks. Political
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parties also called for the removal of the boundary and the reunification of both 
Cameroons. Meanwhile border groups maintained close relations across the boundary 
and turned border zone into an opportunity zone. The struggle for reunification of 
British and French Cameroons took its roots from the division of the territory between 
the British and the French.
Chapter six explores the Anglo-French boundary issue and the reunification 
drive. The chapter builds up from the contribution of border people to the search for 
reunification, and the part played by the British administration and the UN in shaping 
the political history of the territory. Discussions on the Cameroons boundary 
problems were continued at Pan-African conferences that were held from 1920 to the 
early 60s. This lengthy chapter brings Cameroons boundary and reunification problem 
into a wider forum where French colonial policy and colonial boundaries were 
condemned. Chapter seven which concludes this study states that border 
administration as conceived and outlined by the colonial administrations was however 
effective while it lasted but it was faced with a lot of resistance from the divided 
groups who were traumatised by the presence of the boundary. The Anglo-French 
inter-Cameroons boundary was a barrier to increased co-operation among the gateway 
or border people. This study reveals that both colonial administrations made efforts at 
repairing the divisions caused by the boundary. Of equal importance is the 
observation made in the study that the Anglo-French boundary was not solely a 
negative feature for it also provided opportunities for border groups.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE MAKING OF THE ANGLO-FRENCH INTER-CAMEROONS 
BOUNDARY, 1916-1939
This chapter is focused on the making of the Anglo-French inter-Cameroons 
boundary from 1916 when the boundary was drawn by the British and the French to 
1939 when the Second World War broke out and put to a halt all works of boundary 
demarcation in Cameroon, Initially, the chapter examines the pre-colonial socio­
political and economic factors of group cohesion among the border groups in the area 
under study. This will enable the reader to have a clear picture of the particular groups 
concerned, where they were situated, how related they were to each other before the 
imposition of the boundary, how and why the boundary affected them the way it did. 
Factors of geographic cohesion like the sea, rivers, lakes, and mountains for instance 
remained areas of traditional divinities and homes of the ancestors of all the related 
groups.
The African traditional notion of a boundary was different from that which 
was later imposed by the Germans and the post-war colonial administrations. Unlike 
these two, the Germans in their division of the territory into Districts, endeavoured 
and to a great extent, succeeded in respecting traditional polities. After the 
Annexation of the territory, the German administration started off with the exploration 
of the interior and consolidation of their power. It was because of this early contact 
with the people (the Germans met with resistance in some areas) that the German 
District boundaries respected for the most part existing indigenous polities. These new 
boundaries were drawn probably with the intention of creating convenient
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administrative units. Most of the boundaries especially those over which the Anglo- 
French boundary was drawn lasted only to the defeat of the Germans.
With the expulsion of the Germans from Kamerun,1 the British and the French 
occupied the territory. The French proposed a Condominium and a common formula 
for partition both of which were unworkable due to differences in administration and 
ambitions. One of the highlights of this chapter is the correspondences and talks 
between the British and the French governments as they scrambled for this lost 
German colony rich in human and natural resources. After claims and counter-claims 
by both governments, a compromise was reached and a Land Commission was set up 
to work out the details. The joint Boundary Commission that was formed took care of 
the demarcation of the boundary as agreed by the experts of both Governments.
This chapter further discusses the various stages of boundary demarcation in 
view of exposing the difficulties faced by the Land Commission which were usually 
topographical, climatical, economical, cultural, tribal and most of all human. From 
1916 when the Picot line was drawn (provisional line of partition), it was not until 
1922 that an accepted boundary was arrived at and its demarcation started in 1937 
from the coast and was halted in 1939 on Mount Manenguba when the Second World 
War broke out. There is a need to be asserted here that the Anglo-French boundary in 
the Cameroons thus delimited and demarcated planted the seeds of division among 
border groups.
A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF BORDER GROUPS
Before discussing the events that led to the partition, it is important to explore 
the pre-colonial socio-cultural and economic relations of the border groups in the area 
under study. This would hopefully enable the reader to have a better understanding of
1 The word Kainerun refers to Cameroon under German administration from 1884 to 1914,
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the effects of the division and the reaction of the divided people. The ethnic groups in 
the area under study are the Duala, Bakweri, Balondo, Bakossi, Mbo, Mungo and the 
Balong. These groups are found around the coast, in the Moungo Valley and on the 
slopes of Mounts Kupe, Fako, Nlonako and Manenguba. They are bounded to the 
North by the Bamileke, to the East by the Bassa, to the West by the Bayangs and 
tribes of South Eastern Nigeria and to the South by the Atlantic Ocean. They are 
Bantu people. Edwin Ardener points out the strong linguistic inter-comprehension 
that exists particularly among the Bakweri, Duala and the Bakossi while Irene Dugast, 
Jean-Claude Barbier and Jacques Champaud who group the Bakossi with their 
Eastern neighbours speak of very close cultural and linguistic ties between the 
Bakossi, Mbo and the Balong.2
The majority of these ethnic groups share a common ancestry; common 
traditional rites and they live in close geographic proximity with a high level of 
linguistic inter-comprehension.3 According to their traditions of origin, the Bakossi, 
Balondo, Balong and Mbo shared the same ancestor, Ngoe, who lived on the summit 
of Mount Manenguba.4 Due to increased population and land disputes among the 
children, there were frequent clashes among his sons leading to civil wars as in the 
case of the Bakossi and their Bafaw neighbours. As a result of mutual assistance in 
these wars, some of the groups developed close ties; examples are the Mbo and the
2 Edwin Ardener, Coastal Bantu o f Cameroon. London: International African Institute, 1956 , pp. 33- 
36. Irene Dudast. Inventaire Ethnique du Sud-Cameroun. Yaounde: Institut Frangais d’Afrique 
Noire, 1949 p.23. Jean-Claude Barbier and Jacques Champaud, Manjo et le Moungo Central, 
Introduction a une etude de I ’immigration(Cameroun). Yaounde: Institut de Sciences Humaines,1980 , 
p.29.
3 George Peter Murdock, Africa: Its peoples and their culture history. London: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company Inc., 1959, p. 12.
4 S. N. Ejedepang-Koge, The Tradition o f a people. Bakossi, Yaounde: SO.P.E.CAM., 1986, pp.32- 
47.
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Bakossi, the Balong, Balondo and the Bafaw. Colonial reports record the various 
versions of traditions and settlement patterns of these ethnic groups.
The riverine Bakweri, Mungo and Duala groups share very close historical and 
cultural ties with the Balong. According to the Victoria Centenary Committee, they all 
migrated in groups from the northern confines of the Equatorial forest on the border 
between Nigeria and Cameroon and also from the Lake Chad basin to the sites of their 
present settlement, around the slopes and foot of Mount Fako.6 Due to population 
pressure, and the quest for new hunting grounds the Bakweri migrated further to the 
southwest. They clashed with the Balong whom they met on their way. The Mungo 
who formed the last group to migrate into the area are reported to have the same 
ancestor as the Duala, his name is Sunamboke1 It is important to note here that all of 
these groups lived in the same geographical area and due to their proximity; they 
developed and maintained a great degree of group solidarity.
There are dominant relief features around the border area that had and still 
have a major place in the mythology, tradition and history of these border groups. For 
this reason the Bakweri, for example, believe that Mount Fako is the abode of their 
ancestral spirits and thus together with the Duala, they believe in and offer sacrifices 
to these ancestors as well as those of the Rivers Moungo and Wouri. An activity that 
frequently brought the Duala and the Bakweri closely together was the Jengu closed 
Association or Secret Society festival. This was a magico-religious ritual, which 
involved offering sacrifices and gifts to the water spirits. This was to ensure the well
5 Intelligence, assessment and re-assessment reports on the Bakossi, Balong, Balondo and the Mbo 
found at the National Archives Buea, Cameroon hereafter cited as N.A.B. Picture below (p. 78) shows 
some traditional house types that are common among the Mbo, Bakossi, Balondo and the Balong. I 
took most of the pictures in this work; my escorts and guides took a few others.
6 Victoria Centenary Committee, Victoria: Southern Cameroons 1858-1958 Victoria: Basel Mission 
Book Depot, 1958, p .ll.
7 Assessment report on the Mungo Riverine District, Victoria Division, 1922, File no. 247/134/Ag 5, 
NAB.
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being of all in the group and to bring good luck and fecundity. Lovett Elango points 
out that one of the most important functions of the Association was that it was a vital 
cultural link between the Duala and their kinsmen the Bimbians.8 Verkijika Fanso in 
his thesis throws more light on this by saying that the Bakweri and the Duala groups 
mingled in the riverine districts of the Moungo River with the Mungo group, and 
frequently organised traditional wrestling matches and canoe races, and the 
competitions were sponsored by the various groups long before the boundary was 
imposed.9
The Balong who are their immediate neighbours inland hold the River 
Moungo as the home of their ancestors and together with the Duala, Balondo and the 
Bakossi fish in its waters and offer sacrifices in it to appease the ancestral spirits. 
According to their myth of origin, the Balondo, are said to have come from the north 
of Mount Nlonako, at the confines of Mount Manenguba. To this date, that area has 
been considered as the abode of their ancestors.10 In the Bakossi country, Mounts 
Kupe and Manenguba have remained places of veneration and offering. Mount Kupe, 
for example, is seen by the Bakossi and the Mbo as the seat of endless conferences 
between the living and the dead to enhance or limit the fertility of the land and the 
living annually. The twin lakes on Mount Manenguba called the “male” (smaller but 
more powerful) and the “female” lakes are imbued with special powers. It is for this 
reason that sacrifices on the “male” lake were and are still performed by the 
designated sons of the offspring of the ancestor who are located on either side of the
8 Lovett Elango, “ Britain and Bimbia in the Nineteenth Century 1833-1878: A study in Anglo-Bimbia 
trade and diplomatic relations”, Ph.D. diesis, Boston University, 1974, pp.26-27. The Bimbians like die 
Isubu, Wovea and Bambuko are regarded here as Bakweri groups by extension.
9 Fanso, “Trans-frontier relations”, p.176.
10 Assessment Report on the Balong, Kumba Division, 1922, NAB.
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boundary. The grassy plain on Mount Manenguba called “Ebouh” is considered by 
the local groups to be the home of the ancestors of the Bakossi, Mbo, Balondo and the 
Balong.11
These geographical factors of cohesion also reflected a strong intra-group 
solidarity in their economic activities. Fishing, carving and weaving were the major 
occupations of all the groups especially the Duala, Mungo and the Bakweri. These 
groups did seasonal fishing on the River Moungo and its tributaries with no restriction 
as to where each of them could fish. With the inland Mbo and Bakossi, fishing was 
done by some specific clans who were located around the navigable portions of River 
Moungo and its tributaries. Catches were sold in markets open to and frequented by 
all who were to be affected by the border.
Besides fishing, farming was also an important activity undertaken by all the 
groups especially the Mbo, the Bakossi and the Balong. This is an area of volcanic 
mountains and thus very rich in volcanic soils which are good for planting. These 
three inland groups usually planted food crops like cocoyams, plantains, bananas, 
grains, vegetables and fruits. Due to the presence of the equatorial rain forest, which 
contains a variety of game, reptiles, birds and insects, the bulk of the people also 
hunted. It is important to note here that because the forest, waters, sky and the land 
belonged to the community, they all shared what they got from these “gifts of nature”. 
There were intra-group exchanges of the various products on specific market days. 
For example the coastal Duala, Bakweri and Mungo would attend common markets 
like the Mudeka, Loum, Tombel and Nkongsamba markets to exchange their products 
(usually fish, and later, products they bought from European traders at the coast like 
tobacco, spirits wines and beers, gunpowder and cloth) with those of their inland
11 Pictures below (p.79) show the lakes on Mount Manenguba.
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brothers (food crops, smoked meat, elephant tusks and skins). For this reason, it was 
common to see a person from Moujouka, Balong, carry his products all the way to 
Tombel, (about 50km), to exchange or sell to his Bakossi brothers.
Closely tied to these geographical and economic factors of group cohesion 
were socio-cultural and political factors of group cohesion. Traditional markets, 
which took place once in every ten days, were both economic and social institutions 
for all of the groups. People sent messages on market days, thus a person could leave 
Loum (Bakossi) to go to market at Bangem (a distance of about 60km) mainly 
because he intended to send a message to a relation in Mboassoum (Mbo). These 
crisscross movements were also undertaken for purposes of marriages, big cultural 
ceremonies and political exigencies. The Duala and the Mongo for example who trace 
their ancestry to the Isuwu, the Wovea and the Bakweri, intermarry and attend the 
same traditional ceremonies like the Ngondo. This annual traditional obligation pulled 
all the kinsmen together irrespective of their location. Like the Ngondo, magico- 
religious rituals like the Jengu/Liengu involved sacrifices and gifts to the water spirits 
and were associated with good fishing and all kinds of luck.12 There were also birth 
and death celebrations, which brought these peoples together irrespective of their 
location. Elango says that the initiation rites of these secret societies often lasted 
several days and involved repeated feasting and dancing; one of the most important 
functions that the Jengn served was a vital cultural link between the Bimbians and 
their Duala kinsmen.13 The Liengu of the Bakweri was exclusively female but served 
the same functions as that of the Duala. The Balong who settled on both banks of the 
River Moungo trade and intermarry with the Bakossi, Bakweri, Mongo and the
12 Elango, Britain and Bimbia in the nineteenth Centuty, pp.26-27.
13 Ibid.
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Douala. They also had a variety of secret societies whose activities attracted 
attendance from the neighbouring groups; these societies included the Nyangwe, 
Botam, Ekumba and the Maloba for the women.14 These secret or closed associations 
encouraged and maintained close relations between the groups who were cut by the 
border. The Bakossi for example had the Ahon secret society, which played political 
and moral functions in the society, and when it staged its dance, the Bakossi and the 
Mbo alike gathered to participate and watch. The frequency of the Ahon dance 
resulted in frequent movements of ethnic Bakossi and other kin groups to and from 
the border zone.
Other significant closed associations, which cut across these groups and 
demanded participation or attendance from them were the Male/Mall, Mwankum and 
the Ngwe. These associations, the belief systems, economic and socio-political 
organizations of all these groups necessitated people travelling widely for the 
purposes of social visits, arranging marriages, attending and participating in 
traditional ceremonies and also for trade and sometimes for war.15 These were the 
needs that the border peoples expressed and continued to express before the 
imposition of the first colonial administration.
German colonial administration in Kamerun (1884-1916) was a preparatory 
phase for it prepared the scene and the minds of the borderland peoples for foreign 
administrative intervention and implantation. It is not intended here to narrate the 
story of German annexation and rule in their entity. The focal issue here is to 
highlight the fact that the Germans in their administration of Kamerun, endeavoured
14 Assessment Report on the Balong District, Victoria Division, File no. Ag 20/1920, NAB.
15 Assessment Report on the Bakossi, Ninong, Elung tribes of Kumba Division. File No.Ac3 
1922,N,A.B.
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and succeeded for the most part to respect traditional limits. Also, they administered 
Kamerun as a single political unit, a situation that only lasted with their rule.16
The German colonial administrative apparatus in Cameroon took off by 
creating garrisons of troops at critical points as protection against numerous attacks on 
their trade. Military control later gave way to civil rule and large administrative 
Districts or Bezirke were created called Bezirksamtmaner.17 The important point here 
is that the division of these Districts respected the traditional groups as much as 
possible. This explains why amongst the twenty six Districts created, the Douala 
District with Headquarters at Douala comprised the Duala, the Bakossi, Balondo and 
the Balong; the Dschang and Bare Districts with HQs at Dschang and Bare 
respectively took in the Mbo; and finally the Victoria District with HQs at Victoria 
(Present day Limbe) administered the Bakweri and the related groups. All District 
boundaries were traversed by everybody and at all times with no restriction on 
movement by the German Government. In this way, the border peoples kept and 
maintained their group coherence. Before the Germans could carry out effective 
development in Kamerun, the First World War broke out and lasted from August 1st 
1914 to February 20th 1916 when they were expelled from Cameroon.
THE ISSUE OF THE CONDOMINIUM AND A FORMULA FOR PARTITION
After the surrender of Douala, national differences and the ambitions of the 
Allied Powers became important. It is in the light of their ambitions that the 
provisional partition of Kamerun can be understood. British ambitions according to 
Osuntokun were to regain all the territories she lost to Germany by default during the
16 For a detail discussion on German administration in die Cameroons, see, Hany Rudin, Germans in 
the Cameroons 1884-1914. A case study in modern imperialism. New York:Greenwood Press 
Publishers, 1968.
17 Ibid. p. 148. German Districts boundaries for the most part regrouped people of the same ethnic 
groups and were flexible and permeable.
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partition and delimitation of boundaries between 1882 and 1894 while France never 
forgot the cession of territories in French Equatorial Africa (AEF) to Germany in 
1911 and also wanted her empire to stretch from Algiers to Brazzaville.18 The Anglo- 
French conquest of Kamerun was mounted in spite of the colonial rivalries between 
the two Allied powers and resulted in conflicting interests. These as outlined by 
Victor Julius Ngoh were bound to hinder effective, smooth collaboration between the 
two powers.19 Poor collaboration was apparent in the differences that arose in the 
adoption and proclamation of the principles of a joint Anglo-French administration or 
Condominium. While Lovett Elango speaks of a mooted but eventually rejected 
Condominium, Adamou Ndam Njoya and Madiba Essiben say that an Anglo-French 
joint rule took place in Cameroon from the start of hostilities to the end of the war.20
On the British side, the Foreign Office disagreed with the Colonial Office over 
the issue of the Condominium. In the event that General Charles McPherson Dobell, 
the commander of British forces in the Cameroons died or left, the CO wanted the 
next in command to be British; saying that such an officer should be senior to any 
French officer in the Cameroons even if his rank was achieved by temporary 
promotion. The CO also agreed that the pay, allowances and the other expenses of 
maintaining troops should fall on the government, which the troops served. More 
over, they argued that “general expenses” of governments, so far as they were not 
covered by revenue and receipts, should be divided in a proportion relative to the
18 Akinjide Osuntokun, Nigeria in the First World War. London: Longman Group Limited, 1979,
p.206.
19 Victor Julius Ngoh, History o f  Cameroon since 1800. Limbe: Pressbook, 1996, p. 128.
20 Lovett Elango, The Anglo-French Condominium in Cameroon 1914-1916: History o f a 
misunderstanding. Limbe: Navi-Group publication, 1987, p. 10. L. Z Elango, “The Anglo-French 
‘Condominium’ in Cameroon, 1914-1916: The myth and the reality”, International Journal o f African 
Historical Studies, 18,4(1985):657-673. Adamou Ndam Njoya, Le Cameroun dans les Relations 
Internationales. Paris: R.Pichon et R.Durand Auzias, 1976, pp.83-89. Madiba Essiben, “La France et 
la redistribution des territories au Cameroun (1914-1916)”, Afrika Zamani (12,13,December 1981): 41.
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eventual division between the two governments. The CO lastly suggested that areas 
adjacent to the Nigerian border and those of the Eastern and South Eastern borders be 
administered by the adjacent colonial governments. The French government rejected 
these conditions; it was for this reason that the proposed Condominium was laid to 
rest. After elaborating the reasons for the inapplicability and rejection of the 
Condominium, Ngoh concludes, in line with William Roger Louis, that the suggested 
Condominium was abandoned without any serious trial by February 21,1916.21
Like the Condominium, the French first raised the issue of a common formula 
for partition. At the start of the Allied campaigns in the Cameroons, Lewis Harcourt, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies (until 1915) privately made it known to Sir 
Frederick Dealtry Lugard, the Governor General of Nigeria, that he had assumed that 
practically the whole of the territory would go to France. He believed that in return 
for this "generosity", Britain would demand the whole of Togoland and the French 
colony of Dahomey so that British possessions could stretch uninterrupted from the 
Gold Coast to Nigeria.22 In case this plan failed, Harcourt's alternative, as indicated in 
his private correspondence to Lugard, was that Britain should give up her share of 
Togoland in exchange for the French half of the Condominium in the New Hebrides 
plus some pieces of the Cameroons, especially, Victoria, Buea and Mount 
Cameroon.23 Lugard suggested that at the close of the war, the Cameroons should be 
partitioned into two equal parts administered by the British and the French. Colonial 
Office indecision dragged on over the partition and the annexation of Douala.
21 Ngoh, History o f Cameroon, pp. 129-131. William Roger Louis, Great Britain and Germany's lost 
colonies 1914-1919. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967, p.59. In effect there were three distinct zones; the 
Douala zone where the Condominium was nominal under British General Dobell; zone two consisted 
of the area uniquely conquered by the British under the command of Cunliffe and the last zone which 
was most of Cameroon, conquered by the French and under the command of General Aymerich.
22 Osuntokun, Nigeria in the First World War, p.210.
23 Harcourt to Lugard, September 29th 1914, CO 583/28, PRO.
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Douala fell to the Anglo-French forces under the command of Dobell by 
September 27, 1914, after which Lugard sent a telegram to Harcourt emphasising the 
importance of retaining this splendid naval fortress and coaling station. He said that 
if Douala passed into foreign hands it would be a serious menace to British 
possessions and the South African Trade Route. Apart from strategic considerations, 
Douala had commercial value. From there, the British would be able to export rubber 
and other tropical products from the interior. Dobell and the Admiralty supported 
Lugard’s view but indecision as to whether Douala and the rest of the Cameroons 
should go to France or not resulted in the Foreign Office taking up the matter with the 
French Government. This view about the importance of this part of Africa contradicts 
that of historians of European policy like Peter Yearwood who claim that leaders in 
the metropole seldom considered Africa important.25 It is however also true that those 
officers on the spot who had a career to make could have wanted to impress the Home 
Governments by stressing the indispensability of certain portions of their new colonial 
conquests in Africa. This assertion about Douala could have been an exaggeration as 
well.
The French raised the issue of partition through claims of their military 
participation in the war. On March 19,1915, the French declared that they supplied 
far more forces in the military campaigns in the Cameroons and were losing more 
men than the British.26 The memorandum made two points clear; first, France had 
been left to conduct the more difficult and arduous operations to achieve victory in
24 Lugard to Harcourt, 30th November 1914, CO 583/28, PRO. Also see Lugard’s Report on Ms visit to 
Douala, in die same file.
25 Interview with Peter Yearwood on April 10th, 1999 in London. Peter maintains diat Britain did not 
have die same interest in Cameroon like the French. He however acknowledges that Harcort did want 
Mount Cameroon as a hill station but Lugard did not for British territorial expansion was in die north 
but that was overridden when die Milner-Simon line was drawn.
26 Osuntokun, Nigeria in the First World War, p.27. David Killingray says that in order to compensate 
for its demographic and thus military weakness against the Germans, the French embarked on an
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Kamerun; and second, the French forces had covered a lot more ground in the 
conquest than the British. In making these claims, the French were obviously trying 
to lay the ground for their subsequent claim to a greater share of territory in Kamerun 
than the British.
The CO, furious with the French for claiming they were doing more fighting, 
compared it with the contribution of the British Navy which kept the colony cut off 
from fresh supplies of ammunition from Germany which was the deciding factor in 
tilting the balance of power in favour of the Allies. Dobell held that it was difficult to 
judge which side had the more arduous share of the fighting and pointed out that the 
naval factor also had to be taken into consideration. Besides this, Dobell said that the 
incidental and civil administrative expenses of the expeditions were also to be taken 
into account. This was of course because he knew that the naval and financial factors 
were more heavily borne by the British. From the end of 1915, Anglo-French 
correspondence was based on a common formula for partition. The fact that the 
British and French eventually went into negotiations and settled on a provisional 
partition of Cameroon in 1916 signalled the failure of the applicability of the joint 
administration.
BRITISH AND FRENCH NEGOTIA TIONS OVER THE PARTITION OF KAMERUN
The Allies had no intention of returning to Germany any of her conquered
colonies unless forced to do so. Germany was seen as being responsible for the war,
which had cost the Allies so much blood and money. For Britain, a return of the
Cameroons to Germany would have affected her image in Nigeria while the French
intensive conscription campaign, see Hew Strachan ed., The Oxford illustrated history o f  the First 
World War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Hew Strachan’s most complete and definitive 
study of file opening of the First World War, is now available in three paperback sections: The 
outbreak o f the First World War; Financing the First World War; The First World War in Africa. All 
of file sections are published at Oxford and by the Oxford University Press in October 2004. Strachan’s 
volume one, with the subtitle “To Arms”, published in 2003 at Oxford by OUP, is more elaborate on 
ttie Kamerun campaigns.
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wanted to keep the Cameroons on the grounds that her overseas possessions had 
proved to be such great assets in human and material terms during the war. The 
British government maintained that the German colonies could not be returned to 
Germany on humanitarian grounds for according to Lord Curzon, it could lead to 
renewed savagery and bloodshed as a result of vengeance on the "wretched natives" 
who had aided or abetted the cause of the Allies during the war 27
Louis outlines more reasons for the Allied refusal to restore to Germany even 
the smallest of her colonies in Africa, Togoland.28 If Germany was allowed to retain 
her colonies, she would splinter the developing system of communications of the 
British Empire. She would have not only a military base from which to menace all 
parts of the world, but also the resources of tropical Africa with which to outpace the 
Allies in industrial development. It was thought Germany would also have at her 
disposal the human material to build a huge "Black Army" especially as she would 
have created and purchased a Central African Empire -a Mittelafrika- stretching from 
the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. This would have been a base to paralyse Allied 
shipping and commerce, and also provided an extension of German influence to South 
America and Australia. There was also a general fear that it would have been easy for 
Germany to mobilize Black Africans in order to aid her conquest of the world.
The British government had little enthusiasm for territorial expansion into 
Kamerun. Peter Yearwood holds the view that the German colonies in West Africa - 
Kamerun and Togoland- were dismissed as being of little strategic or other value.29
27 Osuntokun, Nigeria in the First World War,p.27
28 Louis, Great Britain and Germany’s lost colonies, pp.2-5. These were general Allied reasons for not 
giving back to Germany her lost territories. They applied more to France than to Britain for the French 
kept on talking of consolidation and adjustment of territories, which meant that territorial expansion 
was more important to her than to the British.
29 Peter Yearwood, “Maps lines and the making of modem Africa; die Nordiem Nigeria-Cameroons 
boundary 1885-1919”, unpublished article, p. 52.
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Yearwood substantiates his standpoint by saying that in April 1917, during the Sub 
Committee of the Imperial War Council/Cabinet; the issue of the German colonies 
was tabled. In reaction to that, Lloyd George maintained that the British were only 
taking the lost colonies to give back to Germany in case the war ended in a 
compromised peace.30
When the war began, Harcourt wanted to retain only the area around Mount 
Cameroon, which was considered suitable for a sanatorium and a rest station for 
officials in West Africa.31 To Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, the Cameroons 
colony was expendable especially if giving it to the French would offset their 
suspicion that the British were collecting the colonial spoils while France bore the 
brunt of the war on the Western front. This suspicion was backed by the accusation 
made against Britain by the French Ambassador in London, Paul Cambon that, Britain 
had not always been sincere with France in its dealings in other areas like German 
East Africa. In a comprehensive memorandum Harcourt proposed, on the assumption 
that Britain was entitled to half of the Cameroons, but that she did not need or could 
not usefully occupy more than a quarter of it, that Britain would demand from France:
a) their share of the Condominium in the New Hebrides
b) their small settlement of Jibuti opposite Aden, which 
controls the mischievous arms traffic to Abyssinia
and Central Africa.
He went on: To obtain this we can offer France:
c) three-fourths of the Cameroons ( instead of one half) plus our 
half share of Togoland,
d) or, if we wish to retain all Togoland and acquire 
Dahomey, we can offer France all the Cameroons except 
Mount Cameroon and Douala.... Alternatively we might 
surrender to France our share of the New Hebrides 
Condominium as compensation, with nearly the whole
30 Interview with Peter Yearwood, April 10 1999, in London.
31 See the various letters of correspondence between Lugard and Harcourt on this subject during the 
months of September and November 1914, Co 583/20, PRO.
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of the Cameroons, for our possession of Togoland and Dahomey.32
Eventually, a committee was established to determine the British position in the 
negotiations with the French.
THE PROVISIONAL PARTITION OF 1916
Meanwhile in Britain, some politicians held that Douala and the rest of 
Kamerun should go to the French until the end of the War.33 This it was hoped would 
prevent the French from participating in the East African campaign and claiming part 
of the spoils. Grey had strongly argued that London should inform Paris that Britain 
would make a great sacrifice and agree to their having all of Kamerun on condition 
that the French dropped any demand to take part in the conquest of East Africa. 
Bonar Law, who was not convinced that the French would accept this bargain, 
stressed the need of French assurance and said it would be better to have a 
Condominium and leave the question of partition until after the war.34 On the 
suggestion that the French might not want all of Kamerun, the British were willing to 
keep what the French did not want irrespective of what it included. It was on the 
basis of this suggestion that a proposal was made that when Strachey of the Colonial 
Office and Lancelot Oliphant of the Foreign Office met with the French 
representatives, the French should be asked to table their demands without being told 
of the decision of the British government. This meant that London would therefore
32 Louis, Great Britain and Germany‘s lost colonies,pp.59-60.
33 On February 22,1916, an inter-departmental committee composed of representatives of the Foreign 
Office, Admiralty, Military intelligence, the War and Colonial Offices met to discuss how best to deal 
with the French on the question of the partition of the Kamerun. The committee was made up of 
liberals like the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mckenna, the Minister of Munitions, Lloyd George, and 
Bonar Law, the Secretary of State for colonies who succeeded Harcourt.
34 Mckenna and Lloyd George wanted to be generous and surrender the entire colony to France, while 
Bonar Law felt that some bargaining might be done. The Admiralty argued strongly for the retention of 
the coastal area north and west of Douala (Balfour was First Lord of the Admiralty at the time and 
Admiral Jackson was no. 2 in the Admiralty). Bonar Law’s insistence on bargaining ended this major 
high level of debate at the time over the future of Kamerun.
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keep whatever Paris failed to ask for. By the time the decision was taken “to give the 
whole of the Cameroons to the French,” Louis says a stratagem was also devised to 
salvage something at least of the territory.35 The stratagem 
worked for the French representative Picot did not ask for all of the Cameroons.36 
The French bluff paid off
Georges Picot, the diplomat and negotiator, and Cambon, both very excited 
about the partition, declared that Paris wanted to take part in the war in East Africa 
but that this desire would no longer be felt if Douala was conceded. Picot stressed the 
domestic pressure on the home government and insisted that unless claims were met 
in West Africa, France would also claim a share in German East Africa. Yearwood, 
who calls this French statement a bluff, said it was very transparent and could easily 
have been called, but the War Committee gave way to it too readily.37
In their lust to retain German East Africa, the British virtually threw the 
whole of Cameroon at the feet of the French. Consequently, when Strachey and 
Oliphant met Picot on February 23rd, he was asked to set out the French desiderata. 
Picot, who had very little knowledge of Africa, chose a War Office map of 
1 ;2,000,000, pointed to a spot to the east of Victoria on the coast and another to the 
south of Yola arc, and began to join these two points in a casual way with a blue 
pencil.38 The French colonial party was so overwhelmed that it did not occur to them 
that they could have had all of the Cameroons if they had only asked for it. Strachey
35 Louis, Great Britain and Germany's lost colonies, p. 60.
36. C.O. West African Confidential Print, 11 January, 1917,no. 1054, CAB 694/9, PRO.
37 Yearwood, “ s In a casual way with a blue pencil’ : British policy and the partition of Kamerun, 
1914-1919”. Canadian Journal o f  African Studies, 27 (1993)p.223.
38 Yearwood, “ ‘ In a casual way with a blue pencil’ ”, p.225; C.O.649/9/9154; F0371, PRO. Maps 
below (pp. 80 and 81) show the various suggested divisions and possible concessions that could be 
considered by both administrations.
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who did know about Kamerun managed to get the line drawn in such a way that 
Britain could have a narrow piece of territory. This British sphere was described by 
Lugard as “ an insignificant little strip that it was hardly worth reserving at all”.39 
According to this provisional boundary usually referred to as the “Picot Line”, France 
had 4/5 of Kamerun less the “Duck bill” which went to French Congo while Britain 
had 1/5 of the territory. The French portion was to be called Cameroun or French 
Cameroon while the British part was then styled British Cameroons.
On March 1,1916, the British Under Secretary of the State for the Colonies 
sent a telegram to Dobell on the delimitation of the British and French spheres.40 It 
was on the basis of this telegram that the British and the French agreed to sign an 
accord for partition following the Picot Line. This agreement, usually referred to as 
the London Accord of March 4th’ demarcated the British and the French spheres on 
paper.41 An important aspect of the London Accord was that both parties were given 
the possibility of slightly modifying the partition line in order to avoid dividing 
villages, ethnic groups, plantations and farmlands as indicated in article six of the 
March 1 telegram. On March, 17,1916, Dobell issued Proclamation No. 10 which 
took effect from April 1, ratifying the March 4th Accord. By this Proclamation, all the 
territory to the west of the Picot Line was to be administered by the British and that to 
the east by the French. Unlike the French, the British appeared to have had a genuine 
desire to prevent the partition of ethnic groups and villages as well as reuniting those
39 Osuntokun, Nigeria in the First World War,p.230. Map below (p. 82) shows the Anglo-French 
provisional boundary after World War One.
Delimitation des zones Francises et Anglaises. Telegram No.272 of March,1,1916, signed Bonar 
Law, APA 10813,National Archives Yaounde, hereafter cited as NAY. Engelbert Mveng. Histoire du 
Cameroun, Paris: Presence Africaine, 1963,p.370. In 1986, a revised edition of the work was published 
in two volumes.
41 Mveng, Histoire du Cameroun, p.370. A copy of this London Accord also called the Bonar Law 
Accord is annexed.
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that had been separated by the Anglo-German boundary of 1913.42 Slight 
modifications of this Picot Line were obvious for the Moisei Ankodat map that was 
used to draw the provisional line was full of errors. It gave the wrong names for 
places and rivers and it was drawn on a very small scale of 1:300,000.43 In spite of 
these shortcomings, the Picot Line remained the basis of subsequent negotiations. 
Although the partition was formally provisional, a major revision was unlikely much 
to the dissatisfaction of the British trading companies on the West African coast, the 
officials on the spot and the Colonial Office. Also, the clearly expressed wishes of the 
Duala and the other divided ethnic groups, like those of the Ewes in Togoland were 
summarily overridden.
FROM THE PROVISIONAL TO THE FINAL PARTITION OF THE 
CAMEROONS, 1916-1922
As regards the provisional boundary, it was pointed out that since the line had 
been hurriedly drawn, it would be necessary to make a good many adjustments, for 
which a boundary commission would be required. Meanwhile, a second phase of 
negotiations opened in Paris on March 6, 1919 in which both parties made further 
claims and counterclaims. Lord Alfred Milner, Secretary of State for the Colonies 
represented Britain while Monsieur Henry Simon, the French Colonial Secretary, 
represented France. Simon told Milner that France would be very accommodating in
42 Victor Julius Ngoh, “Anglo-French rivalry over the Misselele Plantations, 1916-1920: A case study 
in the economic motives for the partition of Africa”, Journal o f Third World Studies; XI l,2(Fali 
1995;277. Also see J.R.V.Prescott, “The evolution of the Anglo-French inter-Cameroons boundary” 
The Nigerian Geographical Journal, 5, 2,(December 1962):104. A copy of Dobell’s Proclamation is 
annexed.
43 Ngoh, “Anglo-French rivalry”, p. 278.
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the negotiations on the Cameroons since she in any case had 9/10 of the territory, but 
that he could not adopt the same policy on Togoland.44
France wanted Britain to cede to her a piece of territory near Dschang which 
would be on the extension of the railway line running northwards to Bare. France also 
wanted the old German road from Douala to Foumban through Kontscha to Garoua as 
well as the Sultanate of Banyo and the towns of Buea, Tiko and Misselele on the 
lower Mungo (Moungo).45 Originally, as Ngoh says, the Picot Line cut through the 
Misselele Plantations with a smaller portion on the French side; but with further 
modifications, the British eventually took over all the plantations resulting in Anglo- 
French rivalry over the area.46
British claims were for a readjustment of the boundary in the south in order to 
permit the frontier to coincide with the mouth of the River Mungo and to run from 
there across the Bimbia flats. In the north, they wanted all of German Borno or Dikwa 
for a small strip of it was left in the French sphere by the 1916 partition. Britain also 
wanted the Mandara Emirate, parts of the Emirates of Kontscha, Lere and Dodo, 
which had been cut off by the provisional boundary and placed in the French sphere.47 
In exchange for all of these claims, Britain was willing to surrender the whole Emirate 
of Banyo to France, part of which was in her sphere.The French agreed to give the 
whole of Dikwa to Britain but rejected the demand for the Mandara Emirate. The 
French insisted that the road from the south to Mora passed through parts of the
44 Strachey’s minute of meeting of Lord Milner and Monsieur Simon, March, 7,1919,
F.0.608/215/4059, PRO.
45 Rectifications eventuelles de la ligne de demarcation des zones d’administration, en vue d’un 
partage definitif du Cameroun, APA 10813,NAY, pp. 1-2. Also see Ngoh. “Anglo-French rivalry”, 
p.278.
For details on this rivalry, see Ngoh, “Anglo-French rivalry”, pp.273-299,
47 Osuntokun, Nigeria in the First World War, p.283; Elango, The Anglo-French Condominium, pp.73- 
74.
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Mandara Emirate, They also turned down the British demand for the former 
Adamawa possessions of the Lamido of Yola. In the south, it was only after much 
persuasion that Britain was given the Mungo River, which was a valuable means of 
transport between the coast and the plantations in the hinterland of the British sphere.
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France eventually secured most of Kontscha Emirate and Dschang District.
These negotiations lingered on through the duration of the Paris Peace 
Conference and were only completed in 1920 when Britain received a Mandate to 
continue administering the territory west of the agreed boundary, which for 
administrative purposes was regarded as an integral part of Eastern Nigeria 49 This 
date contradicts that given by Osuntokun who says the Cameroons was not subjected 
to the Mandate system until July 20, 1922.50 However, it is clear that the boundary 
negotiations lingered on until 1922 when the final adjustments were made and the 
final partition was given the sanction of international law. Some of the major factors 
that complicated these negotiations were: the difficulties created by the Picot line; the 
opposing claims of both countries; the fact that the Cameroons question was one of a 
host of unanswered post-war questions and the absence of an accurate map of the 
Cameroons. It was in the face of these major difficulties that boundary talks lingered 
on until 1922.
WEST AFRICAN NEGOTIATIONS AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, January 
1919 to January 1920
Between 1917 and 1918, the fate of the German colonies became a major issue 
among the Great Powers. Two major options were contemplated; the
48 Dispatch of July 22, 1919, FO 608/215/11233, PRO.
49 Victor Robert John Prescott, "Anglo-French inter-Cameroons boundary",Tfte evolution o f Nigeria's 
International and Regional Boundaries: 1861-1971, British Columbia Geographical
Series, 13,Vancouver, Canada: Tantalus Research Limited, 1971,pp.45-46.
50 Osuntokun, Nigeria in the First World War, p.284.
internationalisation or the annexation of the German colonies. In the midst of the 
conflicting views of both options, the South African Cabinet Minister General Jan 
Smuts, who had fallen for "the principle of self-determination" resulting from 
Woodrow Wilson's notion of "peace without annexation" and the fifth of the Fourteen 
Points, proposed the idea of a mandate. The mandate idea almost succeeded in 
reconciling the two irreconcilable proposals of annexation and internationalisation.
The British public was becoming sympathetic to President Wilson's pleas for a 
"peace without annexations" and the Russian revolutionaries' cry for "no 
annexations".51 For the British Government, it was necessary for the security of the 
Empire after the war to provide evidence of the wish of the local people to live under 
British rule. It was for this reason that the F.O. published the "atrocity Blue Books"52 
which contained photographs of Africans hanged by the Germans and other atrocious 
acts against the "natives". All of this was designed to show that the "natives" could 
not help but be pro-British thereby giving the British the exclusive responsibility to 
protect them from German militarism. Andrew and Kanya-Forstner say that, at this 
point, while Britain was doing all this, the most important administrative issue for the 
French was not mandate but the right to raise black troops for even before the 
slaughter of the War, her population had been less than 2/3 s that of Germany.53
Irrespective of their different ambitions, the British and the French opened 
discussions about West Africa at the Paris Peace Conference in early March 1919. 
The problem was dealt with, in Milner's phrase, " out of court" and not as part of the
51 In 1917, the U.S. entry into the war and the Russian Revolution had an impact on the issue of 
whether or not Germany's colonies should be restored; they were both against any form of annexation 
of Germany’s lost colonies.
52 Alleged ill-treatment of German subjects captured in the Cameroons can be read in C.O.649/2 and 6, 
PRO.
53 Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, France Overseas, p. 191.
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formal conference. It was on March 7, that Milner met with Simon to discuss the 
Cameroons and Togolands. Milner is said to have conducted these African 
negotiations at the Peace Conference without much reference to the C.O.; that is 
probably why the more important memoranda are to be found in the Milner Papers 
and not in the C.O. files.54 The final settlement between Britain and France in the 
Cameroons was substantially the same as the provisional one of 1916.55 Final 
negotiations held on July 10, 1919 ended up with the signing of the London 
Declaration or what is usually referred to as the Milner-Simon Agreement.
The Agreement recommended that experts of the two colonial ministries 
should work out the adoption of the boundary. Article 1 of the Anglo-French 
Declaration of July 10, thus appointed two officers one from each side, to head both 
commissions, made up of officials from Nigeria and the French Camerouns. Before 
the Cameroons was put under the League of Nations Mandates System in July 20, 
1922, minor adjustments were made on the southern section of the boundary.56 It is 
important to state here that both the French and the British appeared to be satisfied 
with the partition and left the rest of the task with the joint boundary Commission. In 
the opinion of Milner and Simon, the settlement was, as Elango says, "not a bad one" 
even though Britain appeared to be at a disadvantage.57 Madiba Essiben says that the 
final settlement could not really be judged as a French victory because the British
54 Louis, Great Britain and Germany's lost colonies, p. 144.
55 The Togoland negotiations were more acrimonious as M. Simon said, he wanted all of Togoland but 
they finally ended up dividing it-60% to Britain and 40% to France-based on the provisional boundary.
56 Boundary adjustments that were made to minimize local hardships caused by the provisional division 
are discussed later. However, such subsequent delimitations were greatly hampered by the inadequate 
information on local conditions, thus, they did not prove satisfactory. Commission Anglo-Frangaise de 
delimitation, letter no 65 of 17/2/1939, Plantation de Ngol, APA 11383,NAY. The entire boundary 
descripion is annexed.
57 Elango, The Anglo-French Condominium, p75.
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attached very little interest to this part of the continent.58 Britain conceded most of 
France’s requests in the Cameroons because of her desire to have a preponderant 
position in east, southern Africa and the Middle East. Also, in accommodating 
France, Britain did not have much to fear from France, which was not an aspiring 
naval power, as Germany had been. They were much more interested in improving 
their Nigerian colony.
The partition did not go down well with the Nigerians and the British officials 
on the spot. The Emir of Yola could hardly contain his resentment of the partition, 
which robbed him of the territories of his forefathers, which has been promised him 
by the British officials during the war. Lugard felt the Mandatory Power should have 
been made to accept that " In all former territories where any arbitrary boundary has 
been fixed since the year 1885, intersecting tribal units as well as defined and fairly 
homologous territory under the rule of a recognised chief, the original boundaries 
shall be restored."59 In saying so, he was no doubt thinking about Yola for he had very 
much wanted to fulfil his promise to the Emir; that is why Lugard recommended that 
as recompense, the Emir be given £250 by the Imperial Government, Osuntokun 
rightly judged this sura as being too small considering that the Emir had spent some 
thousands of pounds in the war in the hope of getting back his territory at the end.60 
THE DEMARCATION OF THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE ANGLO- 
FRENCH IN7ER-CAMEROONS BOUNDARY 1937-1939.
Aware of their inadequate knowledge of local circumstances, and following 
the recommendation of the Milner-Simon Agreement, a mixed demarcation
58 Essiben, “ La France et la redistribution des territoires”, p. 52.
59 Osuntokun, Nigeria in the First World War, p.285.
60 Ibid., p.231.
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commission or a Boundary/Land Commission was appointed and sent to the area with 
some authority to deviate from the line delimited on paper. This commission, which 
had the task of surveying and demarcating the boundary on the ground while taking 
account of the local circumstances sometimes, deviated from the agreed boundary. 
This they did in order to enable the border groups to have access to their land or 
water, or to avoid splitting villages into two, and also to conform to the configurations 
of the landscape. Modifications recommended by such commissions were of a minor 
nature but they nevertheless constituted an attempt to take local conditions into 
account and to diminish the hardships caused by the boundary.
Representatives of both administrations held a series of joint cross-border 
meetings from January 1926 to May 1940 regarding the demarcation of the boundary. 
These meetings, also called protocols, showed a close Anglo-French relationship at 
the time, in the domain of boun^ry demarcation and administration.
JOINT CROSS-BORDER MEETINGS
On January 30, 1926, Ripert, the administrative head of the Circonscription of 
Dschang (French Cameroon) and G.B. Williams, D.O. Kumba Division (British 
Cameroons) met and drew up a protocol concerning the provisionary boundary.61 
After that, Williams and Reynaud, Head of the Nkongsamba Subdivision met and
61 James Godfrey C. Allen was initially assisting Firth but he later assumed control of the commission 
and was appointed full commissioner for the British, He took over from Firth as the British 
Commissioner on the Anglo-French Cameroon boundary commission from 1937 when both 
administrations started the demarcation of the boundary to 1939 when the outbreak of the Second 
World War grounded all works to a halt. The protocols defining the various sections of the boundary 
should be regarded as progress reports, die finality of which in some cases had to await the advance of 
die survey party and the engineer in charge of the placement of the boundary pillars.
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carried out investigations about possibilities of providing the requisite accuracy of 
boundary definition.62
A further reconnaissance was carried out and a protocol drawn up on May 30, 
1927, by Peretti, the French assistant administrator at Nkongsamba, and Roques, 
Surveyor in the employment of the Cameroons Lands Office. In July 1929, 
Carpenter, the Assistant D.O. Kumba and Roques met and carried out a 
reconnaissance of the section of the boundary between Loum-Ngab road and Mount 
Kupe. Their work was followed up by a protocol signed on January 26, 1930, between 
Harris, D.O. Kumba and Brison, chief of the Mbanga Subdivision. During this period, 
Harris held meetings also with his French collaborator Seyert, Assistant to the Head 
of the Nkongsamba Region.
The first of a series of eleven joint meetings of specialists and commissioners 
of the Anglo-French Land Commission held at Tiko (British Cameroons) on 
December 7, 1937. Present at the meeting and representatives of their respective 
governments were the British Boundary Commissioner and Senior Resident Nigerian 
administrative service, O. W. Firth and the French Land Commissioner and 
administrateur-en-chef des colonies, R. Dugast. Also present was J. G. C. Allen, 
District Officer Nigerian administrative service, Assistant Boundary Commissioner 
for the British.63 Both governments through their representatives decided to begin the 
demarcation in that same month. Still in the spirit of collaboration, both 
commissioners met the following day, December 8, 1937 at Tiko and drew up a
62 Annual Report on the Cameroons Province for the year 1926, C0649/31 PRO. For more on the 
protocols from 1926 to 1930 see Anglo -  French Boundary Commission. - Protocols Qf/91937/4, 
NAB.
63 Anglo-French Boundary Commission - Protocols - various. Cameroons Province, December 7, 1937, 
Qtfa/1937/4, p.5,NAB.
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second protocol.64 The major objective this time was to inspect, survey and fix the 
line of demarcation on the southernmost section of the boundary. From Tiko, the next 
joint meeting was held at Mbanga (French Cameroon) on January 29, 1938 between 
Allen and Dugast. Before this protocol was drawn up, both representatives had met on 
January 24 at a point along the boundary called Mongo Beach (British side) or 
Mundame (French side). The objective was to carry out a reconnaissance along the 
course of the Moungo River, precisely between the mouth of the Moungo and its 
confluence with the Ediminjo stream. Protocol number four was drawn up on March 
24, 1938 on board the Nigerian vessel “Myrtle”.
When Firth and Dugast met, it was to inspect and carry out some major 
rectifications in respect of the river sections of the boundary.63 The British and the 
French administrations agreed that both commissioners could meet and decide on 
when work should cease. It was to this effect that Firth, Dugast and their technicians 
held a meeting at Kumba (British Cameroons) on April 21, 1938 at which they 
decided to stop work by the end of the month. The reasons given for the ending of 
work were that some members of both commissions had completed their tours of 
service and were due leave; the very heavy rains would slow the pace of work; the 
necessity to co-ordinate the preliminary work and to effect an overhaul of the 
instruments and materials.66 On the April 22, 1938, a fifth protocol was drawn up at 
Kumba between Allen (Firth was unavoidably absent) and Dugast in continuation of 
protocols number three and four. In the course of their work some border people of
64 Anglo-French Boundary Commission,- Protocols December 8, 1937, p.6, NAB.
65 Anglo-French boundary commission -  Protocols -Victoria Division, March 24th, 1938, Qfla/1938/6, 
p.2, NAB.
Ibid., p.33, NAB.
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the Kumba locality asked not to be deprived of their traditional rights on both sides of 
the Mongo as a result of the boundary demarcation.67 Faced with this protest, both 
administrations through their representatives collaborated to formulate some 
recommendations in anticipation of the concurrence of their two home governments.
They both recommended “the right of free transit should be assured in the territorial 
waters of the two countries under Mandate to all users, including natives, on a footing 
of complete equality with the indigenous inhabitants”.68 Also, they assured reciprocal 
fishing rights to protected persons of both territories without any obligation to reside 
or to pay direct tax in the respective territories.
On the same day, April 22,1938, two other protocols were drawn up at Kumba. Allen 
and Dugast drew up protocol number 6 in respect of the section of the boundary from the 
confluence of the Ediminjo and Mongo Rivers to the main Lum-Ngab road. Firth and Owen 
drew up protocol number seven at the same place. These meetings closed the season of 1937-38. 
It was arranged that the first meeting of the Commission in the second season would be held at 
Nkongsamba (French Cameroon) on November 1, 1938. The eighth protocol was drawn up at 
the Government House Douala (French Cameroon) by Dugast and Allen with the assistance of 
technicians. There were H. Isherwood, Senior Surveyor, Nigeria Lands and Surveys 
Department; J. P. Cunningham, Surveyor, Nigeria Lands and Surveys Department; G. Cardet 
and P. Bossavy, Captains of Colonial Infantry commissioned by the military geographical 
service and Combe of the British Cameroons civil service, secretary.69 The report drawn up on 
November 25, 1938, was to advance the work of demarcation from the Tombel-Loum road to 
Mount Kupe. Still within the framework of cross-border meetings, the next meeting took place
67 Anglo-French boundary commission -  Protocols -Victoria Division, March 24th, 1938, Qf/a/1938/6, 
p.37, NAB.
Ibid.
69 Anglo-French boundary commission -  Protocols Victoria Division, Protocol No. 8, November 
25th, 1938, QFa/1938/6, p.3, NAB.
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in the British Cameroons, at Kumba on March 10, 1939, between Allen and Dugast. The major 
objective of the number 9 protocol was to demarcate the section of the boundary as far North as 
Mount Manenguba, The next protocol, number 10 was drawn up at Victoria on July 7, 1939 
between Allen and Joseph Lenoir, chief administrator of colonies, representing the government 
of Cameroon under French Mandate. This was the last meeting of the Commission in respect of 
the season 1938-1939, and was attended the French administrator, Dugast.70 Both 
Commissioners agreed to respect the general principles laid down in protocol number 9 and 
arranged the first meeting of the third season to take place on October 20, 1939 at a place to be 
fixed later. On May 18, 1940, the Commissioners met at Victoria (British Cameroons) for the 
final meeting of the boundary Commission the activities of which had been interrupted by the 
outbreak of the Second World War.71 Allen drew up this protocol with Georges Verges, chief 
administrator of colonies who acted as the French Land Commissioner, appointed by the French 
Government in place of the late Dugast. It was agreed by the two Commissioners that the object 
of this final meeting should be the preparation of a clear and detailed statement of the work done 
so far and the stage reached in the process of demarcation. This information they deemed would 
facilitate the resumption of work by any future commission.
It is recalled here that two boundary commissioners were appointed by the 
July 10 Declaration. For the British the commission was headed by Owen Watts 
Firth, a Senior Resident in the Nigerian Administrative Service and the French team 
was headed by Rene Dugast, the Chief Administrator of Colonies.72 Local personnel
70 Anglo-French boundary commission- Protocols Victoria Division, protocol No. 10, July 7, 1939, 
p.l, NAB.
71 See Protocol No. 11, p. 1, May 18th 1940, NAB. This meeting took place during the war and shortly 
after the meeting France suffered defeat. After the fall of France in 1940, there were fears in French 
Cameroon of pro-Nazi regime and the establishment of a Vichy regime. Relationship with the 
administration of British Cameroons became tense and die boundary between both spheres was stricdy 
controlled. By die end of August the Free French Movement staged a Coup d’Etat in French Cameroon 
which brought the territory into the war on the side of General De Gaulle.
72 Anglo-French Boundary. File No. 239, Qf/a (1920)2, p. 14, NAB. The following members were chosen:
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from the medical and security departments assisted both teams.73 As the job progressed 
more members were added to this initial boundary commission on both sides. On the 
British side, by a letter of September 24, 1931,74 G.B. Williams (DO) was recommended 
as boundary commissioner to be assisted by Denton Tweed. In August 1937 it was 
suggested that F.B. Tavener, a District Surveyor, should be made the senior survey 
officer for the British. For the French side, Captain Gardet a survey officer and the 
administrator Becq were added to the group, while Joseph Lenoir was acting in place of 
Dugast when he died in 1939.75 These experts had to survey and demarcate the 
boundary.
The Surveyor-General of Nigeria, on the British side, made recommendations 
on the delimitation and demarcation of the boundary. This was because in French 
Cameroon, there were no civil or military personnel specialised in survey work, 
whereas there was a well-structured and experienced Survey Department in Nigeria 
with trained Nigerian technicians76 Their work was done along the lines of the 
delimitation experience in the Anglo-French mandated territory of Togoland. In a letter 
of July 8, 1931, from the Resident of Cameroons Province to the Governor of Yaounde, 
French Cameroons, it was stipulated that survey operations had to be conducted from the
O.W. Firth - Senior Resident, Boundary Commissioner; James Godfrey Colquhoun Allen - D.O, 
Assistant Commissioner. H. Isherwood - Senior Surveyor in-charge; J.P. Cunningham - Surveyor L.A. 
Smith - African Surveyor; J. A.Ume - African Surveyor; J. A. Brown - African Surveyor; J.R. Anganga 
Williams -  African Surveyor; S.O. Ernodi - African Surveyor. On the French side, the members were: 
Rend Dugast - Chief Administrator (Administrateur en Chef des colonies, Chevalier de la legion 
d'Honeur); Captain Bossavy - Head of Colonial infantry, geodesian helper and topographer (Le 
Capitaine d'Infanterie Coloniale, Officier topographe et aide geodesien, brevete technique du Service 
Geographique de L'Armee).
73 Anglo-French boundary delimitation, File no. 124, Qf/a (1937) 6, p. 103, N.A.B.
74 Anglo-French Cameroons Boundary File No. 124 Vol. n, Qf/a (1932)1, NAB.
75 Ibid.
76 Weladji, "The Cameroon-Nigeria Border", p.248
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coast proceeding northwards77 This was to avoid the waste of time incurred by 
transferring operations from one section of the boundary to another and to facilitate the 
consecutive numbering and marking of the boundary pillars. The commission was to 
begin its work on December 1, 1932.
It was initially expected that the work would occupy four seasons of six months 
each in the south where the rainfall was heavy and two complete periods of twelve 
months each in the north. From the start it was clear that the work of surveying and 
demarcating would proceed more rapidly in the northern grassland zones than in the 
south. The gap between each cement pillar to be placed on the boundary on land 
necessarily differed from that on sea. While the distance between land pillars was two 
kilometres, on sea it was 10 kilometres probably because of the difficulty in planting 
these pillars in water.
On all boundary pillars the words "British-French Cameroons" or, at the 
discretion of the commission letters indicating those countries were inscribed on the 
sides corresponding to the territory of each country. Each pillar was marked by its 
serial number as indicated in the pictures below. In planting each pillar, a report was 
drawn up stating the nature of its construction and its serial number. Where possible, the 
commission gave a description of its position by compass bearings and any other data. 
Whenever the boundary followed any river or watercourse, the median line was taken as 
the boundary and pillars were placed on both banks of the river with the initials BC on 
the British side and CF on the French side and a serial number was engraved on the side 
facing the river 78
77 File No. 124, Qf/a (1937)6, p.36. Besides the fact that the French side was not ready financially to 
commence work, the British also seemed not to be enthusiastic enough to begin the demarcation
process. Maybe this again was because the Cameroon question ws not an important issue at the time, 
Such a system certainly took care of problems that might later arise in the future when a river might 
change its course. This was the case in the south-extreme portion of the Anglo-German boundary in 
Nigeria where the River Akpwayafe was used as the boundary. It was specified that should the river
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Furthermore, as long as the work of demarcation lasted, the roads and rivers of 
both spheres were made accessible to member of both Commissions. All articles, 
provisions and instruments used for demarcation were allowed to enter both territories 
free of customs duties and any other internal tax. Both Commissions mutually agreed to 
leave a strip of country between 5 to 10 kilometre on either side of the boundary. An 
estimated budget of over one million francs was made in the budgets of 1932 and 1933 
but it was felt that French Cameroun could not support such expenditure. Consequently, 
the assets of the French commission were liquidated and work of demarcation adjourned 
until when the French side was financially ready. An agreement was made between the 
two parties as to the sharing of the cost of the boundary pillars and for their subsequent 
upkeep through periodical clearing of the boundary.
It was only in 1936 that the French government signalled their readiness to 
start work. The Commission estimated work to last for six years allowing for four 
years dry season work only for the rainy Southern section and three full years on the 
northern provinces. Due to difficulties in climatic, topographic and vegetational 
conditions, the southern section of the boundary would take a longer time to 
demarcate - four out of six years. In another letter of February 11, 1937, the French 
proposed the date November 1, 1937 as the date when they would be ready to start 
work. This they said was because of: “ ...time needed to transport specialised officers 
from France to Cameroon who would then be required to study the 1932 file, verify 
and operate the necessary equipment for the job before it could begin.”79 That same 
year, before the work started, Allen was chosen as an Assistant Boundary Commissioner
eventually flow into the Rio del Rey, the Bakassi Peninsula shall still remain German territory. Weladji, 
"The Cameroon-Nigeria Border", p.249. Pictures below (pp.8438-4) show some boundary pillars on land 
with initials and serial numbers engraved on them.
79 File no. 58/16,of November 1,1937, Qf/a (1916)1, Anglo-French Boundary (Dschang and Others), p.5, 
NAB, The translation is mine.
60
for the demarcation of the southern part of the boundary between the Cameroons 
Province and the Cameroons under French mandate. This section, being very difficult to 
demarcate, needed a man with a lot of experience like Allen. He was an officer of ten- 
and-a-half years standing and spoke French fluently. Both commissions finally met at 
Buea on November 17, 1937 and finalised all details and work started in December 
1937. The joint commission worked periodically notably in the first “campaign” (1937- 
1938) and the second “campaign” (1938-1939). They held periodic meetings and signed 
protocols, which fixed the line of demarcation. A third “campaign” was arranged to start 
by October 1939 but never took place. For convenience, the southern portion of the 
boundary was partitioned and demarcated in three sections.
SECTION I: From the Sea to the mouth o f the Moungo River
It is to be recalled here that the principal duty of the commissioners was to 
translate the verbal description of the boundary into a visibly demarcated boundary on 
water and on land. The southern extremity of the Anglo-French boundary was difficult 
to define with accuracy due to mangrove swamps and creeks. The work also presented 
many difficulties for the boundary was mostly described by reference to natural features 
like the names of creeks and lakes (on the land section names of rivers, villages and 
roads) shown on inaccurate pre-war maps. It was for these reasons that the 
Commissioners were given wide latitude in making minor amendments to the existing 
textual description. The boundary had to be drawn from a point at the mouth of the 
Bimbia River to a point on that River due east of Tiko; then it moved towards the North- 
East along a creek connecting with the Mudeka Bay to the mouth of the Mungo River.80
80 Anglo-French Cameroon Boundary. Delimitation of. File no. 124 QFa /1937/6, p. 19, NAB. On details 
about the work and equipment used, see Commission Franco-Anglaise de delimitation de frontiere 
(Cameroun), Rapport Concemant les travaux de delimitation depuis le ler Janvier Jusqu'au 31 Decembre 
1938. APA 10813, p.9, NAY.
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As shown in the map (p.85) below describing the maritime section of the 
boundary, this portion was full of mangrove swamps and there was hardly any land 
suitable for the planting of cement pillars; thus the work of demarcation was difficult and 
needed expertise. Here the commission benefited largely from the advice of the Marine 
Director at Victoria. Also, creeks abound in the area, among them, the Kange, Victoria, 
Matumal, Njumban-anjau, Mbakwele, Mokota, Mbosa-Bome and Gombe creeks. This 
was similar to the situation to the southern extreme portion of the Anglo-German 
Nigeria-Cameroon boundary. It was difficult if not impossible to demarcate the 
navigable channel of the Akpwayafe River for the channel merged with the Cross and 
Calabar Rivers.
Here too, the area was full of mangrove islands or creeks.81 It was also difficult 
to trace the boundary here because the median line, which was adopted as the boundary, 
wavered with the difference in tides. After hard work, fifteen pillars were placed along 
the median of the waterside on either side at intervals of approximately 10 kilometres. 
This southern most section of the boundary is described from Point Number One 
hundred and thirty-four to Point Number One hundred and thirty-eight in the Graeme 
Thomson Declaration which determined the boundary description and has remained 
unchanged since then. Like the British, the French team also recorded difficulties in 
demarcating this portion of the boundary. These difficulties were recorded in their report 
to the Commissioner of French Cameroun which read thus:
...The confluence area of the Rivers Wuri, Mungo and Bimbia is made up of 
numerous creeks on a marshy insect infested zone with highly reduced visibility.... 
it is very difficult for workers to have any kind of supply even good drinking water
81 Prescott, "The Anglo-French Inter Cameroon Boundary", p.21.
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resulting to doubtful sanitary conditions.82 
In anticipation of such health problems the British government dispatched medicines and 
dressings to the boundary commissions as from December 2 1937. As demarcation 
proceeded northwards, the next portion to be demarcated was from the mouth of the 
Mungo River to Mount Kupe.
SECTION II; From the mouth o f the Mungo River to Mount Kupe
For the most part of this second section of the boundary, the River Mungo was 
taken as the natural geographical division. This portion of the boundary has been 
described from point one hundred and twenty nine to point one hundred and thirty 
three in the Graeme Thomson Declaration. The work of demarcation here was of a 
peculiar nature because this was an area of vast and rich old German plantations. 
Some of these plantations were cut across by the provisional boundary. The 
commission sent letters to the proprietors of some of the plantations involved to alert 
them of the passage of the commission and to ask for their co-operation when they 
arrived.83 It was for this reason that the commission wrote to the proprietors of the 
African Fruit Company, Tiko on whose property the first pillar on land (no. 16) was 
to be placed. They replied pledging their full co-operation when the commission 
arrived. There were the cases of the Misselele and the Kola Nkote plantations where 
boundary demarcation was difficult due to Anglo-French rivalry over these 
plantations. Both parties were also unable to solve the question of tobacco plantations
82 From Dugast to Commissioner of the French Republic, December 1st, 1937, APA 10813, NAY. The 
translation is mine. Weladji, "The Cameroon-Nigeria Border", p.242. Pictures (p. 86) below show a 
difference in height of the boundary pillars that were placed in the sea. Unlike the previous ones we saw, 
they are higher, smaller in size and seemed to have been made with more solid concrete.
83 See letter no. 103/1931/ of November 13, 1937 by the Senior Resident to the manangers of the West 
African Plantation Co Victoria Ltd.-Bota; Africa Fruit Company-Tiko; Kamerun-Kautschuk- 
Compagnie Mukonje Estate and K.E.G. Tornbel on this same subject. Also see Anglo-French 
Cameroon Boundary. Delimitation of. File no. 124 Qf/a ( 1937)6, NAB.
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in Penja Nyombe (Njombe) and Djongo.84 The Misselele plantations, owned by the 
Westafricanische Planzungsgellsohaft, Victoria (WAPV), had two other plantations 
all established between Victoria and Buea.85 The Picot line divided these plantations 
into two leaving a small part on the French sphere. Dobell's Proclamation Number 10 
modified the boundary and gave all of the plantations to Britain. According to Ngoh,
the reason advanced by Dobell for this modification was acquisition of access to the
86sea.
The Kola Nkute plantation was established by the Germans on two villages, Kola 
and Nkut (Nkute). Before the existence of the boundary, the two village communities 
cultivated the plantation with no problems. The Picot line cut through the plantation 
leaving Kola on the French-speaking zone and NKute (Nkut) on the Anglophone zone. 
Pillar number 49 shown below was placed between the two villages. This division 
brought a difficult situation to the boundary commissioners. The Kola Nkute plantation 
was ceded to France while Britain was compensated with the Essosung plantation on her 
own territory.87 Weladji holds a contrary view, which says that the Kola Nkute 
plantation was ceded to the British.88 Considering the fact that the Kola section of the 
village has since then remained in the French administered section of the territory, it is 
certain that the first version is right for Essossung also remained a British administered 
locality.
84 Ngoh, "Anglo-French Rivalry", p.280, Also see Marc Michel, "Les Plantations Allemandes du Mont 
Cameroun, 1885-1914" Revue Frangaise d'Histoire d'outre-mer, Tom LWI,No.207 trimestre,1970): 189.
85 Weladji, "The Cameroon-Nigeria Border", p.243.
86 Ngoh, "Anglo-French Rivalry", p.281.
87 Anglo-French Cameroon Boundary. Delimitation of. File no. 124 Vol.n, Qf/a/1937/6, NAB.
88 Weladji, "The Cameroon-Nigeria Border", p.243-4. When I visited the ruins of the Kola-Nkute 
plantation, today mostly farmlands, I located boundary pillar number 49 which was planted on the 
initial boundary between the two villages. Pictures (p. 87) below shows pillar 49 and some others 
located on the Fench side of the border.
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From the plantations, the commissioners advanced further inland following the 
Mungo River, which they maintained as the boundary.89 When they reached the point 
where the Mungo breaks up into tributaries, the work of demarcation became very 
difficult. The Senior Surveyor on the British side, Isherwood reported that his Assistant, 
Cunningham had great difficulties in surveying the section of the boundary between the 
mouth of the Ediminjo stream and Tombel. This difficulty was due to the roughness of 
the country and the presence of thick forests with no footpaths. Also, most of the stream 
valleys were from two to six hundred feet deep and they twisted in all directions. It was 
therefore very difficult to trace a watershed without much “bush whacking”. Faced with 
these difficulties, Cunningham suggested that a map of the area be drawn, possibly by 
Captain Bossavy, showing the Rivers Mumbo, Bubu and Ediminjo. This map also had 
to show all farms, timber concession roads, bush paths and any other important features 
so as to facilitate their work. When the commission arrived at the boundary between the 
River Bubu and the Lum-Tombel road, their work was rendered easier because the land 
coincided with the southern boundary of the Kamerun-Eisenbahn Geselleschaft (K.E.G) 
lands. The confines of this property had been cleared and demarcated eight years earlier, 
which made the demarcation of this particular portion relatively less difficult.
During their work on this section, the commission frequently met with 
opposition from the local people. When Isherwood reached the Malende customs beach 
on February 2 1938, he wanted to survey a path that ran from Malende leading to Ikata 
but the village head of Malende was very unco-operative and frustrated all the efforts he 
made to reach him.90 Similarly when in April, Captain Gardet, the survey Officer for the
89 Pictures below (p. 88) show sections of the Moungo River, which served as the Anglo-French 
boundaiy, from pillar number 16, where the Moungo empties into the sea, to pillar number 27, where 
the Moungo is fed by the Ediminjo Stream.
90 Isherwood to Boundary Commissioner, February 10,1938, File no. 124 vol.II, Qf/a/1937/6, NAB.
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French, was sent to work at Tombel, he found it impossible to work. Just as the Balong 
frustrated Isherwood at Malende, the Bakossi of Tombel refused to cooperate with 
him 91 The Bakossi chief refused to give him any information on Mount Kupe. On this 
issue, the French government reported the matter to their British counterparts and the 
latter advised Gardet to return to the French sphere of the land. The boundary 
commissioners also faced protests from the Mongo/Mungo people who were divided by 
the boundary. An interesting thing that both commissions learned from the local peoples 
on this section of their work was that the Bakossi and Balong wanted to be on the British 
side of the boundary. The original boundary between the Bakossi and the Balong was 
the Mumbo River which placed them under one administrative unit before 1914 but the 
Anglo-French boundary cut across these ethnic groups as it did with their northern and 
eastern neighbours, the Mbo and the Balondo. Three Balondo villages were placed in the 
French territory, very close to Nkongsamba, these villages were; Nyamsa, Badjong and 
Monako 92
Since the survey parties frequently crossed the boundary in their duties, the 
Surveyor General, Land and Surveys Department, Lagos suggested to the Resident that a 
letter of identification be issued to each member of both parties. The letter stated the 
name of the officer and those of his party. It also stated that no duty was to be taxed on 
his load and that he needed every possible assistance in the pursuit of his duty when and 
wherever he went to. By the end of March 1938, Isherwood and his group had gone 
beyond Malende, Bombe, Mbalangi, and the Mundame customs beach. Due to other 
pressing duties and linguistic difficulties, Senior Resident Firth proposed a replacement
91 The number of workers was not stated. This was a similar situation that the boundaiy 
commissioners of Togoland undertook in their partition of Togoland. File No. 124 Vol. n, cf. Report of 
November 29,1938, No. B.C. 5/1937 Vol. n/12. NAB.
92 Dugast, Inventaire ethnique du Snd Cameroun, p.32.
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of Allen, and this was approved. After this second section, the commissioners had to 
undertake the demarcation of the last portion, which was between Mounts Kupe and 
Manenguba.
SECTION ITT: Between Mounts Kupe and Manenguba
This section of the boundary is indicated in the Graeme Thomson agreement 
from point one hundred and twenty one to one hundred and twenty eight. The work of 
demarcation on this section was to be done in a north-south direction. At a meeting held 
by the two commissioners at Douala on November 25, 1938, working procedures were 
agreed upon93 Work had to begin in December 1 and end on May 15, 1939. The two 
commissioners met at the crater lakes on Mount Manenguba on December 10, 1938 to 
fix the boundary between Mount Manenguba and Mbonzie; it was estimated to take only 
one month but work was slowed down due to topographical, seasonal and “tribal” 
problems. After the experiences of the ethnic groups and the plantations in the south that 
were divided by the boundary, the commissioners endeavoured to avoid such problems 
in future. Unfortunately this aim could not be fulfilled because with the local Bakossi 
and Mbo occupying the slopes of Mounts Kupe and Manenguba, it was very difficult to 
determine the group limits. Eventually, the boundary cut through clans like Elung 
(Elong) as it did with the Mungo (Mongo) in the South, and it also cut through the Ngol 
plantation, which belonged to the KEG Company.
The original boundary of 1916 had put all of Elung into the French sphere but 
the modifications of 1922 cut through Elung leaving 1/3 of the land (Mwangel) in the 
French territory and 2/3 on the British side. In like manner, the Mwamenam who are on 
the Southeastern slope of Mount Manenguba were moved from the British
93 Letter No. 65 of 17/2/1939, Commission Anglo-Frangaise de delimitation (s.d), Plantation de Ngol, 
APA 11383, p. 1, NAY.
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administration in 1919 to French control in 1922.94 This situation provided a strong 
reason for these border peoples to reject the boundary in future and to frequently violate 
boundary laws.
The surveyors followed up with the fixing of pillars between Tombel and Loum; 
Nkut and Kola, Abang and Ngombo-Aku; Mwambong and Mouandong (Akid village); 
Mondong and Ninong (Ebone-Mwin village); and at the summit of Mount Manenguba; 
the large map in the pocket at the back shows the various pillars that were planted along 
the boundary on land with their serial numbers. When the commissions arrived further 
south of this section, they entered an old German tobacco-producing unit at Ngol. 
According to article 235 of the treaty of Versailles, the provisional boundary passed 
through this plantation causing another area of tension between the British and French 
administrations. Because the Germans did not leave any authentic plan of the Ngol 
plantation, the British and French administrations represented by Ripert and Williams, 
tried to lay out a plan of division which contained many errors. For instance, the village 
of Ngol where the plantation was located is wrongly placed in the British zone. 
Consequently, the people of Ngol-Manehas, Nsung-Mwamenam, lower Bakossi- 
Asomengoe and Ninong-Anonge appropriated some of the lands of the plantation. The 
appropriated lands were planted with coffee, cocoa and banana trees.95 When the 
commission finally defined the boundary limit, this plantation fell on the French side. 
The Chief of Ngol imposed a capitation tax on the English-speaking "natives” who 
were working on the plantation. The boundary commission later proposed a lease 
contract of thirty years renewable for individuals of the British side who owned farms in
94 A. Nzume, "The Colonial Frontier and bilingualism in Cameroon: the case of the Bakossi, 1916-1961". 
Postgraduate thesis, Doctorat 3e cycle, University of Yaounde, p,79. Also see by the same author, "Culture 
change in Mouamenam, 1916-1960. A Background study". Postgraduate (Maitrise) thesis University of 
Yaounde, 1983, p.64. Commission Anglo-Frangaise de delimitation (s.d) letter No. 65 of 17/2/1939, 
Plantation de Ngol, APA 11383, p.4, NAY.
95 Plantation N gol, see Letter No, 338 of 26/12/1938, APA 11383, pp. 1 et 2, NAY.
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the Ngol area. The people were furious with this decision and proceeded to remove the 
boundary pillars that were placed along the boundary of the Ngol plantation.96 Dugast 
and his team searched for pillars as far as eight kilometres north of Ngol at Abang but 
found no pillar. Their task was rendered difficult because they had no plan of the area. It 
was for this reason that Dugast wrote to the Kamerun-Eisenbahn Geselleschaft (K.E.G) 
and pleaded that they should send him the annex plan of the area in their keeping. Even 
in the case of Ngol, although the commission sent word to the villagers before they 
arrived explaining the purpose of their visit, the people did not welcome the demarcation 
of their lands.
Meanwhile, it was originally intended that the commission would cease work 
on this section on May 15, 1939. This was the date that a final evaluation meeting 
was scheduled. After this meeting, Isherwood was to proceed to Nigeria to take up 
routine duties during the wet season; Cunningham had already gone on leave. The 
two French surveyors arranged to continue the preparation of their trigonometrical 
survey until the months of July and August when it was hoped that all controls would 
be ready for the resumption of the topographical survey in October. Earlier in 
February 1938, Cunningham in a report to Allen complained about the tedious work 
and the strain it was causing on Dugast's health. He reported that: “I do not think that 
it is at all suitable country for Mr. Dugast to work in, as although he is a game old 
bird, this type of bush whacking is definitely a young man's job. I understand that he 
is about 60 years old.”97 It was not surprising therefore that the strain of the work and 
the weight of his age rendered Dugast very ill the following year. Dugast returned
96 Report from Cunningham to Allen of February 20, 1938 concerning the Ediminjo-Kupe Section of 
the boundary, File No. 124 vol. II. NAB.
97 Cunningham to Allen, February 5th 1938, APA 11383, NAY. Weladji, "The Cameroon-Nigeria 
Border", p.251.
home as the commission promised to meet on October 20 to resume work during the 
dry season. But Dugast died suddenly and the delay in appointing his successor led to 
an indefinite postponement of the resumption of the work.
Meanwhile, Lenoir, Secretary General of French Cameroon was appointed 
acting head of the French Mission. In joint notes signed by Lenior and Allen on July 7, 
1939 at Victoria, the definition and delimitation of the boundary between Pillars 87 to 92 
were confirmed; that is, from Mount Manenguba to a place in the Nkongsamba area, 5 
kilometres north. According to Weladji, all this was prepared before the death of 
Dugast.98 Both commissioners agreed to stop delimitation work in the Mount 
Manenguba region at Pillar 92. On October 20, 1939 both teams planned to meet again 
and begin the third campaign but this plan was never undertaken for work ground to a 
halt with the outbreak of the Second World War on September 3 1939. Consequently, 
the boundary commission never met again. According to Prescott no further work was 
done on this boundary demarcation.99 This implies that the actual work of demarcation 
ended on the top of Mount Manenguba (South East top slope). The distance of the 
frontier thus demarcated on the ground on this section was some one hundred and thirty 
five miles.100
After the work of delimitation and demarcation, before their break, both 
administrations affirmed that individual rights of proprietorship on both sides of the 
boundary be respected. Individuals on the boundary zone could not be called upon to 
pay personal taxes on both sides of the boundary. It was forbidden to remove or destroy
98 Proces-Verbal No. 6, du 22/5/1938. Fait a Kumba, concemant la section des Rivieres Ediminjo et 
Moungo, et la route de Loum a Ngab, APA, 11383, pp. 4 et 5, NAY.
99 Prescott, "The Evolution of the French Inter-Cameroons Boundary", p.40. The entire length of the 
boundary was 1200 to 1500 km of Weladji, "The Cameroon-Nigeria Border", p.248.
100 Weladji, "The Cameroon-Nigeria Border", p.252. A large map of the Anglo-French boundary on land 
(with other small maps that show the Picot Line) has been provided in a pocket at the back of this thesis.
structures at less than fifty metres on both sides of the boundary, this was because the 
commission feared that the border people could by so doing, attempt to alter the 
boundary. It was then left to both administrations through their land commission to see 
that the border was made flexible and that border peoples respected the boundary rules. 
This made both administrations to carry out some adjustments of the boundary to avoid 
splitting villages, clans, people and their farmlands along the boundary.
EFFORTS BY THE BRITISH AND FRENCH ADMINISTRATIONS TO MODIFY THE 
BOUNDARY
According to Fanso, requests by divided peoples for the alteration of the 
boundary through their territory and /or the recognition of their established traditional 
rights across the boundary were conditioned by response of colonial administrations 
towards the groups.101 The reaction of the British and French administrations towards 
divided groups ranged from cautious sympathy and efforts to unite at least some of 
them, to the rejection of appeals for boundary modification. The provisional boundary 
did not take into consideration the cultural and ethnic realities of the border groups. It 
was abstract and both administrations observed, “the so-called Picot Line is therefore 
largely imaginary having the most glaring discrepancies between the theoretical and 
the actual line”; that was why Article 2 of the July 10 agreement gave the latitude to 
the Boundary Commissioners to adjust the boundary.102 Both governments decided to 
leave the actual demarcation with specialists -the Anglo-French Boundary
101 Fanso,“Trans-frontier relations”, p. 199.
102 A. J. Harding to Strachey, letter No. 39912, CO 649/18, PRO.
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Commission- to study and propose areas that needed rectification in favour of the 
divided groups.103
This line may however be slightly altered by agreement between 
His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government of the 
French Republic where an examination of the localities shows 
that it is undesirable, either in the interest of the inhabitants, or by 
reason of any inaccuracies in the map (Moisei 1/300.000) annexed 
to the Declaration to adhere strictly to the line laid down 
therein.104
Border groups were to be assured the right of grazing, fishing, farming etc across the 
boundary. While waiting for the members of the joint commission to be appointed, 
Britain and France agreed to restrict the authority of the chiefs of divided groups to 
their respective sides of the boundary. It was made clear that their authority would not 
be recognised across the boundary.105
When the joint commission was appointed, the commissioners held several 
meetings during which they examined the possibilities of boundary rectification in 
favour of both administrations and the separated border groups as well. To this effect 
the members of the French delegation argued against the unilateral British annexation 
of Misselele plantation originally placed in the French zone by the “Picot Line”. The 
French delegation took the position that the Douala population placed largely in 
French territory depended heavily on food supplies from the Misselele plantation and 
the surrounding area, and that the abandonment of this piece of territory would be a 
serious inconvenience to them. The British also argued that the Misselele plantation 
had to be left to the West of the boundary, on their side. This, they said, was because 
numerous local traders from border towns of the British zone such as Victoria and
103 Resident to DO Bamenda, August 30th, 1920, TB/1920/2 NAB. Hie British and French 
administrations agreed on October 23rd, 1921 to modify the boundary taking the local realities into 
account. See minutes of the meeting of December 17th, 1921, CO 649/23, PRO.
104 Minutes of the meeting of December 17th, 1921, CO 649/23, PRO.
105 Resident to chief administrator of Douala Division, August 11, 1920, APA 10494, NAY. Fanso, 
“Trans-frontier relations”, p. 199.
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Tiko brought their goods, mostly palm oil and kernels, by canoe from Douala through 
the creeks around the Misselele plantation. It would be inconvenient for these people 
if the plantation and the surrounding creeks were given to the French.
On August 9, 1920, J. Davidson, the Resident Buea and V. Chazelas, Chef de 
la Circonscription de Douala, met at Buea to give provisional effect to the 
agreements and to take over and hand over those territories described by the Franco- 
British Declaration signed in London on July 10,1919. The territories, which were to 
pass from the authority of the French to the British, were the lower reaches of the 
Moungo, and the Misselele plantation. The French had controlled these areas since 
1916.106 It is important to note here that some precautions were taken during this 1920 
rectification, to avoid dividing private concessions affecting the rights of the 
people.107 Elong was one of the areas that was re-partitioned. By the provisional 
boundary, Elong was in the British sphere. Elong according to the Moisei map 
belonged to the Kumba District even though the local officers in the Cameroons 
seemed to think that it belonged to the Bare District thus should be French.108 By the 
1920 adjustment, the fourteen villages of Elong were divided between the British 
(Nkiko, Poala, Muasum, Ekambeng, Muabi, Mbad) and the French (Muangel, 
Mboasum, Mwanwekan, Lolag, Ndoku, Nsonsua, Neno and Ndengua).109 The 
boundary cut through the villages of Mwanwekan and Poala. The Elong and their 
Mbo neighbours had always farmed on the same area but with the imposition of the 
boundary, this fertile farmland went to the Mbo while the Elung were left with the
106 Resident to Chazelas, Despatch No. 64/19 of August 9,1920, CO 649/20 PRO.
107 Ibid.
108 Telegram No. 41603/17 of August 23rd, 1917, CO 649/14, PRO.
109 FO to Under Secretary of State for Colonies, No. Cl 1114/63/18 of November 15, 1920, CO 649/21, 
PRO
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unfertile uplands. The same occured in Poala where the boundary left all the
cultivated land to the Mbo of the French zone while the barren lands went to Poala.
When the chief of Poala, James Elunge, laid his complaint to the Resident through the
DO, he was told to take his complaint before the boundary commissioner. When the
commissioners arrived Poala in April 1939, they registered statements of complaint
and were satisfied that the complaints were justified. Both commissioners agreed that:
The line demarcated by us in December should be amended to enclose on 
the English side all plantations of Poala while, in compensation, a small 
section of the village at an area to the North presently cultivated by the 
people of Mwangel (French) should be handed over to the French.
All parties have expressed their complete satisfaction with the new 
boundary, which will be finally demarcated tomorrow and defined in the 
final protocol to be compiled at the closing meeting of the commission 
in May.110
In this memorandum, Allen pointed out that the fact that the border groups 
were divided by the boundary originally demarcated by them was neither due to their 
disregard of local interests nor to a lack of proper study of the terrain. It was because 
they were misled by the frontier defined by Messrs Williams and Reynaud in 1936 
and ratified in the Graeme-Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1937.The Poala case 
shows the efforts that both administrations and the boundary commission were 
making to understand the protests of the border groups and to correct where possible 
the injustice of the boundary. Mouamenam, which by the provisional boundary
110 See memorandun from Allen to Resident Cameroons Province, No. Be, 6/1937/42, of April 12,
1939, NAB.
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wasplaced under British rule was in 1920 put under French administration.111 Further 
to the South, where the River Moungo was considered as the boundary, it was 
difficult to rectify the boundary. This was because there were villages of the Mongo 
ethnic group on both banks of the river. The Mongo it should be recalled was a sub­
group of the Duala and the people’s major activity was fishing. A decision was 
reached by both governments on the fishing rights of the local Duala on the right bank 
of the river and those occupying fishing villages in the creeks on the British side of 
► the boundary. Both governments declared that the fishing rights of the French
subjects acquired West of the Moungo before August 4, 1914 were to be 
respected.112 On the division of the Penja-Njombe and Djongo tobacco concessions by 
the River Ediminjo, the provisional boundary placed a portion of the plantations in the 
French sphere and another portion in the British zone. The French suggested an 
adjustment that would place all of the concessions in their sphere since the British had 
taken the Misselele plantations further south. On this, the Resident said he had no 
power to accord those concessions to the French without referring the issue to the 
Governor of Nigeria.113 Eventually, the plantations remained in the French zone. In 
1920, the British administration complained about the unsatisfactory nature of the 
boundary and decided to make minor adjustments thereafter.114 The following year, 
the same government acknowledged that the customs barrier imposed by the division 
of the Cameroons aggravated the position particularly for the border groups on the
111 Anastasia Nzume, “Culture change in Mouamenam, 1916-1960. A background study”. Postgraduate 
thesis (Maitrise), University of Yaounde, 1983.
112 Resident to Chazelas, No. 16/19 of August 9, 1920, CO 649/20, PRO.
113 Minutes of the meeting of January 30th, 1926 between G. Ripeit, chief administrator of the 
Circumscription of Dschang and G. B. Williams, Acting D O Kumba, APA 1007, delimitation Franco- 
Anglaise. Accord 1919, NAY.
114 Resident to Chazelas, August 9, 1920, C O 649/20, PRO. Also see Harding to Strachey, No. 39912 
of July 8th 1919, C O 649/18, PRO.
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West of the River Moungo. Harding suggested that the boundary would pose 
difficulties to border groups to the West of the River Moungo like the Mbo, Bakossi, 
Balondo and the Balong. For these groups, the natural outlet for their trade was either 
down the Moungo River or by the Northern Railway down to the port at Douala in the 
French zone.115
Minor rectifications were made between 1925 and 1930 to the boundary. In 
the Nkongsamba Circonscription, the British claimed the Kola-Nkut plantation and in 
the Moungo estuary, they also claimed some territory near Lake Mowe.116 Local 
boundary agreements were signed dealing with portions of the boundary, which 
needed further rectification and definition to avoid splitting villages, clans and people 
along the boundary. For the definition of the boundary between Kumba Division and 
Dschang Circonscription, the proces verbal was signed at Nkongsamba on January 
30, 1926. The D O Kumba, G.B. Williams and the chief of administration, 
Nkongsamba, Monsieur Reynaud, signed this boundary adjustment of 1926 by which 
Poala was dispossessed of over 50% of their land, the villages of Moundong, 
Mouakoumel and Abang of the Mouamenam clan were transferred from the British to 
the French zone. This amendment was incorporated in the Graeme Thomson- 
Marchand Declaration. The boundary between Mount Kupe and the Loum-Ngab 
Road was signed in Tombel on January 26, 1929. It was noted by both administrations 
that some Bakossi farms were separated from their owners and placed in the French 
territory by the rectified boundary.117 Ripert observed that the Mbo and the Bakossi 
were split by the boundary but further adjustments made were not satisfactory. The
115 Notes of August 11th, 1923 by Harding, on boundary question, CO 649/27, PRO.
116 C. Weladji, “The Cameroon-Nigerian border 1914 and after (5th and last instalment)” Abbia, 38-39 
(May 1982):243,
117 It was realised that global solutions could not be achieved through these boundary adjustments. In 
some cases, border peoples with property across the boundary were asked by the administration to 
cross over and settle permanently on any side of their choice.
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Commissioners noted that due to their cultural and traditional closeness, it would be 
difficult to trace a clear boundary between the Bakossi and the Balong. The British 
and French administrations continued to record local dissatisfaction about the 
boundary and endeavoured to find workable solutions throughout the period of their 
administration in the territory. While attempting to seek solutions to local protests, 
both administrations continued to administer and police the boundary with the aim of 
maintaining the division between the two spheres. How did both administrations 
administer their sections of the boundary?
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CHAPTER THREE
COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND STATE 
FUNCTIONS AT THE BOUNDARY
BRITISH AND FRENCH COLONIAL POLICIES
Colonial powers were largely ignorant of the nature of the societies they were 
about to govern. As a result, during the early years of colonial rule there was 
considerable debate as to what type of policy and rule was desirable for Tropical 
Africa. From these debates and from the practical experiences of the administrators on 
the spot, there emerged three general dominant trends in colonial policy in West 
Africa, which dominated from 1918 to 1939 (Assimilation, Indirect Rule and 
Paternalism).1 These policies from which colonial practices stemmed were greatly 
influenced by the personality of the man imposing them as for example Lugard for the 
British and Sarraut for the French. Of equal importance were the circumstances under 
which a particular area was occupied either by conquest or by treaty and the character 
of the society to be governed.
The French policy o f  Assimilation
Assimilation is that body of colonial theory, which advocated identity between 
the colony and the mother country. The nature of this identity varied from one place 
to the other. Assimilation theories fell into two main groups; those, which advocated 
the personal assimilation of the administered peoples; and those, which discarded this 
option as unrealistic and advocated administrative political or economic assimilation 
between the colony and the mother country.2
Theories of personal assimilation asserted that all men were equal irrespective 
of their racial or cultural background. There were no differences between peoples that
1 Michael Crowder, West Africa under colonial rule. London: Hutchinson, 1968, p. 167.
2 Ibid.
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education could not eliminate. Therefore African colonial subjects could be treated as 
Frenchmen with same rights and duties. Crowder suggests that the major conflict 
between the various theories of personal Assimilation occurred between those who 
believed in the actual equality of all men at all times and everywhere and those who 
believed in the potential equality of all men.3 But it became increasingly difficult for 
the French to actually practice absolute or whole-hearted Assimilation due to 
economic and cultural obstacles.
As a result, she turned to what has been styled as gradualist or selective 
assimilation policy 4 As this drift emerged, it was excused by the claim that all men 
could be equal given the right opportunities, but was not equal here and now. 
Therefore, Africans had to prove themselves worthy of assimilation by demonstrating 
to the authorities that they had the attributes of citizenship, attributes that were 
determined by the colonial power. The origins of this policy laid in the much longer- 
term experiment in Algeria where eventually it was decreed that fully active Moslems 
could not be citizens. France’s experiment in the Senegalese hinterland gradually 
took the form of a more selective assimilation policy.5
Citizens from the Quatre Communes of Senegal for example, had rights as 
evolues but not equal to those of Frenchmen. This small group of citizens numbered 
not more than 2,136 in 1936.6 They could elect a general council and send a deputy 
to parliament, but in fact the completeness of this citizenship was contested for a long 
time. Could these Senegalese of the privileged communes be considered full citizens
3 Crowder, West Africa, p. 167.
4 Ibid. Ibid.
5 Michael Crowder, Senegal: A study o f French Assimilation policy. London: Methuen, 1969, see first 
chapter.
6 Michael Crowder, Colonial West Africa. Collected essays. London: Frank Cass, 1978, p.269.
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if they also retained a personal status claiming Islamic rights and polygamy? It was 
not until after the First World War, that the people from the four communes were 
given French citizenship and thus could be used as auxiliary staff of the colonial 
administration. The overwhelming majority of the population was classified as Sujets 
or subjects.
In Cameroon like in all French colonies in Africa, it was difficult if not
impossible to achieve the status of a Frenchman or an evolue or assimile. It became
clear that the French could not form a strange race of Frenchmen in black skins. The
French excuse for the shift away from wholesale assimilation were vague claims that
indigenous social standards were too far removed from those of Frenchmen for
Assimilation to be possible.7 This policy had been rehearsed in Algeria where the key
decision was taken about the impossibility of being a French and at the same time a
Muslim was made. Personal assimilation still remained possible even if very difficult.
According to Crowder, personal assimilation left room for non-personal assimilation
■ 8theories, which fell into three categories: administrative, political and economic. 
David Gardinier says that the French used Paternalism in close association with 
Assimilation both of which led to the establishment of direct rule by French 
administrators for neither policy in theory contemplated the maintenance or utilisation 
of African political institutions.9
Unlike assimilation and paternalism, the principle of association was 
supposed to involve a respect for the institutions and traditions of the colonial
7 Jules Harmand, Domination et colonization, Paris, 1901, cited in Victor T. LeVine, The Cameroons 
from mandate to independence. California: University of California Press, 1964, p. 89.
8 Crowder, West Africa, p. 168.
9 David Gardinier, Cameroon. United Nations challenge to French policy. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1963, pp. 10-14. Also see Gardinier, "French policy in the Cameroons, 1945-1959”, PhD thesis, 
Yale University, 1960. The policy of Paternalism resulted not only from France’s activities as a 
colonial power but also from its own internal experiences. By this policy, France assumed die 
superiority of die Frenchmen and their civilization over Africans and African civilization and 
institutions.
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peoples, a respect which should lead to co-operation between colonial administrators 
and local political bodies. Like assimilation, association called for the formation of a 
Gallicised elite who, as leaders of their people, would remain within the framework of 
African societies and would then serve as an intermediary group between the French 
administration and the traditionally oriented masses.
Ironically, in practice, this elite group had to accept so many European cultural 
values that some of them lost touch with their own cultures and with the unassimilated 
populations they were supposed to lead. Albert Sarraut who put the French policy of 
Association into operation in all of the French Empire, stipulated French co­
ordination and collaboration with local elites and stressed the economic 
“development” or “mise en valeur” of colonies along the lines most profitable to 
France.10 As from 1940, French Africa was dominated by two distinct French 
regimes, that of Vichy for AOF (French West Africa) and the Free French for AEF 
(French Equatorial Africa). There was no single French imperial policy. What was the 
British colonial policy?
The British policy o f Indirect Rule
Indirect Rule was that body of colonial theory, which held that there could be 
no identity between such divergent cultures as those of Europe and Africa. 
Consequently, the metropolitan power should rule its African subjects through their 
own institutions since these were clearly the ones best suited to them. Indirect Rule 
was the antithesis of assimilation and was inspired by the belief that the European and 
the African were culturally distinct though not necessarily unequal. The institutions of 
government most suited to Africans were those, which the African had devised for
10 Albert Sarraut, La mise en valeur des colonies Frangaises, Paris: Payot, 1923, pp.62-127. G. Hardy, 
Histoire de la colonisation Frangaise, Paris: Larose, 1931, pp. 434-435. R. Betts, Assimilation and 
Association in French colonial theory, 1890-1914. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, 
passim.
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himself. The European colonial power therefore, should govern their African subjects 
through their own political institutions. Crowder says that the use of such indigenous 
political institutions for purposes of local administration was contingent on certain 
modifications to those institutions.11 Such modifications fell into two categories:
- modifications of aspects of traditional government that were repugnant to European 
ideas of what constituted good government. This explains for example the abolition of 
human sacrifices and certain methods of treating criminals.
- modifications that were designed to ensure the achievement of the main purpose of 
colonial rule, the exploitation of the colonised country.12 An example of such 
exploitation was the introduction of taxes designed to stimulate production of cash 
crops for export.
As conceived by its chief exponent Lugard, Indirect Rule was supposed to be
the progressive adaptation of local institutions to British conditions with a British
officer acting as adviser.13 The 1925 Annual Report on the Cameroons Province
expands on this by saying:
The evolution of indigenous institutions does not mean that those 
institutions are to be allowed to grow unchecked and uncontrolled.
It implies close and continuous direction, supervision and guidance 
by administrative officers....
European standards and methods must be introduced in the form and measure 
in which they can profitably be grafted on the pre-existing stock.14
11 Crowder, West Africa, p. 169.
12 Ibid.
13 Prosser Gifford, “Indirect Rule: Touchstone or Tombstone for colonial policy”. In P. Gifford and R. 
Louis, Britain and Germany in Africa. Imperial rivalry and colonial rule, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1970, p.351.
14 West Africa. Report on the British sphere of the Cameroons, for the year 1925, presented to 
Parliament by command of His Majesty, p.4. Institute of Commonwealth Studies Library, London 
hereafter cited as ICOMM. The stress on the word “profitably” is mine.
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The British quickly realised that adherence to what they deemed as local institutions 
was a better option for the acceptability of their administration. It was important that 
local government and rulers be given defined duties and an acknowledged status. Yet 
the policy as initially conceived was interventionist but progressively, Lugard’s 
successors followed a policy of relatively minimal interference in the process of local 
government. This rendered Indirect Rule less-interventionist. Later however, as 
society evolved, power and authority fell into the hands of the educated people, 
professional men and the middle class who wanted to break with the old system of 
government.
Indirect Rule, which has its origins in India, was initially devised for Islamic 
populations with centralised authorities. In Cameroon, in areas where traditional 
authority was centralised, Indirect Rule was easy to assert but in areas of decentralised 
local authorities, like the area under study, the policy was difficult to develop and 
adapt. For effective administration, the government therefore had to commission a 
series of reports to establish the authority of traditional rulers and the role of religious 
and social organisations. The British assumption that in Cameroon, they had 
indefinite time ahead during which their policy could grow and develop under their 
guidance was another reason for the poor and slow adaptation of the policy.
After the Second World War, both the British and the French had to change 
their pre-occupation with the problems of “Native Administration” to the demands of 
African nationalists. These nationalists wanted to participate in the running of the 
central administration of their countries. Consequently, more and more educated 
Southern Cameroonians were encouraged to participate in Native Administration. 
Senior British administrators like Andrew Cohen report that Indirect Rule took an 
entirely new shape with a positive and constructive policy for economic and social
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developments.15 Indirect Rule had to be adapted to modem needs, there was a great 
forward drive in education, health and communication infrastructure. This version of 
events could be biased and exaggerated when one considers some of the other British 
colonies but in Cameroon, for example, it was after the Second World War that the 
administration opened more elementary schools; political parties and trade unions 
were also formed. The German plantations for example were taken over and managed 
as from 1947 by the Cameroons Development Corporation (CDC). The Corporation 
took care of the economic and social advancement of its workers and paid in huge 
taxes to the government treasury.
The importance of recalling the basic orientations of both colonial imperial 
theories in this work is firstly that, these theories oriented the assumptions under 
which both colonial powers administered the now divided territory. Administration, 
which according to the terms negotiated between the Principal Allied and Associate 
Powers on the basis of article 22 of the Covenent, was to be as Mandates. The 
administration began with the prohibition of abuses, such as the slave trade, the sale 
of fire arms and alcohol. The administrations had to guarantee freedom of conscience, 
religion and movement. Secondly, colonialism in its essence implicitly assumed the 
superiority of the British and the French civilisations over those of Africa and 
therefore that the colonised in contact with the Europeans would abandon their 
institutions and adopt superior European models, one of which was the nature and 
function of boundaries.
COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION
The League of Nations Mandates were created in 1919 and Cameroon was 
given to Britain and France as a class “B” mandate. It was on these terms that both
15 Andrew Cohen, British policy in changing Africa, London: Routledge and KeganPauI, I960, pp.31- 
32.
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powers obtained confirmation of their partition of the Cameroons in 1922. Whereas 
the British merged the administration of their sectors with that of Nigeria, the French 
considered their own sector for administrative purposes as an Oversea Department 
France Outre-mer. Administratively, France did not bring Cameroon into the 
Federation of French Equatorial Africa (AEF). According to Edward Mortimer, the 
reason for this is clear for the Covenant spoke of the Mandated territories as being 
“not yet able to stand by themselves”.16 Unlike the case of the other French colonies 
for example, the Mandatory power (France) had to make annual reports to the League 
on the progress of the Mandate. In an attempt to explain why France did not 
administer Cameroon as part of AEF, Leslie Buell says that it was probably because 
of the poverty of Equatorial Africa that “France thought it contrary to the spirit of the 
Mandate” to incorporate Cameroon as a member of that Federation.17 Whatever the 
actual reasons the French had for that administrative option, they however applied the 
laws of the AEF in Cameroon except where proscribed by the obligations of the 
Mandate.18 What was the French administrative system that was imposed on their side 
of the boundary?
On April 1st, 1916, as General Dobell took over the administration in British 
Cameroons, General Joseph-George Aymerich did the same for the French 
administered part of Cameroon. By May 1916, Aymerich issued a decree dividing
16 Edward Mortimer, France and the Africans 1944-1960. A political history, London: Faber and 
Faber limited, 1969, p. 36.
17 Leslie Buell, The native problem in Africa, New York: Macmillan, 1928, p.291. C. N. Ngwasiri, 
“Developments and reforms in Cameroon land law since 1884” Ph.D. thesis, University o f London, 
1979, p. 3 8.
18 Ngwasiri, “Developments and reforms in Cameroon”, p.38.
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French Cameroon into nine administrative units called Circonscriptions,19 Below the 
Circonscription was the Subdivision and below the Subdivision, there was the 
District Douala and later Nkongsamba units contained sections of the border 
populations under study notably the Mbo, Bakossi, Mungo, Balong, Balondo and the 
Duala. The French created three grades of chiefs: Paramount chiefs (these included 
the Lamidos in the Moslem North); Chiefs of Cantons and Village chiefs also called 
Quarter Heads. The French utilised the traditional chiefs as intermediaries because as 
Gardinier puts it, they lacked the funds to institute an administration of French 
officials at every level.20 In utilising the chiefs the French did not permit the chiefs to 
exercise their functions in the traditional manner. They often forced them to ignore 
the advice of the elders or notables and to implement the policies of the 
administration, which were unpopular with their people. Chiefs were like toys, they 
commanded very little or no respect.
It is reported that the administration replaced chiefs who were less cooperative 
by their sons.21 According to some of our informants, chiefs in the French zone were 
flogged and punished for allowing their subjects to escape to the British zone.22 Also, 
Crowder says the French placed chiefs in an entirely subordinate position to the
19 They were: Barre-Foumban-Nkongsamba; Ebolowa-Ako afim territory; Kribi-Loiodorf-Campo; 
Edea-Eseka; Yaounde; Douala-Yabassi; Bana; Ngaoundere andMora-Garoua-Doume-Lome- 
Yokaduma. Journal Officiel du Cameroun, hereafter cited as JOC, No. 1 of November 1,1916, p. 2, 
Centre des Archives Outre Mer hereafter cited as CAOM. In April 1935, the Circonscrpitions by that 
time 17 in number were retiled Regions, the name they retained throughout the Trusteeship period. The 
Douala-Yabassi Circonscrition became La Region du Wouri.
20 Gardinier, Cameroon, p. 15.
21 Chief administrator of colonies to the Commissioner of French Republic, letter of September 19th, 
1932, AgeFom 989/3430, CAOM.
22 Interview with Chief Moukwelle Moukwelle Benjamin on July 12th, 1999 at Mombo, Cameroon and 
with Anoke Gaston on July 13th, 1999 atMouyouka, Cameroon, Interview with Nhon Blasius Akwe 
Nzume, on April 20th, 1999 at Likomba- Tiko, Cameroon.
97
political officer.23 Chiefs were mere agent of the central government with clearly 
defined duties and powers. They did not head local government units nor did the 
areas, which they administered on behalf of the government necessarily, correspond 
to pre-colonial political units. In the administrative hierarchy, below the Heads of 
Circonscriptions were Chefs de Subdivision and below them were Chefs de Districts 
or Cantons. These District Heads were also called Chefs Superieurs24 Their authority 
depended in a large measure upon French support. They were thus bound to transmit 
the orders of the administration to the village chiefs who were their immediate 
subordinates. Most often than not they were those who had shown loyalty to the 
French or had obtained some education.25 For example, the political officer in charge 
of the Mouamenam canton in 1940, Granier, expressed the reasons for the 
administration’s preference for one chieftaincy contestant, chief Nti Ewane of Nsoung 
village over his other brothers as follows: “ ... he had a good mastery of the French 
language and high political intelligence ... and drew five subjects from the English 
zone to his sphere of jurisdiction 26
The French administration also installed a “foreigner”-Nsaso M’Epang- from 
a different Canton- Manehas (Badjounge)- to rule as Chef Superieur against the 
wishes and protests of his subjects. He was said to be very wicked and when he died
23 Crowder, Colonial West Africa, p.200. There were however some chiefs who “refused to toe the 
line” and the administration had problems working with them, for example the Sultan Ibrahim Njoya of 
the Bamun and Chief Charles Atangana of the Ewondo.
24 Due to the difference in the status of the Cameroon and Togoland, the administration preferred the 
use of the terminology “Canton” instead of “Circle” as they did in colonies of AOF.
25 Rapport de tourn&e de recensement dans le groupement Mouamenam, du 8 au 14 Decembre, 1940, 
APA 11801/B, NAY, Cameroon. For an earlier example, see Chief administrator of colonies to the 
Commissioner of French Republic, letter of September 19th, 1932, AgeFom 989/3430, CAOM.
26 Rapport de toumie dans le groupement Mouamenam, du 8 au 14 Decembre, 1940, APA 11801/B, 
NAY.
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later, in 1949 his subjects were relieved27 The French administration was also 
responsible for the reign of allegedly unscrupulous and wicked chiefs like Chef 
Superieur Essoumboua of Elong (Bakossi) and his neighbouring counterpart Chief 
Pandong of the Mbo. In order to please the administration, these chiefs were very 
brutal to their subjects and as a result, three villages departed from the administration 
of the Elong chief (Njob, Limbo and Ninong villages) to the British zone 28 These 
unpopular and illegitimate chiefs took pleasure in maltreating their subjects to please 
the administration.29 A concrete demonstration of the pressure imposed on the 
administered people through the chiefs and by the French administration was the use 
of the Indigenat, which led to large-scale migration of French subjects into the British 
zone.
The Indigenat was a French system of government which deprived the 
subjects of the liberties of criticism, association, and movement. The system gave to 
the French administration the power to inflict disciplinary penalties, without trial for a 
wide range of minor offences.30 Established by decree in 1924, the Indigenat 
conferred on French and French trained administrators broad disciplinary powers and 
unchecked authority on the locals without trial for a variety of ill-defined violations.
21 Rapport de tournee effectue par le chef de la Subdivision en Region Bakaka, Balondo et Manehas du 
4 au 13 Juillet et du 17 au 30 Juillet 1938, APA 11799/H, NAY.
28 Rapport de tournee au pays Elong et Mbo, du 28 Janvier au 5 Fevrier, 1938, APA 11799/H, NAY.
29 Interviews with informants in former border villages on the French side, notably Ewane Mandengue 
and Nseke Eko of Moungo; Moukouelle Moukouelle Benjamin and Moukete Abel of Mombo;
Moukete Moukete Gustav and Anoke Gaston of Mouyouka; Enoge Frederick of Abang; Akoue Norbert 
and Melango Nzume Jacques of Mouamenam and Mbape Pandong of Mbouroukou. Check list of 
informants for the various dates of interview.
30 Gardinier, Cameroon, p. 16. Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in colonial Africa, New York: New 
York University Press, 1957, p.35.
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The system was condemned at the Brazzaville Conference of 1944, and abolished in 
1946.31 What was the British system of government?
British administration officially began on April 1, 1916 when General Dobell 
was named, by an Order in Council to administer the territory. It should be recalled 
here that as Britain acquired Cameroon as a bargaining chip they thus showed little 
interest in it. Emmanuel Chiabi says the French were more anxious than the British to 
occupy Cameroon in the post-war period.32 While the French made clear their 
intention to administer Cameroon directly as a French colony, the British were 
content with the administrative structure that linked their Cameroon with Nigeria. 33 
Britain requested and the League of Nations granted their request to administer 
Cameroon as part of their colony of Nigeria, an “integral part of Nigeria” thus a 
substate.34 It is evident that such an arrangement, which leads some scholars to refer 
to Cameroon as a “colony of a region of a colony”, was more to foster administrative 
facility than to integrate Cameroon with Nigeria. Our interest here however is neither 
the rhetoric justifying Cameroon’s integration with Nigeria nor the application of 
Nigerian laws in administering Cameroon but the fact that British Southern 
Cameroons comprised four administrative divisions: Bamenda, Ossidinge, Kumba 
and Victoria. The last two Divisions contained the bulk of those who would become 
border groups notably the Bakossi, Bakweri, Balong Balondo and the Mbo. The 
difference between these British administrative divisions and those established earlier
31 Raymond-Marin Lemesle, La Conference de Brazzaville de 1944: contexte et reperes. Paris: 
C.H.E.A.M., no date provided, pp.53-54. Laurent Gbagbo, Reflections sur la conference de Brazzaville. 
Yaounde: Editions C14 1978, pp.29-35. Conference Africaine Frangaise de Brazzaville du 30-1-1944 
au 8-2-1944. Paris: Ministere des Colonies, 1945.
32 Emmanuel Mucho Chiabi, The making of modern Cameroon. A history o f  substate nationalism and 
disparate union, 1914-1961. Volume I, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1997, p. 12.
33 Ibid.
34 As early as 1921, the Report on the Cameroons Province says that the Southern portion of tire British 
sphere of the late German colony of the Cameroons was by then called the “Cameroons Province of 
Nigeria”, p. 47,ICOMM.
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on by the Germans was the splitting of the former Victoria District to form the 
Victoria and Kumba Divisions. Civil officers administered these Divisions.
The chief administrator, the Resident, Major F. H. Ruxton, began the 
administration in 1921 with a dedication to emphasise native administration. The 
Resident instructed the Assistant District Officers (ADOs) to regroup peoples of their 
Districts and establish warrant chiefs who would act like Headmen or the “eyes” of 
the administration at the lowest level. It was for this reason that F. B. Carr of Kumba 
Division divided his Division into twenty-four village areas, each under a salaried 
village head.35 Victoria Division was at first divided into two Native Districts-Buea 
and Victoria but later, in 1931,the Balong Native District was created and added to 
it.36 It is fundamental to note here that the ADOs and the chiefs in charge of these 
respective village areas were those who were directly concerned with the 
administration of and matters concerning border administration and upkeep. The 
chiefs for example were held responsible for any of their subjects who escaped or 
crossed the boundary and were caught without official passes.
As they had in Nigeria, the British administration also took an interest on the 
character of the society they governed. In the Cameroons for example, Indirect Rule 
was easily adapted to the Northern and Northwestern Chiefdoms, which had a more 
organised and centralised authority. With regard to the more decentralised and small 
independent societies of the South and Southwest, which included the border groups, 
they conducted a series of reports (Assessment, Reassessment, Intelligence etc), 
which provided them with information about the various ethnic groups to be 
administered.
35 Annual Report for Rumba Division for the year 1924, Ba 1924/1, pp. 20-21, NAB.
36 Ibid.
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Chiabi reports the shortage and the inexperience of British colonial 
administrators who administered Southern Cameroons throughout their period of 
administration:
The Southern Cameroons became also a “dumping ground” for inexperienced 
colonial administrators ... Divisional Officers (DO) were expected to have had 
nine to twenty years of experience. In Cameroon, these stipulations were 
often ignored or violated, and it was common to find probationers- officers 
who were so-to-speak, doing internships.37
In 1921 for example, the ADOs for Kumba and Victoria, F.B. Carr and A.G.T. Gier
respectively were probationers.38 Usually, the few available British administrators
were assigned various duties at the same time. In 1929 for example, the ADO of Buea
was also in charge of the Provisional Prison, the Buea Treasury, and the Native
Administration. The Resident, E. J. Arnett, supervised the Divisional Administration,
served as magistrate and had to ensure the proper functioning of plantations. Kumba,
Buea and Victoria were the chief administrative towns of the border peoples under
British rule in the area under study.
From the start, the British colonial administration used the chiefs as the major
advisory bodies turning them into “Native Authorities”(NA) each having its own
“Native Court” and “ Native Treasury”. Each “Native Court” and “Native Treasury”
exercised judicial and fiscal functions respectively. Each NA was responsible for the
smooth functioning of the administrative machinery of its area of jurisdiction. It was
also the duty of the NA to provide health and educational services, deal with and
37 Chiabi, The making o f modem Cameroon, p. 13.
38 Chiabi suggests that probationers were sent to administer the Cameroons probably because the 
territory was regarded as a substate and because it was calm and provided an easy training ground, see 
The making o f modem Cameroon, p. 13.
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provide funds for the overall advancement of its area.39 The NA worked in close 
collaboration with the colonial administration.
Later on, there was a slight distinction in British colonial policy between 
Lugard’s School and a new school that developed, the Cameron School. Cameron 
worked with Lugard. The Cameron School appeared as from 1930 with a new 
interpretation of the system of Indirect Rule altering the label to “Indirect 
Administration”. Cameron’s interpretation was more liberal and not restricted to 
preserving the personal and unfettered rule of the chiefs over their people. This new 
school abandoned the rather autocratic ideas of the Lugard School and concentrated 
on the Chiefs Council rather than the chief as the essential element in the Native 
Authority. This has been said to be the forerunner of the principle of “ Local 
government” which continued into the post-colonial period.40
It was as a result of this change in policy interpretation that from the early 
1930s, the colonial administration began incorporating the literate classes using them 
as advisors where possible. By the end of the 1930s, some of the NAs of the border 
groups were selected to manage their own financial affairs- revenue collection and 
expenditure notably the Balong and the Victoria (Bakweri) NAs.41 The outbreak of 
World War Two frustrated all efforts by the administration to improve upon the 
representative nature of NAs. All attention was geared towards the war. Even after 
the war, the more the colonial administration opened NAs to literate and progressive 
forces, the more complicated and difficult it was to handle the two administrative 
systems. The system of NAs was becoming unpopular. The fact however that the
39 Ngoh, Cameroon, p. 166. For more on NAs and their roles in British West Africa, cf. Lord Hailey, 
Native Administration in the British African territories, Part III, West Africa: Nigeria, the Gold Coast, 
Sierra Leone, Gambia. London, 1951,
40 R.E.Robinson, “Why ‘Indirect Rule’ has been replaced by ‘Local Government’ in the nomenclature 
of British Native Administration” Journal o f  African Administration, 2,3, (1950): 12-15.
41 Chiabi, The making o f modern Cameroon, p. 18.
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chiefs were called upon to collaborate in the local administration of their areas later 
led to the formation of the Southern Cameroons House of Chiefs (SCHC) in I960, an 
administrative organ that was absent in the French administered part of Cameroon. 
What were the colonial judicial systems?
A DUAL SYSTEM OF COURTS
When the Allied army was occupying the territory, their systems of 
justice were substituted with the German legal system. Only military war councils of 
the army of occupation were authorised to handle all criminal affairs. The British like 
the French established a dual system of courts in Cameroon. In exercising justice, the 
French always made a distinction between Africans and Europeans, there were la 
Justice Europe erne and la Justice Indigene. Following the European system of 
justice, by a decree of May 6, 1916, a tribunal was instituted by the French 
administration in Douala 42 Appeals from this court were taken to the court of AEF 
and the Court of Appeal or Chambre d  ’Homologation de I ’AEF, which had extended 
powers into Cameroon. By decree of January 12, 1917, besides the Douala Tribunal, a 
Justice of Peace was created as existed in AEF. This system of justice remained in an 
embryonic stage until in 1920 when by decree of August 8, a Tribunal of First 
Instance was opened in Douala, its status and competence fixed just like those of the 
AEF.43 This Tribunal of First Instance was attached to the appeal Court at Brazzaville. 
It was not until the passage of the decree of December 29, 1922 that this Tribunal was 
detached from Brazzaville and the Cameroon legal system acquired its autonomy that 
embodied: Conseil d ’Appel, Cour Criminelle, Tribunal de Premiere Instance
42 Rapport Annuel pour Pannee 1924, p. 53, CAOM.
43 Rapport Annuel pour Fannie 1924, p. 53, CAOM.
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(Douala), and des Justices de Paix Ordinaire, It would be superfluous to go into the 
details of all of these.
The French instituted what was called, Purely Indigenous Courts-/es 
Tribunaux Entierement Indigene, which were for the Africans or the sujets. These 
embodied two sections; Court of Village Chiefs and Indigenous Courts. In the Court 
of Village Chiefs, the village heads passed most of the judgements in criminal and 
civil matters, but only the local administrator could administer sanctions on crimes, on 
rebellion and political offences. In the Indigenous Court, there were three members (a 
President and two African Assessors) who only had a consultative role in criminal 
cases. From 1916 to 1921, village and indigenous courts remained courts of little 
importance. By decree of April 13, 1921, a Tribunal d ’Homologation was opened 
next to the Court of First Instance in Douala, which suppressed all strictly indigenous 
Courts. By a decree of July 31, 1927, Courts of First and Second Degrees replaced 
Indigenous Courts.
In the Districts, the French instituted, Conseils de Notables which were 
composed of important persons appointed by the Governor from names submitted by 
the chiefs, Heads of families, and local merchants of each ethnic group within the 
Circonscription. The local administrator was required by decree, to convene the 
Council twice a year and to consult its members on the forms and rates for taxes and 
fees.44 Here Africans only had a consultative role in government initiatives, but 
however, the administration sought to give representation to all the ethnic groups in 
the Circonscription, In Douala for example, in August 5, 1933, the Governor named a 
new Council of Notables containing eight Duala and six other Africans from the
44 Rapport Annuel pour PAnnee 1933, p. 6, Archives of the Ministry of External Affairs in Paris 
hereafter cited as AMEA.
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immigrant groups.45 A significant remark about the French judicial system was that 
the French were quick to punish individual chiefs who stepped out of line 46 What was 
the nature of the judicial system in the British Cameroons?
Under the British in the Cameroons the judicial system was that of Nigeria, 
except that the Supreme Court of Nigeria had no jurisdiction. There was a Provincial 
Court of which the Resident was Judge with full powers. The officers in charge of 
Divisions were Commissioners of the Court with powers limited to two years 
imprisonment. All Commissioners of the Court had jurisdiction over Europeans as 
well as locals. Full copies of the proceedings in cases with sentence of over six 
months’ imprisonment were sent to Nigeria for confirmation.
According to the 1922 Report on the British sphere, the Governor in 
Executive Council reviewed all capital sentences.47 The criminal law was the 
Criminal Code of Nigeria. Flogging was only allowed under the Code in exceptional 
circumstances in cases of slave dealing and burglary, and all summary punishment 
was done away with. Administrative and disciplinary proceedings were illegal. The 
civil law was the English Common Law. The law was modified by the proviso that 
British Courts shall in Civil Cases affecting the locals recognise local law and custom 
when not repugnant to natural justice and humanity, especially in matters relating to 
marriage and inheritance.48
A District Officer (DO) or Assistant DO (ADO) in charge of a Division had 
jurisdiction in civil matters where the debt, damage or claim did not exceed £50, and
45 David Gardinier, Political behaviour on the community o f Douala, Cameroon: reactions o f the 
Duala people to loss o f hegemony, 1944-1955. Ohio: Ohio University, 1966, p. 8.
46An example was the case of the Douala chiefs as reported by Ralph A. Austen and Jonathan Derrick, 
Middlemen of the Cameroons Rivers. The Duala and their hinterland, c. 1600-C.1960. Cambridge : 
Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 144,
47 Report on the Cameroons Province for the year 1923, p. B3, ICOMM.
48 Ibid.
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in criminal matters could inflict a fine of £50 and /or order imprisonment for two 
years. A flogging of twenty-five lashes was added if the case was one where flogging 
was allowed under the code. Other Commissioners could try civil cases where the 
claim involved did not exceed £25, and in criminal cases could order a fine of £25 
and/or three months imprisonment. All sentences of imprisonment in excess of six 
months, sentences of corporal punishment exceeding twelve strokes, and sentences 
involving a fine of £50, required confirmation by the Chief Justice, who for that 
purpose was furnished with a full copy of the proceedings, together with a report by 
the officer trying the case.49 The Chief Justice reviewed all capital sentences and if 
confirmed by him were considered and decided by the Governor of Nigeria.
One of the major judicial institutions of Indirect Rule was the establishment of 
Native Courts by the Resident from 1916 to 1922, to meet the needs of the different 
Districts. These courts were constituted by warrant approved by the Lieutenant 
Governor. The warrant stated that the area of the court’s jurisdiction, defined the 
powers conferred upon it, and named the chiefs appointed as members. These courts 
adjudicated, between locals only and their law and customs, together with such alien 
law as they were expressly authorised to administer. According to the 1923 Report on 
the Cameroons Province, the object of this all was to make the local and the 
Provincial courts competent parts of one judicial system and to relieve the latter of 
work, which could be done by the locals themselves.50
Native Courts were created in different categories notably A,B,C and D like 
the NAs. Category “A” courts were those, which had powers in civil and criminal 
cases except for capital cases (those involving death sentences which could not be
49 Report on the Cameroons Province for the year 1923, p. B3, ICOMM.
50 Ibid.
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carried out except when confirmed by the Government). Category “B” courts included 
those which could exercise jurisdiction in civil action in which debts or fines did not 
exceed £50. The courts also handled criminal cases where the offence was punished 
by not more than two years imprisonment, 24 lashes or a fine of £50 or the equivalent 
in the local law and customs. Category “C” courts included those with civil 
jurisdiction over cases whose fines did not exceed £10 while for category “D” courts 
the fine was £5 with criminal cases punishable up to three months imprisonment and 
twelve lashes.
Even though the local people advocated for a plurality of courts, the 
administration viewed the maintenance of the courts as financially expensive. This 
was a much cheaper option for the administration to operate than a full blown judicial 
system involving professional, trained lawyers. It was for this reason that the Native 
Courts in Victoria Division for example were reduced in number from fifteen to six 
between January and December 1918.51 Native Courts were set up along the 
borderlands on the British side notably in the lands of the Bakweri, Balondo, Balong 
and Bakossi. From the coast inland, there were the Victoria (C), Tiko (D), Bakweri 
(C), Lower Balondo (D), Upper Balondo (D), Balong (D), Bakossi (D), and the 
Ninong (D) Native Courts. The NAs worked with the Native Courts and British 
administrative officers to ensure a smooth implementation of Indirect Rule. These 
courts formed the core of all traditional authorities and were fully recognised no 
matter whether they were fake, unrepresentative of tribal values or artificially created. 
How did the British and the French control the boundary that was drawn between 
them?
51 Annual Report 1918, Victoria Division, File No. 329/1917G, NAB.
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BOUNDARY CONTROL AND POLICING
As early as September 7, 1922, there were instructions under which the local 
people required permits from the Inspector General of Police to enter French 
Cameroon.52 The French authorities for non-payment of tax could prosecute those 
who did not show this permit to the French guards before crossing the boundary. An 
important moment in the administration of the Anglo-French boundary in the 
Cameroons was marked by the despatch of the Governor of French Cameroon to the 
Senior Resident, Buea on the subject of “passports for Natives between British and 
French Cameroons”.53 He reported that it had been brought to his notice that some 
Africans had left from the French to the British side without an official pass and 
suggested that such persons be followed up and made to return for they had broken 
the law under which they were placed. As a principal reason given to halt this 
situation, the French government said that such clandestine trespassers helped to 
spread epidemics. The French administration also expressed the need to prevent 
crimes from one side of the boundary to the other. Thus they hoped the Resident 
would agree with the French government on the imposition of passports to black 
trespassers.54
It was in response to this French proposal that the Resident sent a confidential 
memorandum to the Secretary, Southern Provinces, Lagos with the observation that 
the real reasons for the French proposal were neither health nor crime prevention but 
to stop the recent influx into British Cameroons of large numbers of labourers from
52 West Africa, Report on British sphere of the Cameroons for the year 1923, ICOMM.
53 Despatch no. 129 of June 24, 1925, CO 649/30 , PRO.
54 Ibid, the emphasis is mine. The stress on the colour of trespassers was necessary for it was important 
to distinguish very quickly and let go European missionaries who were allowed to trespass without 
official passes
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the French side to work in the plantations.55 While awaiting a reply to their proposal, 
the French posted guards along the frontier to prevent emigration but it was easy to 
elude them. J
According to the Resident what the French apparently wanted was for the 
British to extend the Immigration Restriction Ordinance to locals and turn back those 
who had no passports.56 But again he observed that it would be very difficult to 
enforce such a measure; the boundary was of great length, say 275 miles (out of this 
distance the portion under study is about 135 miles); it intersected tribes and could be 
crossed at innumerable points. It would therefore not be practicable, except at great 
expense, to enforce a system of passports on those people, who came under the 
French description of Voyageurs Noirs. The Resident observed that their 
Movements were not clandestine.57
For the British government, it was difficult enough to maintain an admittedly 
far from effective control along a part of the boundary. An effective passport system, 
it was observed, would probably kill trade between the two countries, but the French 
viewed that event with equanimity if it meant that thereby emigration was entirely 
checked,58 To the French, it was more serious to lose men than money.
The Resident observed that a rigid passport system would have wider 
implications than the reduction of inter-Cameroons trade.59 There was first and 
foremost the plantation labour question. It was observed that sometimes people went 
across the boundary not just for plantation labour but also for various other reasons.
55 Despatch no. 129 of June 24, 1925, CO 649/30, PRO
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Letter nol5513/23 of October 8th, 1923, CO 649/30, PRO.
59 Despatch no. 129 of June 24,1925, CO 649/30, PRO .
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That is why for most of 1925 for example, four to five hundred Basossi (a kin and 
neighbours of the Bakossi) people went over the boundary from the French to the 
British side, not for plantation labour but due to exactions by the French in labour and 
tax. Even before that, by mid 1924, a large number of Bamoun people crossed over 
the border from the French side into the Bamenda Division on the British side due to 
political discontent in Foumban 60 All these people were refugees and the application 
to them of the Immigration Restriction would mean that future immigrants would 
have to be deported, a measure not easy to carry out. When the British expressed their 
difficulties with imposing passports on Africans, the French decided to go ahead with 
their plans and forbade the people under their administration from leaving the territory 
without the authority of the Governor or his delegates.61 This restriction was a direct 
outcome of the flow of French subjects from the French to the British Cameroons.
THE USE OF BOTH CUSTOMS AND POLICE DEPARTMENTS ALONG THE 
BOUNDARY
By December 31st, 1926 among the European staff in charge of the Cameroons 
Province were two collectors of customs, one in the port of Victoria and the other in 
charge of customs stations on the French or Eastern frontier. Initially both customs 
and police departments were employed on the boundary to repress smuggling and to 
collect duties to raise revenue. When the amount used to prevent smuggling and to 
control the boundary began rising above the revenue it collected, the British 
administration replaced the customs preventive service by the police along the 
boundary.
60 At Foumban, the French had a great deal of trouble with some of the followers of the Sultan, chief 
Njoya who was anti French. Chief administrator of colonies to the Commissioner of French Republic, 
September 19th, 1932, AgeFom 989/3430 CAOM.
61 Despatch no. 1070 of December 29, 1925, CO 649/31, Cameroons 1926 PRO.
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There were four clerks and thirty-four preventive service men employed on 
the Cameroons frontier distributed over four major stations all of which fell under the 
section of the boundary under study, Tiko, Mundame, Mpundu, and Ngab,62 The 
customs preventive service had proved to be totally inadequate and smuggling was 
rife. It was so serious that British firms were quite unable to compete with the 
smuggled trade. For an example smuggled tobacco and French cigarettes from Societe 
Jean Bastos, killed the sale of tobacco and cigarettes in the European shops in 
Victoria, British Cameroons; consumers could buy for £10 what would cost them £16 
at the nearest Eastern Nigerian port town of Calabar.63
The police finally rejected various alternative schemes for increasing the 
strength and efficiency of the existing customs preventive service. The preventive 
work was to be carried out by a trained disciplined body of men (preferably 
Cameroonians) who could work at any time, in case of necessity. According to oral 
sources, sometimes it was possible for traders and smugglers to negotiate with or 
“settle” the Customs officers who were mostly Nigerians and did not hesitate to take 
bribes and allow smuggled goods across the boundary.64
It was further proposed to increase considerably the number of stations to 
which preventive men were posted. Such stations were not to be revenue-collecting 
stations; their functions would be to divert to the revenue stations as much as possible 
of the intercepted imports, which were smuggled at the time.65 After this, other 
customs stations were opened in the interior at Bombe (Bakundu), Mbonzie, Tombel-
62 Despatch no. 1070 of December 29, 1925, CO 649/31, Cameroons 1926 PRO.
63 Ibid.
64 Interview with John Ndobe Ngwese, retired businessman, on May 15,1999 at Ninong, Cameroon. 
Also see Chiabi, The making o f  modern Cameroon, pp. 113-114,
65 The total force required at these stations was composed o f : 1 Commissioner, 2 Sergeants, 3 
Corporals, 4 Lance-Corporals and 58 Constables.
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Loum road, Muesoh (Mwambong), Ebonemin (Ninong), Nyan (Elong), and Mwabi 
(Poola). The total cost estimated for the first year was £3,210. Regarding the length of 
the boundary to be patrolled and the prevalence of smuggling at the time, neither the 
force suggested nor the expenditure involved could, according to Governor Graeme 
Thomson, be regarded as excessive. Eventually it was suggested that all extra revenue 
obtained by the adoption of the change should substantially exceed the cost of 
maintaining the boundary.
THE LAISSEZ-PASSER
With regards to border administration proper, it was as early as 1917 that the 
French forbade all clandestine emigration in Cameroon. By a decree signed that year, 
all the inhabitants of Old Cameroon (Kamerun) were forbidden to leave the colony 
without an authorisation of the Commissioner or of the head of the respective 
administrative unit or Circonscription This decree was reinforced eight years later
by another.
The Laissez-Passer was initially instituted as we have seen by the French 
government ostensibly for health reasons. It was to control the spread of sleeping 
sickness in the French administered part of Cameroon. From 1923 to 1946 it was 
strictly implemented in Cameroon, From January 30th 1923, there was an arrete 
restricting the movements of the local people and by further decrees of May 6th, and 
November 4th, 1924, what the French administration called vagabondage was 
suppressed.67 What the French administration meant by un vagabon, according to 
Kaptue, was hardly applicable to the African way of life
66 JOC, No. 3 of January 1, 1917, p. 318, CAOM. Also see file No. Vt 38/17 Exodus of the population, 
(Translated file title), NAY.
67 Leon Chedjou Kaptue, “ L’Administration coloniale et la circulation des indigenes au Cameroun: Le 
Laissez-Passer, 1923-1946 ”, AJrika Zamani, a Review of African history, nos. 10 and 11, Yaounde, 
Cameroon, 1979, p. 163. Despatch by Mahoude to the Head of the Region of North Cameroon, dated 
March 27, 1924. Vt 38/17, NAY.
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where there was no fixed notion of a home for home was every where.68 The French 
administration in instituting punishment on those arrested for vagabondage, hoped to 
maintain the people in their respective administrative units for easy exploitation. The 
punishment was from 15 days to 6 months of imprisonment.69 Still eager to maintain 
the people within their own administrative units so as to have easy and quick access to 
them whenever they needed labour, the French administration passed a major decree 
on July 9th, 1925, in which mention was first made of the words Laissez-Passer1Q 
Article III of the decree reads: “ In the interior of the territory, the authorisation to 
move from one’s administrative unit to another...will be done by the presentation of 
either: a Laissez-Passer, or a work permit issued by the administration.”71 It was either 
the Governor or his delegates who were to grant this authority and no authority would 
be granted unless a deposit of 500 francs was made payable on return and a special 
tax of 25 francs to include a passport was paid.
The Laissez-Passer contained the bearer’s name, the name of 
his village and its chief, the purpose of travelling and the length of time or 
approximate duration of the stay. If a European did not sign it, it was considered 
invalid and the date had to be current. Later, a medical visa was added to it as well as 
a fingerprint usually of the index finger of the bearer’s left hand. Despite all these 
precautions, there were many cases of escape for it was impossible, as the 
administration admitted, to catch trespassers for according to them, all Africans look
68 Kaptue, L ’administration coloniale, p. 164.
69 Marchand to Heads of Circonscriptions, No. 49 of August 18, 1928, APA 11367/A, NAY. Also see 
JOC, of May 6*, 1924, p.358, NAY.
70 JOC, No. 127 of August 15, 1925, pp.322-325, CAOM.
71 Ibid. p. 323. The translation is mine.
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alike 44 rien ne ressemble plus a un negre qu’un autre negre”.72 The institution and 
control of the Laissez-Passer was one of the major reasons for the constant flights to 
British Cameroon.
It was probably due to boundary control problems on sea as well that the 
French later issued another decree stating that persons travelling from the French to 
the British Cameroons or inversely should undertake passport formalities.73 Such 
persons had to have a Laissez-passer from the emigration and immigration services.74 
The Laissez-passer was made compulsory for journeys made both by land and by sea. 
Chiefs whose subjects escaped and were caught were strictly punished by the French 
administration. This made the chiefs, in turn to impose fines or corporal punishment 
on any caught escapee or his family member.75
Those caught by the administration had to do unpaid labour on public works 
before regaining their liberty. Sometimes, they were made to cut grass, dig holes; they 
were caned publicly to set an example and in the case of smuggling the goods were 
confiscated76 In Victoria Division for example, the capture of two groups of 
smugglers in Bimbia waters during 1928-1929 resulted in the seizure of goods valued 
at a total of £1, 218.77
72 Chief of the Circonscription of Edea to the Commissioner of the Republic, December 11, 1930, APA 
11367/A, NAY. Kaptue, “L’administration coloniale”, 179.
73 This decree was passed by the chief of security for Free French Africa, Captain Legret cf. APA 1119, 
Laissez-passer principes, avis du 9 mai,1942.
1A Report by Granier, December 14, 1940, APA 11801/B, NAY.
75 Eye witness accounts by Ntoko Fritz Mukete and Blasius Nzume on May 17, 1999 at Ndom, 
Cameroon. Interview with Professor V.G.Fanso on July 8th, 1999 at Yaounde, Cameroon.
76 Ibid.
77 Tc/1923/1, see memo. From Residence Cameroons Province to Secretary, Southern Provinces, 
Enugu, June 26th 1929, NAB.
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THE COLONIAL ECONOMY OF THE BORDERLANDS
The Anglo-French boundary divided ethnic groups whose livelihood 
traditionally depended upon an exchange of goods with either a part of their group or 
other closely related groups directly across the boundary. The imposition of the 
Anglo-French boundary therefore seriously threatened economic interdependence 
among border groups. What were the economic orientations of the British and the 
French? What were the principal sources of revenue and how did it affect the lives of 
the border people?
A major source of colonial revenue was taxation. Before the advent of the 
Germans, African subjects owed their chiefs loyalty, there was no taxation. It was in 
1903 that Governor Puttkamer, by Ordinance no. 53 of May 16th, introduced the 
notion of taxation. Tax was put at 3marks for men and 2 marks for women. The local 
people protested the imposition of taxes. In the Douala circonscription for example, 
two notables; Joseph Bell and Edimo Elang were taken to court for protesting against 
taxation and were condemned to five years of imprisonment and sent back to Campo, 
their place of birth.78 Tax was progressively increased from 3 to 5 and later to 10 
marks.79 It was in 1917 that Capitation (head tax) tax was re-enforced in the French 
sphere with a possibility of payment by undertaking prestation at 1 franc a day of 
labour. By 1920, women were made to pay capitation tax of 3 Frs. for those without 
children and 1 franc for women with children. Women with more than two children 
were exempted,80 In 1921, tax for women was increased to 5 francs for those without
78 Rapport Annuel pour Fannee 1924, pp. 3-4, CAOM.
79 This was around 12F SOcents of French currency and 10 pence a mark, but this rate depreciated after 
die Allied victory to about 6pence a mark, for more on currency parity, see next chapter.
80 Rapport Annuel pour Fannee 1924, p. 5, CAOM. The French explained the taxation of women 
without children by the fact that they had no excuse remaining at home whereas they could carry out 
economic activities.
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children and all those with one or more children were exempted. Two years later, tax 
for men was increased to lSffancs while women without children paid 10 francs or 
ten days of labour. Ngoh reports that in two Districts in the North, children over 
twelve years also paid the capitation tax-a situation, which was non-existent in the 
British zone.81 In places where commercial activities were at an embryonic stage, like 
in Kribi, Edea, Yaounde and Ebolowa, tax could be paid in good quality ivory or 
rubber. For ivory, below 6kg was evaluated at 3 francs; above 6kg was 8 francs while 
good quality rubber was evaluated at 1.50 francs per kg.82 For proof of tax payment, 
each individual received a metal piece or a box, which he had to carry along and show 
on request. Those exempted from taxation were workers, officers and soldiers, 
customs officers, civil servants and carriers for the administrator who earned a 
monthly salary.
Besides the capitation tax, French subjects had to pay a host of other taxes like 
the following: tax on trade, tax on recruiting labour, tax on hunting rights, tax on 
enrolment in civil registry, tax on living in a government area, tax on slaughtering 
cattle, market tax, landing tax for ships sailing on French waters, tax on the 
authorisation to recruit drivers, tax on Indigenous Courts, tax on permits to carry 
arms, tax on passport issuance, tax on the right to build in Douala, Edea and Kribi, 
and tax on organising celebrations and merry making among others.83 All tax 
defaulters had to pay 1,000 francs or serve three months imprisonment.
81 Ngoh, Camroon, p. 105.
82 JOC, No. 1, November 1, 1916, p. 4. CAOM. For more on Capitation tax in French Cameroon, 
AgeFom 2689/3, CAOM.
83 JOC, No. 3, January 1,1917, pp.2-8, CAOM.
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In addition to the capitation tax, there was a form of compulsory labour tax 
called Prestation, which was strictly a tax, which yielded labour for work on railway 
and public works. This tax was an annual obligation on all African adult males and it 
was instituted in French Cameroon by decree of October 9, 1925 with a slight 
increase of the daily rate from 1 to 2 Frs. a day in centres like Douala, Mbanga, 
Nkongsamba, Edea, Eseka and Yaounde.84 Elsewhere it was 1 franc 50 cents. If work 
exceeded the usual ten days, workers were sometimes given some minute 
remuneration. By 1926, the maximum length of time a worker could put in was 10-15 
days. Sometimes when they were taken to work at more than 225kms from their 
villages, workers were given a ration in kind throughout the period of work. When 
work exceeded, some small compensatory ration in kind was given. Provisions for 
health, nutrition, housing and transport were often grossly neglected.85
The use of the Corvee or forced labour by which the administration utilised 
force to recruit people to work for free made the French system of taxation 
burdensome on the taxpayers and they found as a solution, escapes, through bush 
paths to the British zone.86 The system utilised brutal local administrative guards who 
constantly harassed the people for proof of tax payments. This caused the people to 
work out ways of escaping such controls by taking refuge in the neighbouring British 
zone until the exercise was over. Some administrative reports record the brutality
84 Rapport Annuel pour l ’annee 1926, pp. 8-9, CAOM.
85 Leon Kaptue, Cameroun. Travail et main-d'oeuvre au Cameroun sous regime Frangais 1916-1952. 
Paris: L’Harmattan, 1986, pp. 106-126. From Commissioner of the Republic to Minister of Colonies, 
No. 7gm of March 24,1926, AgeFom 2689/3, CAOM. Also see JOCof August 4 and July 13, 1922, 
CAOM.
86 On interviewing some of our informants, it was said that the tax collectors’ maltreatment of the 
people also contributed to the constant flights. Interview with Professor Martin Njeuma on August 2nd 
1999 atBuea, Cameroon.
118
committed regularly by these administrative guards’ like Petrus Simo and Foneba on 
the Elong people.87
Sometimes, escapes were organised by chiefs. There is the example of one 
Elong village called Mwangwekan, which was cut into two by the Anglo-French 
boundary. The chief, Ngounte with the bulk of his subjects were placed under British 
administration while twenty-two of his people and a part of the village were subjects 
of the French administration. The administration of this village was a great trouble for 
the French because each time the officials passed to collect taxes, Ngounte arranged 
for his people to escape and take refuge in the British zone.88 They did the same for 
prestation. The people did so because tax was higher in the French zone than in the 
British zone and wages were relatively higher including better working conditions.89 
The minister complained that the salaries paid in French Cameroon were very low and 
wanted the situation to be redressed. To show this disparity in wages, some workers in 
the Njombe plantation converted workers’ salaries from francs to shillings to show 
how minimal their salaries were compared to those paid by the British in 
neighbouring towns like Tiko and Victoria. The revelation discouraged many local 
workers of the border area from working on the French side of the boundary 90 The 
news paper, La Depeche Colonials etMaritime reports that due to the high taxes, poor
87 Report No. 294/M of January 5,1938, by administrator Gariod, p. 7, APA 11796/C, NAY.
88 Report No. 294/M of January 5, 1938, by administrator Gariod, p. 7, APA 11796/C, NAY.
89 Minister of Colonies to the High Commissioner, Yaounde, July 19, 1939, No. 79, Aff. Pol. 2689/3/5 
CAOM.
90 Commissioner of French Republic to the Director of the Njombe plantation, No. 746g of October 25, 
1923, Aff. Pol. 2689/3/5, CAOM.
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wages and appalling working conditions on the French side, many workers fled to the 
British zone.91 What was the system of taxation in the British zone?
Other than the customs, the principal sources of revenue on the British zone 
were the poll tax, the pedlar’s licence and the jangali tax. These direct taxes were paid 
through the District and village heads. All able-bodied African male paid the poll or 
capitation tax. Exceptions were made for the old and infirm, scholars, policemen and 
members of the government staff specially seconded for service in the Cameroons. 
The Germans had earlier introduced this tax but at a higher rate: 10 marks for major 
towns and areas of high paying capacity and 6marks in Districts or parts where the 
higher rate appeared to be beyond the paying capacity of the people. The German 
system of poll tax was retained in all its essentials, but at a reduced rate. In Victoria 
and Kumba Divisions, which were the chief administrative areas of the border groups 
under study, the rate was Bs. Further inland, at Ossidinge Division for example, the 
rate varied from 7s to 3s while in the Bamenda Division it stood at 3s 6d.92 There was 
however one marked difference. Under the Germans all the tax went to general 
revenue, but under the British, half of the tax was paid to revenue. The other half was 
allocated for expenditure on works and services of public utility calculated to promote 
the development of the Division in which the tax was collected. At the early stage of 
British administration, Africans who were unable or unwilling to pay the poll tax were 
made to pay with their labour but this practice was later abolished. Village chiefs 
were responsible for the collection of this poll tax. They retained 10% of the sum 
collected as payment for their services. In areas where the bulk of the people were
91 “Le regime du travail au Cameroun”, issue of M y 17, 1925, CAOM. To remedy these poor 
conditions between 1922 and 1925, the French government introduced what was called la ration en 
nature comprising food usually rice (500g), meat (125g) and groundnuts (300g) per worker. This made 
the workers to develop remarkable muscles which enabled them work harder and for longer hours 
hence enhancing productivity. Private employers gave “chop money” of 6 francs per worker a day.
92 West Africa, Reports on the British sphere of the Cameroons for the year 1921,p.57, ICOMM.
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plantation labourers, the workers paid their taxes to the plantation managers who 
handed them over to the District heads. This system solved the problem of shortage of 
staff for tax collection that was faced by the British colonial administration.
Another local tax that yielded appreciable revenue was the pedlar’s licence or 
travelling trader’s tax. This was also a German tax that was retained. It was an annual 
tax payable by any African who traded beyond the limits of his village. Persons who 
owned cattle had to pay the jangali or cattle tax of Is per head for their cattle through 
the village heads. Ngoh reports that this British system of taxation worked well and 
without difficulties.93 Africans on the British side therefore, were not overburdened 
with a tax which did not exceed an income tax of Is. 6d. in the £. Besides taxation, 
both governments got revenue from customs duties.
Both the British and the French governments on the major roads and 
recognised trade routes crossing the Anglo-French boundary established customs 
stations. From 1916 to about 1919, there were very few customs and preventive posts 
along the provisional boundary. After 1922 when the partition was confirmed, many 
more customs and preventive control posts were opened along the Anglo-French 
boundary.94 These posts were at Victoria, Tiko, Misselele, Mudeka, Mpundu, 
Mombo, Mundame, Bombe, Ebubu, Mbonzie, Muesog, Nyan, Mwabi, Misso and 
Hunyopa.95 Also, the number of patrol and customs officers along the boundary 
increased as the years went by. Cameroons Reports stipulate that officers of the 
British preventive service for example, increased from 67 in 1927 to 99 in 1930 and
93 Ngoh, Cameroon, p. 105.
94 Ibid.
95 Ngoh, Ibid. Fanso, “Trans-Frontier relations”.,pp.325-328. Map below (p. 155) shows customs posts 
along the boundary.
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later to 138 in 1939.96 The British and French customs and preventive services usually 
operated in the same environments on their respective sides of the boundary.97 In the 
British Cameroons, the German Tariff of customs dues remained in force until 
November 1, 1921 when the Nigerian Tariff replaced it and the fiscal boundaries 
between Nigeria and the Cameroons were abolished.98 On the whole, customs dues 
and direct taxes made up the bulk of government revenue and it was because of the 
importance each power attached to customs revenue and the territorial trade within its 
sphere that there was a constant increase in the number of customs and preventive 
posts along the boundary. One of the tasks of these customs service was to check the 
flow of currency across the boundary. How did the boundary affect the currency that 
was in use?
Under the Germans, the currency in use in Kamerun was the German Mark. 
With the ousting of the Germans from the territory, the Mark was still in use for a 
while, a period during which both Mandatory powers settled their administrations. 
Both the French and the British administrations encouraged the use of western 
currency by paying the expanding labour force in European coin. They also insisted 
on receiving taxes in cash rather than in kind. According to Michael Crowder,99 notes 
were generally slow to be accepted by the Africans especially in French West Africa, 
it was not until 1916 that notes currency were made legal tender in Nigeria under 
which Southern Cameroons was administered.
96 West Africa, Reports on the Cameroons Province for the years 1927,1929 and 1939, ICOMM.
91 Pictures (pp. 156-161) below show the remains of the British and the French customs houses at 
Mbonzie-Edisse CDC camp; Tombel-Loum road; Mundek; and Mundame beach. The structures are 
now used by some local people as living quarters.
98 West Africa, Report on the Cameroons for the year 1921,p.57, ICOMM.
99 Crowder, West Africa, p. 279.
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The currency in use in the British sphere was the Pound Sterling -£,s.d. while 
the French used the French colonial franc-c.f.a.-Za Comunaute Frangaise Africaine, 
British currency had earlier been introduced in the nineteenth century along the coast 
when the British struggled to replace the slave trade with legitimate trade. When the 
Germans annexed Cameroon, the Mark was introduced but following the partition of 
Kamerun in 1916, the sterling and the franc were in full usage in their respective 
spheres. The monetary systems on both spheres were closely related to those of the 
Mandatory powers so as to ensure that international trade would not be unsettled by 
changes in the rates of exchange. The increasing circulation of European currencies 
led to the introduction of modern banking institutions to assist the progress in trade. 
The British established banks like Barclays and the Bank of British West Africa with 
branches in Victoria while their French counterparts opened the Banque de VAfrique 
Occidentale and La Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et TIndustrie 
(B.I.C.I.C) with branches in Douala. Up to 1925, the German mark was still in 
circulation in parts of Southern Cameroons. This was particularly along the boundary 
with French Cameroon where it was officially still kept in circulation with the 
franc.100 As compared to the franc, Sterling enjoyed an international reputation and a 
marked degree of stability. This was why although Southern Cameroons suffered 
some currency difficulties in its internal trade; externally it enjoyed some advantages 
having Sterling as its principal foreign exchange currency.
The exploitation o f natural and human resources o f the borderland
Following the large-scale expropriation of the very fertile soils around Mount 
Cameroon for plantation agriculture, the German colonial government prescribed 
restricted reserves for the local Bakweri and Duala who originally owned the lands.
100 Annual Report on the Cameroons Province for the year 1925, NAB.
123
By 1914 German planters held nearly 3,000,000 acres of land and employed some 
18,000 workers.101 At that time there were some 58 estates in the colony, which 
cultivated a variety of crops, including rubber, palm products, cocoa and to a lesser 
extent tobacco, kola, tea, coffee and bananas.
In 1914/15, following British occupation of the area, the properties of German 
planters were confiscated and turned over to the Custodian of Enemy Property. When 
shortly afterwards the British took over the administration of the area, a government 
department was formed to manage all of the plantations. By 1922, the British 
Mandate Authority decided to get rid of them as the administrative costs of 
maintaining them were said to be prohibitive. The British Mandate Authority 
considered the option of returning the plantation lands to the Bakweri but finally 
decided to put them up for auction, with a restriction on bidding by ex-enemy 
nationals. Very few were sold. Two years later, in 1924, another auction was held in 
London, this time without restrictions on German bids. The former German owners 
bought almost all the estates. By 1924, although British Southern Cameroons was 
under British rule, there were three times as many German expatriates as British and 
the trade pattern in the territory was dominated by Germany. It was to Germany that 
the bulk of the plantation produce was still shipped and from which one half of the 
territory’s imports were derived.
At the beginning of the World War II, the Custodian of Enemy Property 
expropriated the German estates again and considerations were given on how to 
dispose of them. The Bakweri elite group agitated for their retrieval but eventually, 
the British Trusteeship Authority decided to buy the plantations from the Custodian of 
Enemy Property for £850.000 and lease them to the Cameroons Development
101 Piet Konings, Labour resistance in CameroonManageriai stratergies & labour resistance in the 
agro-industrial plantations o f Cameroon. Leiden: African Studies Centre, 1993, p.37.
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Corporation (CDC) in 1946 for a period of 60 years renewable.102 The CDC was 
charged with the responsibility of developing its estates and to pay special attention to 
the workers5 social welfare. It had to pay direct taxes to the government and all its 
profits had to be used for the benefit of the people of the Trust Territory.
According to the Cameroons Report for 1921, the plantations were “dotted 
along the Anglo-French boundary from Tiko to Essossung”.103 Those that were very 
near to or closely affected by the boundary were the plantations in Tiko, Missellele, 
Penja-Njombe, Buba, Tombel, Ngab, Nyassosso, Kola-Nkute, Ngol and Essossoung. 
The plantation of the African Fruit Company, Tiko, was very close to the boundary 
and along the coastline. That was precisely where pillar number 16 was placed. This 
plantation was not cut through by the boundary but due to its closeness to the 
boundary, the Anglo-French Boundary Commission demanded the full support of the 
managers before delimiting that portion of the frontier. The Westafrikanische 
Pflanzungsgesellschaft Victoria (W. A.P.V) owned the Misselele plantations. This was 
a very extensive and well-developed plantation and its main crops were rubber and 
cocoa. When the Germans left, the Picot line drawn by the British and the French cut 
through the plantation leaving a smaller portion of the French side.104 This resulted to 
further protests by the French who asked for an adjustment of the boundary to their 
advantage. After modifications, the British eventually took over the entire plantation 
resulting in an Anglo-French rivalry over the area.
102 Konings, Labour resistance in Cameroon, p.39. S. H.Bederman, The Cameroons Development 
Corporation: partner in national growth, Victoria: Bota CDC, 1968, p. 19, By same author, Plantation 
agriculture in Victoria Division West Cameroon, An historical introduction. Paris: CNRS, 1975, pp. 
349-360.
103 West Africa, Report for the Cameroons Province for the year 1921,p.66, ICOMM.
104 Victor Julius Ngoh, “ Anglo-French rivalry over the Misselele plantations, 1916-1920: A case study 
on the economic motives for the partition of Africa”, Journal o f the Third World Studies, XII, 2.
(1995): 273-299.
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Another border resource that was exploited by both colonial administrations, 
were the tobacco plantations of Penja Nyombe/Njombe and Djongo in the lower 
Moungo.105 After efforts to resolve who should own these plantations, they were 
eventually claimed by the French. It was probably by way of compensation that other 
plantations along the boundary like those of Buba, Tombel, Ngab and Nyassosso were 
given to the British. These other plantations grew mainly coffee, cocoa, palm-oil, 
tobacco and to a lesser degree kola. The tobacco that was grown around this Kumba 
area and beyond was good quality and mostly exported. The area also had large units 
of timber exploitation notably at Ebonji, Etam, Mahole and Bakole in the North West. 
These timber concessions had a processing unit at Etam where there was a sawmill.106 
Further north was the Kola Nkut (Nkute) coffee plantation established by the 
Germans on two villages Kola and Nkut. Under the Germans, both villages cultivated 
the plantation with relatively no problems. The provisionary partition cut through the 
plantation leaving Kola in the French zone and Nkut in the British zone.107 Both 
administrations decided to resolve this problem through their land commissioners. 
Eventually the plantation was ceded to France while Britain was given the Essosung 
tobacco plantation.108 From fieldwork, I collected data that one C. F. Raethke owned
105 Marc Michel, “Les plantations Allemandes du mont Cameroun, 1885-1914” Revue frangaise 
d'histoire d'outre-mer, TomLWI, No.207 (2e trimestre, 1970): 189.
106 S.N.Ejedepang-Koge, The tradition o f a people, p.296
107 Anglo-French Boundary Commissioner to Resident, Letter No. 17/2/1939, APA 11383, NAY.
108 The owner’s son came and visited the plantation again in 1985 with the hope of seeing how to 
revive the farm and thus offering more jobs for the local people. In the annex are letters that were 
exchanged between the son of the German plantation owner and the Chief of Ndom village.
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this plantation from 1903 to 1914. When the British took over this plantation, they 
changed the original product from tobacco to tea.109
To the North of Essosung was another German plantation along the boundary 
and its exploitation caused problems for the British and the French administrations. 
The Ngol tobacco plantation belonged to the K.E.G Company and after the 1914-18 
war, the Germans had left no authentic plan of the plantation.110 The Picot line cut 
through this plantation and as a result the British and the French colonial 
administrations represented by their local administrators Ripert and Williams tried to 
resolve its division and exploitation through several meetings.
While negotiations were going on, the local people of neighbouring 
villages on both sides of the boundary (Ngol-Manehas, Nsung-Mwamenam, 
Asomengoe and Ninong) appropriated some of the land of the Ngol plantation and 
exploited it fully with coffee, cocoa and banana plants.111 When the plantation was 
finally ceded to the French, the chief of Ngol imposed a capitation tax on exploiters 
from the British zone. The boundary commission proposed a lease contract of thirty 
years for the exploiters renewable. In order to convey the plantation products to the 
coast for exportation, both administrations embarked on constructing and improving 
upon the German communication infrastructure notably roads and railroads.
The first motorable road, which was built by the Germans, ran parallel to the 
boundary from Douala through Mbanga, Loum, Manjo, Nkongsamba, and Melong to 
the Western Province. This was the sole motorable road that transported persons and
109 Letter No. 65 of 17/2/1939, APA 11383, NAY. These tea bushes have now grown very wild and are 
like giant trees. Pictures (p. 162) below show the ruins of the manager’s compound and his house.
110 Anlo-French Boundary Commissioner to the Senior Surveyor, Anglo-French Boundary 
Commission. Memo No. BC:8/1938/27 of February 6, 1939, APA 11383 Plantation de Ngol, NAY.
111 Ibid.
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goods from Northern Nigeria through Northern Cameroon, the Western, and Littoral 
Provinces to the coast. The road was in the French administered zone but was used by 
both the British and the French administered peoples. It really was the only way by 
which people could move from the Victoria and Kumba Divisions to the Bamenda 
Division. The French maintained this major road and tightened their control on the 
heavy flow of goods especially that which was directed to the seaport in Douala.
Still on the French side was the German Northern railway line, which ran from 
the coast at Douala to Nkongsamba. This line also ran adjacent to the boundary and as 
a result the French government frequently recruited labour for its maintenance mostly 
from the border population. On the other hand this situation served as a job advantage 
to these border peoples. According to some informants, the work put in was usually 
far too much for the wages paid.112 On the British side the only roads, which were 
designed for motor traffic, were Victoria to Buea (lbmiles), Victoria to Bibundi 
(25miles) and Buea to Tiko (1 Smiles).113 These roads were of permanent construction 
with stone bridges and culverts. The Germans appeared to have given little attention 
to the building of public roads and rail roads on this part of the territory for what was 
more in use were roads and railways constructed in the plantations to convey raw 
materials to the coastal sea ports at Tiko and Victoria. The West African Plantation 
Company, Victoria, is reported to have had a railroad with numerous branches serving 
their coastal plantations. 114
The British administration constructed 20 miles of road north of Kumba and 
12 miles south of Ossidinge but the streams intersecting these roads were bridged
112 Interview with some people at Bombe Bakundu headed by John Epoke and Manfred Meloko on the 
11/5/1999.
113 Annual Report for the Cameroons Province, 1928, NAB.
114 Ibid.
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with temporary structures. However, by the mid-50s, the British had constructed the 
Kumba-Mamfe road, which connected Cameroon (Western border) to Nigeria 
(Eastern border). Communications generally throughout the territory were very 
difficult owing to the rough and rocky nature of the country. The major rivers used for 
water transport were the Rivers Meme, Moungo, and Wouri. The last two were 
navigable for six to seven months in a year. The Moungo for the most part acted as a 
natural boundary and was navigable from the Moungo River delta to the Mundame 
beach. Water transport was known to be the cheapest means of transporting bulky 
commodities over long distances.
The principal ports of import and export in the area under study were at Tiko, 
Victoria, and Douala. There was a natural wharf at Tiko, which was approachable for 
steamers of considerable draft. Tiko was declared a seaport on August 1st 1928. 
Products form the Mpundu and Meanja plantations, which were transported, through 
the Moungo River by launches and lighters were exported through the Tiko port. The 
Victoria and Douala ports were beautifully situated with deep-water close-in shore. 
These like Tiko, were the major ports for the shipping of imports and exports. After 
the colonial exploitation of natural resources and the means of transporting raw 
materials to the coast for exportation to Europe, we shall now look at how the human 
resources were also exploited.
Under German rule the system of forced labour, not only for public 
works and railways, but also for privately owned plantations near Victoria, was 
adopted policy. Compulsory labour was entirely government controlled with poor 
working, housing, and health conditions. When the British took over, they also 
utilised forced labour during the early years of their administration before using 
voluntary labour. They later abolished forced labour for private concerns and official
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recruitment. The only compulsory labour that was permitted was for public works and 
services such as road construction and transport, in the districts to which the labourers 
belonged. The major employers of manual labour were the administration, the various 
Native Authorities, and the plantations management. There were also some few local 
private planters like Chief Ntoko of Bakossi who owned large cocoa farms and 
employed labour as well. Planters generally had difficulties in acquiring sufficient 
labour from the domestic communities surrounding the coastal plantations. Some of 
the main reasons for this were: the area was sparsely populated; the local population 
hated working for the expropriators of their land; harsh and appalling working 
conditions and plantation labour was often equated with slavery. More importantly, 
the local communities were largely self-sufficient and were exposed to early contacts 
with western trade, religion, and education. They did not want to ‘degrade5 
themselves from brokers in the trade between Europeans and farmers of the interior. 
Some of them also planted cocoa, which gave them cash and made them employ 
labour too. As a result, labour had to be ‘freed5 from the interior through various 
forms of coercion to the plantations of the coast.
With the British, labour was thoroughly systematised with the use of Labour 
Commissioners and other officials. Regulations for the housing, feeding and medical 
treatment of the labourers when at work were far better than those across the 
boundary. The British authorities impressed upon the German planters the need to 
improve upon the conditions of service prevailing on the plantations so as to make 
plantation labour more attractive. Motivational inducements then introduced included 
the provision of larger and better food rations, small plots of land for food cultivation, 
usually called ‘chop farms5, higher wages and sometimes reimbursement of transport
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expenses.115 The construction of motorable roads and the creation of increased 
transport facilities promoted labour migration in those regions, which were most 
remote and disconnected from the plantation areas.
Some Districts lost population while others grew. Labour was drawn to a 
considerable extent from the more thickly populated regions of the Central, Western 
and Northwest resulting in a reduction of the population of those areas, which moved 
to swell the population of the plantation areas. That explains why the population 
figures of Bamenda, Kumba Ossidinge and Victoria Divisions which stood at 
220,000; 62,766; 53,281; and 22,867 respectively in 1921 rose to 188,133; 67,024; 
63,115; 35,829 in 1927.116 One of the reasons for this attraction was the fact that the 
British banned all compulsory labour and improved the working and living conditions 
of the plantation workers as opposed to what obtained in the French sphere. Under the 
British, migration to the coast became an important means of earning cash much 
needed for direct taxation.
The demand for labour was high and almost 50% of the total labour force on 
the plantations at the time came from the French Cameroon particularly from the 
Yaounde area, either having been there for some time or having gone there recently. 
This population movement affected the supply and availability of labour. Leon 
Kaptue distinguishes two types of movements, which he calls positive and negative 
migrations.117 Negative migrations were those, which led to the shortage or loss of 
labour in an area while positive migration led to the solution of the problem of labour 
recruitment. French Cameroon suffered from negative migration and as more and
115 Konings, Labour resistance in Cameroon, p. 59.
116 West Africa, Reports on the Cameroons Province for the years 1921 and 1927, pages 52 and 105 
respectively, ICOMM. There was a movement of people from Bamenda to the other towns, that 
explains the drop in that particular area.
117 Leon Chedjou Kaptue, Travail et main-d'oeurre au Cameroun sous regime Frangais 1916-1952 
Paris: L'Harmattan, 1986, p.93. Also see APA 10779, Main d'oeuvre et immigration 1937-1947 NAY.
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more workers left for British Cameroons, the territory registered an acute shortage of 
labour. On the British side, the effects of positive migration and labour gain enhanced 
productivity. According to Konings, the percentage of migrant labour force reduced 
as the years went by; from 52% in 1926, it fell to 13% in 1950 and later to 5% in 
I960.118 The reasons for this decrease could be the efforts of the French Mandate 
Authority to stabilize labour within its territory. Also, numbers were driven down 
because of the mechanization of the agro-industrial system of exploitation and more 
likely the stabilization of the labour force. Between 1946 and 1960, this decline in the 
labour force was greatly compensated by an increasing flow of labour from the 
Northwest and Western highlands and from Nigeria.119 The British never complained 
about the influx for it meant more manpower and taxes for the administration. In the 
British zone even though daily wages were not very high, more liberal ration 
allowance and other inducements such as a bonus for good work were provided. 
Moreover it was galling to the French to be losing manpower especially to the 
Germans who still owned those plantations at the time. The recruitment of labour in 
the French Cameroon for another territory was not prohibited, but was subject to the 
authorization of the Administration, It is interesting to note however that on the 
British side, the exit of women was prohibited by order of June 30th, 1917 indicating 
that emigration was considered by both administrations to be unfavourable to the 
development of the country. This specific ban on female out-migration suggests that 
the government wanted to maintain a stable percentage of its procreation force. It 
could also be that because women were involved in illegal trade across the boundary, 
the administration wanted to keep them within their confines.
118 West Africa, Reports on the Cameroons Province for the years 1921 and 1927, pages 52 and 105 
respectively, ICOMM.
119 Konings, Labour resistance in Cameroon, p.68.
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In the French zone, the administration used forced labour or Corve for the 
building of communication infrastructure and government residential quarters. 
Forced labour was defined as the use of force by the administration to acquire labour 
for government or public usage. Both men and women were forced to dig and 
maintain public roads and the duration of this forced labour was six weeks after 
which the worker was given a clearance card called "Samafou" by the workers. This 
could possibly be a deformation of the French phrase ca m ’a fa it meaning, "this is me 
done"- a kind of self-resignation to a compulsory task. The official duration of labour 
was hardly ever respected by the administration. Commutation was possible at the 
rate of 2ffancs per day of labour but was rarely allowed in practice. Progressively, the 
number of days was increased and a person could be made to work two or more times 
a year. The result was massive flights to the British zone, which offered better 
working conditions. Government soldiers sent to supervise the work were very stern 
and harsh on workers. Two men among several others were reported to have lost their 
lives in this harsh labour system in the persons of Messrs Fabian Abade (Bakossi) 
and Ngale Ngomba (Bakweri).120 Before the Second World War, in 1930, a major 
principle was put in place by the convention of the International Labour 
Organisation. Following the ILO code, after 1930 the promulgation of free labour 
was reinforced in Cameroon by the law of January 1st 1953 by which no person could 
be subjected to forced or involuntary labour.121 Progressively voluntary labour 
replaced forced labour in Cameroon.
120 Interview with some eye witnesses to this labour system, Blasius Akwe Nzume and Ntoko Fritz 
Mukete on May 16,1999 at Ndom-Bakossi, Cameroon.
121 In 1953, a Labour Office was opened in Cameroon that recruited free labour. Rapport Annuel de 1’ 
amufe 1954, p. 170, CAOM.
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Corve was also used in the construction of Government Residential 
Quarters or Les chcmtiers d'utilite publique at Nkongsamba. Many sun-dried bricks 
had to be made by the labourers as an obligation to the administration. This called for 
a strong labour force, a good part of which came from the neighbouring border 
groups, notably the Mbo, Bakossi, Balondo and the Balong. This work was styled by 
the workers as "Njockmassi" which meant "work in vain" or unpaid labour. Because 
France was trying to operate the administration with as few European personnel as 
possible and at minimum expense, a great deal of the work took place under the 
direction of African chiefs who supplied the labourers and food needed for the 
construction projects. Under such conditions waste and abuses by the chiefs were 
bound to occur. The administration punished workers who deserted and farmers who 
did not produce foodstuffs demanded of them. These requisitions imposed on the 
people caused massive desertions by conscripts who fled to the British zone. Besides 
labour migrations, some of the reasons for boundary criss-crossing were trade and 
smuggling.
As early as 1917, twenty years before the boundary was demarcated, 
the British began reflecting on the area's economic potential. According to the 
Colonial Office Report of that year, Walter H. Long, the Secretary of State for 
Colonies noted that if the French imposed import and export duties along the 
boundary before the end of the war, Britain would reciprocate. Eventually that might 
put an end to trade between the two spheres especially in the North with the 
importation and trade in spirits.122 In that same year the Government remarked that 
numerous local traders brought their goods mostly palm oil and kernels by canoe 
across the proposed boundary from Douala to Victoria and Tiko. Besides Rio del Rey
122 Long to Governor of Nigeria, No. 2428/1918 of January 4,1918, C0649/15, PRO.
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on Cameroon's extreme Western boundary with Nigeria, the other two harbours in the 
British zone were Victoria and Tiko where the bulk of trade in the region under study 
was conducted. By 1917, local trade across the boundary was not very intense, 
Foumeau however proposed that the French government should collect duties on 
goods crossing the provisional boundary but Long turned down that proposal. This 
was on the grounds that the actual trade going across that boundary was very small 
and would hardly pay for the cost of maintaining customs stations on the boundary.123
Article 7(v) of Mandate B required the Mandatory powers only to 
"exercise a strict control over the sale of spirituous liquor" for the Liquor Traffic 
Convention (LTC) and the Arms Traffic (AT) were to be applied in Cameroon and 
Togoland.124 This was important for the small but constant amount of smuggling that 
went across the boundary at the time was based on liquor, wines, beers and cigarettes. 
Under the Germans, licences to sell liquor were granted to certain companies and no 
restriction was imposed on sale, except that soldiers and police were not allowed to 
purchase liquor of any sort without a written permit. The situation appeared to have 
been well under control.
It is interesting here to outline the difference between the British and 
French economic and trade policies. They both initially endeavoured to ensure that 
the trade of their administered territories was conducted with the metropolis or with 
metropolitan companies within the territory. The contrast in policies raised the 
problem of price dissimilarities between the two spheres. In the name of "tariff 
assimilation" the French extended to their colonies the tariffs protecting French 
industry, thereby effectively forcing the colonies to buy French products and to sell
123 Despatch of November 26th 1920, C0649/21, PRO.
124 West Africa Report on the British sphere of the Cameroons for the year 1922, p.58, ICOMM.
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their products to France.125 By contrast, the British policy of importing European 
goods from the cheapest possible sources imposed relatively low import duties but 
fairly high export duties.126 Unlike the situation in the French zone, there was no 
policy of preventing foreign firms from operating in British colonies. The result was 
that it was cheaper to buy in the British zone and sell at a higher price in the French 
zone. Many traders therefore bought from markets in Victoria, Tiko, Kumba, Tombel 
and Mwambong to sell at Douala, Mbanga, Loum, Nkongsamba and Melong. Goods 
that were usually smuggled for sale from the French to the British side were tobacco, 
salt, clothes and stockfish. Such smugglers took the Loum- Kupe- Tombel road to 
avoid customs control. Sometimes they went from Tombel to Edibinjock to Mombo 
and then to Mbanga; this was a popular route used by the Balong traders.127
Under the British, (by a Proclamation of November 15th, 1916) the 
importation of all trade spirits was prohibited and by a further proclamation of July 
3rd, 1920, the importation also of injurious spirits, such as absinthe was prohibited.128 
Also, the distilling of any spirits in the British sphere was made a criminal offence in 
Cameroon as in the rest of British West Africa. Imports from the UK were allowed 
and encouraged. Additionally, the Germans had forbidden the import of muzzle- 
loaders and powder. Local people were not allowed to bear arms except in cases 
where an employer certified that his employee was responsible and reliable. In that 
case, the employee(s) could carry a short gun. The rest of the people were permitted
125 J. A. Ballard, ‘The colonial phase in French West Africa’ in J.F. Ade Ajayi and I.Espie (eds.),^ 
thousand years o f West African history. Ibadan: University Press, 1965, p. 449.
126 Fanso, ‘Trans-Frontier relations’, p.319. It is possible that die British were sufficiently confident of 
the strength of their own trading position that they later disdained measures to divert colonial trade 
artificially to Great Britain and they used this economic openness of their own empire as an argument 
for forcing open the trade of other colonial empires. No doubt there was a degree of change with the 
Depression in the 1930s.
127 Interview with chief Ntoko Fritz Mukete on May 16, 1999 at Ndom village and also with a former 
smuggler, of the Bakossi group-British zone, John Ndode Ngwese on May 14, 1999 at Bangem.
128 West Africa Report on the British sphere of the Cameroons for the year 1922, p.58, ICOMM.
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only to carry a weaker gun, the muzzle-loader, for the protection of their crops and for 
hunting. The import of these guns was strictly limited and their distribution 
controlled.129
Before the introduction of the Nigerian Tariff on November 1st, 1921, 
no clear records were kept of or duty charged on imports from the French sphere. 
Around 1923, when customs barriers were imposed, ethnic groups on the West of the 
Moungo River resisted these barriers. This was because the Moungo was the natural 
outlet for their trade down to the coast or by the Northern Railway line to the port of 
Douala, which was placed in the French sphere.130 The situation was aggravated that 
same year by a fall in the value of the Franc resulting in a disturbing effect on some 
imported articles in British Cameroons. This caused a marked degree of smuggling 
from the adjoining French territory, for example trade in cigarettes and spirits, which 
sold more cheaply in East Cameroon than in British Cameroons.131 The border people 
took a prominent part in this clandestine boundary trade which was carried on to a 
large extent by the Bakossi, Duala, Balong, Bakweri, Mbo, Balondo and their 
neighbors of both the British and the French spheres. This profitable illegal trade 
attracted many non-border people from other ethnic groups notably the Yaounde, 
Bafia and Hausas to settle along the border.
These same reports also reveal that the number of persons arrested and 
convicted for smuggling and irregular boundary crossing increased with time. Of the 
68 persons arrested in 1927, 56 were convicted; in 1930, 258 were arrested and 238 
were convicted while in 1931, there were 748 persons arrested and convicted.132
129 West Africa Report on the British sphere of the Cameroons for the year 1922, p. 5 8, ICOMM.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid. Also see from Governor to Secretary o f State for Colonies, December 29, 1925, No. 1070, 
CO649/30, PRO.
132 West Africa, Reports on the Cameroons Province for the various years, ICOMM,
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Fanso attributes this increase in the number of arrests to the watchfulness of the 
preventive men and also to the large number of inexperienced smugglers joining the 
trade.133 This petty smuggling along the Southern portion of the Anglo-French inter- 
Cameroons boundary particularly dealing with goods and currency was rampant. In 
the cash crop growing areas of the South, notably in Bakossi land where planters hid 
the bulk of their harvests and sold it in French Cameroon, smuggling of coffee and 
cocoa was high.134
In the riverine areas and along the part of the boundary where the River 
Moungo formed the boundary, canoes and other small boats were used in this illegal 
trade. As a result, British and French patrol officers of the police and customs 
departments used motor-launches and other speedboats, which enabled them to track 
down smugglers and carry-out large seizures of contraband goods along the coast and 
River Moungo. Water-Guards also tracked down smugglers on the British side. All 
those arrested were taxed double for their goods and if they could not pay, they were 
punished. Consequently, some took the flight option and abandoned their goods on 
seeing the customs officers.135 According to Martin Njeuma,136 chiefs were involved 
in breaking the rules for they organised smuggling expeditions, which were very 
profitable. Border farmers, particularly neighbourhood women who crossed the 
boundary several times in the same day to their farms and homes, aided smugglers.
133 Fanso, ‘Trans-Frontier relations’, p.332-338.
134 Interview with Ngarna Francois at Ebonji village on May 18,1999.
135 Some informants and former smugglers like John Ndode and Mayong Emmanuel reported that 
sometimes they were forced to dump their goods either in the forest or in the River Moungo when 
confronted by customs officers.
136 Interview with Professor Martin Njeuma on August 2nd, 1999 at Buea, Cameroon.
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They usually put the contraband goods in the farm baskets and covered them up with 
food crops or vegetables. Customs officers on either side of the boundary seldom 
suspected them. Farm and market women along the boundary played a significant role 
in this clandestine trade for according to Fanso, unlike men, they were not required to 
obtain travel papers to cross the boundary to their farms and nearby markets.137 
French administrative reports contain complaints about the difficulties faced by the 
administration in controlling border groups notably the Mbo (Mwangwekan), Bakossi 
(Mwamenam), Balondo, Balong and the riverine Mungo, Duala and Bakweri.138 From 
interviews in the creeks of Mokuta, Modeka, Misselele and Kombo, fishermen 
recounted stories of how they had fished clandestinely and cunningly escaped from 
French patrol customs boats.139 French control apparently was more a problem to 
them than that of the British. There were constant complaints of harassment of the 
local fishermen by the French guards. Some of the informants laid stress on the fact 
that the guards usually arrested women and young girls and took them away, probably 
because they were more vulnerable. This tightened control of the boundary was 
perhaps geared at safeguarding the economic (human and material) resources of both 
spheres. How did the 1929 world crisis and the World War II affect boundary 
movements?
The 1929 World Crisis and boundary movements
According to Susan Martin, in French West Africa, the crisis of the 1930s had 
its greatest impact upon European traders and officials: “the crisis underlined their
137 Fanso, ‘Trans-Frontier relations’, p.336.
138 Rapport du 4 Janvier, 1938 et du 28 Janvier, 1938, APA 11796/C, NAY. Rapport du 12 Juin, 1939, 
APA 11801/B, NAY. Rapport du 8 au 14 Decembre 1940, APA 11801/B, NAY. Rapport du 15 Mai, 
1946, APA10417/C, NAY.
139 Interview with the chief of Mokuta, Ebirabo and a group of village elders on April 26th, 1999 at 
Mokuta. The bulk of the population today in those fishing port creeks are the Ogoni from Nigeria.
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weaknesses: the narrow colonial revenue base; the absence of local credit sources; and 
the “archaic” commercial structure of many firms”.140 African farmers were forced to 
bear fresh financial burden as taxation shifted from customs duties towards fixed 
capitation taxes. Many local farmers fled to towns yet there too employment 
opportunities were shrinking and wages falling. Thus began the gradual 
transformation of the impoverished peasantry into the urban poor, a process which 
Coquery-Vidrovitch argues continues today.141
Others share Martin’s assertion that the burden of the crisis was shifted upon 
the peasantry. According to Albert Nzula, the crisis resulted in mass impoverishment 
and ruin of the peasantry as the burden of the crisis was transferred on the shoulders 
of the toiling masses of the colonies in Africa especially.142 Agriculture was 
undergoing a process of accelerated degradation. The local farmer had to grow export 
crops despite the falling prices in order to obtain money to pay taxes. The lower the 
price of export crops the more he had to produce even to the point of starvation. 
African peasants in French West Africa were reduced to the level of bare survival and 
deprived even of the reflex to revolt.143
The prices of raw materials produced in the colonies as well as wages were 
lowered drastically. Of the three major products Cameroon was producing (palm oil, 
palm kernels and cocoa) there was a drop of 4% on the total tonnage of production
140 S. M. Martin, “The Long Depression: West African export producers and the world economy, 
1914-45”. In I. Brown (ed.), The economies o f Africa and Asia in the inter-war Depression. London: 
Routledge, 1989, p. 81.
141 C. Coquery-Vidrovitch (ed), “ L’Afrique et la crise de 1930 (1924-1938)”, Revne Frangaise 
d'Histoire d ’Outre-Mer, 63 (1976):388-96.
142 Albert T. Nzula, Ivan I. Potekhin, Aleksander Z. Zusmanovich, Forced labour in colonial Africa. 
London: Zed Press, 1979, p.92.
143 Martin, “The Long Depression”, p. 81. Coquery-Vidrovitch, “ L’Afrique et la crise”, pp. 411-12.
140
despite the fact that this was a young colony with newly installed equipment.144 Many 
plantations and other business units folded resulting in labour redundancy. In forestry 
exploitation, most sites were closed, a few barely hung on just to keep specialist 
workers for their training had been long and costly to the company. In the 
Nkongsamba Circonscription for example, in 1931, there were was a total of 5,850 
workers involved in trade, rural farms, forestry and industrialisation exploitation units 
but by 1932, the number reduced to 2,350.145 Some of the redundant workers decided 
to go back to their places of origin while others preferred to remain in their former 
places of work. In the agricultural sector, most planters stayed longer in Cameroon 
because they could not afford to return to France. The French administration sent 
masses of unemployed people by railroad to their places of origin to avoid 
vagabondage and other social ills, and did so by force. Mass ruin and starvation 
became increasingly widespread among farmers due to impossibility of obtaining any 
suitable price for their agricultural products. Many left the villages for the towns 
where they met with the rising wave of unemployment in plantations and working 
sites of public utilities and railways.146 Colonial governments simply did not 
recognize the problem of unemployment. To combat the Depression, the French 
administration in Cameroon reduced the prices of goods and cut the costs of railway 
freight as well as taxes on trade. Furthermore it increased the head-tax by seven 
percent because of the falling prices.147 Capitation tax was high and the administration 
did nothing to lower it. The local people paid more taxes like the medical tax and a
144 Government measures taken to overcome the crisis in French Cameroon, Letter from Chamber of 
Commerce to Mr. B. Diagne of May 14, 1932, Aff. Pol. 2535/5, p. 2, CAOM.
145 Rapport Annuel pour l ’annee 1932, p. 131, CAOM.
146 Rapport Annuel pour Fannee 1932, pp. 130-1, CAOM.
147 Ngoh, Cameroon,p. 107. Nzula et al., Forced labour, p. 100.
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tax on women even those pregnant and those breastfeeding.148 Government revenue 
dropped on both sides and both administrations reduced the size of the administrative 
establishments. Martin says that, the Long Depression on the other hand caused less 
of a fiscal crisis in British than in French West Africa but that not withstanding, the 
early thirties saw vigorous tax protests in the British territories.149 As a result of the 
rebellion, British officials were ultimately forced to reduce, and in some cases to 
abandon tax imposition.
Ngoh says that in British Cameroons, it was only later on that the government 
decided to tax the chiefs, institute personal taxation on income, and in 1932 froze the 
head-tax.150 As European owned plantations fell short of expectations, indigenous- 
owned plantations were reorganised into separate small plots and distributed to small 
holders. The point I am making about the Depression is that a good part of the laid-off 
workers went across the boundary on their way home without respecting boundary 
rules. Those from areas under French control leaving plantations under British control 
for example needed to have a pass to cross over. Besides the financial burden, it was 
cumbersome for the border people to go to the administrative pass-issuing centres 
situated some 15 or more miles away for a Laissez-passer to use and visit relatives 
living just under one or two miles away,151 The next crisis period that had an effect on 
the boundary was the post-World War Two period when both territories faced labour
148 Chamber of Commerce to Mr. B. Diagne, Aff. Pol. 2535/5, 1930/32, p. 1, CAOM.
149 Martin, “The Long Depression”, p. 81. In December 1929, tlie introduction of Direct taxation in 
Eastern Nigeria led to the “Aba Riots” or the Igbo Women’s War, accompanied by an export market 
boycott and by many expressions of economic grievance. In the Gold Coast, an attempt in 1931 to 
introduce an urban income tax met with such opposition that it was shelved for several years. European 
government salaries were cut by 10% in 1932 to cover the resulting revenue deficit.
150 Ngoh, Cameroon, p. 107.
151 Interview with Mayong Emmanuel on June 18th 1999, and with Mukete Abel on April 20th, 1999 at 
Mombo (Balong ), Mbome Daniel and Ngape Nicholas on April 13th and 14th at Mwangwekan village, 
Cameroon. The bulk of the people were leaving from the British to die French zone.
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shortages and currency crises.152 The situation caused many restrictions on cross­
boundary movements. But first of all let us examine the situation during the war.
World War Two and the Anglo-French inter-Cameroons boundary.
It should be recalled here that as from the close of 1937, the Anglo-French 
Land Commissioners were already demarcating the boundary beginning from the sea 
northwards. Works of delimitation and demarcation came to a halt with the news of 
the outbreak of the war in Europe. In the Cameroons, just before the outbreak of the 
war, the British and French Mandate administrations were faced with the problem of 
pro-fascist propaganda and espionage activities aimed at winning over the sympathy 
of Africans for their erstwhile German colonial master,153
Pro-German activities took off from the French administered part of the 
territory precisely in Douala where in 1933, a pro-German society was formed called 
Kamerun Duala Volksbund.154 One year after its formation, the founder Peter Mukuri 
Dikongo and his assistants Peter Ebwea and Hans Ferdinand spread the movement 
across the Anglo-French boundary into the British zone changing its name to 
Kamerun Eingebomen Deutsch Gesinnten Verein (KEDGV).155 On the British zone 
the headquarters of KEDGV activities was in Tiko, one of the major border port 
towns belonging to the Bakweri group. According to Ralph Austen and Jonathan 
Derrick, this was a small group of about twenty members who requested the
152 With the outbreak of the Second World War, the Long Depression entered its fmai and severe 
phase, hi British West Africa, the war led to die establishment of marketing boards which gave 
officials the same degree of control over trading networks as French officials had already achieved in 
Senegal. The boards rapidly began accumulating cash surpluses, which were widely invested in Europe 
or used to support the war effort. By die mid 50s, die idea of using tiiese surpluses to reshape the 
economies of West Africa was timidly developing.
153 Before the war, Europe had been divided into two opposing blocs: on the one hand was the Allied 
bloc comprising Britain, France and other lesser powers and on die other hand was die Fascist bloc 
made up of Germany and Italy among others.
154 File no. Vb/b (1940) Kamerun Eingebomen Deutsch Gesinnten Verein, NAB,
155 Ibid. NAB.
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enrolment of its members in the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft, Germany’s official 
colonial propaganda association.156
The KEDGV was probably not committed to Nazi political goals but the 
members were certainly a threat to French interests. When six of its members were 
arrested, the rest fled to the British Cameroons.157 The existence of such an 
organisation however provided French Cameroon authorities with fresh fuel for their 
beliefs that some unlikely combination of German Nazis and pro-Africanist forces 
was acting against them. Most important for this study is that this pro-German group 
was based and operated mostly in the border towns like Tiko and Victoria in the 
British zone.
In quick succession to the KEDGV, was the Auslandes Deutsche Bund (ADB) 
exclusively made up of Germans resident in British Cameroons. Again the main areas 
of its activities were Tiko and Victoria. Even though British residents complained 
about these pro-German and anti-British activities in Victoria Division, the British 
Mandatory administration remained indifferent until the outbreak of the war. The two 
hundred and ninety two Germans at the time in British Cameroons could easily 
outnumber the two European and seventy-five African rank and file policemen in the 
territory if it came to war. When it was rumoured before the war that the ADB had 
acquired large amounts of arms and ammunition through German merchant ships at 
Douala and Victoria ports, the British administration became seriously concerned.
Police records showed that the Germans had one hundred and forty-four rifles 
and fifty-six revolvers. The British administration organised a police search of all the
156 Ralph Austen and Jonathan Derrick, Middlemen o f  the Cameroons Rivers. The Duala and their 
hinterland, c . 1600- c .1960 . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 173.
157 Ibid. For more on German activities in British Cameroons also see Anthony Ndi’s contribution in D. 
Killingray and R. Rathbone (cds.) Africa and the Second World War. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986.
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German plantations, as they feared an eventual German attempt to regain her former 
colony-it was a National Socialist policy to regain the “lost colonies”. The 
importance of this fear to our study is that it triggered tighter administration and 
control of the boundary. The decision to strengthen security measures to forestall any 
German attempt to seize Cameroon was epitomised by a reinforcement of the police 
squad from Nigeria and the imposition of official passes or Laissez-passers for 
crossing the boundary. Since there were many more Germans in the British than in the 
French administered zone, the French administration also responded to the outbreak 
of the war by closing the frontiers with British Cameroons. Access was only possible 
after the presentation of a Laissez-passer because they wanted to avert any migration 
of German Nazis from the plantations in the British to the French zone.
In the British zone also, there were fears of pro-Nazi regime in the 
nearby French Cameroon after the fall of France in 1940 and the establishment of the 
Vichy regime. Relations between both administrations became tense. Each 
immediately restricted the passage of people, goods and currency to and from the 
other. French Cameroon was forced by circumstances to be pro-Vichy. On August 
30th, 1940, the Free French Movement (a French government in exile established after 
the fall of France) staged a coup d’etat, which brought French Cameroon into the war 
on the side of General De Gaulle. France instituted forced labour to help the war 
effort and tried to prevent Africans from fleeing to British Cameroons where 
obligations were lighter.158 The restrictions themselves caused numerous problems; 
arbitrary interpretations of the restrictions caused many more. Individuals with homes 
on one side of the frontier and fields on the other experienced many inconveniences, 
as did members of ethnic groups whose relatives or chiefs lived on the other side of
158 Gardinier, Cameroon, p. 5 8.
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the frontier.159 These groups among which were the Bakossi, Bakweri, Duala, 
Balondo, Balong, Mbo and the Mongo hoped for an easing of border restrictions and 
in some cases minor rectifications of the boundary in order to place all of the lands or 
all of their ethnic group within one territory. The demands to ease border restrictions 
were stronger in the South of the two territories where economic advancement 
especially on the French side was more rapid and the restrictions more rigidly 
enforced than in the North.160 Meanwhile an important aspect of colonial 
administration that affected border groups was the socio-cultural domain notably in 
the fields of education, language and religion.
THE SOCIO-CULTURAL ORIENTATION
Educational activities began in Cameroon in 1844 with the Baptist 
Missionary Society and from then until the withdrawal of the English Baptists in 1886 
(following the German Annexation of Cameroon), the Baptists enjoyed an evangelical 
monopoly in British Cameroons. German and Swiss missionaries arrived in that same 
year and together with the government took over education in Cameroon. Within a 
couple of years, the Germans opened government schools at Douala and Victoria. 
This is important because these schools drew pupils from the neighbouring areas, 
which were later divided by the Anglo-French boundary. By 1910, the German 
government had become tougher on educational policies, making school attendance 
compulsory and dropping out from school became a punishable offense.161 Most 
important for this study is the fact that the medium of instruction was the German 
language, a medium, which lasted only as long as its initiators. However, despite the 
German government's stringent standards and engagement in educational activities,
159 Interviews with Akangkwene and others on May 13, and 17,1999 at Knpe III, Cameroon.
160 Gardinier, Cameroon, p.59.
161 Chiabi, The making o f modern Cameroon, p. 139.
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education remained in the hands of missionaries during and after their rule in 
Cameroon.
The British colonial government did not pursue education vigorously in 
Cameroon. The government was less involved and indifferent as opposed to the 
missions. Schools, which fell under four categories, provided elementary education: 
Government schools; Native Administration schools; Mission schools and "Hedge", 
unofficial or vernacular schools. The main goal of the government was to train 
Africans to serve in the colonial administration as civil servants, clerks and petty 
businessmen and security officers. On their part, the Native Authority (NA) saw 
education as a means of serving ethnic groups, clans and villages while to the 
missions education was regarded as a means of spreading their religion by training 
catechists, teachers, pastors and clerks.162 The British Education Policy for Nigeria, 
which was applied in the Cameroons in 1926, dictated education in British Southern 
Cameroons. In government schools, the medium of instruction from the intermediate 
level onwards was the English language and entry age did not exceed 13 years. The 
use of the vernacular in the early stages of elementary education in general was 
allowed. Chiefs took great interest in visiting the NA schools while accompanying the 
DO and the Superintendent of Education on their visits to these schools. The NA 
schools followed the same curriculum as government schools but the people provided 
the teachers, their living quarters and the school buildings while the NA met the cost 
of books, equipment and teachers’ salaries. For these reasons, their teachers were less 
qualified than those of the government schools. The government was also faced with 
the serious problem of lack of an adequate qualified teaching staff in their schools.
162 Emmanuel B. Ngwa, ‘Western education in Southern Cameroons between the wars (1922-1939)’. 
Postgraduate thesis, (Maitrise), 1982 University of Yaounde, Cameroon, p.24. Crowder, West Africa, 
p. 24.
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This problem persisted until 1940 when an Elementary Training Centre was opened in 
Kake, Kumba Division, which served the entire tenitoiy with trained elementary 
teachers.163 As far as secondary education was concerned, there was no college in 
Southern Cameroons before 1939. All qualified British Cameroonians had to go to 
Nigeria for further education. It was in 1939 that the Roman Catholic Mission opened 
the first secondary school for boys at Sasse in Victoria Division. In 1950 the Basel 
Mission opened a similar institution at Bali in Bamenda Division, From the start, the 
attendance of girls in schools was low as compared to boys. Parents were reluctant to 
send girls to school as they saw this as a waste of time and money. After government 
and Mission encouragement, many more girls began attending school and about 58 
girls were reported to be attending schools by 1923 in the entire territory.164 The 
Roman Catholic Mission at Soppo opened an elementary school for girls, but later in 
1956 was transformed into what became the first girls’ secondary school and 
transferred to Okoyong, Mamfe Division.
The educational cycle was reduced from nine to eight years. This was 
divided as follows: two years infant classes (Infants I and II), four years elementary 
classes (Standards I, II, HI and IV) and two years middle classes (Middles I and II). 
Education was financed from school fees, the sale of produce from school farms, 
grant-in-aid from the NAs, Government expenditure and Mission funds. The last 
group of schools, the "Hedge'1 schools were of mushroom growth and usually the 
offspring of the former Basel Mission schools. They were not of a permanent nature 
and no statistics were kept. They taught little or nothing beyond congregational 
singing in the German or Duala languages. Usually, these “Hedge” schools lacked the 
basic educational facilities until the Government, NA or Mission were in a position to
163 Ngwa, “Western education in Southern Cameroons” p. 279.
164 Report on the Cameroons for 1923, p.43, PRO.
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give them support. One of these schools opened in the French administered part of 
Bakossi, Mouamenam in 1927.165 According to the Annual Report of 1923, French 
Educational organisation was laid down by the decree of July 25, 1921.166 This 
legislation was completed by another series of texts, which determined the categories 
of schools, school programmes and the teaching methods. The administration also 
gave allowance for the creation of what was called Mutuelles Scolaires (these were 
mutual aid societies formed by pupils of the same school to assist members whenever 
the need arose). The French administration opened Village, Regional and Superior 
schools.167 The administation allowed Mission schools to operate as well as some 
Private schools. There was also what was called ’’Bush schools" or les Ecoles de 
brousse, which were the equivalent of vernacular schools in the British zone.
Village schools were opened to children of all levels of the society 
even though preference was given to the children of chiefs to prepare them for 
Regional schools. Village schools were opened in some border villages like 
Mouangel, Manengole, Bakwat and Ekangte in 1950. These schools were meant to 
satisfy the immediate need of the pupils, which according to the administration was to 
spread spoken French. In 1925 a Regional school was opened in Nkongsamba, which 
was fed by the neighbouring border village schools.168 Governor General Antonetti in 
this same year introduced the use of vernacular in a transitional period between the 
Village and the Regional schools but he laid much emphasis on the use of the French
165 Interview with one of its pupils, Germain Enongene, at Mouandong, Mouamenam on April 30,
1999.
166 Rapport Annuel du gouverneinent Frangais sur radministration sous-mandat des territoires du 
Cameroun, 1923, p. 19. CAOM.
167 Ibid. p 26, CAOM. Also see Engelbert Atangana, Cent ans d  ’education scolaire au 
Cameroun.Reflexion sur la nature, les moyens et les objectifs de Ventreprise (1885 a nos jours). Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 1996, pp.439-443,
168 Rapport Annuel, pour l ’annee 1925, p.30. NAY.
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language in schools.169 It was not until in 1948 another decree was issued reorganising 
education that the first secondary school or college modeme was opened at 
Nkongsamba.170
Education in French Cameroon was left mostly in the hands of the 
missionary societies. They opened the first schools at the start of French occupation 
and by 1937, there were 85,000 French Cameroonian children in mission elementary 
schools with the French Roman Catholic Missions accounting for 35,000 followed by 
the American Presbyterian Mission-31,000; the French Protestant Mission-18,000 and 
the American Adventist Mission-500.171 There were a few schools run by the 
Norwegian mission while the Government schools had a total of only 10,000 pupils. 
By 1939, the government opened an Advanced Primary School at Yaounde, a 
Professional Health School at Ayos, a Teachers’ Training School -Ecole Normale- at 
Foulassi, and some secondary and technical institutions in Douala. Regarding 
teaching staff, Ngoh says that in 1944, there were three French Inspectors of schools, 
thirty-eight European school teachers, ten of whom had no teaching diplomas and two 
hundred and fifty unqualified African monitors.172
The Government worked in close collaboration with the Missions 
and supported them financially. As from 1923, the Government gave thirty thousand 
francs to private education annually as aid. Also, a premium of one hundred and fifty 
francs was given per student in mission schools if they succeeded in the Certificat
169 L.C.Gray, J.O’Connel, D.Scallon, Education and nation building in Africa. London: HMSO, 1965, 
p.9, NAY.
170 Rapport Annuel, 1948, p. 133, NAY.
171 Rapport Annuel, 1937, p. 129, CAOM. L’Enseignement au Cameroun, IAC 68, NAY Also see 
APA 12066/s, loc.cit.
172 Ngoh, Cameroon, p. 102.
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d'Etudes Primaires (C.A.P.).173 The Government also trained Assistants who taught 
in the various religious institutions. It is important to state here that the French laid 
emphasis on technical education. The French Protestant Mission at Ndounge for 
example trained pupils for professions like carpentry, bricklaying, and woodwork. 
These were the kind of schools that benefited from government aid.174
With early trade transactions between English traders and the 
coastal peoples of the Cameroons, the local peoples began making efforts to 
communicate with British traders and missionaries along the coast in "broken 
English" or Pidgin English. The language soon became a common means of 
communication between the colonial administrators and the administered people as 
well as a commercial language. It should be recalled here that with the German 
annexation of Cameroon, the German language had been prescribed in schools along 
side the local Duala language. Pidgin English became an unofficial language but was 
still in use. When the British and the French took over the administration of the 
territory, each of them carved out their spheres of influence within which their 
respective languages-English or French - were imposed. As border areas increasingly 
became a zone of opportunities and a cultural ‘melting pot’, many more people used 
either the Duala language or Pidgin English in their daily transactions. Besides 
language, religion was also an organized system that was implanted on both sides of 
the boundary and resulted to across-boundary movements.
The defeat of the Germans in the First World War, favoured the 
establishment of two organized missions in British Southern Cameroons: the Roman 
Catholic and the Basel Missions. There was a French Roman Catholic Mission in
173 Gray et al, Education and nation building in Africa, p. 10
174 Rapport Annuel, 1948, p. 133, CAOM.
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Bamenda, which arrived in January 1921; and an English Roman Catholic Mission in 
Victoria, which arrived in March 1922.175 The Roman Catholics had missions at 
Victoria, Buea, Ossing (Mamfe), Bekom and Kumbo (Bamenda). After the war, 
indigenised movements sprung from the disorganized remains of the Swiss/German 
Basel Missions, which reinvigorated the Basel Missions enterprise in that part of the 
territory. The Basel Mission was based at Victoria, Bombe and Nyassosso (Kumba), 
Besongabang (Mamfe) and Bali (Bamenda). It is not intended here to elaborate on the 
great diversity of missions and their activities in Cameroon but to state that the 
missionary factor was one of the common causes of cross border movements. The 
Government placed no obstacle of any kind in the way of expansion of missionary 
work. This meant that Missionaries could go anywhere they wanted to evangelize and 
visit each other. This was why they were one of the groups that criss-crossed the 
boundary regularly. African catechists were free to go where they liked and to preach 
in whatever language they wanted. This situation later led to problems with the 
administration on the French side where missionaries increasingly used Pidgin 
English in church and in schools.
On the French zone, once the Germans were defeated, the French 
authorities expelled all missionaries of German nationality from Cameroon. The 
activities of the Basel Mission were taken over by the Missions Evcmgeliques of 
Paris.176 This new Mission hoped to unite the Evangelical, Basel and Native Baptist 
churches in Cameroon. They established a printing press and a theological school 
very close to the boundary, at Ndounge. They also opened a college at Libamba and a 
Youth centre at Douala.177 Another mission that was established in the French
175 Report on the Cameroons Province, 1923, p.44, PRO.
176 Ngoh, Cameroon, p. 99.
177 Ibid.
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administered part of Cameroon was the Lutheran Fraternal Mission of American 
origin. Their area of evangelization was largely based in the North of Cameroon. The 
7th Day Adventist Mission was very prominent in the Central and Southern 
Cameroon. A local church, which was prominent and attracted the attention of the 
French administration, was the Native Baptist Church with a local clergy headed by 
Pastor Lotin Same. Probably because of disputes over leadership in this church, the 
administration did not recognize it as an independent religious body until 1949. The 
Catholic Church arrived in Douala through the Holy Ghost Fathers in 1916 and by 
1935, their major Seminary at Yaounde produced its first Cameroonian priests.178 The 
Catholic mission opened many schools and missions all over the territory. They 
opened a vicarage in Douala.
The Catholic Mission adopted Pidgin English as their teaching medium. 
Most of the Catholic catechists and early converts learned their doctrine and received 
baptism in the coastal areas where Pidgin English had become the lingua franca long 
before the German annexation of Cameroon in 1884.179 Both the English and the 
French missionaries used Pidgin English, it is reported that the French fathers had by 
far fewer difficulties in expressing themselves in Pidgin English than in English 
language. It was French Father, Mgr. Joseph Plissoneau of the Nkongsamba diocese, 
1920-1930, who first wrote a Pidgin English series of Gospel books with 
commentaries, a catechism and a Bible history book.180 The adoption and use of these 
books in both British and French Cameroons developed to such an extent that in
178 Ngoh, Cameroon, p. 100.
!79 Edwin Ardener, “The nature of the reunification of Cameroon”. In A. Hazlewood, African 
integration and disintegration: case studies in economic and political union. London: Oxford 
University Press, p.297.
180 Fanso, “Trans-Frontier relations”, p.397.
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Dschang in French Cameroon, the Government felt it had to intervene to stop it and 
save the French language. According to administrative reports, the French 
Government warned that they would penalize the Catholic Mission if the use of 
Pidgin English in their churches was not discontinued immediately.181 It is important 
to say here that Pidgin English became the common medium of communication 
widely used and understood across the Anglo-French boundary in Cameroon.
Despite the widespread use of Pidgin English, it was possible that 
in one family or village along the border, members were divided and depending upon 
which side of the boundary they found themselves they had to think and stand for 
either the British or French nation and values. This situation was not only a problem 
for the border people but sometimes also for the administration. For example one of 
the reasons why the French administration tried to stop the intensive use of Pidgin 
English in French Cameroon was that it saw Pidgin as the language of British 
subjects. The administration feared that its spread on their side of the border might 
create an opportunity for the local people to want to be British subjects or even for the 
British to want to claim back those border areas on the French side.
After examining the administration of border people, it would be 
interesting to now find out how much collaboration on the one hand, and tension on 
the other hand existed between both colonial administrations in the process of 
borderland administration. In other words, we shall attempt to answer the question as 
to how far was border administration successful?
181 French administrator to Mgr. Plissoneau, Vicaire Apostolique de Dschang, APA 1108/A, NAY. 
Fanso, ‘Trans-Frontier relations’, p.397-398. Map (p. 163) below shows that by the early 60s, the entire 
border zone under study fell within the zone in which 75% of the people spoke Pidgin English.
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CUSTOMS AND PREVENTIVE STATIONS ALONG THE 
SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE ANGLO-FRENCH BOUNDARY 
IN THE CAMEROONS
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CHAPTER FOUR
COLLABORATION AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY 
BOTH ADMINISTRATIONS
The first section of this chapter examines the collaboration between the British 
and French administrations in the making and administration of the Anglo-French 
boundary in the Cameroons. The section will explore co-operation through written 
correspondence and face-to-face meetings. Co-operation became easier with the 
setting up of the Anglo-French Joint Boundary Commission. The Commission 
undertook joint projects that had to do with the planning, delineation and demarcation 
of the boundary.1 Efforts at collaboration were sometimes frustrated by attempts by 
both administrations to exploit border resources.
Section two of this chapter discusses the major barriers to increased Anglo- 
French cooperation over border administration. These barriers were in effect 
differences in colonial policies and governmental practices, language, culture, 
currency, and economic exploitation. There was the psychological difficulty of having 
to cross the boundary physically. The administrators and the administered people felt 
these differences.2 Emphasis in this section will be on the administered people, the 
border people.
1 Delineation means the selection and definition of a specific boundary site while demarcation means 
marking the boundary on the ground. For more on key words and terms in boundary terminology, Ian 
Brownlie, African boundaries: A legal and diplomatic encyclopaedia. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1979, p. 3.
2 In the previous chapter, the political, economic and social systems of both administrations were 
examined in detail but now, only highlights of those major differences, which hindered a smooth 
cooperation between both administrations and the border people will be analysed. Also, it is important
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ANGLO-FRENCH COLLABORATION AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR
When the First World War broke out Britain and France decided to jointly 
attack Kamerun following their joint success in Togoland in August 1914. The unity 
of purpose in evicting the Germans was to strip Germany of its colonies and to share 
them out amongst the victors. Ngoh reports that this Anglo-French joint action in 
Kamerun was taken in spite of the colonial rivalries between the two Allied powers.3 
Britain and France it should be recalled pushed their cooperation to the formation of a 
joint Anglo-French force called the West African (the African or the Cameroon) 
Expeditionary Force (WAEF) in September 1914. When the WAEF captured Douala, 
the Germans were forced to retreat further inland to Yaounde where they established 
their new capital.
Anglo-French collaboration continued from the outbreak of hostilities, through 
the war and after the war. Before the end of hostilities, both administrations agreed 
that in order to successfully oust the Germans from the territory, they had to establish 
a joint rule or a Condominium by the close of January 1915. In this chapter our 
interest is not to know whether the Condominium was applied or not but with the 
level of mutual agreement to collaborate in the administration of the territories jointly 
conquered by the Allied Forces (Douala and its environs). By the end of hostilities the 
Allies decided to partition the territory using the Picot Line. The British and the 
French realised the need to form a joint team of specialists from both sides to 
demarcate the boundary.
From 1916 to 1922, the British and the French administrations collaborated in 
the drawing of the Picot Line; they made revisions to this provisional boundary
to note that the perception of barriers somewhat changed with time for as time went on what was 
earlier perceived as barriers became negligible.
3 Ngoh, History o f Cameroon, p. 128. See the same source for the reasons for those colonial rivalries.
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through the signing of the Franco-British Declaration of July 10th 1919. In approving
the mandate on July 20th 1922, the League of Nations invited the future boundary
commission to utilise natural lines as much as possible and to make slight
modifications to avoid separating peoples from their villages and farmlands. Some of
the correspondence between both governments after 1922 was centred on boundary
adjustment and administration. The Governor of Nigeria for example wrote to the CO
that he was ready to meet with the French and proceed with boundary discussions.4
The British called upon the French to appoint members of the boundary commission
so that they could begin the demarcation of the boundary. Between 1925 and 1933,
both governments worked together and made minor adjustments on the southern
portion of the boundary.5
The Commissioner of the French Republic wrote to the Resident, Buea
proposing that they meet in Buea (British zone) instead of Douala (French zone) to
plan the demarcation of the boundary.6 Owen W. Firth, Senior-Resident was
appointed by the British administration to head the British Land Commission. A copy
of his letter of appointment was sent to the French suggesting that they use the same
format so as to maintain uniformity in administration. This letter read thus:
On instructions from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, I hereby appoint 
you to be chief of the British Commission, which will, in conjunction with the
  Commission, survey and demarcate the boundary between ....... in
accordance. With the instructions, of which a copy is enclosed for your 
guidance, which instructions have been incurred by th e  Government.
4 Annual Report on the Cameroons Province for 1923, PRO. Governor of Nigeria to CO, Telegram of 
February 9th 1924, CO 649/30. Also see dispatch from the Governor of French Cameroon to the 
Senior Resident, Buea, No. 129 of June 24,1925.
5 Details on these adjustments will be discussed in a later chapter. See 1922 Annual Report on the 
Cameroons Province, CO 649/29, PRO.
6 Commissaire de la Republique Frangaise to Resident Buea, No. 1723/AP of September 15,1937, 
AgeFom, carton 932, dossier 2970. Archives National de France, Centre des Archives d’Outre-Mer, 
Aix-en-Provence, hereafter cited as CAOM.
166
You will be in entire charge of the British section of the Commission.
In the event of your being incapacitated by illness or other cause.......
will act as Chief British Commissioner.7
Both administrations decided by decree of August 25, 1937 to institute this 
joint Commission in the territory. On October 16, 1937 the Commissioner of the 
French Republic in Cameroun (French Cameroon) appointed Rene Dugast to head the 
French Land Commission.8 The two governments agreed and fixed the date of the 
start of work of demarcation on December 1, 1937, Both administrations decided that 
for an easy co-ordination of work, the commissioners and technicians of both 
commissions were to meet regularly to demarcate the boundary. Anglo-French co­
operation was more noticeable in the domain of boundary demarcation and 
administration. We know that British and French local administrators met regularly 
and drew up protocols following preparatory investigations, which were followed up 
later by specialists of both governments. British and French administrators exchanged 
official visits on both sides of the boundary.
EXCHANGE OF OFFICIAL VISITS BY BRITISH AND FRENCH 
ADMINISTRATORS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BOUNDARY
According to a Colonial Office Report, the provisional boundary was 
impracticable and it was due to the friendly relations that existed between the French 
and the British administrators that the administration of the boundary went on 
smoothly:
The present “so-called” provisional boundary is admittedly impracticable. 
From a geographic, ethnographic, or political point of view it is unsuitable.
7 Mission de delimitation,Cameroun-Nigeria (1937-1939), No. 1723/AP of September 15th 1937, 
AgeFom, carton 932, dossier 2970, CAOM.
8 Mission de delimitation,Cameroun-Nigeria (1937-1939), No. 1723/AP of September 15th 1937, 
AgeFom, carton 932, dossier 2970, CAOM Dugast had spent the major part of his career in Cameroon. 
As early as 1932 he had already been proposed by his government as chief of the Land Commission 
for the French. Dugast spoke English,and between 1935-1936 he undertook a mission to the Union of 
South Africa. Also see Journal Officiet du Cameroun, for the year 1937, hereafter cited as JOC, NAY.
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That no friction or difficulties have arisen is due to the friendly relations, 
which have existed between the French and the British District Officers.9
These friendly relations were perceived through official visits at all levels. Following
a report on the Cameroons under UK administration by Her Majesty’s Government,
relations between the British and French administrations were cordial.10 Both
administrations held regular meetings towards the demarcation and administration of
the boundary as from the end of hostilities through 1919, 1922, 1926 and 1927, It was
in the light of continuous collaboration that officers of the Forestry Department met in
1928. Two officers of the Forestry Department were appointed from both sides of the
boundary to co-operate in the protection and reforestation of degenerated areas at the
Northernmost section of the Anglo-French inter-Cameroons boundary. They both
exchanged visits after which a report was drawn up with proposals for improved
collaboration in the future. To the South of the boundary, at Douala, British naval
officers assisted in the activities marking the celebrations of French Bastille Day of
July 14, 1933. According to an article in L ’Eveil du Cameroun, officers of the British
ship “WESTON” were present and assisted in the festivities at Douala.11 The British
marine officers left on Monday July 16 and their participation had been a further
expression of closer Anglo-French co-operation.
In October 1936, the British Resident at Buea travelled to Douala on an
official visit to meet his French counterpart. He spent a few days in Douala and is said
to have been treated with the greatest hospitality and courtesy. In return, Monsieur le
9 From A. J. Harding to Strachey July 8 1919, Cameroons 1919, CO 649/18 PRO.
10 Report by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
on the administration of the CAMEROONS ubder British Mandate for the year 1936, p. 7, ICOMM. 
Hereafter, all other reports by HM’s Government on the administration of the Cameroons will be cited 
as -R eport on the Cameroons. Some of these reports are also found in the SOAS main library.
11 “L5 Aviso <WESTON> a Douala”, L 'Eveil du Cameroun, no, 113 du ler Aout ,1933, p.4, CAOM.
The officers stayed in Douala for three days during which they played a football match with their 
French counterparts of the “Sporting Club”.
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Delegue Commissaire de la Republique Frangaise, paid a visit to the Resident, Buea 
in December of the same year.12 The following year, relations between both 
administrations remained cordial as French authorities offered assistance to the many 
British officials who passed through French territory on their way to Bamenda 
Division. The use of roads in the French territory by British officials was regular. In 
his article in the Guardian, a British journalist made mention of this fact: “the British 
always crossed to use the French roads when driving long distances, because the ones 
on their own side are so appalling”.13 Manifestations of Anglo-French amity were 
expressed in 1939 when at the request of the British administration in Nigeria, a 
British police detachment comprising 40 men took part in a march past in the capital 
of French Cameroon, Yaounde. This was in respect of activities marking the 150th 
Anniversary of the French Revolution.14 Again, Anglo-French friendship was shown 
by the arrival of a British naval vessel, “Bridgewater”, at Douala from July 22 to 25, 
1939.15
In May 1946, health technicians of French Cameroon and their counterparts 
from British West African countries, including British Cameroons, met at a veterinary 
medical conference in the Gold Coast, Discussions centred on the problems of 
movement of cattle from place to place and the prevention of the spread of diseases. 
Participants examined the possibility of producing various vaccines to control the 
spread of animal diseases as the herds sometimes moved across international 
boundaries. In Dakar, in April 1947, representatives of African colonial
12 Report on the Cameroons for the year 1936, ICOMM.
13 Richard Cox "Avoiding trouble along the Cameroon frontier. A delicate task for Britain” The 
Guardian, Friday May 20, 1960, CO 554/2568, PRO, a copy of the article is put in the annex.
14 AgeFom cart. 1002, doss. 3511, Cameroun, bulletin d'lnformation et de Renseignements, 1937-1939, 
CAOM.
15 Ibid.
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administrations held a meeting. One of the major problems examined in this April,
1947 meeting was that of “liaison” between the British and French colonies in west
and central Africa.16 They also discussed the improvement of the communication
infrastructure between the British and French spheres of Cameroon notably roads,
railways, telephone and telegraphy.
In London, discussions were undertaken in 1947 between representatives of
Britain and France for the development of co-operation between the two countries in
their colonies. The representatives laid much emphasis on economic co-operation
within their African colonies. These talks were continued in Paris in February 1948
and focused on policies to be adopted on the prices of commodities, trade,
communications and inter-African exchange.17 Both parties also talked about the
coordination programme of the development of their colonies. According to the
Annual Report of 1948, in the Month of July, Rene Hoffherr, High Commissioner of
the French Republic in Cameroon went to Nigeria where he contacted his British
counterpart. Both men examined the numerous common problems that hindered the
18smooth and close co-operation between them.
From 1951 to 1955, the collaboration and exchange of official visits continued 
between both administrations. In 1951, medical officials from both sides held talks of 
co-operation and three years later special measures were taken by both governments 
concerning trade across their common boundary. According to Resolution 164 (VI) of 
the Trusteeship Council, both administrations had to take measures to facilitate the 
movement of persons and trade transactions across their common boundary.
16 Rapport Annuel du Gouvemement Frangais aux Nations Unies sur radministration du Cameroun 
place sous la Tutelle de la France, Fannee, 1947, p. 19,CAOM. Hereafter, all such reports by the French 
Government to the United Nations on the administration of French Cameroon will be cited as -  
Rapport Annuel sur Vadministration du Cameroun.
17 Rapport Annuel sur I'administration du Cameroun,, 1948, p. 16, CAOM.
18 Ibid.
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Specialists on both sides met and adopted measures like the use of identity cards, 
laissez-pctsser, importation and exportation taxes in the hope of avoiding smuggling. 
These measures according to the French administration’s report to the UN eased 
border trade and gave satisfaction to the border people.19
In June 1955, the administrative officer from Garoua in the French Trust 
Territory visited the British Northern Cameroons and stayed for two weeks. During 
his stay he was studying the British method of administration through the Native 
Authorities.20 It is important to state here that Garoua, in Northern Cameroon from 
where the French administrator came was one of the areas in which traditional rulers 
exercised great authority. In the British zone, these were the kind of societies 
(Bamenda Division for example) in which Indirect Rule through Native 
Administration worked best. It should be recalled here that this was because the local 
rulers, chiefs and Fons served as Native Authorities with courts, councils and 
treasuries. The British administrative system worked well and won the admiration of 
the French administrator at Garoua. By December 1955, the French Geological 
Exploration Company (S.E.R.A.P.C.A.) carried out some research work across the 
Moungo River into the British zone, precisely in Victoria Division at Mpundu and 
Moliwe.21
Further evidence of co-operation was reported in 1956 when there were 
regular contacts between the British administration in Buea and the French 
Department of External Affairs in Yaounde. Also, by November of the same year, a 
party of French agricultural experts visited British Cameroons to study methods of
19 Rapport Annuel sur V administration du Cameroun., 1954, p.28, CAOM. This Report also gives the 
various security measures adopted by the British and French customs services along the boundary.
20 Report on the Cameroons for the year 1955, p. 17, ICOMM.
21 Ibid.
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combating “Panama Disease”. An outbreak of this disease had occurred in banana 
plantations in the French Cameroons adjacent to the Southern section of the 
boundary.22 Throughout this visit, the British Consul at Douala helped in transmitting 
correspondence between the two administrative Headquarters. To the North of the 
boundary, several village disputes were settled by cross-the-border co-operation 
between British and French administrators.23 A good number of people from British 
Cameroons attended the 1956 French Annual Agricultural Fair at Maroua, Before and 
during this Fair, there were frequent contacts between the local administrators on both 
sides of the boundary.
The following year, along the southernmost part of the boundary, officials of 
both territories collaborated and planned a special meeting in Douala. The aim was to 
discuss forest administration and policy. This meeting was between the chef du 
service des eaux et forets of French Cameroon and the conservator of forests in 
British Southern Cameroons 24 In 1958, prior to the establishment of customs stations 
along the boundary, the Police Departments on both sides worked hand in hand. From 
1958 through 1959, monthly meetings were arranged between the Southern 
Cameroons Police Department (S.C.P.D.) and the French security liaison work - 
Surete Generate (S.G.) on the incidence of terrorism in the French zone. Widespread 
attacks by terrorists necessitated the reinforcement of police in the Southern 
Cameroons and a tighter control along the Southern portion of the Anglo-French 
inter-Cameroons boundary. Both administrations hoped that these measures would 
prevent the incursion of terrorists into Southern Cameroons. Both administrations
22 Report on the Cameroons for the year 1956, p.6, ICOMM.
23 Ibid, p.7, ICOMM.
24 Report on the Cameroons for the year 1957, p.6, ICOMM.
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collaborated to apply the provisions of the Immigration Ordinance on those illegal 
immigrants caught,
THE SITUATION OF PROHIBITED IMMIGRANTS
According to CO Reports, French Cameroonians used the British Cameroons
as a base for armed raids into the French territory.
In order to protect British territory against terrorists and to prevent its use as a 
base for raids into the neighbouring Cameroun Republic large -  scale 
detention and screenings were made. The procedure for dealing with terrorists 
entering British territory was to declare them Prohibited Immigrants,25
These French Cameroonians were mostly insurgents of the UPC party, Union des
Populations du Cameroun, in exile or who had escaped from the territory following
the banning of the party in 1955, The U.P.C. was seen by the French administration as
a radical political party, which called for the immediate independence and
reunification of both British and French Cameroons. The party was banned in French
Cameroon in 1955 but became active in Southern Cameroons from then on. It was
finally banned in the entire territory in 1957.
When the British administration caught partisans of the UPC, they were
declared Prohibited Immigrants (P.I.) and deported to French Cameroon. Under the
Aliens (Deportation) Ordinance, the Governor-General of Nigeria could make a
Deportation Order against such alien(s) if he deemed it to be conducive to public
good. Thirteen cases were so dealt with in 1957, and three in 1959 (between
November and December). The three persons declared P.I.s were Joseph Tekam,
Daniel Nouwou and Aloysius Nkamdum.26 Tekam was declared a P.I. in November
and repatriated. Nouwou was charged with assaulting the police but broke his bail and
25 From Governor Genegral Nigeria to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, No. M2 of September 
30th 1960, CO 554/2569, PRO. Also see extracts from official reports No. WAF.78.01 of February 2nd 
1960 sent to the Federation of Nigeria on February 3rd 1960, CO 554/2562, 1959, PRO.
26 See Parliamentaiy Questions, No. WAF. 825/78/01 PQ2 of February 23rd 1959, CO 544/2565, PRO.
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a warrant for his arrest was issued. An application was made to have him declared a 
P.I. while Nkamdum was detained but later released and not deported.
If a person had been declared a P.I., he committed an offence under the 
Immigration Ordinance by being in Nigeria or British Cameroons. If such a person(s) 
was caught he might be convicted or escorted to the border and released. Even though 
the British administration collaborated with their French counterpart over this issue, 
the object of Nigerian laws and regulations governing repatriation was not basically to 
hand over fugitives or refugees for trial to their home government. However, there 
was also the urgent desire to rid the British Cameroons and Nigeria of aliens who 
were a potential or real threat to law and order in the British Cameroons.
There was a distinction between those called Political refugees (P.R.) and 
P.I.S. Political refugees were given a chance to go elsewhere than the French 
Cameroons if they so wished. A good example was the case of the U.P.C insurgents 
apprehended in British Cameroons. Two of the insurgents expressed the desire not to 
return to French Cameroon and were allowed to go to Sudan and afterwards to Egypt. 
The Under Secretary of State for the Colonies underscored this point in the House of 
Commons when he said: "The House will be aware that a number of refugees coming 
from the French Cameroun have been allowed to leave, when they have been genuine 
political refugees, for the Sudan and Egypt”.27 Unlike the P.R.s, the P.I.s were 
returned to where they came from or simply pushed across the border.
27 Contribution made by Julian Amery during the discussions on political refugees from French 
Cameroon, see extract from official report of December 1st 1959, CO 554/2565, 1959, PR.O. Those 
classified as P.R.s were for the most part, the leaders of the UPC parties. It should be recalled here that 
it was not the objective of the Nigerian Laws governing repatriation to hand over refugees to their 
home governments that was why the administration found it a better option to give the opportunity to 
the P.R.S to go elsewhere other than the French Cameroon if so wished. This option was not applicable 
to others who were declared Pis.
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The Southern Cameroons government also declared officials of the One 
Kamerun (O.K.) party P.Ls and made deportation orders against them.28 When Nde 
Ntumazah, a founding member of the OK party requested the British administration to 
issue a passport to him, to travel to the UK or Switzerland for health reasons, his 
request was turned down. According to a CO Report, it was observed that there was 
nothing wrong with his health.29 Under the Aliens Deportation Ordinance, the 
Commissioner for the Cameroons, on January 25, 1961 made deportation orders 
against two officials of the OK party Gabriel Echokol and Yossa Issidore. They were 
arrested and escorted to the frontier on the same day and warned not to return. When 
they arrived in French Cameroon, they were arrested by the administration and 
imprisoned 30 Terrorists were usually declared P.Ls and sent back home where they 
could be imprisoned or indeed killed.31 However, P.I.s and other deportees could 
appeal British administration if they so desired before they were turned back home. 
Despite the above efforts of collaboration by both administrations, there were major 
barriers to that cooperation.
BARRIERS TO INCREASED CO-OPERATION
Differences in politics, administration and law were contributory factors 
against a smooth collaboration between both administrations on the one hand and the 
administered people on the other hand. The British colonial policy of Indirect Rule
28 The O.K. party was an offshoot of the UPC, which continued the reunification idea after the ban on 
the UPC. Its leaders were Nde Ntumazah and Albert Mukong.
29 From IainMacleod to Fenner Brockway, No. WAF. 825/18/01 of September 12 1960, CO 554/2568, 
PRO.
30 Following the arrest of terrorists from French Cameroon in November 1960, the French Cameroon 
administration hoped that those arrested would be handed over to them but this was not done. Afiique 
Levant 1953 -  1959, Cameroun, Cart. HI Doss. I, Presse et Documentation, I -  30th November 1960, p. 
7, AMAE. Also see Parliamentary Questions of February 14th 1961 and the accompanying notes, CO 
554/2565, PRO.
31 Contribution made by Mr. Dugdale to the House of Commons on December l 3t 1959, CO 544/2565, 
PRO. The British administration expressed concern for the execution of such persons in their countries 
of origin.
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progressively imposed the British administration upon their subjects, which was 
different from that experienced by their brothers on the French side of the boundary. 
We have seen above that the nature of the position and power of the chief was 
different in the two systems. To the West of the boundary, at least in the initial phase 
of colonization, the British political officer was an adviser who only in extreme 
circumstances interfered with the chief and the “Native Authority”. This collaboration 
in the early 1900s (i.e. 1900 -  1930s) made the colonial government to use the chiefs 
as auxiliaries. Some of the reasons for this early collaboration were economic and the 
need for manpower: “Without the revenue or manpower to extend colonial rule, the 
British depended upon friendly local rulers even if they were slave -  owners...”.32 
These early collaborative relationships were sometimes tolerated for the survival of 
alliances between both parties. Towards the 1950s, there was a gradual discarding of 
this alliance with the chiefs by the colonial authority. One of the reasons was the 
increasing number of western educated Cameroonians and the upsurge of the call of 
nationalism.
The border people in the British zone appeared to be a lot more attached to 
their tradition than did their counterparts on the other side. There were for example 
more spontaneous manifestations of this attachment amongst the Western educated 
groups in the British than in the French zone. Present examples like General James 
Tataw, and Minister Emmanuel T. Egbe usually join the masses when they perform 
open performances of traditional dances. Mention should also be made of chief 
Mukete of Kumba who unlike his French-speaking counterparts of Loum and 
Mbanga, has always attended official meetings in the political capital in his traditional 
outfit.
32 Richard Rathbone, Murder and politics in colonial Ghana. New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1993, pp.22-23.
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Unlike the British, the French administration as it operated in Cameroon 
placed the chief in an entirely subordinate position to the political officer. The French 
were more interested in the potential efficiency of local chiefs than in their legitimacy. 
We have seen the examples of chiefs Ewane Nti and Essoumboua. The French- 
speaking border people were brought up in the image of the French man. The French 
system of societal stratification into the evolues and the sujets dislocated the society 
into two groups.33
Another important barrier to increased collaboration was that of language. 
Most of the British administrators could not speak the French language and vice 
versa. It was however important for both parties to communicate in the administration 
of the boundary; that was why in choosing the boundary commissioners, both 
administrations did everything to chose men who could speak both languages. One of 
the important qualities was the ability to speak and understand the language of the 
collaborating administration. Administrators who spoke both languages were 
rewarded. That was why Allen was appointed to succeed Firth as head of the British 
Land Commission, because of his ability to speak the French language. On the French 
side, Dugast was also appointed head of the Boundary Commission because he could 
speak English.34 This language difficulty was also felt among the border people who 
found it very difficult to communicate on the one hand with the administrators on 
their side of the boundary, and on the other hand with those across the boundary. At 
border control posts and during tax collecting exercises, border people were
33 These terms have been explained in chapter three.
34 Commissioner of the French Republic to Resident, No. 1723 of September 15 1937, AgeFom 
932/2970, CAOM.
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sometimes obliged to express themselves in both the French and the English 
languages to officers from both sides of the border to avoid harassment.35
In an effort to allow the people a gradual understanding and knowledge of the 
English language, the British allowed the use of the vernacular in teaching in NA 
schools with a bit of English. The use of English language was imposed only in higher 
studies. On the other side of the boundary, the French educational system was hostile 
to using the vernacular in schools. We know from L. C. Gray and the others that at the 
beginning of their administration, the French maintained that in their view, the best 
training for an African was an education in the finest traditions of Metropolitan 
France through the medium of the French language.36 During the interwar years, the 
French gave priority to eight local languages in French Cameroon, By decree of April 
21, 1933, signed Bonnecarrere, the French administration gave priority to the 
following local languages: Yaounde, Boulou, Foulbe, Bassa, Bamileke-Bandjoun, 
Bamoun, Arab, and Baya.37 If a French subject spoke or understood any one of them 
well, he/she was given l,500frs per year for 5 years duration. If before the expiration 
of five years, proof of mastery of more languages was shown, the prime or incentive 
was received definitely. This money had to be given in the presence of the top civil 
servant of the territory.
A significant result of this language barrier problem was the increased use of 
Pidgin English along border areas. It is important to outline Dugast’s viewpoint on
35 There were cases reported in the Moungo and Elong groups where people from the British zone with 
proof of tax payment were harassed and forced by the French tax officers to pay tax again on the 
French side. A major handicap that these people had was to express themselves in die French language. 
See the Report of 14/8/1922, from DO Victoria Division to Resident Buea, Mungo right bank and 
estuary Douala, setdements on,Qf/e/1922/1, pp. 11-12, NAB.
36 L. C. Gray et al. Education and nation building in Africa, p.8.
37 From chief administrator of colonies to the Commissioner of the French Republic, April 21,1933, 
AgeFom 989/3421 Affaires Politiques (Indigenes), 1933, CAOM.1 AgeFom,cart.989,doss.3421, 
Affaires Politiques (Indigenes) 1933, CAOM. Mention should be made here that these languages were 
not used for scholarly purposes.
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this language issue that as early as 1938, almost all the chiefs of the borderlands 
notably the Moungo, could read and write French and English. This could be a bit of 
an exaggerated statement but it is however true that due to the immigrant nature of the 
border population, the chiefs who became administrators of “strangers” as well 
needed to be bilingual or at least express themselves in Pidgin English to ensure a 
smooth running of their offices. This does not however mean that one had to be 
bilingual to be made a chief.
Differences in the nature of economic exploitation of border resources were 
also responsible for the barrier to increased cooperation between both administrations 
and among border groups. The French, unlike the British, undertook a high level of 
forestry exploitation in their portion of Cameroon. The French administered part of 
the boundary from the sea to Mount Manenguba which being rich in forest vegetation 
offered huge expanse of forests. Tons of timber were floated down the River Moungo 
to the sea port in Douala from where they were transported to France. Forestry 
exploitation was not carried out to a large extent in the British zone where much of 
the land was covered by cultivated land. In British Cameroons, the major economic 
activity was plantation agriculture. Even where the French carried out agriculture, 
there were differences in crop species to those grown in the British zone.
The French grew mostly coffee, bananas, some cocoa and oil palms with the 
use of people they called Plcmteurs or planters. These were usually those local people 
who opened and owned their own farms and employed labour. On the British side, the 
cash crops exploited mostly were tea, tobacco, rubber, some cocoa and palm trees. In 
the case of forestry exploitation, the planters hired equipment and employed labour to
38 Dugast to Commissioner of the French Republic, letter No. 276 of 19/09/1938, 932/2970, CAOM.
As a bilingual (English and French) administrator, Dugast’s emphasis here was more on the language 
issue than on the function of the chieftaincy.
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fell and saw the wood before sale. There was no great cooperation between the French 
exploiters of the East and the plantation owners to the West of the boundary. This 
difference was also remarkable in the nature of market products and commercial 
companies on either side of the boundary. At the start of the Mandate, British 
economic influence was predominant in Cameroon especially along the coast and in 
Southern Cameroons. The main British commercial firms were: John Holt and Co. 
Ltd., Richard and William King Ltd., Hatton and Cookson Ltd., Sanaga River Trading 
Co., Bank of British West Africa Ltd. and the shipping company Elder Dempster and 
Co. Ltd. The French at this time had only La Compagnie Forestiere Sangha- 
Oubangui and La Banque Franqaise de VAfrique Equatoriale,39 When the British 
later on began withdrawing their administrative and economic hold on Cameroon, 
most of their commercial firms withdrew from Cameroon and settled in Nigeria as 
many French firms moved into French Cameroon.40 Some of these French firms 
were; Glamour, S.H.O, C.F.A.O, C.F.S.O., Maurel, C.A.C., S.F.C.N., and Co. 
Pastorale. French products flooded the markets in East Cameroon while on the British 
side, British goods were imported either directly or through Nigeria. In border 
markets however, goods from both sides were available.41 In close association to 
differences in market products and commercial firms was the difference in currency 
between the two spheres.
39 Alain Peloux. “Le regime monetaire dans les regions du Cameroun occupies par le corps 
expeditionnaire Franco-britannique de la conquete au partage” Annales de la Faculty des lettres et 
sciences humaines, 5(1973): 8. There were other French commercial concerns but the most prominent 
were in the forestry, banking and transport sectors.
40 Alain Peloux. “Le regime mon&aire dans les regions du Cameroun occupees par le corps 
expeditionnaire Franco-britannique de la conquete au partage” Annales de la Faculty des lettres et 
sciences humaines, 5(1973): 8.
41 Some of the goods were smuggled into the markets. Traders of such goods were always on the look 
out for customs officers and ready to run away with the goods into the bushes on sight of any official. 
This was a typical scene of these border markets. Two of the major British commercial interests in the 
Banking sector that moved to Nigeria were the Bank of British West Africa and the Barclays Bank. 
There was also die Pmitania that was closed down as well.
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One way of understanding the intensity of this currency difference is to 
examine the disparity in the status and value of the British and French currencies in 
the territory. From the beginning of the conquest of Kamerun to April 24, 1915, the 
official currency in Kamerun was the German Mark.42 However, in the North there 
was some small quantity of British currency, which circulated, and in the South, the 
French currency. This initial stock of foreign money increased with the start of 
military campaigns for the British and the French military officials paid their soldiers 
with their respective currencies.
The mark, shilling and franc had fluctuating values in Europe and in the 
territory. While the Allied forces accepted the mark at a rate of 10 pence to one mark, 
this rate quickly depreciated with the Allied victory to 6 pence to one mark. The 
border people like the rest of the other people of the territory were allowed to pay 
their taxes and do their purchases in the German mark for it still remained legal 
tender. From then on, the Allied powers began the progressive substitution of the 
mark by the franc and shilling. The British Undersecretary of State at the Colonial 
Office and the French Minister of the Colonies agreed to fix the value of the mark at 9 
pence and 0.95 centimes.43
From the proclamation of April 24, 1915 to that of August 5, 1915 (this 
marked the date from which Britain recognized the French franc as legal tender in 
areas of Kamerun that were jointly conquered by the Allies), efforts made to establish 
parity between the British and French currencies resulted in 1 pound sterling being 
equal to 25,32 francs 44 Because this rate between both currencies was not confirmed
42 On this day, Dobell made a proclamation by which he recognized the silver Mark as legal tender in 
Kamerun. It is recalled here that General C. Dobell was the head of the administration of the part of 
Kamerun jointly conquered by the Allied forces.
43 Peloux, “Le regime monetaire dans les regions du Cameroun”, p. 7.
44 Ibid. p.8.
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by any decree or proclamation by Dobell, it was not effectively implemented. This 
currency barrier posed a great handicap to traders, commercial houses and consumers 
along the boundary. Traders and others accepted the franc according to its exchange 
rate in London, given by the local British banks in large commercial centres like 
Douala. Those in possessionof the stronger and more stable currency sometimes 
exploited this situation of unclear exchange rates.
When the franc was 25,32 to the pound, there were no major problems but 
when the franc began depreciating further, people began to prefer the mark and the 
shilling, while steering clear of the franc. The pound sterling was much more widely 
accepted in Cameroon than the franc because at that time, British political and 
economic influence was more predominant in Cameroon than French. Also, the 
pound sterling was a strong, gold-backed currency based on a much firmer political 
foundation than was the franc at the time. To remedy the situation, the French 
Government realized the urgent need to set the value of the franc and the pound 
sterling 45
Paris and London opened up negotiations to balance the value of both 
currencies. Dobell did recognize the franc as legal tender in areas of joint conquest at 
one mark twenty pfennig for a franc, and one pound sterling for 25,396 francs by 
August 5, 1915. Probably due to the difficulties faced by both administrations in their 
efforts to solve this currency difference, they allowed the use of all three currencies 
from August 1915 to the close of hostilities. Dobell asked the Bank of British West 
Africa, which was the bank of the Allied administration, to accept German and French 
currencies following the exchange rates of the last two proclamations. This implied 
that all three currencies were accepted. After the war, the value of the franc kept on
45 Peloux, “Le regime monetaire dans les regions du Cameroun”, pp. 9-13.
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depreciating. In April 3, 1917, the rate was fixed at 1 mark -  0.85 centimes = 8 pence 
and by December of the same year, it was 1 mark -  0.75 centimes — 7 pence.46 By 
October 1, 1920, further depreciation of the franc threatened an upgrade of the mark. 
It was however by the decree of December 13, 1925, enforced by that of April 10, 
1926 (by Governor Theodore Marchand, Commissioner of the French Republic in 
Cameroun, 1923-1932) that legal tender accepted in French Cameroon were notes of 
the Banque de I ’Afriqite Occidentale, and the French gold and silver coloured coins. 
After having been in an inferior position for long, as from 1932 the franc was having 
an important status as the pound sterling and was the only currency in use in the 
greater part of Kamerun (French Cameroon). It later completed its revenge after the 
reunification of both spheres, for it became the only currency recognized in the entire
47territory.
Besides differences in currency, the idea of having to physically cross the 
border presented a psychological barrier to increased cooperation amongst the border 
people. The Eastern and Western borderlands were separated for the most part by the 
River Moungo over which for a very long time there was no bridge. The only major 
motorable road was the Kumba-Tombel-Loum road and this was a seasonal road not 
designed to handle all kinds of traffic. Along the Moungo at Mundame, a ferry was 
used to transport goods and people across the river. Heavy trucks were not allowed to 
go on the ferry.
Crossing the boundary also had a symbolic or psychological impact. Because 
of the imposition of the boundary, border people who could no longer neither visit
46 Peloux, “Le regime monetaire dans les regions du Cameroun”, pp. 9-13.
47 From then until today the only currency utilised in Cameroon is the Franc CFA. There are growing 
concerns in Cameroon today about the future of the Franc CFA with the introduction of die Euro. Some 
foresee a devaluation of the FCFA and an eventual instability while others say a devaluation of the 
FCFA should not be tied to the introduction of the Euro. See Le Messages Cameroon Weekly 
Newspaper of December 28 2001, interview by Le Messager with the financial expert Dr. Francois 
Tiani Keou.
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their kin nor cultivate their farmlands on the other side of the boundary felt 
completely frustrated. Crossing the boundary sometimes made the people to feel 
insecure even when they were within the same village. There is the possibility of the 
reader to assume that as the boundary followed a natural barrier crossing it 
presumably posed the same problems before and after the partition. The kind of 
problems it posed after the partition and which we are outlining here in this research 
were problems with border police, customs and tax officers. In the village of 
Mwanwekan for example which was divided into two by the boundary, villagers from 
the British side visiting the French side were always alert to the passage of either 
French Forest Guards or tax officials 48 On the slightest signal of the presence of any 
such persons or an administrator, they hurriedly crossed over to their own side, which 
was considered safe and secure. Communicating across the boundary was frustrating. 
While the boundary lasted as a physical barrier, border people did not have easy 
access and interaction with each other and at all times as they would have wanted. 
Knowing that one had to cross the boundary and run the risk of being caught without 
an official pass was a major setback to most border people. We shall now examine the 
difficulties faced by the British and the French governments in the administration of 
borderlands.
DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN  THE ADMINISTRATION OF BORDERLANDS 
The third section of this chapter examines the border zone as a difficult zone 
to administer. Some of the reasons for this difficulty were the fact that it was a zone of
48 Since forestry exploitation was a major interest to the French administration, forest guards were 
constantly harassing the people for felling trees without government authorization. Report of 14th June 
1932, from Chamber of Commerce to Monsieur Blaise Diagne, Depute Charge de Missions pour le 
Gouvemement Frangais a Douala. Affpol, Cart. 2535 doss. 5, CAOM.
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immigration, a zone with a very “recent” population, a zone of violence and terror.49 
The difficulties and turbulence of the border zone under study were more of a 
problem to the French than the British administration. However because of mutual 
understanding and assistance, both administrations worked together to ensure a proper 
control of the boundary and give meaningful solutions to the border problems.
The border zone was a zone o f immigration
The border region notably the Moungo area has been an area of constant flow 
of immigrants. The population is generally spread in small towns (except the cases of 
Manjo, Mbanga and Nkongsamba) situated along the road and railway which run 
parallel to the boundary from Douala to Nkongsamba. According to the 1976 census, 
the population of the Moungo was estimated at 276,456 persons, with a density of 
74,21 persons per km.50 Amongst the immigrants, the largest group was the Bamileke 
followed by the Duala, Hausa, Yaounde (Bulu and the Ewondo), Banen, Bafia and 
others. All these people came to the Moungo originally as plantation workers, a 
situation which could enable them to earn money to pay their taxes and needs of 
survival. It is to be recalled here that in the field of agriculture, the French 
concentrated on the expansion of cash crop production especially cocoa for the 
Africans, coffee and bananas for Europeans. French efforts concentrated on the 
production of cash crops for export to the benefit of the expatriate farmers. Very little 
was done to foster the development of food crop production. Cash crop production
49 The border population is considered here as recent because in some areas the bulk of the people 
settled as a result of the presence of the boundary. These people were in other words attracted to the 
border zones because of the advantages offered by the area. Saying that border zone was a zone of 
violence and terror is no exaggeration, as it might seem to some readers for this was the seat of 
repeated acts of terrorism and killings as will be seen later on in this section.
50 J.C. Barbier, J. Champaud, F. Gendreau, Migrations et developpement. La region du Moungo au 
Cameroun. Paris: Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer, 1983, p.95. The name 
Moungo which the local people called the River was also given to the administrative District (it was 
later called “La Region du Moungo) through which the river flows. The population census for 1976 
(Vol.I Tome 2) referred to the people who lived in the Moungo administrative District.
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was a strong attraction to local people from around the Moungo and beyond. The 
Duala were the first locals to open plantations in the Moungo well before the 
Bamileke. When the Duala lost their trade monopoly in the coastal trade between 
European traders and the people of the hinterland, they turned their interest towards 
agricultural exploitation in the Moungo area because of its fertile soil. They opened 
big plantations of plantains, cocoyams, cocoa and coffee. Some authors have 
described this situation as la colonisation agricole by the Douala.51 Some other local 
people who owned some of the farms were the Balong, Pongo and the Mongo but 
compared to the Duala, they were few and their farms were small in size. As many 
immigrants entered the Moungo, the Bamileke outnumbered the Douala in the field of 
agriculture.
Until 1928, the Bamileke in the Moungo had been grouped as Etrangers 
divers but it was not until 1942 that the first demographic statistics were taken on the 
Bamileke immigrants in the Moungo. Following a report by the chief administrator of 
the Mbanga and Nkongsamba Subdivisions at the time, Reynaud, there were many 
Bamileke in the Moungo; 9,630 in Mbanga, 8,554 in Nkongsamba added to those in 
the other areas resulting to a total of 18,174. The Moungo had a rough estimate of 
about 40 to 43 thousand people at the time.52 By 1947, in some localities like the 
Manehas canton, the immigrants were more numerous than the local population: 
Bamileke 2/3, others 1/3 and the locals 1/3.53 Maybe it is important here to look at the 
reasons for the Bamileke progress in their agricultural “colonisation” in the Moungo.
51 Barbier et al. Migrations et d&veloppement, p. 100.
52 Ibid., p.97
55 Subdivision de Mbanga, APA 11799/F, NAY.
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The Bamileke worked initially for the Duala from whom they asked 
permission to grow some food crops on the plantations for their own use. Later they 
acquired their own farms around where they worked. Unlike their Duala employers, 
the Bamileke used mostly family labour and poorly paid labour. They used paid 
labour only when the need really arose.54 The Duala planters progressively found 
great difficulties in paying their workers. For payment, some of the locals gave one of 
their wives or daughters to their labourer or sometimes a portion of their plantation.55 
As the situation of hardship progressed, and due to the decision not to work as 
labourers even for themselves, the Duala gradually passed on their plantations to the 
Bamileke immigrants. The new plantation owners then brought in and employed very 
many other Bamileke immigrants for very little or no wages with the understanding 
that after some years of service, they would be given their own lands to farm.
The immigrants soon discovered lands that had not been occupied. They then 
moved to these unoccupied and uncultivated lands where they eventually formed their 
own villages placing one of theirs as the chief. This was the origin of the growth of 
towns like Nkapa and Bomono.56 In these new settlements, the immigrants first grew 
cocoa and palm trees around 1925, and by the 1930s they were growing coffee and 
bananas. The heterogeneous nature of the population of the border zone contributed to 
the difficulty in its administration. The French administration classified the Moungo 
area as:
An undisciplined region that has been rendered dangerous and risky by the 
proximity of the Douala region with which it shares several similarities. In this
54 Barbier et al, Migrations et developpement, p. 121.
55Ibid.
56 Barbier et al, Migrations et d&veloppement, p. 123.
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Moungo region, instructions and orders given are generally received with
disobedience and executed with bad faith.5
In such a climate, the administrators’ task was put to the test and rendered very 
difficult. When for example Reynaud was appointed Head of the Mbanga 
Subdivision, this was at a period when a campaign of compulsory labour, Prestation, 
was about to be carried out within his jurisdiction.58 This labour was necessary for the 
construction of the road from Mbanga to Mundame beach. Reynaud’s administrative 
superior, the chief of the Nkongsamba circonscription transmitted his worries about 
the administration of this border region to the Commissioner of the French Republic 
in Yaounde. He wrote that the Commissioner should not take into consideration the 
several letters of accusation that could be sent to him from the local population 
against Reynaud.59
This was because it had been reported to the chief of the circonscription of 
Nkongsamba that Prince Bell of Douala had been holding meetings and discouraging 
local people from taking part in any form of compulsory labour called by the 
administration 60 According to this administrative report, Prince Bell presided over a 
night meeting at Mundame at which he decided that a fresh complaint be sent to both 
the Procureur and the Commissioner of the Republic in Yaounde against the chief of
57Rapport Annuel, Nkongsamba, 1933, APA 11798/F, NAY. The translation is mine.
58 The Subdivision of Mbanga was initially called the Subdivision of Nyombe. As from November 26, 
1926, it was removed from the circonscription of Douala and put under the circonscription of 
Nkongsamba.
59 Head of Nkongsamba Subdivision to Commissioner of the French Republic, Cameroon, December 
15,1932, Rapport de Tournee effectue par le chef de la Subdivision de Mbanga, du Decembre 1932 a 
Janvier 1933, APA 11798/K, NAY.
60 Rapport de Tournee effectue par le chef de la Subdivision de Mbanga 1932 -  1933, APA 11798/K, 
NAY. Letter of December 15,1932, APA 11798/K, NAY.
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the subdivision of Mbanga.61 The chief of the Nkongsamba Subdivision addressed a 
letter to his subordinate telling him not to allow himself to be influenced by 
campaigns carried out against him by the local people. This negative influence of the 
Duala on the border groups against the administration is what has sometimes been 
called the “Duala virus.62
The Duala influence did not end in the South of the Moungo at Mbanga but 
was continued further North to Manjo, which is a town in the Manehas canton. By 
1934, this administrative area was divided into two; the North had a strong Bamileke 
immigrant population and the South a strong Duala (notably Abo and Pongo) 
population. The few areas where the local Manehas population resided were 
conspicuously the poor areas of the canton. The immigrants had pushed the local 
population into the unfertile areas of their land. This was the same situation in villages 
like Nlohe, Manengoteng and Manengole.63 This coexistence between the locals and 
the immigrants generated several problems especially as both groups competed for 
agricultural excellence in the eyes of the government. Usually, the farms of the 
immigrants were neater and better kept than those of the local people. The 
administration tried constantly to settle the quarrels and maintain a peaceful 
coexistence between them. In spite of these efforts, the Duala in Manehas still posed a 
problem to the administration.
The Duala in Manehas usually ran into problems with the administration 
because they considered themselves as equal to the administration in that they both 
hired labour from the local people. The Duala employed labourers to work in their
61 Rapport de Tournee effectue le chef de la Subdivision de Mbanga 1932 -  1933, APA 11798/K, 
NAY.
62 Barbier et al. Migration et developpement, p. 110.
63 Head of Nkongsamba Subdivision to Commissioner of the French Republic, Cameroon, April 12, 
1934, Rapport de Tournie, dans la Subdivision de Nkongsamba, APA 11797/B, NAY.
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farms and paid taxes to the state. In the village of Nlohe for example, a good example 
of a large scale Duala planter considered at the time as a model planter was called 
Elimbi Joe.64 The Duala, especially those who were wealthy and owned large farms 
saw themselves as the closest collaborators of the administration. Those who did not 
own farms acquired reputation as office clerks, accountants, bureaucrats etc, this gave 
them a sense of superiority over the other groups. One of the reasons for this Duala 
self-perception was that they were also the earliest collaborators of the European 
traders at the coast. They acted as middlemen in the trade between the early 
Europeans and the people of the interior. They, like their kin on the British side the 
coastal Bakweri, never wanted to do any menial or laborious jobs. Those they left for 
the immigrants. This attitude of theirs put them in constant trouble with the 
administration, which was constantly out to recruit labour.
The problem o f “strangers ” administration
An important factor that has contributed to the administrative problems of the 
border zone was the recent character of the population. There were villages formed by 
the immigrants or “strangers” purposely to escape from administrative supervision 
and exigencies.65 These “strangers” made the Moungo a zone of refUge. There is the 
example reported by a French administrator who during his tour in 1933 around the 
Loum-Tombel area, discovered a very recently constructed village 66 The village was 
just a few meters from the boundary and had about thirty houses and forty persons. 
On the signal of the arrival of the French administrator, all the villagers took flight to 
the British zone. These people were notably immigrants from Yaounde, Duala and
64 Barbier et al. Migration et developpement, p. 111.
65 The word "strangers” here refers to those immigrants who came from out of the Nkongsamba and 
Mbanga administrative units.
66 Barbier, et al. Migrations et developpement, p. 116.
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Bafia as it turned out to be and they certainly did not have any proof of tax payment. 
The administrator gave them one week to pay their taxes and evacuate that village site 
which according to him was “too easy” for them to escape from any kind of control of 
the administration be it French or British. 67
A major problem faced by the French administration in the rule of the border 
areas was who to appoint as chief of the immigrants. As the number of immigrants 
increased, the administration decided that they should have their own chief a different 
chief from that of the locals. Such a person would work as liaison between the 
immigrants and the administration. Before 1938, the Bamileke who were the major 
group of immigrants were under the command of Jean Sah, while the other tribes 
notably the Hausa, Bamun, Yaounde, Bafia and the Duala were put under the 
authority of a Hausa, Adam Arab.68 It is important here to examine a particular group 
of people called the Hausa who quickly gained the confidence of the administration. 
The Hausa traders came in from Northern Nigeria through Northern Cameroon, from 
the Western region notably the Bamun country into the Upper Moungo precisely in 
Nkongsamba. They came in caravans and settled very close to the train stations where 
they formed small communities.69 They were known for their trade in cola nuts and 
cattle across Northern Nigeria and Cameroon.
In June 1939, to compensate Adam Arab for services rendered to the state, the 
administration appointed him paramount chief or Chef Superieur of all the
61 Rapport Annuel du Gouvemement Frangais au Conseil de la Societe de Nations sur l’administration 
du Cameroun sous Mandat Frangais, 1933, APA 11798/H, NAY.
68 Rapport de Tournees, effectue par le chef de la Circonscription de Nkongsamba, 1934-35. APA 
11797/B, NAY.
69 Ibid.
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immigrants. This was also probably because the Hausa were one of the early 
immigrants and had kept a good relationship with the administration. This situation 
completely put off Jean Sah from whom tax discs were withdrawn (the right to collect 
taxes). Tension mounted between the two chiefs and the administration tried to 
reconcile them. Meanwhile Adam also realized that his authority depended largely on 
the ever increasing number of Bamileke immigrants in the Subdivision. Consequently, 
he agreed to have as an assistant, Jean Sah in his authority. This reconciliation was 
done in the presence of all the chiefs and notables in the Subdivision. During the 
reconciliation meeting, Adam requested equal respect and obedience from his subjects 
for Sah as they would pay to him. One of the immediate results of this reconciliation 
was that a surplus tax recovery (235,281frs in 1940 as against 215,045frs in the 
previous year) was realized.70
The French administration helped sometimes to spur trouble among the 
immigrants. At Nlohe for example, the administrator placed another Hausa immigrant 
as chief of the village even though they were not the majority immigrants there. It is 
reported that a major reason for his appointment as head was because he had served 
the administration for fifteen years and was on retirement. After his successful service 
with the government, the administration judged him capable of administering local 
people placed under his control.71 This opposed him to the very influential and 
prestigious Peter Mbimbe who was the representative of the Duala.72 To reinforce this 
Franco-Hausa friendship, in 1939, the French administration supported the opening of
70 Rapport du 4eme Trimestre dans la Region du Moungo, 1939, APA 10801/N, p.6., APA 108801/N, 
NAY.
71 Rapport de Tournee dans la Circonscription de Nkongsamba par radministrateur Menez, du 18 au 
22 Aout 1937, APA 11797/B 1934 - 1937, NAY.
72 Even though the Duala are not of the Moungo, they have very close cultural and linguistic ties with 
the groups of the Moungo. Thus while in the Moungo they do not feel they are strangers.
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an Islamic school at Nkongsamba. Meanwhile, the Bamileke increased their 
competition with the Hausa in trade within and outside the Moungo region.
The borderland became a zone o f political violence and terror
An important aspect of the border zone, which made it a problem to both 
administrations but mostly to the French, was the revealing nature of the border zone 
as a “shadow” zone or a zone of violence. This discussion will lead us into an analysis 
of how the UPC political party (Union des populations du Cameroun) opted for 
violence in response to the French colonial system. The UPC will be discussed in the 
next chapter but for the interest of this section, this was the first broad based political 
party formed in French Cameroon that included people from a wide range of border 
ethnic groups notably the Bamileke, Duala, Bakweri, Bangwa and the Bakossi.73 The 
bulk of these peoples were related to peoples from Southern Cameroons and they used 
this relationship to support their plan for unification and the dismantling of the 
boundary. From its formation in 1948 until 1953, the party had no major conflicts 
with the administration yet the members maintained their goal, which was “immediate 
independence and unification”. This revealed the nationalist and anti-French nature of 
the UPC. From 1953, the authorities began interrupting their meetings by the use of 
force because it was deemed that the party was pro-Communist and had violent and 
aggressive propaganda. The situation deteriorated with time and members of the party 
were ready to fight back in case of any further disturbances.
From April 24 to May 15 1955, the party held several meetings in the 
Moungo area notably in Nkongsamba, Manjo, Njombe and Manengoteng in a climate 
of extreme tension. Government forces (the police and the gendarmerie) were sent to
73 An examination of biographies of the major leaders of the UPC outlined in the next chapter will 
confirm that they were all from border ethnic groups and they stood for the dismantling of the 
boundary and the reunification of the two Cameroons.
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disperse the meeting of Sunday May 15, this led to violent confrontations between the 
forces and the party members. Another meeting was held in the home of a UPC 
official in Loum, Andre Tchembou. Because the crowd exceeded the confines of his 
compound and occupied part of the road, the Head of the Subdivision of Mbanga 
Gerard Prestat (French administrator) ordered gendarmes to disperse the crowd by 
force 74 The crowd resisted and the result was a great number of persons wounded on 
both sides.
Meanwhile, the town of Nkongsamba was in effervescence as UPC party 
militants held public meetings and resisted all attempts made by the forces of law and 
order to disband them. There was more bloodshed on both sides. In Loum, the UPC 
partisans invaded the local prison and set free all political and other prisoners. When 
all of this news reached Douala, the mobilization there was the most violent on both 
sides. On the side of the administration, there were pro-administration movements 
like the Front National Camerounais (FNC), headed by Chief Vincent Mbock who 
alongside the administration was fighting against the penetration of Communism in 
the territory. The administration regarded the UPC as the flag bearer of that ideology. 
Supporters on the side of the UPC were the Jeunesse Democratique Cameronnaise 
(J.D.C.), Union Democratique des Femmes du Cameroun (U.DE.FE.C) and the 
Confederation Generate des Travailleurs (C.G.T.). On May 22 and 24, violent 
confrontations took place between both sides in the UPC strong holds of Koumassi 
and New Bell in Douala.75
74 Achille Mbembe, La naissance du maquis dans le Sud Cameroun (1920-1960). Histoire des usages 
de la raison en colonie. Paris: Karthala, 1996, p.320. Also see Eugene Wonyu, Cameroun de I 'UPC a 
I’UC. Temoingage d t ’aube de I 'independence (1953-1961). Paris:L ’Hamattan, 1985, pp. 44-58.
75 An account of the killings that took place from May 22nd to 30th 1955 is found in file No. 6,
Situation interieure. Les emeutres de Mai 1955, Serie AL-Affique Levant, Sous Serie Cameroun, 
1953-1959, Archives du Minist&re des Affaires Etrangeres hereafter cited as AMAE.86 An account of 
the killings that took place from May 22nd to 30th 1955 is found in file No. 6, Situation interieure. Les
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By the 28th of May, the Headquarters of the UPC in Douala was burnt down 
and many of the properties of the UPC officials were destroyed. The administration 
declared that on their side, nine people were killed, one hundred wounded and 
numerous houses and vehicles were destroyed76 Nothing was declared on the 
opposing side. Violence spread from Douala to other parts of the country. What is of 
interest to us here is that the UPC, JDC and the UDEFEC were dissolved and banned 
in French Cameroon by July 1955.77 Most of the UPC party officials took flight and 
sought refuge in the border towns on the British side of the boundary.
Meanwhile, from 1950 to 1954, a good number of French Cameroonians who 
arrived as plantation labourers had been established in British Southern Cameroons. 
In addition to these immigrants were an important number of UPC party insurgents 
who entered the territory as from 1955 onwards. The immigrants began requesting to 
be politically assimilated into Southern Cameroons. The Governor General of Nigeria 
and the Legislative Assembly of Southern Cameroons were to decide the possibility 
of granting their request.78 It would in such a case have been possible perhaps for the 
Governor General of Nigeria to give them the right to participate in politics in British 
Southern Cameroons through an “Order in Council” but that did not happen. Due to 
the activities of the UPC partisans in French Cameroon, the British Government 
refused to give French Cameroonians residing in British Cameroon the right to vote or
emeutres de Mai 1955, Serie AL-Afrique Levant, Sous Serie Cameroun, 1953-1959, Archives du 
Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres hereafter cited as AMAE.
76 Mbembe. La naissance du maquis, p. 323.
77 For more on the UPC political radicalism and their struggle for nationalism, see Richard Joseph, 
Radical nationalism in Cameroun. Social origins o f the U.P.C. rebellion. OUP, 1977, pp. 171-289. 
Also see article in the news paper La Vie Camerounaise ,No. 27 of March 9th 1956, “Dans son 
rapport a l ’ONU, la mission de visit du Conseil de Tutelle fleurit les auteurs des troubles de Mai 
dernier.”, (unsigned article) AMAE.
78 Despatch No. 2274/AL of December 10,1955, From the French Ambassador in Great Britain to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Serie: Affique Levant, Sous Serie: Afrique Equatoriale Franeaise (AEF) 
1953-1959, No. 8, AMAE.
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to be politically assimilated in British Southern Cameroons.79 Meanwhile, the British 
government took tighter security measures along the boundary to stop UPC members 
especially the chief officials like Felix Moumie, Ernest Ouandie, Ruben Um Nyobe 
and Abel Kinge to cross over to the British side.
Most of them however were reported to have succeeded to cross over and 
were hiding at the border towns of Kumba, Tombel, Ebonji, Misselele, Muyuka and 
Tiko. Others like Francis Fosso, Rene Job Ngapeth, Joseph Kamsi and Gertrude 
Omog joined the group that crossed over and together, they demanded that the British 
government to give them British passports to go to the UN on an invitation. They 
were refused the passports on the grounds that they were neither locals of Southern
on
Cameroons nor subjects of the British administration. In February 1956, they 
addressed a petition to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
explaining that they were being shot at and about 5000 of them had escaped to the 
British zone and were homeless: “Over 5,000 refugees from the new republic -  
independent since January after 40years of French rule -  have already settled in this 
British territory, which is to vote next year on whether to join the Cameroon Republic 
or Nigeria.”81 This was in short a call for assistance, which was never heeded.
In the meantime, officials of the party decided to reorganise the party and in 
this reorganisation, the border branch of Kumba was made the executive wing of the
79 In the same file No. 8, see letter from Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer to Mmistre des Affaires 
Etrangeres a Paris, No.339XD/GW of January 14, 1956, AMAE.
80 From the French Consul, Lagos to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, letter No. 216/AL of November 
4, 1955, AMAE. From Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassador in London, No. 3239/AL 
of September 15, 1955, S&ie: Afrique Levant, Sous Serie: Afrique Equatoriale Frangaise (AEF) 1953- 
1959, No. 8, AMAE.
81 Extract from article in The Observer, “700 flee from New Republic”, published in Buea, Southern 
Cameroons on June 18th, 1961, CO 554/2568,No. 825/18/01, PRO. Hie votes referred to here were 
those of the plebiscites, which were organized in British Northern and Southern Cameroons by the 
UNO to determine the political future of both territories. The plebiscites of Southern Cameroons have 
been discussed in a later chapter.
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party.82 The administration for their part continued with repression as many arrests
were made in the French Cameroon. The safest place for the party to operate was
across the border on the British side where they could hold meetings and send urgent
letters quickly across to the other side. It is reported that the Bamileke border group
for example were alarmed and distressed and were obliged to shelter their terrorist
brothers and cousins from the French zone “who needed somewhere quiet to hide out
and plan new raids”.83 Meetings referred to as “Les Conferences Educatives ”, were
held in border towns like Kumba from the 21 to 23 February and on May 20, 1956.84
These meetings were aimed at sensitising and educating partisans on the importance
of their loyalty to the party’s commitments.
In spite of these and other problems encountered by the UPC in Southern
Cameroons, it was still tolerated in the territory. The leaders were sheltered by pro-
unificationist leaders like John Ngu Foncha - leader of the Kamerun National
Democratic Party (KNDP). According to the Daily Times of August 12, 1956, the
Commissioner of Southern Cameroons, J .O, Field in an address to the population in
the border town of Tiko acknowledged that:
...the Union des Populations du Cameroun [UPC] has a right to exist in the 
territory like any other political party... There is no harm in having many 
political parties so long as the people so desire... although the French 
Government had proscribed the UPC for alleged Communist tendencies there 
was yet no proof of Communism in the activities of its leaders who took 
refuge in the territory.85
82 Mbembe, La naissance du maquis. $ 3 3 1.
83 Cox. “Avoiding trouble along the Cameroon frontier. A delicate task for Britain”, The Guardian of 
May 20th 1960, CO 554/2568, PRO. A copy of the article is put in the Annex.
Mbembe, La naissance du maquis p.333. Also see letter No. 54 (1200/61) of June 12th 1961, from 
Patrick Johnston to J. Chadwick, C0554/2569, PRO.
84 Mbembe, La naissance du maquis p.333.
85 The Daily Times of August 12,1956, NAB. This like The Evening News were Southern Cameroons 
based newspapers with contributions from some French subjects based in the British zone for a long 
time. Also see Ngoh ,Cameroon 1884-1985, p. 207.
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Such a remark could be seen as reluctance of the British administration to co-operate 
with their French counterparts to arrest political refugees and hand them over. 
However, in less than a year after Field’s statement in Tiko, in 1957, the UPC party 
was banned in Southern Cameroons. On the orders of the Governor General of 
Nigeria, the leaders and other members of the party were expelled from the territory. 
Ngoh says the deportation of the UPC members was at the request of the Endeley 
Government who had been criticised by the party for rigging the 1957 elections.86 
Expelled UPC party members started clandestine movements as the British 
administration issued arrest warrants and actually arrested hundreds of them.87 
According to the Evening News, of April 10, 1958, Um Nyobe’s residence was 
besieged, all his furniture and personal belongings were seized and all his were 
arrested, driven out of town and killed.88 On April 25, 1958, by the same report,
. .twenty soldiers raped pregnant women and a ten year old girl...” at Fokoue village 
close to the boundary.89
French Cameroon security forces sometimes took advantage of the situation 
and committed atrocities blaming it on the terrorists. A case in point is the Ebubu 
atrocities committed by security forces of French Cameroon. They committed
86 Ngoh, Cameroon, 1884-1985, p. 208. The Endeley Government was the first Southern Cameroons 
Government led by Emmanuel Endeley when his party, the Kamerun National Congress won the 1953 
elections in Southern Cameroons. More will be said in subsequent chapters on the political situation of 
both Cameroons and how they influenced the call for the dismantling of the boundary and 
reunification. Elections were held to determine the party that would form the government. The KNC 
won again in 1957 but lost to Foncha’s Kamerun National Democratic Party in 1959.
87 From Government House, Nigeria to CO, No. 499/v/867 of May 14th 1960, CO 554/2568, PRO. Also 
see article by Pieter Lessing, “Big army hunt for African terrorists”, The News Chronicle of June 22nd 
1960, CO 554/2568, PRO.
88 From Commissioner of the French Republic in Yaounde to the Minister of Colonies, Nos. 3906 and 
3907 of July 18th 1959 AgeFom 1007/.3571, Cameroun. Troubles maquis:UPC, 1955-1960. In this 
same file there are clipped articles from the newspaper Marches Tropicaux of 1959 about terrorism in 
French Cameroon.
89 Ibid.
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massive murders and fled back on their side of the boundary. The British
Commissioner R. V. Jones who carried out investigations on the murders concluded
that the atrocities were committed by the Security Forces of the Cameroon Republic:
My impression is that both Colonel Blanc and Mr. Mvie have little doubt in 
their own minds as to who is responsible but that the Republic Government 
would prefer the matter to be regarded as regrettable but unproven and left 
where it is. That could not satisfy public opinion here and would leave the 
impression that Her Majesty’s Government is conniving at brutal murder in 
what is still British territory. Delicate as the situation is, I consider the 
Republic Government should be pressed to admit liability and pay 
compensation, it being made clear that it should be very much in their own 
interest to do so in order to restore the badly shaken confidence in them in the 
Southern Cameroons. 90
Moumie, Ouandie and Kinge were deported to Cairo from where they began to plan
organised violence for the border regions notably the Bamileke and Moungo regions
in the near future 91 Some others were given political asylum in Khartoum, Sudan.92
From May to August 1959, the Bamileke region and the Moungo were boiling with
violence from both sides. Many acts of sabotage were committed in the banana
plantations in the Moungo. The population was called upon by the Maquisards or
“terrorists” to go on strike and stop working for Europeans and form a National Front
for the “total Liberation of the territory from the shackles of French imperialism”,93
The French administration labelled the UPC partisans as “terrorists” and attacked
them with brutality. Meanwhile I do not share the usage of this colonial terminology
90 From the Assistant Commissioner of the Southern Cameroons to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, No. 16 Personal, WAF/E/26 of August 21st 1961, CO 554/2571, PRO. The Commissioner’s 
detail report has exhibits of bullet shells found on the crime scene and eye witness accounts describing 
the type of uniforms worn by the killers.
91 Tambi Eyongetah and Robert Brain, A history o f  the Cameroon. London: Longman, 1974, p. 148.
92 From the French Ambassador in Sudan to the Minister of foreign Affairs, letter No. 406/AL of 
August 13,1957, AMAE.
93 From Commissioner of the French Republic in Yaounde to the Minister of Colonies,No. 3977 of 
October 10,1959 AgeFom 1007/3571, Cameroun. Troubles maquis: UPC, 1955-1960. Also see clipped 
articles from MarcMs Tropicaux, (“ Cameroon atrocities. Are these revelations true?”, “Cameroun. La 
situation politique dans f  ouest Cameroun est inquietante”, “Cameroun. M. Ahidjo insiste sur la 
n£cessit6 de lutter contre le terrorisme”) in the same folder, CAOM, copies of these and other articles 
are in the annex.
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for these partisans could also be perceived as freedom fighters struggling to free their 
country from the hands of a petty brutal and repressive colonial regime. In Penja in 
August of the same year, the administration discovered a camp of “terrorists” and 43 
persons were arrested. They were equipped with bullet-proof jacket liners, bullets, 
machetes, clubs, iron rods and an open letter to all their combating colleagues and 
sympathisers. From this document, it was clear that there was a guerrilla network 
operating along the border zone.
The government of French Cameroon was preoccupied with the situation as it 
was rapidly developing along the boundary and had to seek more collaboration from 
the British authorities. For this reason, the Minister of state, C, Akwa, travelled to 
Buea and Victoria in British Cameroons to discuss the issue further with the 
authorities there.94 The Government of French Cameroon was convinced that if their 
British counterparts tightened up border control as they were doing the circulation of 
the “terrorists” from the East to the West would be practically impossible. However, 
they did acknowledge and regretted the fact that the British authorities had very 
limited material and personnel to put into such an exercise. In order to get satisfactory 
results in such a venture, the French administration suggested that local chiefs of the 
border zone be told to watch out for the “terrorists” as well.95 Meanwhile, UPC 
partisans remaining in Southern Cameroons met clandestinely in the border town of 
Kumba and decided that they would utilise all in their means to achieve independence 
and unification. In their understanding, they were only matching violence to violence. 
This decision sparked off wide spread terrorism along the border zone.
94 From Commissioner of the French Republic in Yaounde to the Minister of Colonies, No. 3977 of 
October 10,1959, AgeFom 1007/3571, Cameroun. Troubles maquis: UPC, 1955-1960, CAOM.
95 From Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer to Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, No. 109 of August 16, 
1956, AMEA.
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The Secretary General of the UPC party Um Nyobe did not go to Cairo but 
maintained communication with the others based there. The French authorities have 
described him as “a fearless and elusive outlaw who was thought to have mythical and 
magical powers”.96 Um Nyobe resorted to increased violence in the border region 
where he laid attacks on plantations, missions and missionaries, French government 
offices and officials, traders and other villagers. The rebels killed, kidnapped and 
wounded people; they invaded markets and looted shops. Border towns along the 
Moungo were notorious areas for bloody confrontations between the rebels and the 
villagers. Rebel activities intensified in those border areas inhabited by large numbers 
of Bamileke immigrants. This made the French government and the rest of the people 
especially the Bakossi locals who were in constant war with the invading Bamileke to 
suspect that the terrorists were the Bamileke immigrants.97 The huge number of 
immigrant Bamileke in this border region obtained land from the local Bakossi and 
made the region their home. It was from these “stranger” lands that most of the 
“terrorist” attacks against government forces and sometimes against other villagers 
were launched.
Violence intensified in the Moungo as the territory approached and attained 
independence. In the month of April 1960 (referred to in the report as bloody April), 
“terrorism” continued in Douala, and in the Moungo resulting to the death of several 
Africans and four Europeans including three Frenchmen,98 French security forces 
were driving the “terrorists” towards the border villages and the villagers in turn for
96 From Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer to Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, No. 109 of August 16, 
1956, AMEA.
97 This tension between the two ethnic groups later, in 1966 led to widespread butchery and massacre in 
what was called the Bakossi-Bamileke war on the border, along the western foothills of the Kupe 
Mountain. See Ngoh, History o f  Cameroon pp.244-246.
98 Ambassade de France au Cameroun, Bulletin Mensuel conformation Politique, Serie AL 1953-'959, 
Sous Serie Cameroun, No. 5, V/5, AMAE.
201
security fled to the British zone from where they launched several frequent attacks. 
The French accused the British authorities of allowing “terrorists” to take refuge in 
the British Cameroons where they could rest and regroup 99 Richard Cox observed 
that avoiding trouble for the British Government along the Cameroon frontier was a 
delicate task for the revolt on the French side was likely to involve the British Army. 
Cox continues that, paradoxically, Southern Cameroons was an area that “we have 
never taken any interest in and that we are too anxious to leave”, implying perhaps 
that Southern Cameroons was not worthy of British military involvement.100
It was later announced that the Federal Government of Nigeria was moving a 
battalion of the Queen’s Own Nigerian Regiment to the Southern Cameroons to 
protect the frontier of the Federation of Nigeria. This was also to reassure the local 
inhabitants in the Nigeria-French Cameroon frontier zone in view of disturbed 
conditions in parts of French Cameroon and security operations to restore order there. 
This news was welcomed in the British Cameroons. British Cameroons was 
threatened by trouble spilling over from the Republic of Cameroon with armed 
troublemakers crossing the boundary at high frequency. There were two Nigerian 
battalions stationed in Southern Cameroons but the Nigerian Government knew that 
she could not allow these troops to stay there after September 30th 1960 for at 
midnight on that day, British (and Nigerian) authority over Southern Cameroons was 
to cease. The British administration in Nigeria was worried about this security 
problem along the border and was faced with the problem of whether to rely on 
reinforcements from Nigeria or to attempt to raise a local force in the Cameroons.
99 The News Chronicle, June 22nd, I960, article by P. Lessing, “Big army hunt for African terrorists”, 
CO 554/2568, PRO.
100 Cox, “Avoiding trouble along the Cameroon frontier.”, The Guardian, May 20, 1960, CO 554/2568, 
PRO.
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Either course however presented the difficulty of cost.101 Meanwhile arrangements for 
security after the withdrawal of British troops from Southern Cameroons were 
underway.102
Two major proposals were advanced: firstly, it was suggested that inter-police 
liaison meetings be held frequently to see how to deal with the problems of refugee 
influx and terrorist threats. Secondly, there was the proposal to increase the frequency 
in patrols of the military forces of Southern Cameroons along the border.103 Besides 
these major proposals, there were other observations of the possibility of stationing 
troops from French Cameroon into British Cameroons in an effort to reduce terrorist 
activities. There was however the fear that the presence of the troops might be 
offensive to the local people along the boundary. It was agreed that shortly before the 
French Cameroon troops (Commanders and Officers) were stationed in British 
Cameroons, they should be introduced to the people in a friendly way.104 This would 
calm the fears and reticence of the border people towards the forces.
The Resident Lagos proposed that alongside all the other measures, there 
should be a possibility of easy transfer of Southern Cameroonians in the Nigerian 
Police Force into a Southern Cameroons Police Force. Some of the expatriate police 
officers were to stay on temporarily with the new Southern Cameroons Police Force 
to help it to get growing properly. Meanwhile, as terrorists kept infiltrating into
101 See replies and notes to the various Parliamentary Questions in the House of Commons on the 
security situation of Southern Cameroons, WAF/825/78/01, Q3, C0554/2564, PRO. Also read extracts 
form official reports of March 10th 1960 sent to the Federation of Nigeria on March 11th 1960, CO 
554/2564, PRO.
102 Commissioner of Southern Cameroons to Secretary of State for the Colonies, No. 23 of May 16th 
1961, CO 554/2569, PRO.
103 From Lord Head to John Profumo, No. 33A of February 1st 1961, C0554/2569, PRO.
104 From J. O Field to C. G. Eastwood, letter No. CC. 84/S4/115 of July 26th 1961, CO 554/2575, PRO. 
Of interest are also the minutes of the meeting held by technical experts of both Cameroons on July 
24th 1961, CO 554/2575, PRO.
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Southern Cameroons many more arrests were made at the border towns. In Muyuka 
and Kumba, there were reported cases of the arrest of alleged arms smugglers by UPC 
supporters.105 Mrs. Cecile Teck who was a courier operating between Douala and 
Tiko across the boundary was arrested at Tiko with her husband in possession of UPC 
literature. Mrs Monique Kamen, the Vice President of the Union Democratique des 
Femmes Camerounaises wrote to Mr. Fenner Brockway of The House of Commons, 
London requesting the release of Cecile and the husband,106 They were both later put 
on bail after appearing before the Magistrates Court.107
An important and militant wing of this terrorist organisation, which also took 
refuge across the boundary, was the Armee de la liberation nationale du Kamerun 
(ALNK). There are reports of the arrests of some of the members of the ALNK 
(Examples were Samuel Fosso, Martin Njimi and Francois Tadje) in Southern 
Cameroons from training in China where special military courses were dished out 
only to members of the group.108 Many of the members were caught around Muyuka, 
Ebonji and Mbanga. In this situation of violence and confusion, people of various 
nationalities were present in the border area. It is not surprising therefore that one 
American and two Swiss Protestant missionaries in Southern Cameroons reported the 
presence of two Czechs and one Chinese at a small border village, Nyasoso
105 From Commissioner Southern Cameroons to Colonial Office, No. 92 of November 30, 1960, CO 
554/2569 Security situation in Southern Cameroons, PRO.
105 From Monique Kamen to Fenner Brockway, No. 00097 of August 3rd 1960, CO 554/2568, PRO.
107 From Governor General Nigeria to Secretaiy of State for Colonies, No. M2 of September 30th, 1960, 
CO 554/2575, PRO. Other UPC partisans arrested at Tiko at the same time were Mayo Beck and Yopa 
Louis from French Cameroon.
108 There are copies of secret reports on die incidents in Southern Cameroons from September 1st to 23td 
1961, in die file CO 554/2574, PRO. Of particular importance is the letter from die Under Secretaiy of 
State for War to Mr. Fairclough, No. 6/E/33 dated October 9th 1961, CO 554/2574, PRO.
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working with the “terrorists” from French Cameroon.109 The terrorists were said to be 
largely Chinese Communist trained. This report led to serious security and a tighter 
boundary policing around pillar number 38 where these foreign terrorist assistants 
were said to be operating from.
It was very close to this area, around pillar number 37, that the Ebubu 
murders took place in which twelve CDC workers including two Nigerians were shot 
by the security forces of French Cameroon.110 This is what has been described as “the 
Ebubu Atrocities”. On hearing this, the Secretary of State for the Colonies sent a 
telegram to the Commissioner of Southern Cameroons that read thus: “While we 
naturally want to avoid a quarrel with the Cameroun Government, particularly at this 
stage and over security arrangements in the frontier area, we obviously cannot let this 
deplorable incident pass”.111 The British administration proposed that the 
government of French Cameroon should promise a full enquiry into the affair and 
punishment to those responsible. They also hoped that the government of French 
Cameroon would offer compensation for the loss. On this, Ahidjo sent a fact finding 
mission which at first maintained that the evidence was compatible with the attack by 
the rebels. The mission intended to carry out full investigation on their side of the 
boundary and communicate the results to the British administration later.
This situation of terror enveloped the border zone as large numbers of refugees 
and some terrorists continued to seek asylum in Southern Cameroons. Nigerian troops 
had been moved to Southern Cameroons to guard against any spread of violence from
109 From an Annual Report on the Cameroun Republic dated September 17th 1961, NAY, the 
Czechoslovakians and Chinese are said to have been there since June but the missionaries were afraid 
to report to the police for fear of retribution.
110 From Secretary of State for the Colonies to Commissioner Southern Cameroons, Telegram No. 117 
of August 18, 1961. CO 554/2571, PRO. French Cameroon is referred to in these CO files as 
“Cameroun”.
151 Ibid.
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the border. When Nigeria became independent on October 1, I960, British troops 
replaced the Nigerian troops in the Southern Cameroons. One year later, troops of the 
military and the Gendarmerie from French Cameroon were sent into Southern 
Cameroons (Bamenda-October 1st, Kumba-October 2nd, Buea-October 3rd 1961).112 
Even after Southern Cameroons and French Cameroon became independent, Britons 
left in Southern Cameroons were armed in fear of a possible raid from the rebels. 
British troops were maintained in Southern Cameroons until the leaders of the new 
East and West States felt confident that the situation was under control or until an 
effective police force could take their place.113
The training camps of the “terrorists” were destroyed and some of their major 
leaders were arrested. The British troops stopped the reorganisation of the ALNK in 
the Moungo. With all of these forces in Southern Cameroons and many of the UPC 
partisans either arrested or on exile, calm was established in the Bamileke and 
Moungo regions. In the next chapter we will see the response of the border people to 
the boundary.
112 Secret letter from Acton to Eastwood, N0.CAM/POL/I/MO3 of 21/07/1961, Co 554/2575, PRO.
113 Confidential telegram from the Commissioner of the French Republic, Yaounde to FO, No. 160 of 
August 8th 1961, CO 554/2574, PRO. By the time Ahidjo became President of the Republic in 1960, he 
was determined to secure his position and sought to come to terms with opposition leaders. Meanwhile 
Moumie died in 1960 from poisoning in Switerland and the bulk of the resistant UPC members were on 
exile, relative calm was thus established in the Moungo.
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CHAPTER FIVE
AFRICAN RESPONSE TO THE IMPOSITION OF THE ANGLO-
FRENCH BOUNDARY IN CAMEROON
We shall now look at the reaction of the border people to the boundary. Their 
reactions varied, from organised and group reactions to unorganised and spontaneous 
actions. People put their complaints to the UN visiting missions orally and also 
through written petitions. Political parties were formed which included in their 
programme the ambition to dismantle the boundary and achieve independence and 
unification for Cameroon. There were also cases of open rejection of the boundary as 
some border groups destroyed boundary landmarks. Others ignored the boundary by 
maintaining close socio-cultural relations across the boundary. Some criss-crossed the 
boundary without official passes while others destroyed boundary marks and attacked 
border guards.
It is important to say here that border groups were not passive victims for they 
often tried to make the best of a difficult situation. While protesting against the 
boundary on the one hand, the border groups made the best of their border position by 
transforming it into an opportunity zone, a zone of “conduit” or transition. This 
situation was favoured by the fact that those managing the boundary were working in 
very difficult terrain-thick forests, hilly and sometimes rugged landscapes with 
dangerous reptiles and insects; these prevented efficiency and increased the 
opportunity for the border groups. On the whole, this group of opportunists did not 
outnumber the larger group who saw the boundary as negative and divisive and and 
called for its dismantlement.
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THE UNITED NATIONS VISITING MISSIONS AND PETITIONERS IN  SOUTHERN 
CAMEROONS
Two bodies, the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee of the 
General Assembly (often called the Trusteeship Committee), were directly concerned 
with the trust territories. On the Trusteeship Council, all administering, authorities 
were represented, as were permanent members of the Security Council. A number of 
non-administering states were elected for three-year terms, so that the number of 
administering and non-administering countries remained equal,1 The very first session 
of the Fourth Committee, in 1946, illustrated the tensions and pressures bearing upon 
the political development of the trust territories. Seven draft agreements were 
submitted to the General Assembly, including those for both sections of Togoland and 
the Cameroons.2 More than assuring good supervision and the correction of abuses, 
international supervision became a safeguard for rapid progress towards self- 
government. The increased scope of international supervision was also made evident 
by the visiting mission system. In Article 87 of the Charter, the Trusteeship Council 
was authorized to “make periodic visits”. Every three years, four members of the 
Trusteeship Council were selected to visit West Africa; the first regular mission 
visited in 1949, the fourth and last in 1958. UN Visiting Missions toured the 
territories in 1949, 1952, and 1955 and in 1958 to assess how well the British and the 
French were performing their role of Trusteeship.3 Visiting Missions were intended to 
gather information (and accordingly could accept petitions), as well as to inquire into
1 The Fourth Committee included all UN members and was more responsive to changes in the 
composition of the General Assembly. Since its membership was correspondingly wider than that of 
the Trusteeship Council, the Fourth Committee tended to press for more rapid implementation of self- 
government or independence than the Trusteeship Council.
C. E. Welch, Jr, Dream o f unity. Pan-Africanism and political unification in West Africa. Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1966,pp. 30-31.
3 United Nations Trusteeship Council Official Records here after cited as UNTCOR, on the various 
Visiting Missions, ICOMM. Annual Reports on the Cameroons under British administration for the
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specific problems, in accordance with the particular instructions of the Trusteeship 
Council. They wrote reports and collected petitions, which they sent to the 
Trusteeship Council. From these reports the Council made observations and 
recommendations that contributed to the advancement of the territory from a 
completely dependent status to self-government. Petitions were formulated, 
demonstrations and meetings organized, and the inhabitants told of the significance of 
the Mission’s tour.
As direct representatives of the UN, the Visiting Missions were believed to 
possess great influence over the administering authorities. This UN Trust status of the 
territoiy has been seen by Africans as advantageous as the inhabitants of the trust 
territories were able to petition directly to the Secretary-General of the UN. Such 
petitions were in the form of telegrams, letters, memoranda or other documents, and 
they contained requests, complaints and grievances. People could equally present their 
problems directly to the Missions while in the territory.
According to Welch, the “avalanche of petitions” (the 1955 Visiting Mission 
to West Africa received about 200,000 communications in French Togoland alone, 
and another 40,000 in the French Cameroons) received testified to the willingness of 
the Africans to co-operate with the Missions 4 The number of oral petitioners who 
gave statements in New York also increased. Eleven out of the sixty-six petitions and 
supplementary petitions to the UN Trusteeship Council presented by the inhabitants 
of Southern Cameroons, were on the Anglo-French boundary and twelve from French
years 1949,1952,1955 and 1958, SOAS Main Library, London. Henry Kam Kah, “The United 
Nations Visiting Missions and the Southern Cameroons, 1949-1958”, BA dissertation, University of 
Buea, Cameroon, 1996. For more data on the UN Missions in French Cameroon, see various “Rapports 
Annuels" of the respective years, CAOM.
4 Welch, Dream o f  t/ni^,pp.32-33.
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Cameroon were based on the same issue.5 Among those who called for an end to 
artificial boundaries were pressure groups and political parties like the French 
Cameroons Welfare Union (FCWU); the Cameroons National Federation (CNF); the 
Kamerun National Congress (KNC); the Kamerun People's Party (KPP); the 
Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) and the Kamerun United National 
Congress KUNC.
Some of the petitions called for the unification of the two British 
Cameroons; meanwhile the bulk wanted the unification of the British and French 
spheres.6 This implied the removal of the boundary. French Cameroonians (Bamileke) 
living in the British zone held a conference in Kumba in 1949 in which they presented 
a memorandum to the first Visiting Mission which went to the territory in November 
of that year. This group was called the Baminyang Improvement Union (BIU), 
Kumba. The memo called for the removal of the boundary and the unification of the 
British and French Cameroons. Requests for unification also came that same year 
from economic and ethnic organisations and the thirteen Southern Cameroonians who 
were members of the Eastern House of Assembly, Nigeria.7
The first Mission to both Southern Cameroons and the French Cameroon was 
in 1949. According to the Annual Report of the French Government to the UN for
5 Ngoh, Cameroon, p. 188
6 The Cameroons administered under British Mandate (also referred to as the Cameroons under UK 
administration) was divided into two parts: the British Northern Cameroons and the British Southern 
Caneroons. Southern Cameroons until 1954 was administered as an integral part of the Eastern Region 
of Nigeria, until the independence of Nigeria as a “quasi-Federal” territory that evolved towards full 
regional status. Northern Cameroons remained administratively an integral part of the Northern Region 
of Nigeria, divided between Adamawa, Benue, and Bomu Provinces, until October 1,1960. On June 1, 
1961, Northern Cameroons was formally reintegrated into the Northern Region of Nigeria as the 
Sardauna Province.
7 It should be recalled here that for administrative purposes, British Southern Cameroons was put 
under the control of the Eastern Region of Nigeria and administered as part of Nigeria. The seat of 
government was until 1949 in Lagos before it was transferred to Buea in Southern Cameroons. The 
Eastern Region had an Eastern House of Assembly with Southern Cameroonian representation. The 
Association; Ejagham Improvement Union; Mbu Improvement Union; Bamenda Improvement 
Association in Kumba and Grassfield National Union, see Welch, Dream o f unity, p. 162.
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that year, the Mission was made up of: Awni Khalidy (Iraq- President), A. Claeys
Bouvqert (Belgium), A. Ramos Pedrieza (Mexico) and Benjamin Gerig (USA).8 It
was to have on-the-spot consultations with the local representatives of the
administering authority. On arrival in Southern Cameroons, the Mission received
complaints from pressure groups like the CNF and the FCWU, which later became the
East Cameroon Welfare Union (ECWU).9 Both groups canvassed for the unification
of the two Trust Territories of the Cameroons into a single unit. The CNF opposed the
administration of Southern Cameroons as a part of Nigeria becausein such a system,
the interests of Southern Cameroonians were not fully respected. This was because
the number of Cameroonian representatives in Nigerian legislative institutions was
too small to have any effective impact on the development of the territory. The
Mission’s reaction to these petitions was that Britain and Southern Cameroonians
were advised to carefully examine the desirability and practicability of some
administrative, legislative and budgetary autonomy being established in the
territory.10 The Mission also called on the easing of frontier regulations between the
British and French Cameroons.
In the French Cameroon, the Mission entered from the North at Mora and
proceeded southwards towards Douala passing through Maroua, Garoua, Ngoundere
and Yaounde. On the last lap of the tour they went through the border areas of
Dschang and Nkongsamba where they met with border people and their
representatives were J. N Foncha, S.T. Muna, V.T. Lainjo, J. T. Ndze, A. N. Ngala, J. C. Kangsen, S. 
C. Ndi, S. A . George, M. N. Forju, N.N. Mbile, R. N. Charley, E. M. L. Endeley, and P. N. Motombi- 
Woleta. These economic and ethnic organisations were: the Bakweri Improvement Union; Bakweri 
Land Committee; Cameroons Development Corporation Workers’ Union; Mamfe Improvement Union, 
Victoria; Bafaw Improvement Union; Bakundu Improvement Union; Balong Tribal Union; Balue 
Improvement Union; All-Bakossi Improvement League; Bakossi Land Committee; Ngolo-Batanga- 
Bima-Balondo-Badiko Improvement Union; Mbonge Improvement Union;Isangele Farming
8 Rapport Annuel du gouvemement FranQais aux Nations Unies sur l’administration du Cameroun 
placee sous latutelle de la Fiance, 1949, P. 34, CAOM.
9 These and other pressure groups and political parties will be discussed below.
10 Kah, “The United Nations Visiting Missions”, p. 19.
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representatives. Due to the support of the local populations and the administration, the 
first UN Visiting Mission in French Cameroon appeared to have worked under good 
conditions. Members of the Mission had working sessions and free contacts with the 
various elements of the local population wherever they went. They also received 
freely, all petitions from the people.11 During this visit, the French administration did 
much to make sure that the members of the Mission acquired a complete view of the 
territory, its inhabitants and organisation.
The next Mission arrived in 1952. The Mission was composed of the 
following members: Messrs H-K. Yang (China), M. H. Dorsinville (Haiti), Roberto E. 
Quiros (El Salvador), Roy A. Peachey (Australia-Chairman), Robert Scheyven 
(Belgium) and E. W. Mulcahy (USA).12 The aims of the Mission were to accept and 
receive petitions without prejudice to its acting in accordance with the rules of 
procedure and to investigate on the spot, after consultations with local representatives 
of the administering authorities concerned:
- to examine in consultation with the administering authorities, the means 
taken and to be taken in respect of the provision of information about the 
United Nations to the peoples of the Trust Territories.
- to transmit to the Council as soon as practicable after the completion of 
its visit a report on each of the territories visited containing its findings
11 Rapport Annuel du gouvemement Fransais aux Nations Unies sur le Cameroun, 1949, p. 34, CAOM. 
It is reported that most of these violent petitions came from the UPC party members and some of the 
border groups,
12 “Dans son rapport & l ’ONU, la Mission de visite du Conseil de Tutelle” La vie Camerounaise, No. 
27,1956, CAOM. Also see UNTCOR, 13th session (28 January -  25 March 1954), Supplement No. 4, 
p.l, ICOMM. The Mission was accompanied by seven members of the Secretariat: Mr. J. J. Cebe- 
Habersky (Principal Secretary); Mr. L. Stembach, Miss J. Brown-Harrop and Mr. F. T. Liu (Assitant 
Secretaries); Mr. E. Sameh (Administrative Officer); Mr. G. Margoulies (Interpreter); and Miss P. 
Lacerte (Stenographer), UNTCOR, 13th session (28 January -  25 March 1954), Supplement No. 4, p.
1, ICOMM.
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with such observations, conclusions and recommendations as it might wish 
to make.13
The Mission visited French Cameroon from 14th October to 10th November and 
Southern Cameroons from 10th November to 23rd November 1952. In Southern 
Cameroons, this second Mission held sessions at the Native Court Hall in Kumba and 
also at Victoria. During these sessions, village chiefs, tribal unions, political 
organisations and individuals had all prepared their petitions, thoughts and grievances. 
Among the many petitioners were traders, farmers, businessmen, smugglers and other 
town dwellers, Thomas Abanda says smugglers also put in a petition, for a total 
relaxation of frontier restrictions but not for its removal.14 Petitioners hoped that the 
second Mission would give immediate solutions to their demands.
The United Nations Trusteeship Council Official Records report that the 
Mission received sixty-eight communications and memoranda most of them relating 
to local problems and general questions.15 The Mission agreed to split up into two 
groups, A and B to cover different sectors of the territory. Group B was to visit the 
southern section (at the border towns of Buea, Victoria, Kumba and Tiko) while 
group A would cover the north (parts of Kumbe and most of Mamfe and Bamenda). 
When the Mission (group A) visited Kumba on 19th November, members attended a 
meeting with the CNF (this was a pressure group that advocated for the reunification 
of Cameroon), and heard an address delivered by Dr Emmanuel Mbella Lifafe 
Endeley, Minister without portfolio and member of the Eastern House of Assembly. It
13 UNTCOR, 13th session (28 January -  25 March 1954), Supplement No. 4, p. 1, ICOMM.
14 Thomas Abanda, “ Optimists in the Cameroons”, WestAfricax XXXVI,1868, (December, 13, 1952): 
1160. Sample copies of some of the petitioners and the symbol references of their petitions have been 
annexed,
15 UNTCOR, 13th session (28 January ~ 25 March 1954), Supplement No. 4, p. 2, ICOMM. In the 
annex is a map showing the routes of the 1952 Visiting Mission in tire Trust Territories of die 
Cameroons.
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also attended a meeting organised by the KUNC during which it held oral hearings. 
Nerius Namtta Mbile set forth the demands of his organisation Honorary Secretary of 
the CNF) as follows: the reunification of the two Cameroons, self government for the 
Cameroons under UK administration within five years, abolition of frontier 
difficulties and intensive general development. Still in Kumba, the CNF 
representatives requested for: an alleviation of frontier difficulties, a separate regional 
status for the whole of the Trust Territory, the amendment of the Land and Native 
Rights Ordinance, a reform of the local government and the establishment of a 
comprehensive housing scheme particularly in the areas affected by the plantations 
(largely the border zone).
At Buea, the Mission held oral hearings with the various Bakweri groups, the 
Cameroons Development Co-operation (CDC) Workers’ Union and the Likomba 
Plantation Workers’ Union. It held a meeting with the Southern Cameroons 
representatives in the Eastern House of Assembly, five of whom were also members 
of the Central House of Representatives in Lagos, Nigeria. At this meeting, the 
demand for reunification was presented in very general terms with no concrete 
proposals for implementing it practically. The Mission noted that as of that time, no 
political campaign had been waged on the issue of unification. It appeared to the 
Mission that the question of unification was closely linked in the minds of the 
representatives with concerns over their minority position in the Nigerian legislative 
organs and as such the interest of the Trust Territories might be subordinated to those 
of Nigeria. When it arrived at Victoria, it visited the general hospital and its dentistry 
section and noted the operation of the nursing scheme. It held meetings with members 
of the Victoria Federated Council, the Balong Native Authority, the Co-operative 
Farmers’ Union and the Tiko Council. The Mission registered more oral hearings
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from the KUNC at Victoria. It visited the Roman Catholic Mission, the St. Francis 
Training College for girls, the Roman Catholic Girls School and Orphanage, the 
medical field unit and a research centre. The group (A) that left from Buea went to 
Sasse where it visited St Joseph’s College, the first Roman Catholic Mission 
secondary boys school, and then went on to visit the New Trade Training Centre at 
Ombe.
The major concern of the petitioners could be summarised as follows: 
Unification of French and British Cameroons, removal of frontier restrictions, free 
trade with their French neighbours, help from the UN agencies, scholarships, self 
government by 1956, repeal of the Cameroons Land Tenure Ordinance vesting all 
lands in the Governor, and a Cameroons House of Assembly having nothing to do 
with the Eastern Region.16 Advocates of unification told the chairman of the Mission, 
Peachey that they would like immediate unification with their brothers on the other 
side of the boundary. The Mission accepted the interpretation of the government that 
the demand for unification arose because of the fear of subjugation if Southern 
Cameroonians remained with Nigeria.17 This analysis of the situation by the British 
administration suited their own interests. The Mission progressed to the French 
territory.
When the Mission reached French Cameroon, (September 25th to November 
10th) it travelled from the South to the North. Following the 1952 Annual Report of 
the administration of French Cameroon, the second Visiting Mission received 
“millions of visitors and hundreds of petitions”.18 The UPC party presented twenty-
16 Welch, Dream o f unity, pp164-180. Thomas Abanda, “ Optimists in the Cameroons”, West AfricaA 
XXXVI,1868, (December, 13,1952): 1160.
11 Report on the Cameroons for the year 1950, pp. 18-19.
18 Rapport Annuel du gouvemement Frangais sur le Cameronn, 1952, p. 20, CAOM.
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seven petitions in favour of reunification to the 1952 Visiting Mission in French 
Cameroon and the Mission once more accepted the interpretation of the administering 
authority that the demand for reunification was unimportant and confined to a few 
malcontents. The Mission erroneously accepted the interpretation of the French 
administration that Um Nyobe commanded slight support and popularity among the 
political representatives of the people.19 The Mission was also made by the 
administration to understand wrongly that Um Nyobe represented only a small portion 
of the Cameroonians or public opinion. This was not true for the call for reunification 
and independence which Um Nyobe and his partisans stood for was not only an affair 
of the border people but of most Cameroonians as well. What however was still 
lacking was solidarity and concerted group action towards these goals. Consequently, 
the 1952 Mission like the previous one informed the Trusteeship Council that the 
reunification option was not a popular one for it was not an acute problem by then.20 
To counter the findings of the Visiting Mission, Um Nyobe requested and received a 
hearing before the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly where he made 
remarks that gave to the UPC arguments for reunification an air of authority 21 The 
mission observed however that there was growing interest in political affairs in the 
territory 22
It is important here to reflect on issues concerning frontier relations between 
the two Cameroons. The Mission heard the views of the people living along the
19 It is likely that the number of visitors received by the Mission in French Cameroon that year has been 
exaggerated in the report, but however, the above source reports that they did receive veiy many visits.
20 Welch, Dream o f unity, p. 183.
21 Ibid.
22 Rapport Annuel du gouvemement Frangais sur le Cameroun, 1952, p.20, CAOM. Also see 
UNTCOR, 15th Session, 25 January -  28 March 1955, p. 7, ICOMM.
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frontier and had talks with the officers of the two administering authorities. 
According to its report, relations between the two sectors in the north were close 
evidenced by co-operation between the two administrations in connexion with 
customs problems and, particularly banditry, in the south, the situation was 
different.23 The frontier in the south had more significance. The ethnic affiliations and 
local economic interests of the border zone population constituted a basis for frequent 
inter-change of goods and movements of people on both sides of the frontier. The 
attraction of the port of Douala and the Nkongsamba-Douala railroad in the French 
Cameroons for exports from the UK side of the border, such as the banana production 
of the Tombel area, was important.24
With regards to movement of persons, the British administration requested no 
documents at the time from people entering the territory from the French side. This 
was because these people constituted a sure force of manpower and revenue to the 
administration. There were by far many more people coming in from the French than 
from the British side, mostly in quest for jobs in the plantations, which offered better 
wages and living conditions than in the French zone. The French authorities required 
a Laissez-passer for people crossing into their territory. The Mission was told that in 
order to alleviate border difficulties, the number of customs posts had been reduced 
from twenty-four to eleven on the UK side and from eleven to seven on the French 
side.25 The French authorities informed the Mission that local agricultural and 
handicraft products, small livestock on lead, three herds of large animals and 
manufactured articles regarded as customary gifts, of a value of not more than 15,000 
francs per person, could be imported and exported freely, without customs duty. The
23 UNTCOR, 15th Session, 25 January -  28 March 1955, p. 10, ICOMM.
24Ibid.
25 Ibid.
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report continued that with regard to currency, frontier dwellers may import up to £15
per person into the French zone and may export up to £15 and 20,000 francs CFA per
26person.
Further alleviation of frontier formalities and the removal of frontier barriers 
were requested in general terms in several communications received by the Mission. 
Other questions raised with the Mission in relation to the frontier were: the abolition 
of the Laissez-Passer between the Cameroons under UK administration and the 
Cameroons under French administration, the establishment of a Customs Union or the 
complete removal of customs duties between the two trust territories, and the 
abolition of inland customs posts and their transfer to coastal ports. 27 The Mission 
assigned Allen who had worked for a long time on delimiting the boundary to 
investigate the frontier problem in co-operation with the liaison officers of the French 
Cameroons. The Mission received the cordial hospitality and co-operation both from 
the administration and from all sections of the population.28
At its 608th meeting, the Trusteeship Council decided to dispatch yet another 
Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of the Cameroons under British and French 
administrations. This third Mission was composed of: Robert Scheyven (Belgium),
26 UNTCOR, 15th Session, 25 January -  28 March 1955, p. 10, ICOMM. It is possible that the issues 
reported by the administering authorities to the Visiting Mission did not reflect what was actually 
talcing place practically. It might have been an exaggeration of the situation to paint a positive picture 
of a highly relaxed frontier administration.
27 UNTCOR, 15th Session, 25 January -  28 March 1955, p. 10, ICOMM.
28 Ibid. A. C. T. Benson, Acting Governor of Nigeria and the Cameroons under UK administration 
received the Mission in absence of His Excellency the Governor. After the visit, the Mission expressed 
gratitude to Brigadier Gibbons, Commissioner of the Cameroons and to officers and members of the 
administration whom it met notably J. G. C Allen and D. A. F. Shute who were the chief officers 
providing liaison with the Mission.
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Hsi-kun Yang (China), Max H. Dorsenville (Haiti) and Edward W. Mulcahy (USA) 
as members.29 The Mission was directed among other tasks:
to receive petitions without prejudice to its acting in accordance with 
the rules of procedures of the Council and to investigate on the spot, 
after consultation with the local representative of the administering 
authorities concerned, such of the petitions received as, in its 
opinion, warranted special investigation;
to examine, in consultation with the administering authorities, the 
measures taken or to be taken in respect of the provision of 
information about the United Nations to the peoples of the Trust 
Territories and;
to submit to the Council as soon as practicable a report on each of 
the territories visited containing its findings with such observations, 
conclusions and recommendations as it might wish to make.30
In October 1955, the third UN Visiting Mission entered French Cameroon 
from the North at Maroua and Garoua heading for Ngaoundere. One of the complaints 
the Mission heard when it arrived Ngaoundere was that the UNO should not tolerate 
the existence of the UPC in French Cameroon any longer. This complaint was 
submitted by the local population of the Northern part of the territory who saw the 
UPC as a threat to the presidency of their tribesman, Ahidjo. The Northerners also 
deplored the use of violence by the UPC partisans. The Mission stayed in the North 
until November 6 when it proceeded to Yaounde. In Yaounde, members of the
29 UNTCOR, 17th Session, 7 February -  6 April 1956, Supplement No. 3, p.l, ICOMM. The mission 
was accompanied by six members of the secretariat, namely: Mr. W. F. Cottrell (Principal Secretary), 
Messrs. T. Shore, R. Watlien (Assistant Secretaries), Mr. G. Margoulies (Interpreter), Mr. E. Sameh 
(Administrative Officer), Miss D. Wyns (Stenographer).
30 UNTCOR, 17th Session, 7 February -  6 April 1956, Supplement No. 3,1956, pp. 1-2, ICOMM. The 
map in the annex shows the itinerary of the 1955 Mission.
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Mission broke up into two groups which both held meetings with local chiefs, 
municipal counsellors and representatives of the various legal political parties. The 
report of the Mission contained a chapter on the killings of May 1955 in which it 
condemned the authors of the killings and their methods.31 The report justified the 
dissolution of the UPC and its affiliated groups, the Jeunesse Democratique 
Camerounaise (JDC) and the Union Democratique des Femmes Camerounaises 
(UDFEC). However the report added that dissolution did not constitute the solutions 
of Cameroon's political problems.
During this visit to French Cameroon, the Mission received 40.000 petitions 
from groups and individuals.32 This number, which is by far higher than those of 
Southern Cameroons, could once more be an exaggeration. The petitions were 
regrouped into two main classes: one class asked for the independence of French 
Cameroon and its unification with British Cameroons. Another class expressed the 
satisfaction of the people with the French administration. Following an Annual Report 
of the French administration, the Mission expressed the view that none of the petitions 
of the first class presented a coherent programme to achieve unification.33 In order to 
get a popular opinion of the people, the Mission envisaged a future project that would 
include participants of all political parties represented at the Territorial Assembly and 
all the sections of the population to meet and discuss the political future of the 
territory. That forum would also examine ways of improving on the living standards
31 Rapport Annuel du gouvemement Fran?ais sur le Cameroun, 1952, p.20, CAOM. Also see,
Cameroun vie politique (1945-60) see article entitled “Dans son rapport a 1’ONIT, La Vie 
Camerounaise, (1952): 1, AgeFom 1005/3504, CAOM.
32 Cameroun vie politique (1945-60) see article entitled “Dans son rapport & FONU”, La Vie 
Camerounaise, (1952): 1, AgeFom 1005/3504, CAOM. Official records of the Trusteeship Council talk 
of 60 communications and memoranda, UNTCOR, 17th Session, 7 February -  6 April 1956, 
Supplement No. 3,1956 p. 3, ICOMM. These figures could be an exaggeration of the actual numbers 
but they are indicative of the fact that there were several petitions tabled.
33 UNTCOR, 17th Session, 7 February -  6 April 1956, Supplement No. 3,1956 p. 3, ICOMM.
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of the North. According to the same French Report, the Mission observed with 
satisfaction the economic and social progress undertaken by the French administration 
in Cameroon since their last visit and congratulated the Christian missions on the 
progress made in the education of the people 34 By IB November, the Mission left 
French Cameroon through the Moungo for British Southern Cameroons.35
On 23 November, the border people at Buea welcomed the Mission. There, it 
met informally with the Executive Council of the Southern Cameroons, consisting of 
the Commissioner of the Cameroons, the Deputy Commissioner, the Legal Secretary 
and four unofficial members namely, Endeley, Reverend J. C Kangsen, S, T. Muna 
and F. A. Sone.36 All of these members spoke as individuals in their private capacity, 
so that each felt free to express his own personal opinions without committing the 
Executive Council as such. After this meeting, the Mission was shown the 
government buildings in Buea, the House of Assembly that was completed in March 
of that year, and the Court House. In order to cover as much ground as possible, the 
Mission once more divided into two groups; one group went to Tiko where it visited 
the Likomba Plantation of Messrs.Elders and FyfFe’s, the CDC rubber plantations and 
the co-operation’s school. The second group went to Bota visiting more units of the 
CDC and then preceded to Victoria where it met the members of Federated Native 
Authority Council and heard an address by Chief Jesco Manga Williams, who was the 
Victoria Division Native Authority member in the Southern Cameroons House of
34 Cameroun vie politique (1945-60), AgeFom 1005/3504, CAOM, see article entitled “ La visite de 
mission de l’ONU a Douala et au Moungo, du 9 au 18 Novembre, 1955”, La Vie Camerounaise,
(1955) CAOM. It was in the administration’s interest to report the Mission’s satisfaction with the 
French administering authorities.
35 “ La visite de mission de l’ONU a Douala et au Moungo, du 9 au 18 Novembre, 1955”, La Vie 
Camerounaise, (1955) CAOM. Brayne Baker, the Deputy Commissioner of British Cameroons, the 
Resident Special Duties, A. B Westmacott and the District Officer, Bamenda, F. Walker, welcomed 
members of the mission
36 UNTCOR, 17th Session, 7 February -  6 April 1956, Supplement No. 3,1956 p. 3, ICOMM. It was 
also met by two members of the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly for Bamenda Division, S. T. 
Muna and J. N. Foncha and V. Mukete, Federal Minister without Portfolio.
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Assembly. 37 The Mission divided again as it continued to visit more of the towns 
along the border. A part of it visited the Government trade Centre at Ombe while the 
other part went to the Tole tea plantation. On 25 November, the Mission went to 
Kumba stopping en route at Muea for a short visit with representatives of the Bakweri 
Co-operative Union of Farmers. The Union read an address of welcome to the 
Mission, which also heard oral communications from the group. In Kumba, 
representatives of the Division Native Authorities had interviews with members of the 
Mision after which, other groups also held talks like the Kumba branch of the KNC 
and the women’s section of the same body, the Kamerun United Commoners’ Party 
(KUCP), ex-service men and pensioners. Later on in the day, a part of the Mission 
attended the first congress of the Co-operative Union of Southern Cameroons while 
another group visited the Government Agricultural Station at Barombi-Kang.
The Mission rounded up its visit in Southern Cameroons in Buea with a long 
session of uninterrupted interviews from 9.30am to 2.40pm. These interviews in 
particular afforded the members of the Mission an excellent opportunity to further 
acquaint themselves with the problems of the people. By this time when the third 
Visiting Mission arrived in Southern Cameroons all three political parties (KNC, KPP 
and KNDP), the Bakweri Land Committee and the CDC Workers’ Union were 
working together for the political advancement of the territory. The KNC, KPP and 
the KNDP argued that prior to the First World War, Cameroon was a single country 
governed by Germany. They thus wanted the reunification of the two Trust territories 
of British and French Cameroons. The UN report for 1955 however says that, people 
were still uneducated on the reunification issue.38 It continues by saying that some
37 UNTCOR, 17th Session, 7 February -  6 April 1956, Supplement No. 3,1956 p. 3, ICOMM.
38 The Cameroons under United Kingdom administration: United Nations Report of the Trusteeship 
Council covering the period from July 23 1955 to August 14,1956, p. 120. ICOMM.
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people were indifferent and interpreted independence and reunification as bringing 
together members of the same tribe who were separated by artificial boundaries.39 
The Mission recommended that no hasty decision should be taken for it could be very 
damaging. It suggested that, the people should be educated and should meet regularly 
for this might enhance the feeling of solidarity among them.
At its 888th meeting, on 26 March 1958, the Trusteeship Council decided to 
dispatch a fourth mission to the Trust Territories of the Cameroons. At its 924th 
meeting, on 8 July 1958, it approved the nominations of Messrs George Salomon 
(Haiti), Rikhi Jaipal (India), Gray Thorp (New Zealand) and Benjamin Gerig (USA - 
Chairman) as members of the Mission.40 The Council directed the Mission to 
investigate and report as fully as possible on the steps taken in the two Trust 
Territories to address the issues concerned in the petitions received so far.41 In 
addition, it requested the Mission to include in its report on the Cameroons under UK 
administration its views on the methods of consultation, which should be when the 
time came for the people in the territory to express their wishes concerning their 
future 42
From New York through the Colonial Office in London, then through Nigeria, 
the Mission arrived in the Cameroons under UK administration on 29 October 1958. 
Because of the special functions of the Mission in regard to the future of the 
Cameroons, it set aside most of its time to hearing the views of the people and their
39 The Cameroons under United Kingdom administration: United Nations Report of the Trusteeship 
Council covering the period from July 23 1955 to August 14,1956, p. 121. ICOMM.
40 UNCTOR the 23rd Session, 30 January -  20 March 1959, Supplement No. 2, 1959, p. 2, ICOMM. 
The mission was accompanied by six members of the secretariat: Messrs R. T Miller (Principal 
secretary), F. T. Liu, R. W. Wathen (Assistant secretary), J. Delattre (Interpreter), T. Trisciuzzi 
(Administrative officer), and Miss C. E. Charpentier (Stenographer).
41 Ibid, p. 3.
42 UNCTOR the 23rd Session, 30 January -  20 March 1959, Supplement No. 2, 1959, p. 2, ICOMM.
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representatives on the political future of the territory. The Mission did not limit such 
interviews to those of a formal character scheduled on its programme, but adopted the 
practice of halting even if briefly, to hear and acknowledge groups of people who had 
assembled along the roads and in other places in the obvious desire to express their 
views. Moreover, it had many informal contacts with political leaders and other 
representative persons.
The Mission also carried out a broad based approach by paying tribute to those 
many hundreds of men and women from countries far from the Cameroons, especially 
from the USA, UK and other countries of the Commonwealth of Nations.43 These 
people the Mission estimated had given their devotion, effort and skill to help the 
Cameroons people develop the political institutions, economic, social and educational 
facilities that constituted the foundation of their future self-government. These were 
the administrators, doctors, teachers, agricultural officers and experts in many other 
professions and skills who, whether in the service of government, private enterprise or 
missionary societies, had over the years established orderly administration, begun a 
transformation of the economy, and laid down the essential medical, educational and 
other services.44
It is important to state here that at the time of this fourth visit, the Mission 
found that there were political activities going on in Southern Cameroons. In close 
association with the political activities was the Kamerun Idea based on the concept of 
a search for a “national identity”. Political activities during this time was marked by 
inter-ethnic rivalries, influence of powerful chiefs and clashes of political 
personalities. In the border areas the activities of Political Refugees and immigrants
43 UNCTOR the 23rd Session, 30 January -  20 March 1959, Supplement No. 2, 1959, p. 2, ICOMM, p.
3.
44 Ibid.
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from the Cameroons under French administration created an atmosphere of fear and 
uncertainty. But from all this, two central facts emerged at the time of the Mission’s 
visit: first, that public discussion was dominated by the question of the future of 
Southern Cameroons; and secondly that public opinion fell into two major categories 
represented in organised politics by the two main political parties, KNC/KPP and 
KNDP. On the one side there was the view of self-government within the Nigerian 
Federation and on the other was unification with the Cameroons under French 
administration.
After listening to the views of the various sections of the society, the Mission 
reported that there was strong support in the territory for the unification of Southern 
Cameroons with Cameroon under French administration.45 It further recommended 
the organisation of plebiscites to decide the political future of Southern Cameroons. 
This proposal was made because the Mission had recently used the plebiscites route to 
resolve the issues at stake in southeastern Ghana and was therefore enthusiastic about 
this methodology. The Trusteeship Council together with the UN accepted this 
recommendation after careful study. In arriving at this conclusion, in regard to the 
principal question entrusted to it -  that of the determination of the wishes of the 
people as to their future -  it was not evident that the plebiscite route was the best 
option for the ebb and flow of political influences at the time, ethnic differences, 
different historical background and communication difficulties played a large part in 
directing the course of unification.
Besides petitions presented to the UN Visiting Missions, border groups sent 
independent complaints to the British and French administrations directly. The 
Balong for example laid a complaint in 1923 before the British administration through
45 Below (pp. 263-264) are pictures of members of the Visiting Missions to Cameroon.
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their chief, Mandenge Bell. They complained that they as Kamerunians never divided 
the Moungo River and travelled freely on it; that those inhabiting the French and 
British spheres were the same people who had homes and farms on both sides of the 
river.46 The Balong begged that the portion of their territory in the French zone be 
united with that of the British zone under one administration, the British 
administration. The chief of Misselele, also chief of the Balong in the coastal area 
appealed to the Resident Buea against using the Moungo River as the Anglo-French 
boundary line and expressed his wish that the administration should cease applying 
Nigerian Customs laws to divide groups.47 The boundary left seven villages of the 
Balong in the French sphere and the majority in the British Zone. Chief Mandenge 
Bell complained bitterly that the divided Balong were being forced to pay taxes twice, 
for the French and the British governments due to their border position.
From Assessment Reports by British administrators, the Bakossi were reported 
to have sent in several applications for all their villages and clans separated by the 
boundary to be reunited under the British administration.48 The Bakossi on the French 
side also complained about French attempts to prevent them from crossing the 
boundary to continue contacts with their brothers of the other side. Further to the 
North, the Mbo chiefs in French territory also wanted the boundary to be removed and 
all their villages united under one government. Whilst on tour in the Mbo country in 
1924, the DO of Mamfe Division received applications from several Mbo chiefs from
46 Chief Mandenge Bell to Resident Buea, December 23, 1923, Tc/1923/1, NAB. Solutions to these 
and other complaints made to both will be discussed in a section below.
47 Chief Mandenge Bell to Resident Buea, December 23, 1923, Tc/1923/1, NAB.
48 Assessment Report on Bakossi, Ninong, Elung Tribes, 1922, by F. B. Carr, Ac 3, NAB.
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the French zone requesting that their villages, which had been placed in the British
zone, be returned to them49 They gave a strong impression to the DO and his
administration that life would return to normal and would be a lot easier for them if
the separated territories were returned to them and put under one rule. The Mbo in the
French administered zone had earlier requested for the repatriation of their villagers
who were crossing the boundary and settling in the British territory.50 Actually, the
boundary had divided the Mbo chiefdoms into almost two equal parts:51 on the British
side were the Santcho, Njinjam, Singam, Mama, Menkoue, Mbokambo and Ekondo
villages; on the French side were the Fonwen, Fonjoungo, Fotabong, Elumba, Tanga,
Kamlempe, Nsoa and Finape villages. Like with the Elung clan of the Bakossi, the
Anglo-French boundary split the Mangem clan assigning to the French its original site
with the clan head and to the British seven out of eight of its constituent villages. It is
to be recalled here that when the boundary was demarcated in the case of
Mwanwekan, the chief and a few of his subjects were sent to the British zone while
the bulk of his subjects and all his fertile lands went to the French side. The boundary
also cut through the village of Poala leaving the chief the unfertile lands and giving all
their farmlands to the Mbo. In 1939, the village chief of Poala, James Elunge, sent the
following complaint to the Resident:
The whole of my land which is mostly cultivated has been despatched to 
the French-Mboh. I was profoundly surprised at this action (at this action) 
and when I tried to put the Commissioner through, no permission 
was allowed to do so.
Now seeing that I have no more land to farm and for no reason should I 
entrust my land to Mboh French... All fertile soil is given to Mboh and the 
portion left is only barrel land where no crop has been planted since our
49 DO Mamfe to Resident Buea, July 17,1924, Tb/1924/1, NAB.
50 Chef de la Circonscription de Dschang a Monsieur le Commissaire de la Republique Fran^aise, le 12 
Novembre, 1923, APA 10006/C, NAY.
51 Assessment Report on the British section of the Mbo Tribal Area, June 18, 1923, by J. W.C. 
Rotlierford, Af 32, NAB,
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forfathers days. I beg the Resident to consider of the case and I venture 
thanks if the the reply may be urgently (be) sent to us, as my people are 
now famine from 18th Dec., 1938 when that boundary was set up.52
From this petition, a clear appreciation of some of the grave problems posed by the 
partition can be understood. In this case for example, a village was cut in two halves 
leaving the chief with the bulk of his subjects and no farmland on one side while the 
other half of the land with very few people were put on the other side of the border 
with all the farmland. There were many other complaints of like nature by border 
groups that called for the dismantling of the boundary and a reunion of the separated 
groups. To the coast, the coastal Duala who had been separated from their Bakweri 
cousins protested. The Duala claimed their English connection with its language; its 
customs and its business habits, which they deemed, would be considered betrayed if 
a part of their territory was passed over to the French without their consent. They 
wanted to be placed with their brothers under British administration.53 Some political 
parties and pressure groups also vividly expressed the demands for the removal of all 
frontier restrictions and unification with French Cameroon on both sides of the 
boundary.
52 James Elunge to Senior Resident, Qf/q/1937/5, letter of January 3, 1939NAB. All grammar and 
spelling errors have been maintained as they appear in the letter. There is a copy of the letter in the 
annex.
53 John Holt & Company (Liverpool) Limited to Lord Milner, January 25,1919, CO 649/18, PRO. 
Also see, despatch No. 39912 of July 8th, 1919, from A. J. Harding to Strachey, CO 649/18, PRO.
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POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE CALL FOR THE REMOVAL OF BOUNDARY 
RESTRICTIONS IN  THE CAMEROONS: 1948-1958.
The British Southern Cameroons
The call for union between British and French Cameroons began in Nigeria by 
Cameroonians living and studying there. The Cameroons Youth League (CYL), 
founded in Nigeria in 1939 by Peter Monyongo-mo Kale and Emmanuel Lifafe 
Endeley was the first group that discussed Cameroonian political interests outside the 
territory. Kale and Endeley helped Nnamdi Azikiwe, Herbert Macaulay and others in 
1944 to form the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC).54 The 
CYL represented Cameroonian interests in the NCNC. Nnamdi Azikiwe and the 
NCNC supported the union between British and French Cameroons.55 During a visit 
to Southern Cameroons in 1947, Azikiwe suggested that an organisation of both 
territories should be formed. According to Paul Kale, in April 14, 1953, Azikiwe said 
“ ...the National Council also recognises and supports the desires and aspirations of 
the peoples of the Cameroons for unification of the two sections of the territory under 
the British and the French... ”.56 This meant that the NCNC supported the removal of 
all frontier restrictions. Another influential party in Southern Nigeria, the Action 
Group (AG), led by chief Obafemi Awolowo supported the political aspirations of 
Southern Cameroons. From 1953, the AG worked in alliance with the first Southern 
Cameroons political party, the Kamerun National Congress (KNC) in the opposition
54 The NCNC began like a confederation of trade, tribal unions and other small organisations, which 
widely debated die ideas of regionalization and local autonomy. It was perhaps inevitable that the 
Cameroons, with its distinct name and unique status, would be attracted to the idea of regional status.
55 Ngoh, History o f Cameroon, p. 198.
56 Paul Monyongo-mo Kale, Political evolution in the Cameroons, Buea: Government Printers, 
1967,p.39.
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in Lagos. Foncha justified his decision to leave the KNC in March 1955 to form the 
KNDP by the Awolowo/Endeley political alliance.57
Also, some students from Southern Cameroons studying in Nigeria also called 
for the dismantling of the Anglo-French boundary in Cameroon. According to 
Eyongetah and Brain, Mr. Sabum, one of the students in Nigeria expressed the view 
that:
The division of Kamerun was an arbitrary and immoral act designed to suit the 
imperialists. No one can tell me that the division of Kamerun was in the 
interest of Kamerun. Putting it mildly, I say it was a mistake; a mistake is not 
corrected by simply accepting it or arguing that it has gone on for a long time. 
Time does not make a mistake right.58
As early as 1939, the Bakweri Cultural Organisation (BCO) formed by G. J. 
Mbene in Victoria expanded its membership and sphere of influence to other ethnic 
groups. It changed its name to the Cameroon Welfare Union (CWU). According to 
Joseph Ebune it aimed at making Southern Cameroonians aware of their political 
rights, to serve as the people’s mouthpiece before the creation of well-organised 
groups and to lessen the boundary tensions between French and British Cameroons.59 
This was the first cultural based group that aimed at reducing boundary restrictions 
between the two spheres of Cameroon. The French Cameroons Welfare Union 
(FCWU) closely followed it in August 1948. Formed by R. J .K. Dibonge. Its 
members were French speaking Cameroonians who found themselves as “strangers” 
in the British zone and wanted to enjoy the same political rights as their English- 
speaking counterparts. They did not want to be regarded as strangers in Southern
57 Eyongetah and Brain, A history o f the Cameroon, p. 147.
58 Ibid. p. 190.
59 Joseph B. Ebune, The growth o f political parties in Southern Cameroons, 1916-1960 . Yaounde: 
CEPER, 1990, p. 121.
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Cameroons considering the fact that Cameroonians had been one people under the 
Germans before the partition between the British and the French.60
Another pressure group that sought to bring the British and French Cameroons 
together was the Cameroons National Federation (CNF). Formed in May 1949, by 
Dr. Emmanuel Mbela Lifaffe Endeley, the CNF advocated the reunification of British 
and French Cameroons. The Federation accepted only tribal unions and other similar 
organisations as members. The Federation wanted as a temporary measure, the 
“Adjusting of boundaries to reunite tribal groups” 61 Rather than demand the 
complete and immediate removal of customs restrictions, it wanted a “relaxation of 
boundary restrictions that would enable the free passage of agricultural products and 
local manufactures” 62 This they hoped would boost the local economy.
When in 1951, French Cameroonians domiciled in the British Cameroons 
were denied voting rights, the FCWU, their mouthpiece and a strong member of the 
CNF wanted the Federation to fight for them. The Federation did nothing and as a 
result, the FCWU withdrew its membership. This strained the relationship between 
Endeley and some other founding members like Nerius N. Mbile and Dibonge who 
both withdrew and founded the Kamerun United National Congress (KUNC).63 Victor 
LeVine says that it was the goal of reunification that brought a split within the ranks 
of the KNC.64 Welch confirms that the strain was due to a conflict of personalities and
60 Thomas Abanda, “The parties in the Cameroons”, West Africa,, XXXVII, 1872 ( January 10th 1953 
to January 2nd 1954): 11. Disagreement over voting rights in the 1951 elections to the Eastern House of 
Assembly forced the French Cameroonians living in Southern Cameroons to articulate their political 
grievances further. The British Government limited the franchise to British subjects and British- 
protected persons. Persons bom in the French Cameroon who comprised nearly 20% of the population 
of Victoria Division did not qualify unless they went through the naturalization formalities.
61 Thomas Abanda, “The parties in the Cameroons”, West Africa,, XXXVII, 1872 ( January 10th 1953 
to January 2nd 1954): 11.
62 Ibid.
63 Ebune, The growth ofpolitical parties, p. 135. Also see Abanda, Ibid.
64 V. T. Le Vine, The Cameroons from Mandate to in dependence . Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1964, p.203.
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the issue of voting rights.65 Whatever the reasons for the split, the important thing is 
that it led to the formation of the KUNC, one of the most militant parties arguing for 
the removal of the boundary.
The reason for using the “K” was as members of the KUNC put it : “ we want 
the Cameroons under French and British administrations to be brought together as in 
the days of German rule”.66 For Dibonge and the KUNC, their foremost desire was 
to see the unification of the British and French Cameroons. The KUNC canvassed for 
unification and the removal of frontier restrictions. Because the party stood for 
unification and the dismantling of the border; and also because its leader was a 
Cameroonian from French Cameroon, separated border groups, traders, farmers and 
smugglers formed the bulk of the party’s membership. The KUNC also called for the 
teaching of French in schools in British Cameroons and of English in schools in 
French Cameroon thus re-enforcing the unity between the two spheres.67
In 1953, the CNF and the KUNC amalgamated to form the Kamerun National 
Congress (KNC). Among the political aspirations of the Congress was self- 
government for a united Cameroon. Endeley was the president while Dibonge was the 
patron. Mbile broke off that same year, 1953, and joined P.M. Kale to form the 
Kamerun Peoples’ Party (KPP), which did not spell out the reunification goal but did 
sympathise with it. The KNC and the KPP were the two major political parties in 
Southern Cameroons at the time. More force was added to the drive towards the 
removal of the frontier when in 1955 two members of the KNC, John Ngu Foncha and
65 Welch, Dream of unity, p. 175. Ngoh, History o f Cameroon, pp.207-208.
66 Abanda, ”The parties in the Cameroons”,p. 11.
67 Ibid., p. 11. Also see Welch. Dream o f  unity, p. 178.
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Augustin Ngom Jua, broke off from the KNC and formed the Kamerun National 
Democratic Party (KNDP).
The KNDP took the initiative in British Cameroons after 1955 to reunify with 
French Cameroon. The party’s programmes were in line with those of another party 
on the French territory, the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC). They both 
demanded independence and reunification; as a result, the UPC worked actively in 
Southern Cameroons to achieve their common goals. Several local branches of the 
UPC were opened in border towns, notably at Misselele, Likomba, Douala, Tiko, 
Tombel and Kumba. A major difference between the political aspirations of the two 
parties was that, the KNDP wanted gradual reunification and independence while the 
UPC opted for immediate independence and non-interference by foreign countries in 
the internal affairs of Cameroon. When the UPC was banned in East or French 
Cameroon on July 13, 1955, Nde Ntumazah in Southern Cameroons formed an 
offshoot called One Kamerun (OK). It was very similar to the UPC in membership, 
aims and organisation and aimed at continuing the activities of the UPC.
Even though the KNC Government quickly banned the OK party in Southern 
Cameroon’s it later reappeared in strong coalition with the opposition KNDP party 
and campaigned for subsequent elections.68 Endeley’s KNC was in power and in 
coalition with the Kamerun Peoples Party (KPP) while Foncha’s KNDP and the OK 
remained in the opposition. In the 1959 elections the KNDP/OK coalition defeated the 
KNC/KPP alliance thus Foncha became the new premier replacing Endeley. What 
was the situation of the political parties in the French Trust Territory?
68 Ebune, The growth o f  political parties, p. 155. The KNC Government was headed by Endeley and put 
in place after the party’s landslide victory in the 1953 elections in Southern Cameroons.
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The French Cameroon
Unlike in the British Southern Cameroons, pressure groups and political 
parties in French Cameroon appeared to be less interested in boundary restrictions and 
the reunification question. It is not very clear why this was so but probably the fact 
that British Southern Cameroons was administered as a part of the Eastern Region of 
Nigeria made them feel like second-class citizens. This feeling increased their desire 
to return to the old Kamerun in which there were no boundary restrictions and no 
administrative subjugations.
Among the early Associations that called for the removal of the boundary and 
the unification of both territories in the French Cameroon was the Ngondo - the 
Association of Douala chiefs and notables. According to David Gardinier, the 
Association had first existed in the 19th century working together with the Court of 
Equity 69 The Ngondo aimed at a Duala hegemony over other groups in Cameroon. 
Their call for boundary removal and unification was because through unification, they 
would be reunited to their Bakweri cousins. The Ngondo resurfaced in February 1947 
with a strong adherence to the idea of boundary removal and unification. In 
November 1947, the Bamileke ethnic group also created their own movement, the 
Kumsze.70 They called for the dismantling of the boundary because it separated them 
from their Bangwa brothers.
The lone political party in the French Cameroon that militated strongly for the 
cause of reunification was the UPC. Created in 1948 in Douala by Leonard Bouly it
69 Gardinier, Cameroon: United Nations challenge to French policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1970, p 62. The Court of Equity was established in Douala by agreement between white and local 
traders to settle disputes between them. It reported to the British Consul and was abolished in 1885.
70 Eyongetah and Brain, A history o f  the Cameroons, p.45. The Bamileke were a border group to the 
immediate North of the area under study.
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stood as the first indigenous political party in the French Cameroon.71 It called for 
immediate independence and the reunification of the two Cameroons. One of the 
founding members, Reuben Um Nyobe, and some other Cameroonian politicians at 
the time addressed the Fourth Commission of the UN in 1952 calling for the 
reunification of the British and French Cameroons. The party became radical and 
violent in its demands, as a result, in 1955; the UPC was banned in the French 
territory. The banning of the UPC by the French authorities transformed it from a 
militant nationalist party to a revolutionary, underground movement. Many UPC 
members as from this year took flight to the British Cameroons where they created a 
community of UPC refugees. During the crisis, the British administration tightened its 
control of the boundary to prevent UPC refugees infiltrating into the British zone but 
with very little success.
In February 1956, the refugees addressed a petition to the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees asking for his support and protection. Meanwhile, due to 
continuous acts of violence committed by these refugees in Southern Cameroons and 
pressure from the French administration, they were consequently expelled from the 
territory in 1957 72 It is important to note here that all through the Mandate and 
Trusteeship periods, both the French and the British administrations continued to 
administer the boundary in the hope of preserving their respective natural and human 
resources while some of their subjects, especially the border groups continued to 
protest against the maintenance of the boundary.
71 Ngoli, Cameroon, p.207. For more on the UPC, see Richard Joseph, Radical Nationalism in 
Cameroon :The Social origins o f the UPC rebellion. London: Oxford University Press, 1977.
72 Ngoh, Cameroon, p. 207.
235
A REJECTION OF THE BOUNDARY BY BORDER GROUPS
From written petitions to oral protests to the UN and expressions through 
political parties, many Cameroonians, especially border groups expressed their 
rejection of the boundary by trespassing without a passport for various transactions, 
by ignoring the boundary and maintaining close relations across it.
Trespassing
In 1939, during the demarcation of the boundary, both Commissioners were 
struck by the ease with which it was possible for people of either French or British 
Cameroons to cross the boundary and to take up residence on the other side. This had 
led to the formation in the vicinity of the boundary of a number of large settlements of 
immigrants from both territories. Examples of such settlements were, Loum, Mbanga, 
Mombo, Tombel, and Muyuka all of which had large numbers of Duala and Bamileke 
immigrants. Administrative control of such settlements was impossible since the first 
sign of action was the signal for the disappearance of offenders over the boundary. A 
majority of boundary regulation-breakers or trespassers settled in such settlements for 
it was easier to cross over from border settlements than from towns inside of the 
territory. It is important to state here that trespassing was done both by the border 
people and by agents of the administration as well. A good example to use to illustrate 
this fact is tax collection.
One of the reasons for the clandestine crossing of the boundary was tax 
evasion. According to Protocol No. 9, it was found by the Commissioners that certain 
inhabitants of the border zone at Nyan and Nkut villages had for some years been 
paying tax annually both to the French and the British administrations.73 
Following a report of 1922 by the DO Victoria Division, A. R. Whitman, the Duala
73 Anglo-French boundary Commission-Protocols, Victoria Division, 1939, Qf/al938/6, protocol No. 9 
of March 10, 1939, signed R. Dugastand J.G.C.Allen,p.ll.
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settlers on the right bank of the River Moungo were also made to pay their taxes to
both administrations.74 The river divided this settlement into two and when those from
the British side went to visit their brothers on the French sector:
.. .they were made to pay, irrespective of whether or not they produced a disc 
to prove that they have paid tax in British territory. In the British Cameroons it 
is not the practice to collect tax from a man who has already paid for the 
current year in the French territory. As French tax collection commences in 
January, whereas our financial year begins with April. It is clear that in this 
regard we are at a disadvantage.75
French tax officers raided border villages on the British side asking for taxes even
from people who showed proof of payment to the British administration. Both the
British and the French administrations transmitted several heated correspondences on
the position of the Duala living on the British side of the banks of the River Moungo.
The Resident, Davidson, in 1920, made it clear that as long as they lived in the British
zone, they had to naturally become and remain during their residence, subject to the
jurisdiction of the British courts and laws. On this issue, the chief of the
Circonscription de Douala, Chazelas insisted that the Duala in British zone should be
left to pay their taxes to their chiefs who had been left in the French zone and only
pay environmental and other small taxes to the British government. On March 17,
1937, French police constables entered the village of Nkongte, on the British side and
74 Report of 14/8/1922, from DO Victoria Division to Resident Buea, Mungo right bank and estuary 
Douala, settlements on,Qf/e/1922/l, pp. 11-12, NAB. Disagreement on the Duala settlements in 
Victoria Division continued until 1922 when the Acting DO Victoria said in a memorandum that before 
August 2nd, 1914, the area on the right bank of the River Moungo was Bakweri land. The Duala locals 
were not allowed to land on this side of the river. But just prior to the First World War, permission was 
given to the Duala to land and trade at a small beach near Tiko (possibly that which later became 
known as Duala Beach). In 1918, the cocoa boom commenced and the Duala at Tiko began to cultivate 
the land of the Bakweri for the production of cocoa, a thing the Bkweri had never done. The result was 
unending disputes between the two. Meanwhile the Duala had continued to settle on the Bakweri land 
as squatters but later claimed the land as theirs. By 1922, the Duala started off five settlements: Tiko 
(40people), Ebonji (20), Misselele (20), Bopula (15) and Mudeka (10). On all these places they had but 
squatters rights except in Tiko. The administration observed that the Duala were helping to open the 
country and thereby atoning for the failure of the Bakweri in this respect. These creek settlements 
turned out to be places of considerable smuggling and an ideal refuge for men wanted by the French 
Government and as a result both French tax raiders and local tax evaders kept on trespassing on an 
almost regular basis.
75 Report of 14/8/1922, DO Victoria Division to Resident Buea, NAB.
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arrested a number of men and women for non-payment of tax. That not withstanding,
all the arrested men had paid tax to the Kumba Native Administration and were living
on Bakossi land. The DO wanted inquiries made as the arrested people were taken to
the French side Nkongsamba, where they were locked in cells.76 A similar situation
occurred in Mwanwekan on January 21st, 1938 when three local tax officers, people
from the French side of the village entered the British side and caught two women and
one man (the names of those arrested were Asumbwe, Nkumbe Eto and Etuke). The
local officers attempted to extort tax money from them. The DO Kumba, Johnson
suggested to his French counterpart that the authors of the act be punished so as to
stop a recurrence of such raids in future.77 The chief at Nkongsamba acknowledged
that his officers were wrong to have crossed the border in their duty and gave
assurance that a similar act would not happen in future.78 Such a situation made the
border people to escape tax raids and officers whenever their arrival was signalled. To
salvage the situation, both governments agreed that the most satisfactory criterion for
determining to which administration an individual should pay was that of domicile:
It was suggested that the officers in charge of each Division on either 
side of the boundary should communicate to each other at the 
moment of preparation of nominal rolls of taxable males, the names 
of the foreigners inscribed, with an indication as to where they were 
permanently and legitimately established with their families 79
76 DO Kumba to Chef de Subdivision de Nkongsamba, No. 0104/112 of April 1,1937, NAB.
77 DO Kumba to Monsieur le chef de la Subdivision de Nkongsamba, No. 0104/126 of February 1st, 
1938, NAB.
78 Chef de la Subdivision de Nkongsamba to DO Kumba, No. 0104/135 of May 6th, 1938, NAB. In this 
same file, it is reported that in March 1949, some French customs officers crossed the boundary to 
arrest one boy, Timeforns Kengbwe, alleged to be found in possession of smuggled goods at a village 
called Waterfall Camp. Having arrived the village late in the evening, the officers spent the night of 
March 30 to 31st at Mr. Abanda’s house in the camp. Meanwhile, the parents of the boy had left during 
the night to go and lodge a complaint at the police station, Kumba. Before the police could arrive the 
customs officers had returned to the French zone.
79 Anglo-French boundary Commission-Protocols, Victoria Division, 1939, Qf7al938/6, protocol No. 9 
of March 10,1939, signed R. Dugastand J.G.C. Allen, p .ll.
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Some of the border people who were smart clandestinely crossed the 
boundary to the British side especially during seasons of tax assessment or tax raids 
usually referred to by the local people as Cale Cale. Around the coastal creeks, the 
taxable population usually migrated to Nigeria where they waited until they got news 
that the raid was over before returning.
Even though the border people were aware of the boundary landmarks, and 
knew that they needed an official pass before crossing to the other side, some of them 
kept criss-crossing without a pass. It would appear that the French administration was 
much more severe on trespassers than the British. French forest guards regularly 
molested farmers from the British administered area around Tombel who owned 
farms in the French sphere. According to two letters of complaint from villagers who 
had farms around Tombel, (Manaseh Alobwede, Petros Kome, Martin Mbongo, 
Mathias Ntungwe, Cosmas and Joseph Mbongo), they were being molested by French 
Forest Guards (Markus, Apoloniah, Ewondoh, Cusmand, Rubert, Mboko, Daniel, 
Mathias and their headman Npessi) who refused to allow them to work in their farms 
and caused them to pay a total cost of £9, 3 pigs and 3 fowls. These farmers, headed 
by their chief Manaseh Alobwede, complained that French guards forced them to pay 
fines within a period of twelve months before they would be allowed to work on their 
farms.80 The DO Kumba in his letter to the Resident said that it was possible that the 
farms had originally been in British territory but in an adjustment of the boundary, the 
area had become French administered. This behaviour of the French guards was 
illegal for the Boundary Commission had given the people the right to cultivate their 
land on both sides of the boundary:
80 D.O. of Kumba to the Anglo-French Boundary Commissioner, Letter No. 1.278.24 of May 30,1936, 
Qf/c 1936/2, Anglo-French Frontier: Kumba Division, pp.2-4, NAB. Fines usually comprised nine pigs 
and three fowls.
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The rights of individual Africans to cultivation, collection of firewood, 
erection and extension of buildings on land on either side of the 
Anglo- French frontier, to which they held legitimate title at the time 
of demarcation of the boundary by cement pillars should remain 
undisturbed by such demarcation, except in so far as such land will 
become subject to the laws and regulations of the Government under 
whose administration they are thereafter situated.81
The chief of Ndom, Ntoko Fritz Mukete, also laid much emphasis on the brutal
treatment of farmers of the British zone who owned farms in the French zone. He said
people who lived at Kola and farmed at Nkut were driven away and their cocoa trees
cut down. He said that the French government drove them away and gave their farms
to someone called Mango/Mangou who caused the arrest and imprisonment of many
local farmers.82 It was only after the pleading of the chief of Kola, Nyambe, with the
head of the French administration at Nkongsamba that the arrested people were
released.
Meanwhile trespassers from the French to the British zone were hardly 
punished. Archival reports say Mangou owned farms in Nkut in the French side but 
trespassed into the British side and cut down cocoa trees and other plants and began 
planting banana suckers.83 His destructive acts were confirmed by the DO of Kumba, 
Goodlife, and estimated at 28,000 cocoa trees. He was told in writing to evacuate the 
land within the period of six months from February 18, 1939 84 Mangou was also 
asked to pay compensation to the Bakossi farmers whose crops he destroyed. He 
admitted liability and surrendered the sum of 3000frs in full settlement. The people 
whose crops he had damaged refused the offer as being inadequate and the French
81 Anglo-French Boundary Commission. Protocols, various, Cameroons Province, memorandum No. 
Bc:5/1937/Vol.I/78 of March 16,1939, Qtf91937/4, NAB.
82 Interview with chief Ntoko Fritz Mukete on May 16, 1999 at Ndom.
83 Commission Franco-Anglaise de delimitation, APA 10813 , pp.7-8, NAY.
84 Anglo-French boundary Commission, Prtocols, Qf/91937/4 , p.3, NAB.
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authorities then tried to get the dispute settled by arbitration. The Boundary 
Commissioner also observed that the sum of 3,000 frs. was too small for the damage 
caused. He said the estimated compensation could have been in the neighbourhood of 
£200 or 35,000frs.85 Although Mangou was made to pay for the destruction he caused, 
farmers of the British administered border zone felt abused. This was because 
somebody from the French administered zone (Mangou) had crossed the boundary 
and destroyed their crops, when they were sometimes not allowed by the French 
guards to go and work on their farms in the French zone. To remedy the situation, the 
British administration stated that until the end of that farming season (1939), all their 
subjects who owned farms in the French zone could cross over when ever the need 
arose to farm and harvest. After that farming season, the farmers from the British 
zone needed to obtain permission from the local owners.
Land ownership was a major cause of trespassing. Trespassers often laid 
claims to land on the other side of the boundary. The French administration offered to 
grant agricultural concessions to all those from the British zone who at the time of 
demarcation owned plantations of permanent crops, houses or other buildings in 
territory which was now under the French Mandate. The people of Poala (British 
Cameroons) who owned farms situated on the French side of the boundary by the time 
of demarcation, 1937, were entitled to the produce thereof until the end of the current 
farming season. No one was authorised to interfere with their cultivation or to 
deprive them of ordinary farming rights. After the harvest, all of the lands were to 
revert either to the Mbo or the Mwangel according to its position on the frontier. If the 
Poala people wanted to continue to farm in that area, they needed to obtain the prior 
permission of the land owners (French subjects), either Mbo or Mwangel, as the case
85 Anglo-French Boundary Commissioner to DO Kumba, No.Bc:6/1937/14 of January, 1939, NAB.
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may be. The Boundary Commissioner reassured the protection of the trespassers and 
their crops by saying that: “If before the end of the present farming season any natives 
under French administration attempts to interfere with the farms in question, you 
should report either to the District Officer Kumba, or to me, if I am in your 
neighbourhood.” 86
These French subjects had started cultivating considerable areas of cocoa and 
other permanent crops without permission. Some of them resided on their farms on 
the British side while others kept crossing over daily to cultivate and harvest crops 
from their farms without passes. Such people usually used footpaths and other roads, 
which carefully avoided the customs stations. The British administration considered 
the solution of recognising and registering land held legitimately by the “strangers” so 
as to be able to eventually identify and evict trespassers.87 It was recommended that a 
list be prepared by the local landowners, under the supervision of an Administrative 
Officer, ... showing the names of all “native” foreigners whose title to the land in 
actual occupation by them was recognised by native custom, and that those plots, the 
boundaries of which were to be previously confirmed and marked by the Bakossi 
should be properly surveyed, after which the tenants could be furnished with 
Certificates of Occupancy, for a period of, say, twenty five years.88
Each plot would be numbered on top of the plan and the number quoted in the 
Certificate of Occupancy. The administration did not over-look the point however that
86 Anglo-French Commissioner to James Elunge, village Head of Nhia-Poala, Despatch 
No.Bc:6/1937/6 of January 4th, 1938, NAB. The Commissioner hoped that there would be reciprocal 
proposals for the protection of British subjects in the French zone.
D O  Victoria to Resident, May 22nd, 1939, Memorandum No. Bc5/1937/Vol: 11/93, Anglo-French 
boundary Commission. Protocols, Qf/91937/4, P.6, NAB
88 Ibid. This solution had been applied at the Ngol Plantation in the French zone where it worked fairly 
well.
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these trespassers might not wish to apply for a lease or a Certificate of Occupancy 
when they realised that the expenses of a survey might have to be met by them. The 
administration also had to face protests from the local Bakossi Traditional Council 
which had already expressed the desire to formulate rules forbidding the sale or lease 
of any more of their land to “strangers” and unauthorised planters in the Tombel area. 
The recommendation was adopted and implemented for certificates of occupancy 
were issued to trespassers.
In cases of accidental trespass, a Certificate of Occupancy was also issued. 
This applied in the case of Madame Scheitlin’s Plantation situated on the French side 
of the boundary around Tombel, on the slopes of Mount Kupe. While the two 
Commissioners had, in principle, little sympathy with the encroachments of European 
planters whose boundaries were, or, should have been clearly defined, and who had 
already large areas of fertile land at their disposal, it was clear that the encroachment 
of Scheitlin was due entirely to an error of demarcation by a cadastral survey. It was 
then found that a section of her land, approximately five yards by one hundred and 
fifty laid outside the limits of the plantation and in British territory. This area was 
planted with coffee bushes which were too mature to be successfully transplanted and, 
there being no local farms in the neighbourhood, must either be preserved for the use 
of the owner or destroyed.89
She was notified of her trespass and informed that the nature of the action to 
be taken had to depend on the decision of the Nigerian Government. Since the 
trespass was clearly not deliberate, it was recommended that she be granted a
89 D O Victoria to Resident, May 22nd, 1939, Memorandum No. Bc5/1937/Vol: 11/93, Anglo-French 
boundary Commission. Protocols, Qf/91937/4, P.6, NAB. She abandoned the plantation because of 
terrorist activities that intensified in the area by the late 1960s.
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Certificate of Occupancy of the small sector for a period of ten years.90 This was the 
approximate life of the coffee trees concerned with a proviso restraining her from any 
further plantation or development of the land during the period of tenure. She was 
liable for the cost of survey of that sector.
A third kind of trespass, besides trespass by persons, farm or plantation lands
was trespass by cattle. While on tour at Poala, in May, 1936, the DO Kumba received
complaints from a deputation from all the villages around there that herds of cattle
from Muangel and Mbo in the French zone were allowed to roam at will across the
boundary and had caused continual damage to farms during the past two years.91
These herds were owned by a French Farming Company at Nkonsamba, La
Compagnie Pastorale. Due to the gravity of the complaints, the DO suggested that:
I should be obliged if you (the Resident) will write to the Chef Du 
Region at Nkongsamba and bring this complaint to his notice. The only 
remedy appears to be to corral the cattle. The people who came to see 
me were much aggrieved by the damage done and by the fact that 
apparently no notice had been taken of previous complaints. Unless 
some action is taken by the French owners to prevent this in future 
they may find that the local farmers will take matters into their own 
hands by killing or impounding the cattle who do damage.92
When the Resident contacted his French counterpart about the destruction, the 
later replied that he had made it clear to the company owning the herds to make sure 
that in future the cattle did not stray onto the British side. According to an archival 
report, the company owning the herds had been granted some patches of land along
90 D O Victoria to Resident, May 22nd, 1939, Memorandum No. Bc5/1937/Vol: 11/93, Anglo-French 
boundaiy Commission. Protocols, Qf/91937/4, P.6, NAB.
91 Letter No. Bc.6/1937/5 of December 13th, 1938, from the Anglo-French Boundaiy Commissioner to 
D O Kumba, similar complaints were made about considerable damage from the ravages of these same 
herds of cattle, Qfra(1937)5, NAB
92 D O Kumba to Resident, letter No, 1177/22,NAB.
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the slopes of Mount Manenguba by the government of French Cameroon.93 The 
boundaries of that grazing land were not clearly defined on the ground and as a result, 
the herds were left to graze astray, far across the international boundary into British 
territory. It took some time for this trespass by cattle to be ended, possibly because of 
the good pasture that was available on that slope of the Manenguba Mountain. 
Another cause of frequent trespassing, was that which maintained socio-cultural 
contacts within separated ethnic groups along the boundary.
The maintenance o f close relations between separated groups across the boundary.
From the demarcation of the boundary to independence, border groups resisted 
the boundary by ignoring it and by being completely indifferent to it. They continued 
to maintain close relations with their brothers on the other side of the boundary. This 
feeling of indifference and ignorance has been considered in this research as 
resistance to the boundary. This was the case of the Bakossi, Balong, Mbo, Bakundu, 
Mongo and the Duala-Bakweri groups who occupy the Southern portion of the Anglo- 
French boundary in Cameroon. The Mongo for example, ignored the boundary 
whenever they were organising celebrations on either side of the boundary. Those on 
the British side attended tribal meetings and other important events taking place on 
the French side of the boundary. The Duala, Bakweri and the Mongo greatly 
intermingled and frequently organised wrestling matches locally called Pala Pala, and 
canoe races. Competitive matches were sponsored alternately, and drew participation 
from both sides of the boundary. These thrilling traditional sports competition used to 
occur long before the imposition of the boundary; as a result, it was difficult for the 
administration to stop the people from crossing over to participate in matches or to 
cheer their competing heroes. Border people chose not to understand that they needed
93 Anglo-French Boundaiy Commissioner to D O Kumba, No. Bc/1037/5 of December 13th 1938,
NAB.
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to pay and obtain an official pass before visiting their brothers across the boundary. It 
was unrealistic and impracticable for a person living on the British side of the 
Moungo, and who could see and talk with his relation from across the river to walk 
for about a day or more to Buea or Kumba to pay for a passport in order to visit his 
relation from across the river. It was much easier for him to jump into his canoe and 
paddle across the river in five minutes or less to reach his kinsman.
As with the coastal groups, other border groups further inland like the
Balong, Bakossi, Mbo and Balondo also ignored the boundary by maintaining close
relations with their kinsmen across the boundary. Since border groups belong to the
same ethnic groupings, they operated the same social institutions ranging from birth,
marriage, age-set rites and burial ceremonies. For example, the Bakossi of the
Mouamenam clan were traditionally required to go to the summit of Mount
Manenguba to perform fertility rites with their brothers of the Elung clan of the
British side. Numerous Bakossi moved to and from the boundary to attend the
traditional Ahon, Mwankum, and Ndiye celebrations. During border market days like
the Bello, Tombel, Bangem or Mwambong market days, attendance was drawn from
the Bakossi, Mbo, Balong, Balondo and sometimes the distant Duala. Village markets
had more than economic importance. They were also the site of socio-cultural
activities where messages were sent and delivered and appointments were made.
Fanso underscores this point by saying local markets were attended:
Not only to sell or buy a thing, but also most importantly to “hear” news, 
“see” some relatives, despatch gifts, meet a girl friend or fiancee, pay 
debts, settle a dispute and pay respect to the elders. The local market 
was also a place where some villagers organised their thrift of mutual 
aid societies ... .Traditional market announcements from the chief or the 
traditional council were also made on the market day.94
94 Fanso, “Trans-Frontier relations”,p. 189.
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These announcements were usually important and on issues of communal or ethnic 
concern sometimes needing prompt action.
The difficulty of staying on one side and maintaining normal contact 
with the group on the other side resulted in many Bakossi abandoning their homes in 
the French sphere and crossing over to new settlements on the British side. In 1925, 
between 400 and 500 Bakossi crossed over from villages on the French side to begin 
new settlements within the main group on the British side.95 The Mbo also ignored the 
boundary maintaining close relationships with their brothers across the boundary. The 
British administration came to the conclusion in the Mbo case, as in the other border 
groups, that the migration of people from parts of their chiefdom in the French 
territory to the parts in the British territory could not be prevented without strong and 
widespread action on both sides of the boundary.96 On ritual occasions like the 
coronation of a chief, the funeral of a notable, the wedding of important persons, all 
the Mbo from the villages on both sides of the boundary grouped together for merry­
making.
Another important aspect of cultural contact that all the border groups 
maintained across the boundary was their language. Border groups sometimes 
identified each other with the administering authority on the respective section of the 
boundary on which they found themselves. The Duala for example who were on the 
French side referred to their Bakweri brothers on the British side as “Bato ba Englisi” 
meaning English people/subjects. The Bakweri in return referred to their Douala 
brothers as “Wato wa Flenzi” meaning French people/subjects. Despite these 
descriptions, both groups usually communicated during meetings and other social
95 Resident Buea to Secretaiy Southern Provinces, August 5,1925, Tb/1925/1, NAB. Fanso,“Trans- 
Frontier relations”, p. 189,
96 D O to Senior Resident Buea, July 17, 1924, Tb/1924/1, NAB.
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gatherings in the local Douala or Mokwe languages or in Pidgin English. It was 
deemed more intimate and safe for border groups to communicate in their local 
languages than in either French or English. Like the coastal Duala and Bakweri, the 
Balong also maintained their older social, socio-cultural and linguistic intercourse 
across the boundary. The Balong of Mundek (French zone) often moved over to the 
British zone to meet their brothers at Mundame and partake in common cultural 
rituals and celebrations97 A significant aspect of culture contact prevalent among the 
Balong was inter-group marriages. The chief of Mombo and Moujouka (French 
Balong) reported several examples of cross marriages with the Balong of Muyuka and 
Laduma (British Balong).98
A further expression of rejection of the boundary by the border groups was the
destruction of boundary landmarks. According to Protocol number 7, the British and
the French land commissioners agreed that:
In the event of damage, removal or destruction of any pillar or of 
any other similar mark placed at the instance of the Boundary 
Commissioners to demarcate the line of the frontier, each 
government will be equally responsible for the cost of 
replacement, repair or reconstruction unless it is possible to trace 
the author of the damage, destruction or removal and to oblige 
him to bear the cost of rectification, without prejudice to 
subsequent legal proceedings.99
In August 1938, it was reported that British subjects crossed over to the French side at
the village of Abang in the Mouamenam clan where they destroyed boundary
97 Interview with Clement Pandong, on June 2-4th, 1999, atLimbe. He was the courier officer 
operating between the Kumba Post Office (British zone) and Mundek (French zone) and he was often 
invited by his Balong friends on both sides of the boundaiy to celebrate traditional ceremonies.
98 Interviews with chiefs Anoke Gaston of Mouyouka on July 13th, 1999 at Mouyouka and 
Moukouelle Moukouelle Benjamin of Mombo on July 12th, 1999 at Mombo.
"Anglo-French Boundaiy Commission. Protocols, Protocol No. 7, of April 22nd, 1938, signed R. 
Dugast and O. W. Firth, p., NAB.
248
landmarks and planted their own marks of demarcation.100 Abang, at the time under 
chief Etouke had a total population of 143 persons (60 men, 40 women and 43 
children) and was two hours walk from the Anglo-French boundary.101 Situated on the 
higher flanks of Mount Manengouba, Abang was difficult to reach.
When the chief administrative officer on the French side Raynaud, went to 
Abang to find out what damage had been done there, he was accompanied by the Chef 
Superieur, Nti Ewane of Mouamenam; Chef Superieur, Nji Edio of Manehas, the 
immediate neighbouring clan to the South; Chef Superieur, Adam Arab of all the 
stranger settlers, and the Chef Superieur, Jean Nguissi of all the Bamileke in 
Manjo.102 The information they gathered was that, on the third of August at about 
three o’clock in the afternoon, thirteen locals including two police officers from the 
British zone arrived at the village of Abang. The subjects of chief Etouke who 
according to the report pretended that he knew nothing about the arrival of the 
strangers had previously cleared the path they used.103 The fact that the chief of 
Abang did not report the presence of these people to his paramount chief, Nti Ewane, 
made the French authorities suspect that Etouke was working in agreement with the 
British authorities. It was possible that the chief of Abang could have supported the 
strangers in their actions because he wanted his village to be placed under British 
administration. It should be recalled here that most cases of escape were from the
100 Confidential letter number 90/AP of September 1, 1938, from the Commissioner of the French 
Republic to the Head of the Boundaiy Commission, AgeFom 932/2970 CAOM. These were alleged 
British subjects for they were never identified.
101 Report from the Chief of the Mungo Region to the Commissioner of the French Republic dated 
August 22, 1938, p.l AgeFom 932/2970 CAOM.
102 Ibid.
103 Report from the Chief of the Mungo Region to the Commissioner of the French Republic dated 
August 22,1938, p.2 AgeFom 932/2970 CAOM. p.3. The denial was presumably to stir clear of any 
blame by die French for conniving with the British to be placed under British rule.
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French to the British zone where wages, working and living conditions were better 
than in the French zone.
On August 9, after having built a cement pillar with the help of the villagers, 
the visitors affixed a chain of 500 meters to it and planted the pillar far into the village 
of Abang and well away from the original boundary landmark that was there. To 
make their own boundary clearer, the visitors from British Cameroons ripped the 
backs off some trees and imprinted serial numbers (L.45 -  L.43 L etc...) on them with 
red paint. At the entrance of the village where the boundary commission had 
demarcated the boundary with a pillar, the visitors buried the pillar, which they found 
there. This pillar had the following inscriptions engraved on it B.M.T.V.W. 33 and 
was in the shape of a square, twenty-five centimetres in dimension. This original 
pillar was completely destroyed and concealed. When the chief administrator 
Raynaud arrived at Abang, all the visitors from the British zone had gone away to the 
Northern village of Mouandong, also under the administration of chief Nti Ewane. 
Since Mouandong was a four hours walk from Abang, Raynaud, who was certain that 
the strangers were acting clandestinely, knew they would escape before he could get 
there. He concluded in his report that the Chef Superieur Nti Ewane should expect the 
Boundary Commission, which would clearly define the final boundary between the 
two villages.104 Chief Nti Ewane put the following questions to the French 
administrator and his entourage: “How could British subjects enter French villages 
without announcing their arrival”? “Why do they plant boundary landmarks which 
clearly shows that they want to take our villages and make them British
104 Anglo-French Boundary Commission. Protocols. Protocol No. 7, of April 22nd, 1938, signed by R. 
Dugast and O. W. Firth, QF91937/4 p.2, NAB.
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possessions”?105 He continued by declaring the loyalty of the local people to the 
French rather than to the British administration. Chief Nti Ewane said, however, that 
the British subjects that he questioned on the matter told him that they were members 
of the boundary commission. Raynaud who found it difficult to provide answers to 
chief Nti’s questions asked all those present to keep calm and thanked them for their 
loyalty to the French administration and their pride to remain Frenchmen.
Reynaud’s report was transmitted to the Commissioner of the French Republic 
through the Chief of the Mungo Region who suggested that perhaps that was an 
attempt by “their neighbours” (possibly the British) to claim land inside the French 
territory.106 The Commissioner wrote to the French boundary Commissioner, Rene 
Dugast, to verify and report if the actions reported were justified.107 Since the British 
authorities could not identify the authors of the actions, it was left with the boundary 
commission to demarcate the actual boundary in their next campaign that was to start 
by October 1939. This mission could not be carried out due to the outbreak of the 
Second World War.
Another example of the destruction of a boundary pillar occurred at the village 
of Mouangwekan/Mwanwekan to the North of the village of Mouandong. The 
boundary line cut the village into two and the village chief Ngounte was placed on the 
English zone with some of his subjects. It was therefore necessary that those who 
were left in the French zone choose their own chief. They did so and the two chiefs 
began competing with each other as the new chief regarded himself as an equal to his 
former chief. This rivalry spread to the elders of both sides of the village and also to
105 Anglo-French Boundary Commission. Protocols. Protocol No. 7, of April 22nd, 1938, signed by R. 
Dugast and O. W. Firth, QF91937/4 p.2, NAB.
106 Chief of the Mungo Region to the Commissioner of the French Republic, No. 80 C of August 23rd- 
1938, AgeFom 932/2970 CAOM.
107 Commissioner of the French Republic to the Head of the Boundary Comission, confidential letter 
No. 90/AP of September l at, 1938, AgeFom 932/2970 CAOM.
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family members. Unidentified villagers seriously damaged the boundary pillar that 
was placed at the centre of the village.108 On interviewing the chiefs on both sides of 
the village it was very clear that this bitter feeling and competition still exist even 
today between them.109 The former choirmaster and catechist of the first Catholic 
church of the village recounted the brutal destruction of their church house when 
villagers from the French side attended a church service and realised that the 
priestwas from the British zone.110 The priest who came from Bangem, a nearby 
village on the English speaking side could not convince the people to change their 
mind. The counsellor, also called a “quarter head”, of the English speaking side said 
early efforts at opening a primary school for the children did not bear fruit because 
each side wanted the school to be in their educational system.111 While at work 
around the Kumba-Loum boundary area, the Boundary Commissioner reported the
108 The pillar is shown in the picture (p. 265) below. I was unable to see what number was engraved on 
the pillar. However, following the serial number from the summit of Mount Manenguba to the village 
of Mwanwekan, it is possible that the pillar bore the number 87.
109 The chief on the English speaking side who was interviewed with his elders was Nicholas Ngape, 
the same interview was carried out on the French speaking side with chief Daniel Mbome, on April 14, 
1999 at Mwanwekan. It was difficult to convince both of them to accept to pose for the photograph
(p. 266) below.
Picture (p. 267) below shows the remains of the destroyed structure that served as the church and 
school house. Interview with Ignatius Elume, April 14 and 15,1999 at Mwnwekan.
111 Interview with Ignasius Elume, April 14th, 1999 at Mwannwekan. Today, Mwanwekan has five 
quarters namely Mbilla, the majority of the people here are English speaking, Ekossum (French 
speaking), Mwakumbang (French speaking), Mwebekong (French speaking), and Nkongte (English 
speaking). The village has remained divided. The first thing any visitor sees as he enters the village is 
the destroyed pillar which today is used by children to crack palm kernels.
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destruction of a survey control point at Tombel.112 The DO Kumba sent a police 
constable to arrest the situation and bring the offenders (destroyers of the survey 
beacon) to Kumba but they had escaped. The same file reports the poor behaviour of 
the chief of Tombel towards the French surveyor, Captain Gardet during his work in 
that locality in May 1938. The chief refused to give the French geodesian officer any 
information about Mount Kupe. The DO Kumba advised Gardet to withdraw from the 
British side of the boundary because he, the DO, could not provide Gardet with the 
necessary liaison to enable him continue his operations at Tombel.113 While border 
people ignored the boundary, destroyed boundary landmarks and made border 
demarcation and administration difficult, others saw the boundary as a zone of 
numerous opportunities.
THE ANGLO-FRENCH BOUNDARY WAS AN OPPORTUNITY ZONE TO BORDER 
GROUPS
The Anglo-French boundary was not solely an object of division. The 
boundary also provided opportunities to border groups. Border people made the best 
of their border position for while some of them were protesting and resisting the 
boundary; others who were smart used the border zone as an opportunity zone, a zone 
of transition. Paul Nugent and Anthony Asiwaju have underscored the double 
paradoxes that characterise African colonial boundaries.114 The first is the paradox 
between the hard lines drawn on the map and the reality on the ground, which is the 
invisible frontier. The second paradox is that between frontiers, which are supposed to
112 Anglo-French Boundaiy Commissioner to D O Kumba, No. Bc:6/1937/14 of January 22nd. 1939, 
NAB.
113 From Captain Gardet to D O Kumba, letter of April 29, 1938, also see reply by D O Kumba, V. K 
Johnson of May 6th, 1938, NAB.
114 Paul Nugent and Anthony Asiwaju, African boundaries. Barriers, conduits and opportunities. 
London & New York: Frances Pinter, 1996,p. 1.
253
be zones of division and demarcation and the reality, which is that, they tend also to 
be zones of interaction and contact.115 It is this second paradox that is of interest. 
According to Wilson and Hastings, border zones can be threshold areas inhabited by 
bandits and others wishing to escape the control of the state.116 Most border towns in 
Cameroon were cosmopolitan and were sometimes of recent growth thus offering 
many advantages for exploitation by border groups.
Tombel was a good example of such a town. The growth of Tombel was 
entirely due to uncontrolled immigration and the town was populated almost 
exclusively by “native” strangers. From an administrative point of view, Tombel was 
regarded by officials on either side of the boundary as “a centre of the smuggling 
industry, a repository for stolen goods and a welcome refuge for tax evaders and 
fugitives from French justice”.117 This was so because all the main paths from the 
town of Tombel into the French territory carefully avoided the customs stations. As a 
result, experienced smugglers usually found -little difficulty in evading the periodical 
police visits, which patrolled the boundary. From an administrative point of view, the 
formation of settlements like Tombel was to be deplored.
In order to reduce the smuggling and petty theft which prevailed in and around 
Tombel, the British administration recommended that a stricter control of passports be 
made at the border with a penalty applicable to all those who entered British territory 
without the requisite passport. The British administration operated a strict system of 
control on the boundary around Tombel with some modification in the interests of the 
border groups so as to allow the people free passage to and fro over the boundary at
115 Nugent and Asiwaju, African boundaries, p. 2.
116 M. Wilson and D. Hastings, Border identities. Nation and state at international frontiers 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 83.
117 Anglo-French Boundary Commissioner to die Resident, No. Be:5/1937/Vol. 11/55, of March 213t
1939, NAB.
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least for a period of time. The French authorities refused to allow the entrance into
1 1 0  t
French territory of any persons without a passport or a Laissez-Passer. While both 
administrations attempted to reduce the rate of smuggling in border towns like 
Tombel, they took into consideration border people with property astride the 
boundary.
Persons in borderlands who were in legitimate possession of property on both
sides of the boundary were given special consideration regarding the length of their
official passes to cross the boundary. In 1939, the Acting Resident, L. Sealy-King in
an attempt to reduce the difficulties encountered by border people with property on
both sides of the boundary, increased the duration of their passes from six weeks to
one year. This the Resident explained was because:
it would , I consider, be unreasonable to expect owners of property 
on both sides of the frontier to have their passes renewed at such 
frequent.... Incidentally the holders of such passes would be 
much inconvenienced at having to have their passes renewed at such 
frequent intervals, as many of them would have to travel from 2-3 
days journey on foot to get even as far as Kumba and if for any 
reason they fail to get their passes renewed they are liable to a fine 
of £50 or to imprisonment for 6 months.119
To make matters easier for both the administration and the administered, the Resident
suggested that it would be necessary to appoint the D O, Kumba, as an Assistant
Immigration Officer (AIO). In the whole of the Cameroons Province there was only
one AIO who also acted as the Collector of Customs, Victoria, answerable to the
Principal Immigration Officer (PIO), Lagos. Such measures, it was presumed, would
render immigration work in the Province workable.120 Due to their border position,
1,8 DO Kumba to Resident, No. 2331/133 of APRIL 24™ 1939, NAB.
U9 Anglo-French boundary commission. Register of boundaiy pillars, see letter No. EP 362/854 of 
January 5,1939, pp. 1-2, Qf/a/1939/la NAB.
120 From the start of British occupation, the Resident was also appointed the AIO, but this was 
cancelled in 1937. Henceforth, it was the Superintendent of Police for the Cameroons who was 
appointed the AIO, by Gazette No. 882. The Resident later on suggested that all the D Os of the 
Divisions be appointed AIO.
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borderland people had the special advantage of obtaining permits for a longer period 
than those in the interior of the territory on either side of the boundary.
Another important advantage that border people sometimes had and exploited 
to their advantage was the official use of both currencies. By 1935, tax collectors and 
taxpayers along the Northern borderland of the Anglo-French boundary, on the 
French side encountered several difficulties.121 The border peoples of the 
Adamawa/Adamaoua region found it very difficult to acquire French currency. This 
was because their closeness to the boundary made it easier for them to interact with 
their brothers on the Nigerian side than with those on the Cameroonian side. They 
frequented border markets where they sold mainly cattle and their regular customers 
were Nigerians who paid in British currency. Border people on the Cameroonian side 
who also went to these border markets could hardly afford to pay for the major trade 
commodity, cattle. It is important here to say that trade and other contacts had been 
going on between the people and they had been frequenting the same markets long 
before the imposition of the boundary. The point I am making here is that the problem 
was not one of currency conversion but that of unavailability of the currency of the 
authority under which the people were placed (the French currency).
When the people tried to pay their taxes to French tax collectors in British 
currency, the collectors refused to accept payment. The collectors reported the 
difficulty to the French administration. The French administration resolved that trade 
should be allowed to continue between the border groups and also that the border 
people could pay their tax in British currency, the only currency which they had at
121 Monsieur Periquet to the French Minister of colonies, letter No. 422T of May 3rd, 1935, AgeFom 
928/2906, CAOM.
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their disposal.122 To that effect, both the French Ministers of Finance and the Colonies 
wrote a report to the President of the French Republic. This was because of the French 
monetary regime that had been put in place since December 31, 1925 stipulating that 
only French currency should be used in French colonies. Border people therefore 
enjoyed the exception to this rule as they were given the right to the use of the 
currencies of both France and Britain. The President of the French Republic 
eventually signed a decree (copy annexed) to remedy the situation by permitting 
border people to pay their taxes in British currency. Border people later used this 
advantage to trade in both currencies across the boundary. To the South of the 
boundary, there were people who sold British pounds at exorbitant prices especially 
as by the 1930s, the sterling value was rated higher than the French franc. The French 
authorities complained that the black market in currency was causing the depreciation 
of their currency and inflation in French Cameroon. Special patrols were carried out 
along the boundary to arrest and stop all illegal currency traders and smugglers.
Smuggling was an important activity that shows the permeable nature of the 
boundary. Smugglers for the most part were border people. Non-border settlers were 
attracted to the borderlands by the lucrative business in contraband goods.123 
Smuggling along the Anglo-French border was intense and organised. A discussion 
with a few of the smugglers revealed that border groups organised smuggling
122 Monsieur Periquet to the French Minister of colonies, letter No. 422T of May 3, 1935, AgeFom 
928/2906, CAOM. It is reported that this position was taken because a derogation of like nature had 
been done in AOF, by Decree of 25/10/1934 and thus could be also done in AEF.
123 Paul Nugent talks of border chiefs who were involved in organised smugglers associations on the 
British side of the Gold Coast. Paul Nugent “The Comptroller of customs Vs Togbe Sesinu: Ex-slaves, 
smugglers and the state on the Togoland frontier 1920-1939”, paper presented at the African History 
Seminar, SO AS, October, 18, 2000.
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expeditions during the night across hidden paths in the forests.124 Informants in the 
creeks and along the River Moungo recounted how smugglers used to cross with 
contraband goods in canoes and usually at night.125 On the approach of the Customs 
Preventive Service (CPS), they dumped the goods consisting mostly of crates of 
Beaufort beer, cartons of cigarettes and bales of used clothes into the river and 
escaped. Usually, when the CPS men had gone, the smugglers went back and tried to 
retrieve their goods from the bottom of the river. Other villagers usually tailed the 
smugglers to see where the CPS would surprise them. As the smugglers dumped their 
goods and ran away chased by the Preventive Service, the people dived into the river 
and took as much as they could carry of the smuggled goods and escaped. This made 
the smuggling network all the more complicated for the CPS who eventually decided 
to work in collaboration with villagers and their chiefs in an effort to identify 
smugglers either individually or by groups and families. It was not uncommon that 
sometimes, the chiefs they went to were the organisers of smuggling expeditions 
or/and retailers of smuggled goods. Border groups never regarded smuggling as 
unlawful and illegal. Some of the reasons advanced for smuggling by border people 
were: “ It was a challenge to the authority and an exciting adventure; because it was 
profitable; because it was manly and equal to a great hunt; because smugglers became 
rich in money and property.”126 They considered taxation and other exactions wrong 
and so according to them; they felt free to earn the money for them the way
124 Interview with John Ndode and two others who preferred to remain anonymous, on May 15,1999 
at Bangem.
125 Interview with Chief Ebirabo, on May 5, 1999 at Mofcuta Creek.
126 Fanso, “Trans-frontier relations”, p.333. Even though our informants refused to disclose the names 
of chiefs involved in smuggling, they did acknowledge however that chiefs were involved in the illegal 
trade.
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government did not like, through smuggling.127 Smugglers saw the boundary as a 
trade, and cultural barrier and thus felt it right to break patrol and customs regulations 
by trespassing whenever they felt was necessary to do so without official passes.
Sometimes, the CPS men ran into open confrontations with smugglers. There 
was the example recounted of an open attack that took place around the fifties 
between a group of smugglers and customs officers near the customs post at 
Ebonemin-Ninong.128 The reporter said that he and other friends were smuggling 
Beaufort beer, salt, clothes stockfish and tobacco from the French into the English 
zone when French customs officers on patrol spotted them.129 They hid their goods in 
the forest and lured the officers into thick undergrowth where there was an open 
confrontation that left people on both sides with wounds. There were two customs and 
two guards against a group of eight smugglers. Before complaints from the officers 
reached the authorities at Melong, the smugglers were in safe hiding. Fruitless efforts 
were made by the French administration to arrest them.
On the section of the boundary that was on sea, precisely in the creeks, there 
were reports of harassment by French sub-ordinate officials on British subjects fishing 
in the Moungo.130 It is to be recalled that Nigerians who remained for the most part, 
loyal to the British rather than French authorities, dominantly populate the creeks.131
127 Fanso, “Trans-frontier relations”, p.333.
128 Interview with a former smuggler, John Ndode and others, on May 15, 1999 at Bangem.
129 Interview with John Ndode Ngwese on May 16,1999 at Bangem-Ninong. The informant could not 
give a precise date when the incident occurred but appeared to have a clear memory of the incident. 
Similar accounts were recounted by other informants who were involved in the smuggling business at 
the time.
130 Interview with chief Ebirabo (Nigerian) of Mokuta on May 6, 1999, at Mokuta Creek.
Sometimes patrol guards took away their female captives, Anglo-French frontier Victoria Division, 
1924, QFe 1921/1 NAB.
131 Ibid.
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According to the chief of one of the creeks, when they went out fishing at the mouth 
of the River Moungo they were followed by French patrol officers sometimes far out 
to sea.132 It was difficult to tell where the median line, which formed the boundary, 
was, as a result, they often crossed over to the French side sometimes unknowingly. 
They usually had several hidden water routes in the creeks, which they used in times 
of emergency to escape back into the British waters. Smugglers caught had their 
goods seized and were forced to pay more than the required amount as duty on each 
item. Reports on the capture of two groups of smugglers in Bimbia waters, near 
Victoria, during 1928-1929 resulted in the seizure of goods valued at a total of 
£1,218. Customs and Preventive men sometimes stormed border markets and seized 
all suspected contraband goods they could find there. Such goods could be easily 
detected for they bore the official customs stamps of the side of the territory from 
where they were smuggled. Traders of contraband goods sold “under the counter”- a 
process by which the buyer and the seller haggled on the price of an item before the 
item was exposed. Usually, the goods were not displayed on the shelves like other 
goods for fear of customs seizure or stampede. Smugglers who were caught and could 
not pay the required fines in Native Courts were imprisoned for a given period of 
time. If for example anyone was caught trespassing without a pass, the fine was £50 
or six months imprisonment.133 Native Court files report several cases with charges
132 Provincial Office Buea to DO Victoria Division, unsigned letter No.2331/55, of April 29, 1938, 
Anglo-French Boundaiy Commission. General. Cameroons Province, Qf/al938/5 NAB. The heavy 
Nigerian population in the creeks is still the situation today. They do everything to evade control by tax 
officers and Gendarmes who ask them to present their resident permits.
133 Anglo-French boundaiy commission register of boundary pillars, letter No. EP 362/854 of January 
5,1939, p. 2, Q Fal939/la, NAB.
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of smuggling, unlawful assembly and evading payment of customs duty.134 Due to the 
length of the boundary, it was difficult for the CPS men and the customs officials to 
efficiently police the boundary and contain smuggling.
Boundary officers were working on the difficult terrain of thick forests, hilly 
and rugged landscapes that prevented efficiency. The boundary was crossed at several 
points by footpaths. In certain areas, the border was unclear. George Atem speaks of a 
case in 1938 when preventive police officers, in pursuit of smugglers crossed, without 
knowing, from the British sector into the French territory near Bangola.135 The 
constables were immediately arrested and disarmed by their French counterparts and 
sent to the authorities at Foumban from where they were later handed over to the 
British Cameroonian authorities. The CPS had limited resources at its disposal, and 
these needed to be strung out along some very difficult terrain.
On the British side of the boundary for example, the number of CPS men rose 
from 67 in 1927 to 199 in 1930 and 138 by 1939. There were only three European 
officers working with the CPS men on the entire length of the boundary.136 Of the 
138, 92 were assigned to the section of the boundary from Santa down to the sea; this 
means that there were less than that number of men put to patrol the section under 
study which was approximately 135 miles long. This was practically unworkable for 
control to be effective. On the sea section, they had to go through dense mangrove 
swamps sometimes wading through mud and water in marshlands infested with 
dangerous insects and reptiles. In the inter war years the CPS men had difficulties in
134 For files on Native Courts - NC Bakossi (mfrb); NC Ninong (mfl); NC Upper Balong (mf/m); NC 
Balong(mh/b); NC Bimbia (mh/c); NC Tiko (mh/e); NC Victoria(mM); N C Buea (no/c). The bulk of 
the files cover from 1917 to 1940.
135 George Atem, “ Cameroon-Nigeria relations 1884-1961: A study in political, economic and social 
interactions between two neighbouring states”. PhD thesis, University of Calabar, Nigeria, 1984, 
p.363.
Fanso, “Trans-frontier relations”, p. 363.
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coping with the problem of detecting and arresting the large sailing canoes used by 
the smugglers. Consequently, by the close of 1930, motor-launches were placed at the 
disposal of the Assistant Commissioner of the Preventive Services, Victoria. This was 
to facilitate movements by patrol along the coast and on the River Moungo.137 The 
use of these motor-launches and the creation of water guards led to large seizures of 
contraband goods along the coast and in the creeks; but smuggling continued to 
flourish in borderlands. Meanwhile calls for the dismantling of the boundary remained 
some of the major reasons for the search for the reunification of both territories. This 
will form the focus of the next chapter.
137 Cameroons Report from 1929 to 1931, cited in Fanso, “Trans-frontier relations”, p. 332.
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THE 1955 UN VISITING MISSION RECEIVING PETITIONS FROM THE 
PEOPLE OF KUMBO, SOUTHERN CAMEROONS, IN THE COURTYARD OF 
THEFON
Source: Report on the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration by Her Majesty’s 
Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the General Assembly of 
the United Nations. London: HMSO, 1961.
MEMBERS OF THE VISITING MISSION INSPECTING MIXED FARMERS 
PLOUGHING AREAS IN SOUTHERN CAMEROONS
Source: Report on the Cam eroons under U nited Kingdom  administration by Her M ajesty’s 
Governm ent in the United Kingdom  o f  Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the General A ssem bly o f  
the U nited Nations. London: HM SO. 1961.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE ANGLO-FRENCH BOUNDARY ISSUE AND THE 
REUNIFICATION DRIVE IN CAMEROON, 1950-1961
Research on the Anglo-French boundary issue in Cameroon can be better 
appreciated when highlighted by the demand for the reunification of the territory. The 
perceived inconvenience of the boundary remained a major reason behind the 
campaign for reunification. This chapter aims primarily at exploring the efforts made 
by border people, and then the various administering authorities (British, French, 
Cameroonian) and the United Nations in the quest for the reunification of Southern 
Cameroons and French Cameroon. The chapter will draw heavily from secondary 
sources. These are mostly comparative studies on the reunification and independence 
of both Cameroons.1 References would also be made to some UN Trusteeship Reports 
on Cameroon.
Interest in reunification or the desire to return to the old Kamerun was 
strongest in Southern Cameroons and the adjacent French territories. The British and 
the French who partitioned the territory were keen to maintain and police the 
boundary to protect their investment and resources on their respective spheres. The 
strictness of border administration contributed to the increased demand for
1 The selection of secondary sources exploited in this chapter is from works of Cameroonian political 
historians like Victor Julius Ngoh, Martin Njeuma, Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Nicodemus Awasom, Chem- 
Langhee, Emmanuel Chiabi and Paul Kale for the most part. Works of non-Cameroonians on the 
related issues have been also exploited like those of Willard Johnson, Edwin Ardener, Claude Welch, 
Saadia Touval, David Gardinier, Ayodele Langley, George Padmore, Richard Joseph, Odette Guitard 
and Colin Legum. I was not able to examine primary materials on the reunification and Independence 
issues especially in Cameroon and in France because most of the files are still not made accessible to 
the public yet. In Cameroon for example, many files have not yet been being codified at the National 
Archives, Yaounde and most of them have been damaged by poor conservation. In die PRO, files on 
the independence of Cameroon have remote relevance to the boundary under study. They discuss for 
the most part the end of Trusteeship in the territory and the achievement of independence.
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reunification, a demand, which according to Martin Njeuma, was overshadowed by 
the demand for independence.2 Reunification was advanced as a solution to irksome 
frontier restrictions. These restrictions prevented separated border groups from 
continuing their long nurtured relations. It became burdensome for Cameroonians, 
especially the divided people, to continue to interact politically, economically and 
socio-culturally. It was for this reason that the Anglo-French boundary presented a 
significant target for the resistance movements.
By far, the strongest challenge to the existence of the boundary was the desire 
of the border groups to return under a single colonial administration, preferably the 
British. Belonging to this single administrative pre-1916 unit was what the border 
people understood as their “old national unity”. The ideology that served as the basis 
for Cameroon reunification is often referred to as the “Kamerun Idea” 3 Although the 
claim that there was a “national identity” in Kamerun could be challenged, it is also 
true that there was a Kamerun ideology that embodied the aspirations of the 
Cameroonians for a recreation of their nation within the framework of the pre-1916 
German Protectorate of Kamerun. That is why it is important to make reference to the 
period of German occupation when discussing the Anglo-French boundary and the 
reunification drive in Cameroon. People from separated border groups of the South 
and Northwest, West and Littoral provinces were more involved in the protests 
against the boundary and the call for the reunification of both Cameroons than people 
from the interior of the territory. They were local chiefs, some influential individuals, 
prominent leaders of political parties and other socio-cultural associations that
2 Martin Njeuma, “ Reunification and political opportunism in the making of Cameroon’s 
independence". Inpaideuma, 41(1995):27-37.
3 Chem-Langhee and Martin Njeuma, “The Pan-Kamerun movement, 1949-1961". In Ndiva Kofele- 
Kale, An African experiment in nation building. The bilingual Cameroon Republic since reunification. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980, pp.25-64.
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condemned the imposition of the boundary and struggled for the reunification of 
Cameroon.
BORDER PEOPLE PROVIDED ACTIVE MILITANCY TO THE REUNIFICATION 
DRIVE
This section will highlight the idea that border groups actively demanded the 
dismantling of the boundary and the reunification of both Cameroons. The militancy 
cuts across what can today be geographically grouped as the South and Northwest, 
West and Littoral provinces. Even though our scope of study covers only the 
Southwest and Littoral provinces, border people of the other two provinces, which 
were also divided by the boundary, shared the quest for reunification with the same 
enthusiasm as their immediate Southern neighbours.
Before discussing the border people and the reunification 
struggle, it is important to say here that it is not the major concern of this section to 
examine the degree of commitment to the reunification issue between the British and 
French administered subjects or the long term ripples of reunification in post-colonial 
Cameroon. The history of reunification has been told from many perspectives.4 The 
reunification ideology originated from French Cameroon after the Second World War 
and spread to Southern Cameroon. When Britain and France accepted the principle of 
transfer of power to Cameroonians they opened the way for several local leaders to 
emerge and distinguish themselves. In our discussion, we shall begin by exploring the 
efforts made by local chiefs and some influential persons along the border before
4 Edwin Ardener, “The nature of the reunification of Cameroon". In Arthur Hazlewood, African 
integration and disintegration: case studies in economic and political union. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1967; Willard R. Johnson. The Cameroon federatiompolitical integration in a 
fragmentary society. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1970;Ndiva Kofele-Kale, An African 
experiment in nation building:the bilingual Cameroon Republic since reunification. Boulder Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1980; M. Njeuma, “Reunification and political opportunism", 1995; Nicodemus F. 
Awasom. “The reunification question in Cameroon histoiy: was the bride an enthusiastic or a reluctant 
one?” Africa Today, 47,2(1999): 1-16.
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examining the works of political leaders, all of whose contributions resulted in the 
dismantling of the boundary.5
An important element in Southern Cameroons history is the role 
and influence of traditional rulers on political and public affairs. This is especially 
true of the grasslands chiefs in the northern half of Southern Cameroons. With support 
from some of their people, some southern border chiefs worked for the reunification 
of Cameroon in the hope of reuniting their subjects from across the boundary. Chief 
Mukete of Kumba, for example, hosted a meeting in his palace in May 1949, 
sponsored by Endeley. This meeting regrouped leaders of political parties from both 
West and East Cameroon who all agreed to work hand-in-hand to achieve 
independence, after which reunification would follow as a matter of course. Most of 
the participants argued that since socially and economically, British Cameroon had 
suffered a high degree of neglect, any premature unification would have the effect of 
making Southern Cameroons “a protectorate” of French Cameroon.6 Another 
example of a border chief who worked for the reunification cause was the chief of the 
Mbo of Mbouroukou. During the UPC incidents in the Moungo, the chief of the Mbo, 
chief Pandong of Mbouroukou village held a UPC party meeting at his chiefdom in 
December 1949. This he declared was to show his support for what the party stood 
for, the reunification of Southern and French Cameroons.7
The Bakossi like their Mbo brothers supported the reunification 
cause and hosted UPC meetings around Kumba, Ebonji and Tombel especially when 
the party was banned in French Cameroon. That was why a majority of the Bakossi
5 Biographies of the major political leaders have been put in the Annex.
6 Eyongetah and Brain, A history o f the Cameroon, p. 129.
7 Rapports d ’inspection sur les incidents de Nkongsamba, 1949-1950,1 AC 37/2/1949, NAY. For more 
on the involvement of border chiefs and their subjects in supporting the UPC and the reunification 
cause, see 1 AC/299/1951, Letter No. M85 S/PS2/GM/OL of October 6,1951, NAY.
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headed by people like Thomas Ebong Ngalame, Eugene Ebako Ngome and Lazarus 
Ngahame campaigned for and voted for reunification with French Cameroon at the 
plebiscites. The results of the plebiscites, which were organised by the UN in 
February 1961 in Southern Cameroons were in favour of reunification with French 
Cameroon.8 Meanwhile, on the French side of the border, the efforts of the local 
people to dismantle the boundary were sometimes sponsored by the colonial 
administration.
During the interwar years, the French sponsored a political 
movement, the Jeunesse Camerounaise Frangaise (JEUCAFRA), in response to 
Hitler’s bid to recover Germany’s colonial possessions. Information on JEUCAFRA 
is important here because that was the first movement in East Cameroon that provided 
the forum for Cameroonians under French administration to call for the dismantling of 
the Anglo-French boundary in Cameroon. Actually, JEUCAFRA was an offshoot of 
Jeunesse Camerounaise (JC). The JC was the first organisation to provide Africans in 
the French- ruled territories with a vehicle through which to express themselves on 
social and public affairs. Because French policy did not permit Africans to form 
political organisations, the JC, established in 1933, was largely concerned with the 
cultural and social improvement of African societies. All political interests were 
pursued clandestinely.
The formation of JEUCAFRA was largely the work of the French High 
Commissioner, Richard Brunot, in French Cameroon.9 The movement was composed 
of three groups with conflicting ideas. The first group was the French colonial 
authority, which wanted the movement to assist the administration in its efforts to
8 The plebiscites will be discussed later on in this chapter.
9 Ngoh, Cameroon, 1884-1985, p. 123. At the back of this pro-France political build-up in Cameroon 
was a son of the border. Paul Soppo Priso and the French Government engineered the transformation of 
the JC to the JEUCAFRA.
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prevent the return of French Cameroon to Germany. The second group was made up 
of French business interests in Cameroon, which supported the movement because 
they wanted to take Cameroon out of the control of the League of Nations.10 They 
wanted French Cameroon to be firmly and entirely under the control of France like 
other French colonies in Africa. Finally, the third group, which was made up of the 
educated elite, saw the movement both as an instrument for voicing their anti-German 
sentiments and as a forum for expressing their political, economic and social 
grievances against the French colonial administration. These conflicting tendencies 
within JEUCAFRA made it difficult for the movement to survive after 1945 when the 
war ended the German threat.11
Once the German threat was ended, some local leaders along the border 
committed themselves to the political advancement of French Cameroon in general 
and to the reunification cause in particular. It is important to say here that in French 
Cameroon, radical nationalism was ranged against the French and force was fteely 
used by the administration. Reunification was seen by the French administration as a 
revolutionary idea and only those they saw as radicals adhered to it. In 1947, a group 
of border Duala headed by Paul Soppo Priso formed a political party, the 
Rassemblement Camerounais (RACAM), and made reunification the cornerstone of 
this new party. In so doing, they hoped to locate the battlefield for the political 
advancement of French Cameroon abroad, at the United Nations.12 There was a strong 
colonial lobby in the UN to challenge French assimilationist policies and frustrate the
10 Examples of French business units in Cameroon in the 40s were: Societe Commerciale et Agricole 
de la Lokundje; Compagnie Frangaise du Continent Africain among others.
11 The extreme seriousness with which the French administration viewed the German presence in 
French Cameroon contrasted with the relatively less attention that the British colonial authorities paid 
to the Germans. Pro-German post-war organisations were tolerated more in the British than in the 
French zone. See Ngoh, Cameroon, 1884-1985, pp. 124-125.
12 Njeuma, "Reunification and political opportunism”, p.28.
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integration of French Cameroon into the French Union.13 RAC AM hoped that when 
the boundary would be dismantled, reunification and independence would follow. 
This would reduce British and French political domination of the territoiy. It was 
reckoned that the two powers would compete with each other for a new hegemony in 
a reunited Cameroon, and that the Cameroonians would be able to dictate their own 
terms of co-operation.14 RAC AM was considered by other Cameroonians fighting for 
reunification as too moderate and as a result, other more radical French Cameroonians 
from border groups (notably those from the Bamileke and Bamoun ethnic groups) 
took up the banner in April 1948 with reunification high on their agenda.
Radical nationalists like, Reuben Um Nyobe, Ernest Ouandie, Felix-Roland 
Moumie, Albert Kingue, and Albert Ndogmo, largely from border groups, formed the 
UPC political party with immediate reunification and independence as the twin 
policies on its agenda. The UPC found most of its support among border groups 
notably the Bamileke and the Duala. Even though the Bassa were not directly 
separated by the boundary, their close socio-cultural and kinship relationships with 
the Duala and their ideas on the importance of reunification made them militate for 
the cause of the UPC. Leaders of these border groups who militated for reunification 
through the UPC platform used the division of their groups by the boundary and the 
relationship with their kin from across the boundary to support their plan for 
reunification. Evidence for the use of these factors lies in the fact that most of the 
members of the UPC were from border groups and as such the major concern of the
13 Awasom, “The reunification question”, p. 3.
14 Njeuma, “Reunification and political opportunism”, p. 2. It is important to say here that while 
Cameroon was working towards reunification and independence there was a possibility of examining 
the ways in which she could also benefit from the resources that could be reaped from Britain and 
France.
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party was to dismantle the boundary and reunite with their brothers across the 
boundary.
Um Nyobe, (the Secretary General of the party) for example, 
had appeared before the UN in December, 1952 and declared that the division of the 
Cameroons was artificial and arbitrary benefiting no one but the French and the 
British governments. 15 He argued that because the groups across the boundary had 
common traditions and interests, reunification would bring economic benefits for 
Cameroon through resources from both the French Union and the Commonwealth. 
The chance of getting advantages from both organisations would be enhanced by 
reunification. With this argument, the party won over border traditional organisations 
like the Ngondo and the Kumze .16
When French Cameroon achieved independence Moumie, for 
example, stated that he would negotiate with the administration only if French troops 
were removed from Cameroon, an amnesty granted to political prisoners and elections 
supervised by outside observers.17 When these requests were not granted, the result 
was widespread violence along the boundary especially in the Moungo and Bamileke 
areas. News of the reunification struggles that were going on in French Cameroon 
soon reached British Southern Cameroons. The first adherents of the movement were 
principally French Cameroonians who were spread throughout the principal border 
towns in British Southern Cameroon, precisely in the Buea, Tiko, Victoria and
15 Eyongetah and Brain, A history o f  the Cameroon, p. 147. Also see Ngoh. Cameroon 1884-1985. 
p. 143.
It is to be recalled here that the Ngondo and the Kumze were ethnic based organisations - the 
Ngondo for the Duala and the Kumze for the Bamileke. Both groups affiliated with the UPC from the 
creation of the party.
17 The founder of the Kumze was Mathias Djoumessi, an important chief of the Bamileke and the first 
national president of the UPC. Djoumessi worked in close collaboration with his counterpart of the 
Ngondo, Chief Betote Akwa, to achieve reunification through the UPC platform. Eyongetah and Brain, 
A history o f the Cameroon, p. 149.
275
Kumba Districts. Some had taken up residence in Southern Cameroons during the 
German period as plantation workers, but the bulk were emigres who had escaped the 
harshness and oppressiveness of the French colonial system.
A significant part of border population was formed by these 
emigres who rallied around one of their prominent leaders, Robert Jabea Kum 
Dibonge, and formed the pressure group called, the French Cameroon Welfare Union 
(FCWU). The FCWU was a voluntary association organised on a regional basis with 
the objective of advancing the social, political and economic conditions of French 
Cameroonians living in the British territory.18 Members also informed themselves 
about the political and social conditions back home on the French side of the 
boundary. The FCWU was one of the several groups that petitioned the first UN 
Visiting Mission to unify the British and French territories.19 In August 1951, the 
FCWU leadership decided and combined forces with other border politicians like 
Nerius Mbile, Emmanuel Endeley, Ernest Ouandie and Abel Kingue in a meeting held 
in Kumba (Southern Cameroons) to give birth to the Kamerun United National 
Congress (KUNC). We know from the previous chapter that the KUNC was the first 
and the most militant party to work for the reunification of Cameroon.
Working in close collaboration with the KUNC in the promotion 
of the idea of reunification were some people from the Western and Northwest 
Provinces who were attracted by the business opportunities of the border area and had 
crossed the boundary and settled on the British side of the border.20 This group of 
people exploited the dynamic commercial traffic across the boundary, a cardinal
18 V. B. Amazee, “The role of French Cameroonians in the reunification of Cameroon 1916-1961”, 
Transajrican Journal o f History, 23,(1994): 199-234.
19 Johnson, The Cameroon Federation, p. 122. Welch, Dream o f  unity, p. 177.
20 Prominent among those was Joseph Ngu. Joe Ngu as he was popularly known, was bom in the 
Bamenda Division but resided in the border town of Kumba from where he could use the boundary as a
276
aspect of which was the importance of relatives and support systems on both sides of 
the boundary. Some of these “strangers” used their wealth and influence to sustain 
reunification meetings and to facilitate a steady stream of petitions to the UN on the 
necessity of reunification.21 Besides efforts made by chiefs, some prominent 
individuals, business men and border political leadership on the French side of the 
border, Southern Cameroon politicians who were committed to the reunification cause 
saw it as a means to end the administration of their territory as an integral part of the 
Eastern Region of Nigeria. It is important here to explore the differences and 
evolution of political platforms between two leading political leaders (Endeley and 
Foncha) because they influenced the results of the 1959 elections that brought a 
change of political leadership in the territory and the dismantling of the border.
Endeley initially saw reunification as a useful and vital means to 
achieve an autonomous status for Southern Cameroon. Through the CNF, he called 
for separation from Nigeria, the unification of both British Northern and Southern 
Cameroons and their reunification with French Cameroon. During the constitutional 
conference that was held in Ibadan in 1950, Endeley is said to have raised the issue of 
reunification and this was the first time it was discussed any where outside the 
territory proper besides the UN.22 Yet as political opportunism increased in Southern 
Cameroons, he became insincere in his call for reunification.
Before 1956, Endeley was committed to reunification, he 
pressed for the elimination or the relaxation of naturalisation requirements for French 
Cameroonians residing in Southern Cameroons. This was in order to have their votes.
conduit for his business transactions between Nigeria and Cameroon. Njeuma, “Reunification and 
political opportunism", p. 3.
21 It is reported that connections and support provided by Ngu and Dibonge within the FCWU 
strengthened trans-frontier ties, Njeuma, “Reunification and political opportunism", p.3.
22 B. Chemlanghee andM. Njeuma, “The Pan-Kamerun Movement, 1949-1961“, Ndiva Kofele-Kale. 
An African experiment in nation building, p. 36.
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By 1957, when he got the votes, he opposed reunification and pressured Parliament to 
disfranchise them. Meanwhile, the pro-reunification forces led by Foncha and the 
KNDP, pressed for their enfranchisement at the time, but later, during the plebiscites 
campaign in 1961, the pro-Nigerian forces led by Endeley and the pro-reunification 
forces of the KNDP, switched positions again.23
Endeley later on began pressing for workers’ rights, 
representation in the Nigerian legislative organs and the reform of the Land and 
Native Rights Ordinance rather than a reduction of frontier difficulties in the 
Cameroons. This change of commitment to the reunification cause put Endeley at 
loggerheads with French Cameroonian activists in Southern Cameroons some of 
whom decided to break away from the CNF to form two very militant pro-unification 
parties, the KUNC the KNDP.
Foncha’s KNDP decided to work with the leaders of the UPC 
who were in radical pursuit of the reunification idea in French Cameroon. In 
November 1955, the KNDP and UPC met in Bamenda and formed a Reunification 
Committee in which Moumie was elected President, and Foncha, Secretary. The 
radical anti-colonial stance of the UPC in British Cameroons added more weight to a 
pastoral letter of the Catholic Bishops in the French Cameroons, which on Easter 
Sunday 1955, warned the faithful of the dangers of communism and the UPC.24 In 
1956, an enlarged reunification committee was formed including Foncha and Nde 
Ntumazah (KNDP leaders) from the British Southern Cameroons, and UPC leaders in 
exile from French Cameroon like Moumie, Kinge, and Ouandie. According to
23 Johnson, The Cameroon Federation, pp. 120-21. At the time of the plebiscites, the KNDP thought 
there were more Nigerian migrants (anti-reunificationists) in the territory than French Cameroonians, 
and that their cause (reunification) would be advanced by having both groups removed from the voting 
rolls.
24 Awasom, “The reunification question”, p. 7.
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Awasom, this union between Foncha, a devout Catholic school head teacher turned 
politician, and the radical UPC turned out to be difficult to maintain and was 
eventually bound to collapse.25 The Catholic Church was uncomfortable with the UPC 
because of its communist orientation and its radical nationalism, and Foncha was 
accused of associating with violent communists who could eventually destroy the 
church. Moreover, the revolutionary language and violent methods of the UPC made 
Foncha and his party men to relent in their joint struggle for reunification with the 
UPC partisans. The KNDP wanted a conservative approach.
When Foncha’s KNDP defeated Endeley’s KNC in the January 
1959 elections, the results were seen as a triumph for reunification. Njeuma says that 
the elections were a test for the popularity of “Foncha’s brand of reunification”.26 
Foncha, who in 1959 became the Premier of West Cameroon, stated that the KNDP 
would prefer a Federal System of government in the event of reunification, a loose 
Federation between the two components. He however added that the issue was still to 
be negotiated with the authorities of French Cameroon. The Commissioner for British 
Southern Cameroons, J.O. Field, advised Foncha at this point to meet with Ahidjo, 
who at the time had become the President of French Cameroon, as a team and discuss 
the terms of reunification. Ngoh and Chem-langhe report that Foncha ignored the 
advice and decided to negotiate with Ahidjo alone.27 Njeuma emphasises this point by
25 Ibid. Chemlanghee and Ngoh also elaborate on the uneasy union between both leaders, B. 
Chemlanghee, “The road to the unitary state of Cameroon, 1959-1972”, Annals o f the Faculty o f Arts, 
Letters and Social Sciences, the Social Science Series, 1 and 2 (January-July 1990):9. Ngoh. Cameroon 
1884-1985, p. 11.
26 Njeuma, "Reunification and political opportunism”, p.2. Meanwhile, in French Cameroon, the 
government passed from Andre-Marie Mbida to Ahmadou Ahidjo without solving the problem of 
widespread violence and a strong French involvement in the country’s affairs.
27 Njeuma, "Reunification and political opportunism”, Paideuma, p.34. This has been considered by 
some authors as one of the major causes of the marginalisation of the West Cameroonians. B. Chem 
Langhee, “Anglophone-Francophone divide and political disintegration in Cameroon. A psychistorical 
perspective", P. N Nkwi and F.B Nyamnjoh, Regional balance and national integration in Cameroon, 
Yaoundeilcassrt, 1997, p.91. Piet Konings and F. B. Nyamnjoh, “The Anglophone problem in 
Cameroon". In Journal of Modern African Studies, 35,2(1997): pp. 207-229.
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saying that Foncha, as Premier, went ahead single-handed without first seeking 
general consensus in his (KNDP) party, nor with West Cameroonians to negotiate 
reunification with Ahidjo.28 By so doing, Foncha drifted irretrievably into the hands 
of Ahidjo and his allies, the French government. The French administration was 
happy with Foncha’s plans for reunification with French Cameroon. This was because 
in the event of reunification, French Cameroonians would constitute the majority in 
the reunified Cameroon, thus French influence, it was assumed, would be 
predominant.
By reunification Foncha meant a loose federation of states, 
precisely of the West and East Cameroon states on equal terms. Foncha’s formula also 
bore the seeds of destruction for British policy in West Cameroon. This was because 
the formula was based on the principle that negotiations for a federal constitution 
would be undertaken by the ruling parties of West and East Cameroon who would 
work out the details without consulting either the British or the French. This was 
probably why the British attempted to thwart the reunification movements as shall be 
observed below. However Foncha’s dream for a loose federation suffered steady 
erosion after independence.
THE 1959 ELECTIONS AND THE CHANGE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN  
SOUTHERN CAMEROONS
The January general elections of 1959 in Southern Cameroons 
were prepared at the London Constitutional Conferences of May-June 1957 and 
September-October 1958 with representation from all major political parties in the 
territory. They were, the KNC represented by Endeley, V. E. Mukete, Fon Galega II 
of Bali and J.T. Ndze; the KPP represented by P.M. Kale and N. N. Mbile while the
28 Njeuma, “Reunification and political opportunism”, Paideuma, p.34.
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KNDP was represented by Foncha and A. N. Jua. On the question of constitutional 
arrangements, one of the conclusions drawn was that the Leader of Government 
Business in Southern Cameroons would be called the Premier.29 During the two 
previous conferences, the differences between the KNDP then in the opposition and 
the KNC/KPP alliance were made clear. The latter supported the idea of continued 
association (as a separate region) with Nigeria. The KNC/KPP delegates declared that 
they wanted rapid constitutional progress only in order to prepare themselves to take 
their place in an independent Nigeria. Their reason was the greater financial and 
economic benefits available to Southern Cameroons as a region within a Great 
Federal Nigeria. Also, the “integrationists” as they were called wanted to avoid the 
continuation of political unrest in French Cameroon.
On the other hand, the “reunificationists” or KNDP favoured 
ultimate reunification after having seceded from the Nigerian Federation. For the 
KNDP, secession was to be followed by a short period of British administration, 
which would lead to independence. During its campaign, the KNDP insisted that 
reunification would be achieved only after independence and was to be a matter of a 
roundtable discussion between the governments of both Cameroons. The political 
leadership in Southern Cameroons was under great pressure to define reunification in 
concrete terms. This led to tension between the government (KNC/KPP) and the 
opposition (KNDP/OK).30
When the results of the 1959 elections were made known, the 
KNDP won the elections; they won 14 seats as against 12 secured by the KNC/KPP
29 Ngoh, History of Cameroon, p. 213.
30 It should be recalled here that the OK party was an offshoot of the UPC, which was formed in 
Southern Cameroons after the UPC was banned in French Cameroon. The OK formed a coalition with 
the KNDP because both of them were campaigning on the same platform.
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Alliance. The KNDP captured 75,326 of the votes (which appeared, however, to 
include 2,021 cast for two candidates of the OK party) while the KNC/KPP obtained 
51,384 of the votes and 10,509 for independent candidates.31 The KNC/KPP failure 
was largely the result of over confidence. This is clearly seen in the votes they scored 
in Victoria South East for an example. They were confident that they would carry the 
votes there since it was an allegedly KNC/KPP area. Instead of uniting their forces for 
better results, they split the votes between KNC (Dipoko) and KPP (Nambile), while 
Mbua Monono stood for the KNDP. The result was that Dipoko had 1182, Nambile 
had 813 and Mbua Monono captured the most, 1293 votes. In Victoria North West, 
the KNC/KPP scored very highly there because the KPP candidate, Kale stepped 
down for the KNC candidate. Endeley thus became the lone candidate there, enabling 
the alliance to score 3086 votes against 841 for KNDP.32 Foncha was invited to form 
a government and on 30 January he was appointed Premier of Southern Cameroons.
At this point in time, Endeley and his government were 
becoming unpopular and strongly opposed by the chiefs and populations of the 
Grassfields, an important area that had been captured by Foncha and the KNDP. 
Endeley, who favoured association with Nigeria, was out of power and Foncha 
became the Premier of Southern Cameroons. These election results brought to power 
not only a party planning to separate from Nigeria, but one which championed the 
cause of reunification with French Cameroon.33 After his failure in the January 1959
31 Ngoh, Cameroon 1884-1985,pp.211-212. Also see Welch, Dream of unity, p.203. Also see UNTCR, 
May I960, 26th Session, pp. 36- 7, see annex for the election speeches made by principal political party 
leaders.
32 UNTCR, May 1960, 26th Session, p. 37. The 4th Visiting Mission observed that personal likes and 
dislikes towards candidates and issues of a purely local character had a bearing on the polling.
33 This however, was not the first time that elections in Southern Cameroons had been contested on 
issues of separation or continuous association with Nigeria. In an earlier election in 1953, the issue 
contested was whether Southern Cameroons should separate from Eastern Nigeria and constitute itself 
a region or whether it should continue as a province in Eastern Nigeria. At the time, Endeley1 s party
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elections, Endeley looked back with satisfaction on what he had achieved prior to the 
elections and in a speech to the UN on February 23, 1959, he asked what advantages 
Southern Cameroons would get by associating with a long-estranged French 
administered territory and concluded that: “It will be unwise to abandon a secure and 
floating vessel which offers us sure landing to allow ourselves to drift in an open life­
boat because we hope to be picked up by a new and better vessel which we have not 
even seen on the horizon.”34 At the time, it was probably too early to tell if the 
“floating vessel” was as safe and secure as Endeley made it to look. The Fon of Bafiit 
like Foncha did envisage French Cameroon as “fire”, because of the civil war that 
raged there, and Nigeria as “water” in which Southern Cameroonians could be 
drowned, but Foncha judged that the violence in French Cameroon would be short 
lived and that reunification would still be possible.35 While all of this was going on, it 
is necessary to know what the Yaounde authorities thought about reunification.
THE FRENCH CAMEROON AUTHORITIES' MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT 
REUNIFICATION
In French Cameroon, the government had changed hands from
Premier Andre-Marie Mbida an arch anti-reunificationist, to Ahmadou Ahidjo, a
moderate politician, in February 1958.36 Mbida hated the UPC and energetically
kicked against reunification and independence at a time when almost all political
groups had already espoused these goals as realizable. He was forced to resign on
February 17, 1958 after a year in office, when criticism mounted over his handling of
the UPC and his long-range policies. In a speech before his resignation, in January
had won the election on the question of separatism. His party pressed for the territory to be given the 
same position as any other Nigerian region.
34 Eyongetah and Brain, A history o f  the Cameroon, p. 145.
35 Welch, Dream o f unity, p. 207.
36 Daniel Abwa, Andre-Marie Mbida premier Premier Ministre Camerounais (1917-1980). Paris: 
l’Harmattan, 1993, p. 124..
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1958, he spoke of the possibility of considering independence within a decade, and 
completely left aside the possibility of reunification. As a result of his remarks, most 
of the cabinet resigned. Welch says three motions of censure were filed and following 
hurried discussions with Paris a new High Commissioner was recalled.37 The new 
High Commissioner, Jean-Paul Ramadier, in an interview with Mbida on February 4, 
1958, made it clear that one of his major objectives in Cameroon was to either make 
the PM to submit to his orders or leave office.38 Mbida was then forced to step down. 
Ahmadou Ahidjo as leader of the largest parliamentary group, le Groupe d'Union 
Camerounaise , was called upon to form a government.
Ahidjo endorsed reunification and independence and indicated 
that if reunification was the wish of Southern Cameroons he could not object to it. He 
was not over-enthusiastic about reunification, and thus played down its structural 
implication. He was more concerned with the political situation in French Cameroon 
than with reunification. According to Njeuma, the one thing Ahidjo did that made all 
things possible was to insulate reunification from party politics in French Cameroon 
politics. This was achieved by getting the East Cameroon Assembly of Deputies to 
approve a motion in September 1958 accepting reunification with Southern 
Cameroons whenever the latter was ready39 Well aware of the factors causing 
Mbida’s downfall and the dangers of a north (Moslem)-south (Christian) split, the 
new leader adopted the cardinal points of the UPC, independence and reunification 
were the basic policies of his new government. In his investiture speech, he claimed
37 Welch, Dream o f  unity, p.210. Georges Chaffard. Les carnets secrets de la colonisation. Paris: 
Calmann-Levy, 1965, pp. 295-329.
38 Abwa, Andre-Marie Mbida, pp. 124-133. Ramadier said his predecessor, Pierre Messmer was 
exclusively an administrator but he did not want to continue with that for he was going to do more of 
politics than administration. Mbida quickly realised that his forces against those of Ramadier would be 
hopeless.
39 Njeuma, “Reunification and political opportunism”, p.3.
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that reunification was the ardent wish of all Cameroonians -le reve ardent de tons les
Camerounais. A few months later, he told the Legislative Assembly that immediate
steps should be taken to bring about reunification. He said:
reunification has remained the principal preoccupation of French 
Cameroonians and they have the immediate intention to open dialog 
with their neighbours on reunification. The reconstitution 
(reconstitution) of Cameroon which was arbitrarily divided by 
treaties in which Cameroonians did not participate is a problem that 
needed an urgent solution, even before the proclamation of 
independence.40
Ahidjo exchanged visits with Foncha several times between the months of July and 
December 1960, in preparation for the plebiscites.
The French Cameroon authorities also endorsed reunification 
because it was a strategy aimed at weakening the UPC revolutionists who were in 
active terrorist warfare against them. It was possible that Ahidjo in endorsing 
reunification aimed at depriving the UPC of their ideological ammunition, at 
rendering them empty, and making their political tactics irrelevant. Some of the 
problems contemplated by the Yaounde authorities on reunification with Southern 
Cameroons were that in case of reunification, it would need much financial and 
manpower investment to develop Southern Cameroons economically.
French Cameroon authorities also had mixed feelings on 
reunification with Southern Cameroons, because, when compared with Nigeria and 
the French Cameroon, the backwardness of development in Southern Cameroons was 
striking.41 This was as a result of the nature of British administration of the territory as
40 Communication de M. Ahmadou Ahidjo, Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvemement Camerounais, le 
18 octobre 1958 a I’Assemblee Legislative du Cameroun, Yaounde: Imprimerie du Gouvemement, 
1959, p. 21, NAY. Of importance is also his speech of investiture delivered at the same Assembly on 
February 18, 1958, in the same file, p.8, NAY.
41 French Consul Lagos to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, No. 60/AL. Togo-Cameroun, Tutelle 
Britannique, Juillet 1946-Decembre 1952, K21-5. Also see Telegram No. 124 of March 15, 1950, in 
the same file, AMAE. Chiabi, The making of modern Cameroon., pp. 133-220. The author analyses in 
three chapters (7,8 and 9) the backwardness and powerlessness of Southern Cameroons as a result of
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an adjunct to the Eastern Region of Nigeria. Between the wars for example, the 
development of Southern Cameroons remained substantially that left by the Germans. 
By 1945, the entire Cameroons Province was staffed by an average of 6.7 
administrative officers - about one British official for each 100.000 inhabitants.42 A 
fifteen days’ walk was necessary to visit some villages in Bamenda. In fact 
administrators never visited some remote villages. Communications with Nigeria, the 
administrative HQs were slow and tortuous. Letters written in Southern Cameroons 
reached Enugu, the chief administrative HQ after about three months. The first road 
(seasonal), linking the forest zone with the edge of the Grassfields (the towns of 
Kumba and Mamfe) was not completed until 1947. It was apparent that in the case of 
reunification, Southern Cameroons would be an economic burden to the Yaounde 
authorities, which would need much financial and manpower investment to uplift the 
former’s economy.43
They also contemplated the language and cultural barriers that 
prevailed between the two territories and on the trouble created by the terrorists in the 
Moungo and Bamileke areas which had resulted in most of them taking refuge in 
Southern Cameroons, Southern Cameroonians spoke English and had an English 
culture as against French Cameroonians who spoke French and had a French culture. 
There would be the trouble of harmonising the two cultures. There was also a
its administration as an integral part of Nigeria, in die domains of education, economy and 
urbanisation.
42 Welch, Dream o f  unity, pp. 156-7. From the start of British administration until 1949, Southern 
Cameroons had existed as a separate Nigerian province. As from 1949, it was temporarily divided into 
two provinces, the Bamenda and Cameroons Provinces. These were later abolished by the new 
constitution of 1954. Between 1949 and 1954, Bamenda Division was made a province and Kumba, 
Mamfe and Victoria were administreed togedier as Cameroons Province. They were all later 
transformed into Divisions.
43 Bulletin mensuel de rinformation politique par l ’Ambassade de France au Cameroun, Mai 1-31, 
1960, V,5, Serie AL 1953-1959, Sous Serie Cameroun, AMAE. Due to the deplorable situation of the 
territory by the mid 50s, it was a custom then for some highly trained Nigerian civil servants to resign 
their appointments when they were transferred to the Cameroons, Eyongetah and Brain, A history o f the 
Cameroon, pp. 133-4.
286
problem of harmonising the administrative systems of both territories. With a 
population o f400,000 Bamileke, the Yaounde authorities would have the difficulty of 
trying to strike a balance between the South and the North of the territory. If the 
400,000 Bamileke of French Cameroons united with their brothers of Southern 
Cameroons, they could number over 900,000 resulting in a severe ethnic imbalance of 
the population in the entire country.44 The Yaounde authorities also explored the 
differences in currency and the constitutional problems that could ensue from 
reunification. Despite these and other worries, Yaounde continued the forward move 
towards reunification. Reunification was not just an issue of Foncha and Ahidjo and 
their governments, it was of particular interest to the British government as well.
HOW BRITAIN ATTEMPTED TO DOWNPLAY THE REUNIFICATION DRIVE IN  
SOUTHERN CAMEROONS
When in the late 1940s, the reunification movement was gaining 
momentum in Cameroon, the British and the French colonial administrations 
increased their monitoring of the political developments. When the French Minister 
for Overseas announced to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that there were 
reunificationist movements going on in French Cameroon, an emergency meeting was 
held in the cabinet of Governor Delteil with the intention of curbing the movements.45 
On the British side of the boundary, the administration viewed the movements with 
the same alarming sensation. Although the British administration thought in 1949 that 
reunification was not an active issue in Southern Cameroons, they were also aware 
that at the time, the CNF had began talking about reunification. In fact the Federation 
presented petitions to the first UN Visiting Mission, which raised the frontier
44 Bulletin mensuel de rinformation politique par F Ambassade de France au Cameroun, Mai 1-31,
1960, V,5, S&ie AL 1953-1959, Sous Serie Cameroun, AMAE.
45 French Overseas Minister to Minister of Foreign Affairs, No. 1794 of March 6th, 1952, AMAE.
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problem. When the CNF was presenting the memorandum, which suggested 
reunification to the Mission, reunification was used as a convenient pretext on which 
to attack administrative shortcomings. Reunification to the CNF, was used as a threat, 
as a method of calling attention to the neglected condition of the territory and to win a 
measure of autonomy from Nigeria.46 According to Chiabi, the argument of the 
colonial administrators was that the grievances of Cameroonians rested upon the 
inconveniences of frontier control rather than upon any concrete proposals for 
unification.47 Because of this assertion in 1949, the Commissioner of Cameroon, E. J. 
Gibbons, concluded that the idea of reunification in Southern Cameroons was not an 
actively pressing issue. Over and over, the British colonial administration stressed the 
passivity of the reunification movement. Gibbons this time supported by French 
representatives from French Cameroon - Laurentie and Watier - again expressed his 
view in 1950.48
Gibbons in 1951 warned that the ideology of the reunification
movement in Southern Cameroons was going to be a source of embarrassment to the
colonial administration and, therefore had to be contained. Gibbons suggested a
course of action for the British government to curb the movement’s increasing
momentum, he proposed that:
I would observe at the outset that this movement is, in my
opinion, now likely to attract international attention and it
seems necessary to adopt deliberate measures, with the concurrence of
46 Welch, Dream o f unity,p. 159.
47 Chiabi, The making of modern Cameroon,p. 111. To make their case, proponents of reunification 
quickly capitalised upon the boundary, which prevented people of the same ethnic group from easy 
communication. On this issue, Ardener says there was no great division of peoples along the Anglo- 
French boundary (Edwin Ardener. “The nature of the reunification of Cameroon". In Arthur 
Hazelwood, ed. African integration and disintegration.London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p.293. 
B. Chem-Langhee and M. Njeuma take the opposite stand, “The Pan-Kamerun movement", in N. 
Kofele-Kale, An African experiment, pp25-64. The boundaiy effectively divided ethnic groups who 
expressed the desire to be reunited. It was convenient for the colonial administration to think that the 
boundary neither divided ethnic groups nor caused any serious local handicap.
48 Chiabi, The making of modem Cameroon,p. 111.
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the Majesty’s Government to limit so far as possible the inconvenience 
and disturbance that may be expected to result.49
Gibbons matched his words with action and with his superior, the Acting Governor in 
Lagos, they proposed and adopted a course of action to check the reunification 
movement in Southern Cameroons.
The three immediate measures that were adopted were: frontier
control, a review of the situation of French Cameroonians in Southern Cameroons and 
attempts to improve upon the economic development in the territory. The British 
administration relaxed frontier controls and limited it to the imposition of customs 
dues on goods of European origin and currency when moved in commercial quantities 
only. This relaxation of frontier controls was based on the understanding that 
Cameroonians capitalised on the frontier issue more because of the inconveniences 
that they engendered than on any real need to create reunification between the two 
Cameroons. For this reason the administration was ready to give in to the demands of 
nationalists and border groups. That was why Gibbons further proposed the extension 
of the relaxation of control to the passage of basic commodities like African 
foodstuffs.
On the situation of French Cameroonians in British Cameroon, 
the British colonial administration from the start did not issue any comprehensive 
policy defining their status and role. The issue however became of great importance 
as the settlers began to claim citizenship, voting and other benefits from the 
government. More precisely their complaints centred on three areas: disqualification 
from voting in elections, discrimination in the award of scholarships and
49 E. J. Gibbons to Secretary to the Government, Nigerian Secretariat No. S. 149/5 of October 8th, 1951, 
Vb/bl951/l, NAB,
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discrimination in employment.50 In the bid of undercutting the reunification 
movement, Gibbons attempted to appease the French Cameroonians’ demands. He 
proposed that both governments should reconsider the conditions of service of French 
Cameroonians. To relieve the discontent on scholarship issues he suggested to the 
authorities of the CDC that awards notices be altered to include French 
Cameroonians, especially those bom in the territory.51 The Commissioner also 
proposed that French as well as English be taught in secondary schools where its 
introduction was more feasible than in primary schools. In their efforts to pacify the 
“settlers” from French Cameroon, the British administration was ready to give out 
scholarships to them. What the administration did not want was to grant to them their 
request of inclusion in Southern Cameroons politics. One of the reasons for this 
refusal could have been that if the French Cameroonians in Southern Cameroons were 
allowed to partake in local politics, political and governmental decisions in the British 
sphere could have been conditioned by events in French Cameroon. That would have 
made it difficult for the British administration to control. On the other hand it 
appeared simpler and cheaper to let them return to French Cameroon if they wanted to 
but then the administration would have been losing manpower and tax payers as well.
The third measure adopted to forestall the reunification 
movement in Southern Cameroon was an examination of the economic conditions of 
the territory. From 1916 to 1951, British Cameroons had suffered serious economic 
neglect. As a measure to forestall movement towards the union of both Cameroons, 
Gibbons proposed to develop trade and communications networks along the British
50 The problem of integrating French Cameroonians into the institutions of Southern Cameroons was 
one of the major causes (besides the frontier problem) of the formation of the French Cameroons 
Welfare Union (FCWU) by Dibonge.
51 It is recalled here that the Cameroons Development Corporation (CDC) is a giant agro-industrial 
organisation that emerged from the sale of ex-enemy property, precisely the old German owned 
plantations in 1947.
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frontier areas. In order to intensify and encourage production in British frontier zones, 
he awarded a grant to build a seasonal road to transport cocoa from the border town of 
Nyasoso to the coastal ports of Victoria and Tiko. He further proposed that cocoa 
processing plants be established in the Bakossi border area, a major cocoa producing 
zone. The area was also one which abounded in forest reserves, thus Gibbons 
employed Costain Ltd., to construct a road from Tombel to the Moungo River from 
where logs were to be floated down to the coast for shipment. More importantly, the 
British government hastened the provision of communication between Southern 
Cameroons and Eastern Nigeria by hoping to link Kumba-Mamfe-Ikom-Calabar by 
road.52 Road projects and other policies adopted in the 1950s by the colonial 
administration in Southern Cameroons hoped to appease Cameroonians and to 
discourage them from the reunification movement.
When in 1952 D. A. Schute was made the colonial administrator 
in charge of British Cameroons, one of his objectives was to curtail the influence of 
the KUNC, a nationalist party that demanded immediate reunification. The KUNC 
alarmed colonial officials especially as one of its activists was Dibonge who had 
earlier been refused political participation in the politics of the territory by Gibbons 
on the grounds that he was a “stranger” or a settler.53 Schute considered that the party 
aimed at disrupting the terms of the Trusteeship Arrangements and to work in 
opposition to the colonial administration. As a result, he suggested that the KUNC be 
denied the official recognition for which they applied. The colonial administrator tried 
to persuade members of the KUNC to seek a friendly relationship with the 
administration.
52 Chiabi. “The making o f  modern Cameroon ",p. 117.
53 Ibid., p. 121.
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British attempts to downplay the reunification movements in 
Southern Cameroons have been noted by Njeuma, who says once the results of the 
1959 elections were made known, the British authorities decided to act fast to kill 
reunification and refused to sanction the results.54 Foncha, they claimed, had won the 
elections on parochial and vague promises to the electorate. Since the British 
authorities realised that they could not hold another general election immediately, 
they welcomed the UN decision to organise plebiscites in British Cameroons. The 
plebiscite options were limited to independence either by joining French Cameroon or 
by maintaining their connection with Nigeria. Throughout 1959 British officials 
increased pressure on Foncha to abandon reunification. They organised several 
meetings in Southern Cameroons, Nigeria, Britain and the UN for that purpose. The 
Nigerian government was urged to arrange frequent meetings between representatives 
of British Northern and Southern Cameroons. This hopefully would have made the 
people of British Cameroons (British Northern and Southern Cameroons) to develop a 
sense of unity and common feeling as British subjects as opposed to French 
Cameroonians.55 Due to close association with personalities advocating for integration 
with Nigeria like Endeley and Mbile, British officials minimised Foncha and failed to 
take cognisance of the increasing popularity of the KNDP after the 1959 elections and 
Endeley’s waning fortunes among the leading politicians. When the KNDP won and 
Foncha became the Premier, he felt confident to negotiate reunification and he did so 
without soliciting British advice.
54 Njeuma, “Reunification and political opportunism",p.3
55Ngoh, History o f Cameroon,p.219.
292
BRITISH INSPIRED CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL CRISIS IN  NIGERIA 
ADDED MORE STEAM TO THE REUNIFICATION DRIVE IN  SOUTHERN 
CAMEROONS
The British decision to administer Southern Cameroons as an 
integral part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria worked to the economic, educational, 
political and social disadvantage of the territory. There was the near absence of 
political advancement in the form of political institutions. The Nigerian-educated 
members of the elite of Southern Cameroons like Endeley, Kale, Mbile, Foncha and 
S. A. George strongly criticised the situation after 1945.56 Prior to 1943, Southern 
Cameroonians were politically powerless regarding the participation in their country’s 
affairs. In 1944, Southern Cameroons politics became bound up with those of Nigeria 
through the formation of the NCNC. Political developments that took place in Nigeria 
indirectly helped in fostering the spirit of national consciousness among Southern 
Cameroonians resulting in the quest for and the achievement of the reunification of 
the territory.
On January 1, 1947, Sir Arthur Richards, Governor of Nigeria, 
put into effect his new constitution called the Richards Constitution.57 This new 
constitution aimed at furthering unity in Nigeria by including the North in the central 
Legislature and at the same time created Regional Councils for the North, East and 
West. These regions had Houses of Assembly, which performed advisory roles and
56 The War Experience and their exposure to Nigerian activists and politicians like Azikiwe and 
Awolowo kindled nationalism and political consciousness in Southern Cameroonians in Nigeria. They 
were in Nigeria either as students, businessmen, petty traders, journalists or employees in many firms.
57 We shall not give a detailed analysis of the constitution as it concerned Nigeria but shall examine 
how it affected the Southern Cameroons. Sir Arthur Richards had submitted the constitutional 
proposals to the Nigerian Legislative Council since March 1945, For a detailed analysis of 
constitutional developments in Southern Cameroons, Ngoh, Constitutional developments in Southern 
Cameroons, 1946-1961. Yaounde: CEPER, 1990.
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were intended to serve as a link between the Native Authorities and the Legislative 
Council in Lagos.58 Before the Richards Constitution, Chief Manga Williams of 
Victoria represented Southern Cameroons in the Legislative Council but with the new 
constitution, he lost his seat. Although the Richards Constitution allowed for two 
representatives from Southern Cameroons, Chief Manga Williams and Vincent 
Samdala, who adopted the title of Fon Galega II of Bali, in the Eastern Regional 
House of Assembly, this could not compensate for the loss of their seats in the 
Legislative Council at Lagos. The Legislative Council at Lagos had more political 
weighting than the Regional Houses,
The constitution made the Chief Commissioner of Eastern 
Nigeria the president of the Eastern House of Assembly in which Southern 
Cameroons had two representatives as against thirty from Eastern Nigeria.59 Despite 
the poor representation of Southern Cameroons in the Nigerian Legislature, it would 
appear that the British did not consider disassociating the territoiy from Nigeria. On 
the contrary, until their final days in British Cameroons, the British preferred and 
argued for the maintenance of Southern Cameroons as part of Nigeria. It was 
therefore left to Cameroonians to protest both the indirect administration and the 
legislative misrepresentation. They were assisted in their protest by the NCNC. The 
NCNC which was the most vocal political party against the Richard’s Constitution 
decided to take its criticism of the constitution to the people through tours in Nigeria, 
the Cameroons and London. It was for this reason that the NCNC delegation led by 
Nnamdi Azikiwe, visited Southern Cameroons in its campaign against the
58 In 1942, the Legislative Council, Lagos, was the first Nigerian institution which provided for 
Southern Cameroonian participation in Nigerian political activities, through two representatives, Chief 
Manga Williams and Fon Galega II of Bali. This was followed by the Richards Constitution in 1947.
59 Besides the president, there were thirteen other official members and fifteen to eighteen unofficial 
members from the provinces.
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constitution, after a nation-wide tour in Nigeria in 1946.60 Kale was the head of the 
Cameroonian members of the NCNC delegation, and he was determined to point out 
the problems facing Southern Cameroons especially that of no representation in the 
Nigerian Legislative Council.
After the tours, the NCNC delegation received £13,000 to 
finance its trip to London to present its case against the constitution to the Secretary 
of State for the colonies, the Right Honourable Arthur Creech Jones. In June 1947, a 
seven-man NCNC delegation left for London to discuss the revision of the 
constitution. The delegation was received by Creech Jones in London in August, 
1947. All grievances and proposals were tabled to Creech Jones in the form of 
memoranda. Paul Kale presented Southern Cameroons grievances in what was called 
the Kale Memorandum.61 Among other points, the memorandum stressed the fact that 
the division of Kamerun between France and Britain had divided families and made 
them strangers to one another.
Unfortunately, Arthur Creech Jones’s reaction to the 
delegation’s demands was merely to urge them to return home and give the Richards 
Constitution a trial. On their return, a conference was held in Ibadan, from January 9 
to 28, 1950, to review the constitution.62 Southern Cameroons sent a two-man 
delegation to Ibadan. The delegation pressed for a separate region for its territory, as 
Endeley, one of the tworepresentatives, stressed that the territory was disadvantaged 
by being administered as part of Nigeria. The conference rejected the request for a 
separate region. It was however agreed that the territory should be represented by
60 Ngoh, Constitutional developments, p.68.
61 Eyongetah and Brain, A history o f the Cameroon, pp. 126-7
62 Report by Her Majesty’s Government to the General assembly of the UN on the administration of the 
Cameroons under UK Trusteeship for the year 1950. London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1950, 
p.38. SOAS Library.
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thirteen elected members in the Nigerian Legislature - the House of Representatives in 
Lagos and the Eastern House of Assembly in Enugu. Meanwhile, as dissatisfaction 
over the Richards Constitution prevailed, the British Government sent someone to 
succeed Sir Arthur as the Governor of Nigeria.
Sir John Macpherson, Governor of Nigeria replaced the Richards 
Constitution by the Macpherson Constitution of 1951 which took effect as from 
January 1952. Under the new constitution, Southern Cameroons was divided into six 
political districts (Kumba, Mamfe, Victoria, Bamenda, Nkambe and Wum) and each 
district was allowed two seats except Bamenda which was accorded three seats 
because it was largest. In the Eastern House of Assembly Southern Cameroons was to 
have thirteen members in a House of approximately eighty members and one senior 
regional official. Six of the thirteen elected members were to be appointed to sit in 
the House of Representatives in Lagos. Elections, which were held to select the 
thirteen members, revealed the following results:
POLITICAL DISTRICTS NAMES OF ELECTED MEMBERS
Bamenda J.N. Foncha, S.T. Muna and V.T. Lainjo
Nkambe J.T. Ndze and A.J. Ngala
Wum J C. Kangsen and S.C. Ndi
Mamfe S. A. George and M.N. Foiju
Kumba N.N. Mbile and R.N. Charley
Victoria E.M.L. Endeley and P. N. Motombi-Woleta 63
Southern Cameroons was represented at Lagos by: Endeley, Muna, Ndze, Kangsen,
George, and Mbile. Endeley was subsequently appointed Minister of Labour in the
Council of Ministers in Lagos while Muna was appointed Minister of Works in the
Eastern Regional Executive in Enugu,64 The Macpherson Constitution not only
increased the representation of Cameroonians in the Nigerian legislature at the
63 P.M. Kale, Political evolution in the Cameroons. Buea: Government Printers, 1976, p.7. Report on 
the Cameroons under UK Trusteeship for the year 1954, p. 13, SOAS Library.
64 Ngoh, Cameroon 1884-1985, p. 190; and Chiabi, The making of modern Cameroon, p.49
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Regional and Federal levels, but it also introduced representation by educated people 
of the territory. Thirteen educated men were introduced as the two NA rulers, Manga 
Williams and Galega II were dropped. Chiabi says Endeley declared at the time that, 
they were ready to work hand in hand with Nigerians though they were aware that the 
fusion of Cameroon and Nigeria was a mere marriage of convenience.65 He added that 
the new representatives had at least recognised the subaltern position of Cameroon 
vis-a-vis Nigeria. The feeling of being in the weaker position in their dealings with 
Nigeria made Southern Cameroonians to think that union with French Cameroon was 
a better political option for the development of their territory.
The Macpherson Constitution collapsed in 1953, when the 
Eastern Regional House of Assembly was thrown into crisis. The Eastern House was 
controlled by the NCNC. The Vice-President of the party, Eyo-Ita, was the leader of 
the government of the Eastern Region. According to Ngoh, the crisis resulted from the 
reluctance of Eyo-Ita to carry out radical constitutional changes and to reshuffle the 
cabinet of the Eastern Region at the request of Nnamdi Azikiwe, the National 
President of the NCNC.66 The rift in party and the government leadership led to the 
collapse and resignation of the government, legislative paralysis and eventually the 
dissolution of the Eastern House on May 6th, 1953.67
All the Eastern Regional Council ministers were dismissed.68 
Southern Cameroonian representatives had demanded that Muna be re-instated in the 
Executive Council but their demand was rejected. The dismissal of Muna, the only
65 Chiabi, The making o f  modern Cameroon, p. 50.
66 Ngoli, History o f Cameroon, p. 197.
67 Report on the Cameroons under UEC Trusteeship for the year 1955, SOAS Library. Ngoh, 
Constitutional developments, p. 97.
68 Welch, Dream o f unity, pp. 184-8. Ngoh, Constitutional developments, p. 97.This dismissal took the 
form of resignation in protest against the January 28, 1953 ministerial shuffling. The shuffle caused a 
split in parliament and a prolonged administrative crisis in the Eastern Region. This stalemate led to the 
resignation of the ministers in accordance with the directives of the NCNC Committee.
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Southern Cameroonian in the Eastern Executive Council, caused a great deal of
frustration among Southern Cameroonians of the House. This split was a turning
point in the political history of Southern Cameroons for it brought the question of the
status of Cameroon to the forefront of politics. Southern Cameroonians had to review
their status within a politically divided Nigerian institution, Endeley, the leader of the
Southern Cameroons bloc in the Eastern House, came to the conclusion that
separation was the only response to such political embarrassment. Nine out of the
thirteen delegates from Southern Cameroons decided to steer clear of Nigerian
politics and opt for a policy of benevolent neutrality. This meant that Southern
Cameroons representatives notably Endeley, Ndze, Kangsen, Muna, Lainjo, Foncha,
Forju, Ngala and George formed a bloc which opted out of Nigerian politic, by
boycotting the session of the Eastern House of Assembly. Foncha explained that
Southern Cameroons had adopted a neutral stance:
not because support of the NCNC had not been beneficial but 
because.. .the Southern Cameroons should begin to manage its own 
affairs without undue outside (Nigerian) influence.
It (the neutrality) gives Cameroonians a wider field to exploit the 
opinions of the Northern Peoples5 Congress and the 
Action Group as well as the NCNC for the benefit of the 
Cameroons national move for separation with all its parts appended 
to Nigeria.69
Foncha was right in his judgement of the situation and he was supported by Azikiwe 
and Awolowo. Delegates who opposed neutrality were, Mbile, Ndi, Motomby-Woleta 
and Charley. They wanted to maintain Southern Cameroons5 connection with Nigeria, 
and permanent ties with the NCNC. This polarisation of Southern Cameroons 
politicians into two blocs on the basis of involvement or neutrality made it clearer and
69 Ndifontah mo Nyamndi, “Cameroon-Nigeria relations (1958-1978)”. Postgraduate thesis, School of 
International Relations, Cameroon (IRIC), 1979, p.30. Like the NCNC, the NPC, and the AG were 
political parties in Nigeria.
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clearer that at some point in the future Cameroonians would have to choose between 
integration with Nigeria and reunification with French Cameroon, Meanwhile when 
the members of the benevolent neutrality bloc returned home, they initiated a 
conference in Mamfe, Southern Cameroons.70 At the conference, it was agreed that a 
petition be sent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Lyttelton demanding 
that Southern Cameroons be accorded a separate and autonomous legislature. 
Lyttelton called for a conference in London to revise the Macpherson Constitution 
and replace it with his own, the Lyttelton Constitution. The representatives of 
Southern Cameroons were Endeley, George, Kangsen and Mbile. It turned out that at 
the Lancaster House Conference, London, Cameroonians were not unanimous in their 
call for a separate region. While Endeley, Kangson and George pressed for Southern 
Cameroons to become a separate region with a legislature and executive, and with 
suitable representation in the Central Nigerian legislature and Council of Ministers, 
Mbile, who attended the conference as a member of the NCNC, argued that, before 
regional status was created for Southern Cameroons, it was necessary to set up a 
commission of inquiry which would see whether the majority favoured separate 
status. Mbile also requested that the commission should inquire into the financial 
viability of the region if it were to obtain separate status. This situation presented the 
Secretary of State with two options; the first option proposed by Endeley, the official 
representative of the people of Southern Cameroons, chosen at the Mamfe 
Conference; and the other option by Mbile, representative of a party that at the time 
had lost its popularity in Southern Cameroons due to the Eastern Regional crisis.71
70 This conference will be discussed below.
71 Chiabi, The making o f modem Cameroon, pp53-54.
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The British colonial administration attempted to hinder all 
efforts made by Cameroonians to sever links with Nigeria. Lyttelton decided to adopt 
a compromise solution. He set up a commission of inquiry under the supervision of 
the Governor of Nigeria, who worked in consultation with Southern Cameroons’ 
delegates.72 The commission was also to produce a plan of governmental and public 
service structure which would be suitable for Cameroon if a separate region were 
established. To appease Endeley, Lyttelton agreed to create a separate region for 
Southern Cameroons should the electorate in the territory approve of it in a general 
election that was planned for 1953. In other words, if Endeley won the 1953 elections, 
the victory would represent a mandate for Southern Cameroons separate status.
When the election results were announced, Endeley’s KNC won 
an outstanding victory and on October 1, 1954, Southern Cameroons was granted a 
quasi-regional status and its own House of Assembly. By this new status, Southern 
Cameroons became what was called a “quasi-Federal” territory and enjoyed many of 
the prerogatives of regional status. Some of these prerogatives were:
- The Governor-General was part of the legislature in as much as Bills were sent 
to him for assent,
- The Governor-General could give directions to the Southern Cameroons 
government as to the discharge of its executive authority,
- The Public Service in Southern Cameroons was part of the Federal Public 
Service,
- The leader of the government was not called Premier but rather Leader of 
Government Business,
- Her Majesty’s representative was not called a Lieutenant-Governor but a 
Commissioner and while Lieutenant-Governors could approve laws passed by
72 Chiabi, The making o f modem Cameroon, pp53-54. Welch, Dream o f unity, pp. 186-7. The report on 
the economic viability of Southern Cameroons was executed by a fiscal commissioner, Sir Louis 
Chick, who concluded that Southern Cameroons could support the additional expenses if  accorded 
separate status, Welch, Dream o f unity, p. 187.
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their parliaments, the laws of the quasi-federal Territoiy had to be approved by the 
Governor-General, and finally,
- The unofficial members of the legislature were called “Executive Council 
Members” instead of Ministers 73 
Endeley was appointed Leader of Government Business. The Executive Council
created comprised the Commissioner of the Cameroons as President; three ex-officio
members of the House of Assembly who were the deputy Commissioners of the
Cameroons; the legal Secretary and the Financial and Development Secretary. Finally,
there were four unofficial members who were selected from the twenty-one unofficial
members of the House of Assembly.
The Assembly provided forums for more Cameroonians to
participate in the political affairs of their territory. The Southern Cameroons House of
Assembly which met for the first time on October 26, 1954, was empowered to make
laws for the territory, raise revenue and deliberate annual budgets.74 The British
Commissioner for the Cameroons, Brigadier E. J, Gibbons, was made the President of
the House of Assembly. The President was succeeded two years later by J. O. Field.
The Ex-Officio members were J. Brayne-Baker, Deputy Commissioner of the
Cameroons (J. S. Dudding succeeded Brayne-Baker in 1956); C. A. Burton, Legal
Secretary; J. Murray, Financial and Development Secretary75 The Unofficial
members were E. M. L. Endeley, J. C Kangsen, S. T. Muna and F. A. Sone.76 The
House also had six Native Authority members (Chiefs. AsungnaFoto, Chief Mformi,
73 Neville Rubin, Cameroon. An African Federation. London: Pall Mall Press, 1971, p.72. Chem- 
Langhee, “The Kamerun Plebiscites 1959-1961: perceptions and strategies". Ph D dissertation, 
University of British Columbia, 1976, p.60. Ngoh, Constitutional developments, p. 123. Eyongetah and 
Brain, A history o f  the Cameroon, p. 137.
14 This date was later commemorated as the Southern Cameroons National Day. Eyongetah and Brain, 
p. 136. Chiabi. The making o f modern Cameroon,p.55.
Report on the Cameroons under UK Trusteeship for the year 1955, p.28, SOAS Library.
76 Mr. Sone was appointed temporary unofficial member of the Council on August 11th, 1955 due to
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Chief Manga Williams, Mr. A. N. Jua, Mr. M. T. Monju and Mr. H. N. Mulango) and 
two special members (Mr. W. E. W. Carter - Manager of Barclays Bank and Mrs. 
D. E. Idowu). The preponderance of colonial administrators at the helm of the House 
of Assembly reduced the function of Cameroonians to what Chiabi calls “Rubber 
Stamping” 77 It is reported that even though he almost always did so, the President 
was not bound to take the advice of the Executive Council.78 Although this new 
situation looked like a great improvement, it however meant that legislation in 
Southern Cameroons still required the consent of the Governor-General of Nigeria. 
There was no Public Service Commission in the territory, and Cameroonians who 
wanted to enter the civil service in Southern Cameroon had to be recruited by the 
Public Service in Lagos 79 The impact of this administrative dependency on Nigeria 
added more fuel to the reunification drive and the desire to secede grew stronger and 
stronger.
The establishment of a semi-autonomous House of Assembly in 
Southern Cameroons in 1954 with no representation by the “settlers” from French 
Cameroon, reveals the efforts made by the British administration to keep 
Cameroonians of the two Trust territories apart. The exclusion of Dibonge, for 
example, from representation in the newly created House made him to relax his 
radical stance on the reunification issue and further engaged in the dissolution of the 
most zealous pro-reunificationist party, the KUNC in favour of the less zealous KNC. 
The extent of success or failure by the British authorities to downplay the 
reunification drive in Cameroon cannot easily be measured, but Cameroonians
incapacity through illness of S. A. George, but by September 1st, 1956, Sone was made a full 
member.
77 Chiabi, The making o f modern Cameroon, p.55. Ngoh, Constitutional developments, p. 124-5.
78 Report on the Cameroons under UK Trusteeship for the year 1955, p. 28.
79 Report on the Cameroons under UK Trusteeship for the year 1953, p.25.
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themselves made the work of the colonial government easier for they could not come 
to an agreement on the issue of reunification and the independence of their territory. 
As a result, the UN decided to organise plebiscites to resolve the political status of 
British Cameroons.
THE UNITED NATIONS PLEBISCITES
Before discussing the plebiscites in British Cameroons, it is 
important to provide an analysis of the All-party conference that was held in Mamfe 
from August 10 to 11, 1959, to prepare for the plebiscites.80 The major parties present 
were the KNDP, KNC, KPP and the OK and the major preoccupations of the 
conference were the plebiscite options and the qualification for voting. Foncha and 
the KNDP who had been preaching reunification decided to change their position at 
the Mamfe conference. This was probably because of the fear that if reunification 
were put to the people, the UPC activities in French Cameroon would scare people 
from voting for integration. Foncha wanted the alternatives to be that Southern 
Cameroons should remain as an integral part of Nigeria or separate from it and work 
out its own independence after a further period of trusteeship. In the other camp, 
Endeley and his KNC/KPP alliance understood Foncha5 s fears. He thus argued that 
the plebiscite alternatives should be either continued association with Nigeria or 
reunification with French Cameroon.
Before the Mamfe conference was held, there had been two new 
parties formed in Southern Cameroons namely, the Kamerun United Party (KUP)
80 Plebiscites were held in British Northern Cameroons, which was governed as part of Northern 
Nigeria, and it resulted in the choice of integration with Nigeria. The results were not surprising neither 
to the organisers nor to the colonial administration for British Northern Cameroonians had always 
expressed the wish to remain in Nigeria. For more on British Northern Cameroons, see, B. 
Chemlanhgee,“The Kamerun plebiscites 1959-1961: perceptions and strategies44. Also see, by same 
author “The British and the Northern Kamerun problem 1919-1961“, Abbia, 38-39-40 (May 1982): 
322-324. Welch, Dream o f  unity, p,220.
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formed by Kale; and the Cameroon Commoners’ Congress (CCC) formed by Chief 
Stephen E. Nyenty of Mamfe. Although the CCC did not command strong support, 
its members stood for independence of Southern Cameroons as a separate entity, at 
least for an interim period before deciding on which other option to choose. This 
seemed to be the new trend of thought amongst the chiefs, for by September/October 
1959 traditional rulers were getting frustrated with the integration idea and began 
calling for reunification. The chief of Bafut, Fon Achirimbi II, remarked that he 
supported secession without reunification. Some secession protagonists by the close 
of 1959, inwardly hoped that Southern Cameroons would secede from Nigeria to 
acquire the right to be independent as a separate entity.
Meanwhile, Kale had abandoned integration and the KNC/KPP 
and through the KUP formed in 1959, he advocated for secession and independence 
for Southern Cameroons. According to the KUP, the plebiscite looked like an 
imposition and gave the “impression of lack of faith and trust in the people of the 
Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons”:
.. .must Cameroonians be compelled or forced after 30 years of German 
rule and 45 years of British tutelage to accept or should they be free 
to choose the form of government under which they would like to live?
The plebiscite is compelling or forcing emancipated Cameroonians 
politically or otherwise to accept... living under the Government of 
Cameroon Republic or the Federation of Nigeria. For that reason 
we denounce the plebiscite in all its entirety.81
In a letter dated September 20, 1960, Kale warned the UN Secretary General, Dag
Hammarskjold that the KUP would boycott the elections or mutilate ballot papers if a
third alternative, secession, was not included in the plebiscite options. Another
newly-formed party that held this opinion at the Mamfe conference was the
81Ngoh, Cameroon 1884-1985, p.218. It was becoming clearer and clearer that Cameroonians were 
pressing for a third option, that of secession.
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Cameroons Indigenes Party (CIP) formed by Jesco Manga Williams. Chem-Langhee 
writes that the CIP pressed for secession.82 The threats and pressures of the 
secessionists, however, struck no responsive cord at the UN. There were other groups 
represented in the conference like the National Union of Kamerun Students (N.U.K.S) 
and the Kamerun Society (K.S). These were groups of educated young Cameroonians 
mainly based in Nigeria, who maintained that reunification was not necessarily an 
alternative. Since the terms of reunification were not yet spelt out, they wanted to 
remain in association with Nigeria.83 Besides the above political parties, all the Native 
Authorities of the Territory were represented at the conference. Because of the 
deadlock concerning what questions to be presented at the plebiscite, the chairman of 
the Mamfe conference, Sir Sydney Phillipson, the Acting Commissioner of the 
Southern Cameroons, said that the UN would take up the issue again at a session to be 
attended by the major political parties. Concerning the qualification for voting, only 
persons bom in Southern Cameroons were to be allowed to vote in the plebiscite. All 
ideas of Southern Cameroons becoming an independent state were squashed by Sir 
Sydney Phillipson’s report to the government at the end of 1959. In his report, Sir 
Sydney Phillipson said that the Trust Territory at the time did not have enough 
financial strength to survive as a completely independent state and recommended a 
further period of trusteeship.84 The Southern Cameroons Government in reply to Sir 
Sydney Phillipson’s report said he based his assumption on the fact that the territory
82 Chemlanghee, “The road to the unitary state”, p. 10.
83Ibid. Rubin, An African Federation, pp. 104-5.
84 The Sydney Phillipson’s Report on die financial, economic and administrative consequences of 
separation from Nigeria has been analysed by Johnson, The Cameroon Federation, p. 106; Rubin, 
Cameroon. An African Federation, p.80-2; Eyongetah and Brain, A history o f Cameroon, p. 154, Ngoh, 
Constitutional developments, pp. 167-8. Other economic reports followed like the Kenneth E. Berril 
Report submitted on August 25th, 1960, and the KJELL Anderson Report of February 1961. For details 
on these reports, see Ngoh, Constitutional developments, pp. 167-9.
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would remain separate for a longer time than contemplated. Foncha and the KNDP 
who wanted to use the report to advance the call for secession felt disappointed, as a 
result, its circulation was severely restricted.85 The ostensible reason for its 
suppression was because Foncha felt that admitting the extent of the territory’s 
dependence would undermine the expectations he had built up in his followers of a 
considerable autonomous state in a Cameroon Federation, or that 
it might scare off the leadership of French Cameroon.86
In the face of the political differences that prevailed among 
leading Southern Cameroonian politicians during the Mamfe plebiscite conference, 
the major political leaders returned to the UN to defend their political positions. The 
UN ignored the resolution of the Mamfe conference, which had been for integration 
and secession and imposed on Cameroonian politicians the choice of either 
integration or reunification as a way of obtaining independence. Britain supported this 
stance for it allowed for the possibility of Southern Cameroons joining the Federation 
of Nigeria. However, the UN had decided that there should be a plebiscite in Southern 
Cameroons.
The plebiscite question was contained in the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 1352 XIV, of October, 1959, which read:
1) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation 
of Nigeria? OR
2) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of 
Cameroon?
85 Johnson, The Cameroon Federation, p. 107.
86 Despite the extensive efforts of Foncha and the KNDP at self-reassurance, it took little research to 
reveal the financial difficulties the territory had experienced throughout the post-war period. The 
leadership of French Cameroon was not blind to the situation.
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The plebiscite date was fixed for February 11, 1961 and Hubert Childs was appointed 
the Plebiscite Administrator in Southern Cameroons.87 Awasom says that once the 
UN made the alternatives known, there was great discontent in Southern Cameroons 
for there was growing opposition to reunification and integration in favour of 
secession and independence.88 It is recalled here that just before the plebiscite, 
Southern Cameroons politicians showed that they wanted secession and independence 
for the trust territory and no longer reunification and integration.
Foncha was realising also that some of his party members with 
important positions were also being unfaithful in their commitment to the 
reunification struggle. As campaign strategy, both the party in government and the 
opposition offered bribes in cash and promises for political favours. This became 
more important when on March 11, 1960, a KNDP member of parliament from Wum 
West, J. M. Boja crossed the carpet to the KNC/KPP alliance. He did so because of 
pressure from his constituency who rejected the new KNDP platform.89 With Boja’s 
defection, the House of Assembly was evenly split: KNDP 13 seats and KNC/KPP 13 
seats. Then the “Frambo Affair” turned up which showed the shaky and menacing 
climate that reigned among the KNDP partisans, causing Foncha to drift away from 
the reunification platform.90
87 Report on the Cameroons under UK Trusteeship for the year 1959, pp. xii and 99, SOAS Library.
88 Awasom, “The reunification question", p. 10. Foncha and the KNDP were making the reunification 
option to appear less important than integration just because they feared that if it came up as a strong 
option, it might loose due to the violence going on there. For more on the polarization see Rubin, 
Cameroon. An African Federation, pp. 104-6. Eyongetah and Brain, A history o f the Cameroon,
pp. 153-8.
Ngoh, “Dr Foncha’s political career 1953-1999: A historical analysis”. Talk given at the University 
ofBuea, Cameroon, on April 10th, 1999.
90 Frambo was a KNDP parliamentarian in Mamfe whose constituency opposed the new option of 
Foncha and asked Frambo to resign and join the KNC/KPP alliance. Frambo sent out feelers suggesting 
that he would do so if he was given money to repay a loan he had taken to buy his Land Rover. He was 
given the money £2000 and he signed his resignation letter from the KNDP, but later on changed his 
mind. He reported to the police that he was forced to sign the letter. However, in court, he was asked to 
pay back the money.
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Southern Cameroonian politicians in trying to reach an 
agreement ended up in only shifting their positions without greatly clarifying the 
issue. As a result, a London Conference was organised by the UN in November 1960. 
Fields attended the conference which was chaired by the British Secretary of State for 
Colonies, Ian Macleod, in the presence of Southern Cameroons politicians like 
Endeley, Foncha, Motomby-Woleta, Kangsen, S. E. Ncha, Fon Galega II of Bali and 
Chief Oben of Mamfe.91 The only noteworthy outcome of the conference was the 
confusion it created in the minds of Southern Cameroonians but that notwithstanding, 
the UN maintained the proposed date for the plebiscite to hold and the plebiscite 
options. The conduct of the plebiscite, according to the Plebiscite Administrator, was 
efficient and done in accordance with the legislation passed for the purpose.92 During 
registration, polling and counting periods, a large number of officials, mostly 
Southern Cameroonians had been recruited and given special training by the 
Plebiscite Supervisory Staff. The British Commissioner of Southern Cameroons also 
hailed the orderly conduct of the operation. Turnout was estimated at 90% and there 
was polling in all twenty-six plebiscite districts in the territory. The results of the 
plebiscite in British Southern Cameroons were as follows:
RESULTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS PLEBISCITE IN BRITISH CAMEROONS, 
FEBRUARY 1961
AREA FOR CAMEROON FOR NIGERIA TOTAL MARGINS
REPUBLIC VOTES
SOUTHERN
CAMEROONS 233,571 97,741 331,312 135,830
NORTHERN
CAMEROONS 97,659 146,296 243,955 48,63793
91 Ngoh, Constitutional developments, p. 195.
92 Ndifontali, “Cameroon-Nigeria relations", p.67.
93 Report of the United Nations Commissioner for the supervision of the plebiscites in the Southern and 
Northern parts of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration, April 3, 
1961, p. 140, ICOMM. V. T. LeVine, The Cameroon Federal Republic. Ithaca, New York; Cornell 
University Press, 1972, p. 16. Welch, Dream o f  unity, pp. 234-235. The section of Northern Cameroons 
that voted for union with Nigeria has until today remained a province of Northern Nigeria.
308
Following the detail results, nineteen of the plebiscite districts
voted for reunification with French Cameroon and only seven for integration with
Nigeria. Out of the six administrative divisions, two (Nkambe and Kumba) voted for
Nigeria, and the remaining four (Victoria Mamfe, Bamenda and Wum) voted for
French Cameroon. In the forest areas, notably in Mamfe which is closest to Nigeria,
there were more votes for reunification with French Cameroon than for integration.
Additionally in Victoria, which is the closest coastal town to Nigeria, the same results
were registered. The outstanding victory for reunification and failure of those for
integration in these places could be explained by the poor relationship between
Cameroonians and the Nigerian immigrants, notably the Igbo and the Yoruba and the
Cameroonians. After the Second World War, the influx of Igbo immigrants into
Southern Cameroons increased. They came as plantation workers, traders and affluent
dealers. They entered the civil service and together with the Yoruba they occupied
important posts in the government departments as teachers, postmasters, clerks,
nurses, drivers and mechanics. They owned many shops and market stalls, and
peddled goods in country districts. Ngoh gives estimates on the percentage of these
immigrants in Southern Cameroons as follows:
In 1958, Nigerians comprised roughly 30 per cent of the plantation 
workforce in the territory. In 1961, about 12 per cent of the civil 
servants in the territory and nearly 25 per cent of the civil service 
positions of the Federal Nigerian government in Southern Cameroons 
were held by Nigerians. In addition, 85 per cent of the commercial 
establishments in Southern Cameroons were controlled by Nigerians, 
particularly Ibos. The predominance of Nigerians, especially Ibos, in 
Southen Cameroons naturally created a strong dislike for the Ibos. 
Southern Cameroons was mockingly called a “colony within a colony” 
because of this strong presence of Nigerians. 94
94 Ngoh, History o f Cameroon, pp. 188-9.
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With the approach of reunification and independence, there was 
increasing local resentment against the Nigerian immigrants. According to Victor 
Amaazee, amongst the Nigerian immigrants, the Igbo seemed self-centred, obsessed 
with wealth and lacking in respect for traditional customs and authority.95 David 
Gardinier says the Igbo antagonised the local population by either building or renting 
houses, which they later sublet and they settled on the land of the Bakweri and 
aggravated the Bakweri land problem.96 There were accusations made that the Igbo 
“stole church bells in order to make counterfeit coins; they introduced corruption into 
the public offices; they assaulted women and made them sterile; they deliberately 
mistreated local patients in hospitals; they sold poisoned food; they desired to control 
and dominate Cameroonians at all cost” 97 Although unproven, these and other 
accusations built up resentment of the Igbo by the local people.
The British administration warned the local Native Authorities 
against any kind of discriminatory practices, verbal or physical attacks at Nigerian 
immigrants especially the Igbo.98 It was possible that some of the accusations were as
95 Victor Bong Amaazee, “The ‘Igbo scare’ in the British Cameroons, c. 1945-61” Journal o f  African 
History, 3 1(1990):282. There was an increasing number of Efik ( Ibibio) immigrants as well.
96 David Gardinier, “The British in the Cameroons, 1919-1939“. In P. Gifford and R. Louis, Britain 
and Germany in Africa, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, p. 554. The Bakweri land problem 
came about as a result of the expropriation of native land by the German government and the 
concentration of the local people into reserves. Under the leadership of Endeley, a Bakweri Land 
Committee was formed in June 1946. The committee had as its objective to reclaim the expropriated 
Bakweri land. The settlement of Nigerians on their land was considered by the Bakweri as a threat to 
the security of their land.
97 Amazee, “’The Igbo scare’ “, p. 287. The Bakweri Native Authority for example outlined rules to 
control relations between local Bakweri and Igbo and demanded their expulsion by the government.
98 Ibid. Amazee reports that according to one British official, the Igbo lacked respect for local 
institutions and through their proud speeches and ways they aroused a feeling of inferiority among 
Cameroonians. The administration also believed that anti-Igbo sentiment was organised and 
encouraged by two local politicians; chief Manga Williams and Dr. Endeley. The administration fought 
hard during the first half of 1948 to halt the discrimination but without marked success.
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a result of a feeling of frustration by the local people who were jealous of Igbo influx 
and successes in all sectors of the society. Le Vine says the “aggressive and 
commercially adept Ibo” were resented by many indigenous Cameroonians because 
of their increasing domination of the commercial sector." A measure of the 
importance of this fact is that the threat of Igbo domination was skilfully utilised by 
Premier Foncha and the KNDP as an argument for reunification with French 
Cameroon during the plebiscite. Foncha wittingly made the electorate to believe that 
when they voted for integration, they were going to meet mostly the Igbo ethnic group 
in Nigeria, thus they would be increasingly dominated. The KNDP made it clear that 
any persons or party that deviated from the anti-Igbo stance were bound to lose votes. 
However, the use of the Igbo-scare by the KNDP was not the sole factor that led to 
their victory in the plebiscite.
Victory for reunification in Bamenda for example was attributed 
to the vigorous campaign undertaken by the party there. The propaganda machinery 
was heavily financed by Francophone Bamileke and Douala (border) groups also 
interested in reunification. Between 1959 and 1960, Soppo Priso donated the money 
with which Foncha bought presses for the first printed newspaper in the Southern 
Cameroons, The Kamerun Times, the KNDP organ.100 Foncha. also met the more 
progressive Duala notables who patronised the reunification efforts. One of the 
notables, Douala Yondo, who spoke English and French, organised fundraising 
campaigns during the plebiscite period for the KNDP. Yondo also served as Foncha’s 
principal contact with immigrant or itinerant British Cameroonians, as well as Eastern 
sympathisers.
99 LeVine, The Cameroon Federal Republic, pp.46-7.
100 Johnson, The Cameroon Federation, pp. 132-3. Welch, Dream o f  unity, p. 230. The paper later 
became The Cameroons Times.
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KNDP campaigns registered heavy defeat in two significant 
areas; in Nkambe and in Kumba. Nkambe was a plebiscite district contiguous to 
Nigeria and a good percentage of the people argued that they wanted to be with their 
brothers in Northern Cameroons.101 Further to the south west, along the border, parts 
of the ethnic groups in the Mamfe plebiscite district, notably the Hjagham (Ekoi or 
Ekwe), had been divided by the Anglo-French boundary. A part of the group was cut 
off and placed under British administration. When they were offered the opportunity 
through the plebiscite to choose between two options, they voted for union with 
Nigeria so that they could remain with their kin and kith on the Nigerian side of the 
boundary. In Kumba, massive victory for the integration option was because of the 
influence of politicians like Mbile, Vice-President of the Cameroon People’s National 
Convention (CPNC).102
The victory for reunification has sometimes been described as a 
mixed victory, a victory achieved through unpopular political intrigues.103 The KNDP 
in their campaign wrongly rephrased the two alternatives deliberately to mean 
whether the people liked Endeley, (campaigning for integration) the Bakweri man or 
Foncha, (campaigning for reunification) the Bamenda man. In certain areas, voters 
were asked whether they wished to stay in the Cameroons or to sell their country to 
the Igbo who could dethrone their chiefs and carry away all their land and property. In 
the grasslands, the KNDP used the alternatives of the Bakweri man as against the 
Bamenda man to win votes, since Foncha was from the grasslands. In the coastal
101 A great section of this border plebiscite district had earlier voted for integration with Nigeria.
102 Following their defeat in the 1959 elections, and in respect of their common ideology about 
integration of the tenitoiy in Nigeria, the KNC and the KPP held a joint convention of the two parties 
at Mamfe on July 1st, 1960, where they formed a merger -  the CPNC - and drafted the constitution of 
the new party. Endeley was President, while Mbile was Vice-President.
103 Edwin Ardener, “Crisis of confidence in the Cameroons”, West Africa, August 12th, 1961, pp.878- 
9. Welch, Dream o f unity, p. 231.
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forest region, he used the Igbo scare to reach his objective.104 The KNDP also 
skilfully manipulated the electorate into believing that reunification meant “home 
rule”. It would seem that some people voted without knowing the implications. Others 
voted thinking reunification meant membership in the Commonwealth while some 
thought if after ten years, the union with French Cameroon proved unworkable, they 
could simply walk out of it.105 Victory for the KNDP meant victory for reunification 
with French Cameroon and a mandatory dismantling of the Anglo-French boundary in 
Cameroon. How were the plebiscite results received in both territories?
The effects o f the plebiscite results
The results of the plebiscite in Southern Cameroons were 
received with joy in French Cameroon, and Foncha became the hero of the hour.106 In 
contrast, French Cameroon took the results in the Northern Cameroons with ill grace. 
It claimed at the UN that Great Britain and Nigeria had exerted undue pressure on the 
Northern electorate to the extent, for example, of bringing in 700 armed Nigerian 
policemen to coerce the voters into voting for Nigeria.107 The Ahidjo government 
pursued its complaint to the UN. On April 21st, 1961, the General Assembly rejected 
the Cameroonian allegations and voted to ratify the Northern plebiscites by calling for 
the end of Trusteeship and the inclusion of Northern Cameroons territory into
104 Rubin, Cameroon. An African Federation, pp. 105-109.
105 Ngoh, “Dr. Fonclia’s political career”, Buea, April 10th, 1999.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid., p. 27. Also see Rubin, Cameroon. An African Federation, p. 109. The importance of the 
complaint according to LeVine, however, was more over losing Northern Cameroons than over the 
conduct of the plebiscite. This was because French Cameroon hoped to use Northern Cameroons as a 
strong card in the bargaining with Foncha over the status of Southern Cameroons in the new 
Federation. Without the North, the Ahidjo Government realised that Foncha’s hand would be 
strengthened and that his demands for maximum local autonomy for his part of the Federation would 
be difficult to deny, LeVine, The Cameroon Federal Republic, p. 28.
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Northern Nigeria.108 Unsatisfied by the decision of the UN, the Ahidjo government 
took its case to the International Court of Justice, which rendered its verdict two years 
later, December 2nd, 1963, contending that the General Assembly had already settled 
the issue.109
In Nigeria, the results were hotly debated in the House of 
Representatives in Lagos. During the debate, Chief Denis Osadebey of NCNC 
proposed that all Nigerian civil servants and traders in the Southern Cameroons 
should be recalled home and that all Cameroonian civil servants in Nigeria should be 
expelled.110 To some other Nigerians like Chief Kola Balogun on the Government 
benches, Nigeria had to begin an all-out battle to retain Southern Cameroons so as to 
“preserve the territorial integrity of Nigeria” but his suggestion was opposed by the 
Foreign Minister, Jaja Wachuku who instead called on Britain to refund all the money 
that Nigeria had spent on the territory.111 The Nigerian press (particularly the West 
African Pilot, associated with Azikiwe and the Igbos) was hostile to the results and 
called on the Federal Government to “do her duty to the people of Nigeria and the 
innocent masses of the Southern Cameroons” and take back their lost brothers and 
sisters. Despite all of these complaints from Nigerians, the plebiscite results were 
maintained.
In Southern Cameroons, after the plebiscite results were made 
public, the number of Nigerian workers in the CDC dropped considerably (in 1958, 
Nigerian workers in the corporation constituted 32% but this proportion fell to 7% in 
1963). A similar situation occurred in another large-scale oil-producing unit,
108 Welch, Dream of unity, pp.242-3. LeVine, The Cameroon Federal Republic, p.28.
109 Rubin, Cameroon. An African Federation,p. 109. Welch, Dream o f unity, pp.242-3.
U0Ndifontah, “Cameroon-Nigeria relations", p. 68.
111 Ibid., p. 69.
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PAMOL, where many Nigerian workers were repatriated. This created job 
opportunities for Cameroonians who had previously not been able to get employment.
In the administration, Federal services in the territory continued 
to be carried out by the Nigerian Government until alternative plans were made 
whereby those services became the direct responsibility of the West Cameroon 
Government. A West Cameroon Public Service Commission was established which 
speeded the recruitment of West Cameroonians into civil service jobs. Additionally, a 
judge of the West Cameroon High Court, resident in the territory was nominated. In 
the social domain, the plebiscite unleashed a series of population movements across 
the frontiers. With the ratification of the results of the plebiscite, it was incumbent for 
the border people to choose and stick to one nationality, either Nigerian or 
Cameroonian. Along the southern portion of the Anglo-French boundary, there was 
jubilation among border groups. The reunification of the Balong for example brought 
great relief among the Balong people of Mukonje who could once again visit and 
interact with their brothers of Mundek without having to procure an official pass.112
Independence (French Cameroon-January 1, 1960; Nigeria- 
October 1, 1960) and the plebiscite (February 11, 1961) were important steps in a 
long process of decolonisation that had begun with the rise of nationalism in Southern 
Cameroons decades before. Many reasons had been advanced to justify separation: 
poor administration and neglect of the territory by Britain, the fear of domination by 
Nigerians, and the desire to revive the old Kamerun. For Southern Cameroons, 
reunification was to be achieved with the date of the termination of trusteeship. On 
April 24, 1961, the General Assembly approved October 1, as the date for the
112 From an interview with Chief Moukouelle, the Balong chief of Mombo, on April 15, 1999 at 
Mombo, reunification led to increased inter-village and clan relationships. He said that more frequently 
than before, young people organised inter-village competitions across the boundary.
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termination of trusteeship for Southern Cameroons through federation with the 
Republic of Cameroon or French Cameroon. On Reunification Day, Ahidjo formally 
welcomed Southern Cameroonians in Yaounde in a emotional speech that began thus: 
“After over forty years of separation, we form again today one family, one nation, one 
state”.113
With independence and reunification, the immediate goals for 
both territories were reached but there were still problems to be solved. One of the 
major problems was the integration of the two territories into one coherent political 
and administrative entity in which there would be equal opportunities for all, a 
Cameroon in which former British and French subjects would evolve as the same 
people, Cameroonians. For such integration to be feasible, it was necessary for the 
people especially border people to “dismantle” the boundary in their minds. It would 
appear that even reunification could not enable the people to think beyond the 
boundary. With reunification, the status of the boundary changed from an 
international to an intra-state boundary, yet border control was not relaxed. Federal 
guards and Gendarmes continued to police the boundary checking the movements of 
persons and goods cross the boundary. Specific areas of control have remained; the 
Tiko/Douala, Mbanga, Loum/Tombel, Manjo, Nkongsamba and Melong areas. 
Meanwhile, outside the national territory, African politicians had been holding a 
series of conferences on issues concerning independence and unity in Africa. One of 
the discussions at these conferences was the question of the Anglo-French boundary 
and Cameroon reunification.
113 Ndifontah, “Cameroon-Nigeria relations", p. 68.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
The First World War brought considerable suffering to colonized peoples, 
caused enormous social and economic dislocation and inspired increased resistance to 
imperial institutions. Germany lost its African possessions to the Allies. Britain and 
France survived the war as the world’s two largest overseas colonial powers. 
According to Michael Callahan, during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the 
atmosphere was dominated by competeing pressures of revenge, anxiety, optimism, 
and intense skeptism.1 There was no question of restituting the German lost colonies 
as the colonies were placed under the supervision of a newly created League of 
Nations. The lost colonies were given to Britain and France as Mandates within a 
framework of international accountability rather than as colonies under national 
sovereignty.
Cameroon was given to Britain and France as a class “B” mandate. It was on 
these terms that both powers obtained confirmation of their partition of the 
Cameroons in 1922. Whereas the British merged the administration of their sectors 
with that of Nigeria, the French considered their own sector for administrative 
purposes as an Oversea Department of France Outre-mer. Administratively, France 
did not bring Cameroon into French Equatorial Africa (AEF). Once in place, the 
Mandate system represented the changing character of postwar European imperialism 
in Africa.2 Despite flaws, Mandates contributed to an evolution in the culture of
1 Callahan, M. Mandates and empire. The League o f Nations and Africa, 1914-1931, Brighton & 
Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 1999, p.2.
2 Ibid., p. 188. The author says Britain and France shared some common responses to the mandates 
system but they reacted differently. While British colonial officials considered mandates as expressions
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colonialism that affected not only the vast diplomatic and colonial bureaucracies of 
both Britain and France, but Europeans and Africans within all the mandated 
territories as well. The Mandate system cemented the joint occupation of the territory 
and its partition.
Recent treatments on boundaries argue that colonial boundaries were not 
entirely arbitrarily drawn. Nugent says that African colonial boundaries are not 
entirely artificial because they did reflect pre-existing ethnic and political divisions.3 
Anene holds the view that while some boundaries were artificial or drawn using crude 
astronomical and geometrical lines, there were instances where the colonial boundary 
makers attempted to follow precolonial divisions 4 Nugent and Asiwaju push this idea 
further by saying that even where the boundary was artificially drawn, vested interests 
were forged by the border people who saw the boundary as a conduit or a zone of 
opportunities.5 In his case study on Hausaland, William Miles observes that contrary 
to expectations, the Anglo-French demarcation of Hausalands did take local political 
political divisions into account but because African and European practices of 
geopolitical division were different, the colonial boundaries assumed new functions 
and rectified previously dynamic spatial relations.6
In Cameroon, the pre-colonial concept of boundary was not divisive, it was 
fluid and permeable. This concept is different from the Western concept of a 
geometric boundary, which separates the intervening lands and people into distinct
of the very best intentions of British imperialism in Africa, their French counterparts considered 
mandates as danger to the intentions of French imperialism in Africa..
3 Nugent, P. Smugglers, secessionists and loyal citizens,. 63, this view is also shared by D, J. Thom. 
The Nigeria-Niger boundary, 1890-1906. A study o f ethnic frontiers and a colonial boundary, Athens: 
Ohio University Centre for International Studies, 1975.
4 Anene, The international boundaries o f Nigeria, passim.
5 Nugent and Asiwaju, African boundaries, pp.60-61.
6 William Miles, Hausaland divided: colonialism and independence in Nigeria and Niger, Ithaca; 
London; Cornell University Press, 1994.
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entities under different political sovereignties. This alien concept of a boundary was 
matched with the expectation of “political loyalty” or national consciousness.
The provisional partition of Kamerun paid scant attention to the interests and 
rights of border people. This became all the more glaring when the "Picot line" drawn as 
the provisional boundary cut across ethnic groups, farmlands, plantations, fishing and 
hunting grounds of border peoples among whom were the Bakweri, Duala, Balong, 
Balondo, Bakossi, Mongo and the Mbo. These groups are found around the coast, in 
the Moungo Valley and on the slopes of Mounts Kupe, Fako, Nlonako and 
Manenguba. These groups had shared a common culture and similar historical 
experiences. They shared traditions of origin, possessed the same socio-political 
institutions, adhered to the same religious beliefs and had been exposed to a 
remarkably similar degree of contact with the outside world. The Anglo-French 
partition of this group was distressful as each fraction was placed in an area of 
jurisdiction of two distinct and new socio-economic and political systems far removed 
from the original cultural whole. Asiwaju, in citing the Somalian example, confirms 
that partitioned groups were without exception distressed by their division into 
separate political entities.7
After the partition, the British and the French installed their administrations on 
their respective spheres of the territory. Differences in European colonial administrative 
heritage tended to pull the border peoples apart. Asiwaju and Miles have considered the 
divergence of administrative practices, especially of chieftaincy, on either side of the 
boundary line.8 Unlike the British, who consciously attempted to adapt their method of
7 Asiwaju, Partitioned Africans, pp. 3-4. Miles, Hausaland divided, p.62, he says here that most 
partitioned groups especially the Hausas have accepted the reality of political separation and they may 
not wish to have it otherwise.
8 A. I. Asiwaju, West African transformations. Comprative impacts o f French and British colonialism. 
Nigeria: Malthouse Press Limited, 2001, passim.. Miles, Hausaland divided, chapter 5.
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governance to indigenous rule and custom, the French made no distinctions among thew 
areas under their sovereignty so far as colonising policy was concerned. The British with 
their preoccupation with chiefly legitimacy, the French displayed relatively little 
compunction in dismissing chiefs whom they disliked.
As each colonial administration aimed at safeguarding her human and 
natural resources on border zones, the administrative policies of border areas were 
hardened. This explains the imposition of the use of passports and the existence of 
British and French custom posts on their respective sides of the boundary. The situation 
frustrated the traditional rights of border peoples and provided the focal issue that fuelled 
the pleas for the fixture reunion of the British and French spheres of Cameroon.
It was difficult for both governments to maintain an admittedly far from effective 
control along the entire boundary. Various alternative schemes for increasing the 
strength and efficiency of the existing customs preventive service were considered, but 
the result was a replacement of the customs men by the police and an increase in the 
number of control posts. The Laissez-Pctsser was initially instituted by the French 
government ostensibly for health reasons but was later adopted by the British 
government. The Laissez-Pcisser was made compulsory for journeys both on land and on 
sea.
The demand for labour in the old German plantations caused many people to 
move across the boundary from the French to the British zone. This population fluidity 
across the boundary was a constant worry to the French administration which kept losing 
manpower and tax payers. In his case study of the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta (present 
Burkina Faso), Asiwaju highlights that the stresses and strains in the French colonial 
administration were fundamental motives for a large proportion of people to move
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across the boundary.9 In Cameroon, French subjects running away from the repressive 
French colonial regime, crossed over to the British side where working and living 
conditions were better.
Anglo-French collaboration over Cameroon took off from the outbreak of 
hostilities, through the war and well after. They jointly attacked and ousted the 
Germans from the territory, which they decided to partition after long negotiations. 
Anglo-French co-operation was more noticeable in the domain of issues on boundary 
demarcation and administration. British and French local administrators met regularly 
and drew up protocols following preliminary and preparatory investigations to be 
followed up later by specialists of both governments. In the light of continuous 
collaboration, British and French administrators on both sides of the boundary 
exchanged official visits. In London and in Paris, discussions were undertaken 
between representatives of both governments for the development of co-operation 
between the two countries in their colonies.
Both administrations increasingly realised that the border zone was a difficult 
zone to administer. Some of the reasons for this difficulty were the fact that it was a 
zone of immigration, a zone with a very recent population, and a zone of violence. 
The difficulties and turbulence (UPC violence) of the border zone under study was 
more of a problem to the French than the British administration. However because of 
mutual understanding and assistance, both administrations worked together to ensure 
a proper control of the boundary and give meaningful solutions to the border 
problems. What was Africans5 response to the imposition of the boundary?
Their reactions varied, from organised and group reactions to unorganised and 
spontaneous actions. After 1945, people put their complaints to the UN visiting
9 Asiwaju, West African transformations, pp. 82-90.
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missions orally and also through the writing of petitions. Political parties were formed 
which included in their programme the ambition to dismantle the boundary and 
achieve independence and unification for Cameroon. There were also cases of open 
rejection of the boundary as some border groups destroyed boundary landmarks. 
Others ignored the boundary by maintaining close socio-cultural relations across the 
boundary criss-crossing without official passes.
An important push factor for Southern Cameroonians to reject the boundary 
and call for reunification was the British neglect of the territory. We have seen that 
Southern Cameroons was administered as an intergral part of the Eastern region of 
Nigeria and this worked to the economic, educational, political and social 
disadvantage of Southern Cameroonians. Some inhabitants wanted the territory to be 
a separate political entity in its own right, others wanted it to be a separate region 
within Nigeria while still others wanted it to be reunited with French Cameroon. Ngoh 
says that the British neglect of the territory was a contributory factor to the desire of 
the Southern Cameroonians to seek unity with their French administered 
counterparts.10
The appeal for reunification was also driven home by what the 
reunificationists called the Kamerun Idea. This idea carried with it the notion of 
recreating the territory as a nation with its pre 1916 boundaries. The idea was given 
substance by the fact that the Anglo-French partition of the territory in 1916 led to the 
dismemberment of ethnic groups, villages, farmlands and even families.11 The need to 
reunite these groups and re-create the German Cameroon, gave birth to the Kamerun 
Idea. The validity of this idea has been disagreed by some scholars who dismiss it as a
10 Ngoh, V. J, Southern Cameroons, 1922-1961: a constitutional history. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000, 
p. 22.
U Ibid, p. 37.
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myth for according to them, German rule in Cameroon did not promote nationalism. 
In this study, I have viewed the German rule as a preparatory phase that formed the 
basis on which Cameroonians shared some kind of political oneness as subjects under 
the same colonial administration. When they later compared German Cameroon and 
the Mandates under British and French rule, some people preferred to be put back to 
the pre-1916 colonial administration. Ngoh talks of three important German legacies 
(memory, idea and hope) which were a catalyst for reunification and the subsequent 
dismantling of the boundary.12
I have said that even though victims of division, border groups were not 
passive victims for they often tried to make the best of a difficult situation. While 
protesting against the boundary on the one hand, border groups made the best of their 
border position by transforming it into an opportunity zone, a zone of “conduit” or 
transition. This situation was favoured by the fact that those managing the boundary 
were working in very difficult terrain-thick forests, hilly and sometimes rugged 
landscapes with dangerous reptiles and insects; these prevented efficiency and 
increased the opportunity for the border groups.
Border people provided a strong struggle for the reunification of British and 
French Cameroons in the hope to reunite with their families from across the boundary. 
Meanwhile, with post World War Two political developments the territory was on its 
way to independence. Meanwhile, more complaints by the border people for 
reunification and efforts by both administrations to adjust the boundary ended up in 
the long run, with the plebiscite in 1961 which saw the reunification of the two Trust 
Territories and the dismantling of the physical boundary between both spheres. After
12 Ngoli, V. J, Southern Cameroons, 1922-1961. p. 37.
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reunification, the boundary ceased to be an international boundary, it became a state 
boundary, yet it remained a highly policed state in the territory.
This research has revealed that colonial boundaries in Cameroon like 
elsewhere in Africa are arbitrary and resulted from conflicting interests of European 
powers with no consideration for the colonised. British and French administration of 
borderland people in Cameroon was largely in the interest of the administration. At 
the stage of surveying and demarcation, the borderland peoples were indifferent for 
the most part while some were co-operative and were recruited as guides and 
labourers to set up a boundary that they later rejected vehemently.
The divisive effects of this boundary on border groups have been the same 
throughout the entire length of the boundary; variations did occur however along 
areas where the border had strategic or economic importance as around the coast and 
in the Moungo region. Such were the areas that suffered very strict border control and 
policing and as a result the divided peoples in those areas were more traumatised than 
others in the less strategic zones. The Anglo-French inter-Cameroons boundary was 
therefore a barrier to increased co-operation among the border peoples.
Meanwhile, the Anglo-French boundary problem and the reunification of the 
Cameroons soon became issues of discussion at Pan-African conferences. Nkrumah’s 
belief in political union was based on his view on borders. He argued that within a 
politically united Africa, boundaries could be redrawn to take better account of social 
and economic factors. West Africans began planning the first break-through 
conference for addressing issues concerning them and the first conference was the 
National Congress of British West Africa, (NCBWA). This was an important stage 
in the development of modern African nationalism. Dissatisfaction with the final 
partitions of Togo and Kamerun was an important element in the programme of the
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NCBWA. The Kamerun question was becoming of Pan-African importance as the
NCBWA condemned specifically the partitioning of Togoland between the English
and the French Governments and the handing over of the Cameroons to the French
1 ^Government without consulting or regarding the wishes of the people in the matter.
In addition to its claim that the local population should have a voice in the shaping of 
borders, the Congress also resolved that boundaries ought to conform to ethnic 
divisions. The conference laid stress on the principle that peoples and territories 
should not be disposed of arbitrarily and that ethnic groups ought not to be divided by 
international boundaries.
Africans allied with Asian peoples in a series of conferences that took place 
across Africa and Asia from 1957 to I960.14 Some of the resolutions of the 
conferences called on all the Asian and African countries to help the people of the 
Cameroons in their struggle for reunification and independence. There was an explicit 
call for the reunification of the Cameroons. These conferences created a perfect 
opportunity for exiled politicians from both Cameroons to express the views of their 
parties on reunification and French colonialism. Odette Guitard says that the most 
passionate discussions were from the FLN (Algeria) and the UPC (French Cameroon) 
delegates who talked at length about French colonialism.15 Moumie called himself the 
head of state of French Cameroon in exile and gave a press conference in which he 
proclaimed himself the Porte parole or mouthpiece of all Cameroonians. As time 
progressed evolving political events in Africa redefined a new context of unity. We
13 West Africa (May 20th, 1961): 555. Welch, Dream o f  unity, p. 13.
14 George McTuman Kahin, The Asian-African conference. Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955. Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1956, for more on these conferences, also read Odette Guitard, 
Bandoung et le reveil des peuples colonises. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969, pp64-78 and 
Touval, The boundary politics, p.52.
15 Guitard, Bandoung etle reveil des peuples colonists, Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1969, 
pp.64-78.
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have seen that by January 1, 1960, French Cameroon was independent while Southern 
Cameroons was preparing for the forthcoming UN plebiscite. In Southern Cameroons, 
even the most militant political party for reunification, the KNDP, had dropped the 
reunification option in its plebiscite campaign in favour of secession and 
independence. In French Cameroon, the UPC party that clamoured for reunification 
had been exiled from all parts of the territory.
The Cameroons question was no longer a major issue of discussion at later 
conferences for the very notion of unity was beginning to be disrupted as each African 
state pressed for territorial claims. There was the need to revise African boundaries. 
How such revisions could be carried out had yet to be worked out; but the delay in 
finding an appropriate and workable solution resulted in many border disputes and 
warfare in Africa.16 Even where the colonial boundary has been dismantled as in the 
case of the Anglo-French boundary and other boundaries in East Africa, the ghost of 
the boundary has remained.
Pan-African meetings progressively sidestepped the problem of redrawing 
frontiers. As more non-self-governing territories were granted independence, the 
problem of boundaries took on different dimensions from those of the colonial period. 
From the revival of Pan-Africanism to the post second World War period, and the rise 
of African nationalism, issues on pan-Africanism began fading away into different 
forms. While some forms called into question the legitimacy of any colonial border, 
for the Cameroonians, the issue was rather a choice between the 1914 (Kamerun) or 
the 1919 (British and French Cameroons) boundaries. Many Cameroonians come to 
envisage pre 1914 Kamerun as a valid political space, rather than an ephemeral
16 A. J. Day, Border and territorial disputes. Harlow: Longman, 1987 and C. G. Widstrand. African 
boundary problems. Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1969.
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colonial imposition which had been unjustly divided in 1919 and which had as such to 
be restored.
Since independence, leaders of most African states have realised that a large- 
scale redrawing of frontiers (through possibly justified on economic, ethnic, 
geographic, or other grounds) could open a Pandora’s box of difficulties.17 
Accordingly, African heads of states have tended to accept the status quo, which, if 
not perfect, is less contentious than most adjustments.
17 Welch, Dream o f  unity, p. 21.
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1 AC Rapports administratifs, Frontiere.
2 AC Douanes, Administration.
APA Affaires Politiques et Administratives (1945-47)
Rapports de Tournees, Rapports Annuels, Delimitation Frontiere 
Franco-Britannique de 1916 a 1939.
DOM Mouvements a travers la frontiere et les relations Franco-Britanniques
VT Mouvements a travers la frontiere et les relations Franco-Britanniques
Journal Officiel du Cameroun (JOC) 1916-1960
Rapport du Gouvemement Frangais a l’ONU sur 1’administration du Cameroun sous 
Tutelle Frangaise, 1916-1960 (These are printed and published reports on French 
administration of the ier section of Cameroon).
3. ARCHIVES DUMINISTERS DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES-PARIS (AMAE).
SERIES
“K” Afrique, 1918-1940 
Afrique, 1944-1955
SOUS SERIES 
Questions Generates 
-Togo-Cameroun
-Afrique Equatoriale Frangaise
(A.E.F)
Guerre, 1939-1945
AL -  Afrique Levant 1944-...
1944-1952 
-Generalites 
K: Vichy Afrique 
- Afrique Equatoriale Frangaise (A.E.F.)
1953-1959 
-Cameroun, 1953-1959
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AL -  Afrique Levant, 1953 ... -Afrique Equatoriale Frangaise (A.E.F)
1953-1959
-Cameroun, 1953 -1959 
-Cameroun Britannique 1953 -1959
4. ARCHIVESNATIONALESDE FRANCE
CENTRE DES ARCHIVES D ‘OUTRE MER, AIX-EN-PROVENCE (CAOM)
Agence France d’Outre-Mer (AgeFom); 1913-1960
Archives du Gouvernement de I \AEF
Serie D: Politique et Administration Generale; 1936-1956
Archives du Gouvernement de I ’Afrique Occidentale Frangaise ( AOF)
Serie G: Politique et Administation Generale -  CAMEROUN 1914-52. (Microfilms)
Serie AF: Afrique- Cameroun- Cartes et Plans (CP)
Affaires Politiques (AFF. POL.)- Togo-Cameroun (1920-1957)
Rapports Annuels du Gouvernement Frangais sur 1’administration du Cameroun 
(1916-1958)
5. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON (PRO) now THE NATIONAL 
ARCHIVES LONDON
Colonial Office (CO)
CO records relating to British Cameroons are found in the series of Nigeria, through 
which the mandated territory was administered.
473: Southern Nigeria Protectorate (SNP), Miscellanea, 1900-1913.
520: SNP, Original Correspondence, 1900-1913.
537: West Africa- Cameroons, Colonies General: Supplementary Original 
Correspondence, 1759-1955.
554: West Africa, Original Correspondence, 1911-1965.
583: West Africa, Nigeria, Original Correspondence, 1912-1915 
590: SNP, Register of out letters, 1899 to 1913.
591: SNP,Government Gazettes, 1900tol913.
592: SNP, Sessional papers, 1906 to 1913.
642: SNP, West Africa Frontier Force (WAFF). Register of out- letters, 1900 to 1926. 
649: West Africa-Cameroons, Original Correspondence, 1915 to 1926. Territory 
(1924).
656: West Africa, Nigeria, 1914 to 1960.
657: West Africa, Nigeria, Sessional papers, 1912 to 1966.
658: West Africa, Nigeria, Government Gazettes, 1914 to 1957.
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659: West Africa, Nigeria, Customs and Trade Journal, 1911 to 1916.
660: West Africa, Nigeria, miscellanea, 1913 to 1945.
750: West Africa, Cameroons, Register of Correspondence, 1915 to 1926.
On the Anglo-French administration and boundary, see “Pass Laws”(1923).
751: West Africa, Cameroons, Register of out-letters, 1915 to 1926.
763: West Africa, Nigeria, Registers of Correspondence, 1912 to 1915.
764: West Africa, Nigeria, Registers of out-letters, 1912 to 1926.
820: SNP, Military, Register of Correspondence, 1927 to 1951.
871: SNP, Military, Register of Correspondence, 1927 to 1952 
957: West Africa, Nigeria, Commission on minority groups in Nigeria,
(Willink Commission) 1957 to 1958.
968: Anglo-French colonial cooperation, 1944-1945.
1039: West Africa, Nigeria, Council of Ministers, papers, 1952 to 1959.
Foreign Office (FO)
FO 371: Political Department, General Correspondence, Africa, 1906 to 1919, 1920 
to 1951.
This series of records, together with a number of other subject based 
series, is indexed in a contemporary card index held in the Research 
Enquiries Room (RER) which covers from 1906 to 1919, and there­
after by printed indexes, from 1920 to 1951.
608: Peace Conference (Paris)
912: Consulate, Douala Cameroon, 1940 to 1955.
Cabinet Papers (CAB)
CAB 23 Munites from December 1916 War Committee minutes.
/24 Cabinet papers.
Reports on the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration for the years 1928, 
1929, 1936,1937, 1949, 1951, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1959.
6. INSTITUTE OF COMMONWEALTH STUDIES LIBRARY (ICOMM)
(Referred to in this work as ICCOM but usually referred to as ICS)
West Africa, reports on the Cameroons from 1921 to 1960.
United Nations Trusteeship Council Official Records (UNTCOR) on the various 
Visiting Missions to Southern Cameroons and Cameroon under French 
administration, 1952, 1949, 1955, 1958.
Report of the United Nations Commission for the supervision of the plebiscites in the 
Southern and Northern parts of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United 
Kingdom administration, 1961.
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n. LIST OF INFORMANTS
Anoke Gaston
(1937)1 Chief of Mouyouka village. 
Interviewed on 13 July 1999 at Mouyouka.
Akangkwene
(1938) Regent chief of kupe 3. Interviewed, 13 and 17 May 1999 
at Kupe 3 village.
Ako Egbe Ben
(1960) Lieutenant and Chief of Marine Marchand, Tiko. Dates 
Interviewed, 29, 30 and 31 May 1999 at Tiko.
Akoue Bonaventure
(1950) Chief of Mouamenam village. Interviewed, from 2-5 
August 1999 at Likomba- Tiko.
Akwe Nzume Blasius
(1921) Has written unpublished manuscripts on Bakossi history. 
One of our major informants and guide.
Interviewed frequently during my research in Cameroon 
at Likomba-Tiko. Died 28 August 2003.
Ebirabo
(1940) Of Nigerian Nationality (Ogoni) and chief ofMokuta. 
Interviewed with a group of elders on, 26-30 April 1999 at 
Mokuta.
Ekolle Michael
(1935) Quarter Head of the English speaking section of the 
Mouangwekan village. Interviewed on, 14 and 15 April 1999 
at Mouangwekan.
Elume Ignatius
(1956) Choir master of the defunct English choir. 
Interviewed on, 14 April 1999 at Mouangwekan.
Enoge Frederick
Chief of Abang village. Interviewed on 17 May1999 at Abang.
1 The bracketed dates indicate the dates of birth of the various informants.
Enongene Germain
(cl 916) One of the early puipils who attended the French vernacular school.
Has a retentive memory. Interviewed at the border village ofMouamenam on 30 April 
1999. Died 25 June 2001.
Fanso V. G.
(1946) Professor of History and has published extensively on 
border studies. Interviewed in Yaounde, Cameroon on 8 July 1999.
Mbape Pandong
(1939) Chief of Mbouroukou village. Interviewed on 19 May 
1999 at Mbouroukou
Mbome Daniel
(1935) Chief of the French section of Mouangwekan 
village. Interviewed on 14 and 15 April 1999 at 
Mouangwekan village.
Mayong Emmanuel
(1934) A stranger from Ndop village (North West 
Province) who has lived in Mombo since 1959. Interviewed 
on 18 April 1999 at Mombo very close to the Waterfall 
village.
Moukete Moukete Gustav
(1940) Notable of Mouyouka village. Interviewed on 19 
May 1999.
Moukwelle Moukwelle Benjamin
(1943) Chief and Mayor of Mombo village.
Interviewed on 20 April and 12 July 1999 at Mombo.
Mukete Abel
(1945) Notable and counsellor of Mombo. Interviewed 
on 20 April 1999 at Mombo.
Ndode Ngwese John
(1928) Retired businessman. Interviewed on 14 and 15 
May 1999 at Bengem. Died 12 September 2002.
Ngama Francis
(1940) Ebonji village. Interviewed on, 18 May 1999 at Ebonji.
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Ngape Nicholas
(1930) Chief of the English speaking section of
Mwangwekan village. Interviewed on 14 May 1999 at Mwangwekan.
Njeuma Martin
(1940) Professor of History, scholar of border studies. Interviewed in Cameroon, 
Buea, on 2 August 1999.
Njoume Andre
(1919) Chief of Moumekeng village. Interviewed on 17 May 1999. Died in 2001.
Nsong Regina
(1942) Midwife with a long time working experience at border villages.
Was of immense assistance to me as a guide and informant throughout my research in 
Cameroon. Interviewed on several occasions from June to August, 1999.
Ntoko Fritz Mukete
(1922) Chief ofNdomBakossi village. Interviewed on 16 May 1999 
at Ndom.
Pandong Nzumbe Clement
(1938) Former transborder courier officer. Interviewed 2-4 June 
1999 at Likomba. Died in 2002.
Peter Yearwood
(cl938) Has written on the Anglo-French boundary in Cameroon. Supplied data on 
the post-war Anglo-French negotiations. Interviewed in London (10 April 1999) and 
in Reading (15 and 16 October 2000).
I also collected valuable data from some of my major guides namely:
John Epoke, Manfred Meloko of Bombe Bakundu village
Ekwo Oscar (Prince) of Mundame Beach
Muna Eka, Mbiang Sop Christopher of Mundek Beach
Ekane Gordon, Ekinde Shadrack, Epie Beddings of Tombel Town
Ewane Mandenge, Nseke Eko of Moungo and Mudeka villages
Chibuzor (Nigerian Fisherman) of Misselele, Ngombe and Mokuta Creeks
Acha Ndeh Foncha of Mabetta and Bimbia fishing towns.
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1 ,  • T h a t  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  . .Cam eroons  w h i c h  h u e  b e e n
o c c u p i e d  b y  - t h e  A l l i e d  F o r c e s  - u n d e r  . my command h a s
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i<-.- s o l e l y  ' by  F r e n c h  a u t h o r i t i e s , t h a t  •• t o  t l i e  V 'es t  o f  t h e  
l i n e  b y  B r i t i s h  A u t h o r i t i e s .  - ;
. d d ' !). • T^ie *inhf\Tii t a n  t.s o f  t h e s e  t e t r i  t o  r Leu w i l l .  I am c o n f i ­
d e n t ,  c o n t i n u e  t o  r e n d e r  to  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e  p o w e r  
w i t h i n  w hose  s p h e r e  t h e y  may f a l l ,  t h e  l o y a l t y  a n d  o b e ­
d i e n c e  w h i c h  t h e y  h a v e  d i s p l a y e d  t o v / a r d r  m / s e l f  d u r i n g  t h e
p ANGLO-FRENCH
CAMEROONS BOUNDARY
DESCRIPTION
Cameroons
F ra n co -B ritish  D eo la ra tio n .
The undersigned;
S ir  Graeme Thomson, G.C.M.G*, K .C .B ., Governor 
o f  the Colony and P r o tec to ra te  o f  N ig er ia , 
e t  Paul M&rehand Governor o f  the French 
Cameroons; '
have agreed to  determ ine th e f r o n t ie r ,  sep arating  the 
t e r r i t o r ie s  o f  the Cameroons p laced  r e sp e c t iv e ly  under 
th e a u th o r ity  o f  the B r it is h  and Frenoh Governments, as 
i s  traced  on the map annexed to  t h i s  d ec la ra tio n  and 
d efin ed  in  the d e sc r ip t io n  a ls o  annexed h ereto .
The boundary s t a r t s  from the ju n ction  o f  the three  
o ld  B r it is h  French and German boundaries at a p o in t in  
Lake Chad 130*03' L a titu d e  North and approxim ately 14°.05  * 
Longitude East o f  Greenwich. From th ere the boundary has 
been determ ined as fo llo w s  j -
(2 ) On a s tr a ig h t  l in e  as fa r  as the mouth o f  the
E b e ji.
( 3 ) Thence from t h is  mouth along the course o f  the 
r iv e r  fc.bej i ,  which bears on th e  upper part the names o f  
L e w e jil, Labejed, Ngalarem, L eb e it  e t  Ngada, as fa r  as  
the conflu en ce o f  th e  r iv e r s  K a lia  and l e b a i i t .
(4 ) Thenoe from th e  con flu en ce o f  the r iv e r s  
Ngada, K ali a and L eb a iit  a lo n g  th e course o f  the r iv e r s  
K a lia  or Ama as fa r  as i t s  con flu en ce w ith  the r iv e r  
Borma or Kutelaha (K outelsha)
(3 )  Thence from th e con flu en ce o f  the r iv e r s  K alia  
and. Dorma or Kutelaha along th e  course o f  th is  l a s t  r iv e r  
as fo r  as a p o in t to  the South o f  the v i l la g e  o f  Segage 
where i t  meets a marsh s tr e tc h in g  towards the South.
( 6 ) Thence by a l in e  throu^i the middle o f  t h i s  
marsh to  where i t  meets th e road from Segage.tow ards a 
marsh named S a le .
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( 7 ) Thenoe fo llo w in g  the road to  a p o in t about a 
K ilom etre and a  h a l f  to  th e North o f  the sa id  marsh.
( 8) 'lhenoe p a ssin g  about a Kilometre to  the w est 
o f  th e marsh as fa r  as a p o in t about a Kilom etre and a 
h a l f  to the South o f  the marsh on the road lea d in g  to  
the v i l la g e  o f  Gourgouron.
(9 ) Thence fo llo w in g  th is  road to a p o in t  
s itu a te d  about two K ilom etres to  th e North West o f  the  
v i l la g e  o f  Gourgouron and p a ssin g  through a marah
(1120 n ea r ly  a  K ilom etre to  the north o f  t h is  v i l la g e  to  a
p o in t s itu a te d  about two K ilom etres to  the West on
th e  Oourgourorr-Ferfarti road le a v in g  the v i l la g e s  o f  
S a le , Moda and Gourgouron to  France.
(10) Thenoe fo llo w in g  th is  road and m eeting a 
number o f  w a te r -h o le s  ( shown on M o ise i's  map under the name 
o f  Amjumba) to  a po in t s itu a te d  about a K ilom etre from
the v i l l a g e  o f  F c r fa r t i and en ter in g  a marsh s itu a te d  
^00 m etres to  th e  North o f  t h is  v i l la g e  which i s  s t i l l  
a ssig n ed  to  France*
(11 ) Thenoe tu rn ing to  th e West, South West and 
South as fa r  as th e  bed o f  a d efin ed  r iv e r  and fo llo w in g  
the bed o f  t h is  r iv e r  in  a Sou th-w esterly  d ir e c t io n  to  a 
la r g e  marsh named Uirma Jumba (Amjumbs.) le a v in g  the v i l la g e s  
o f  Oalsdima J id d a , Abu Kharasa and Ulba to  England.
(12) Thenoe fo llo w in g  a l in e  through the m iddle o f  
t h i s  marsh p a ss in g  the bed o f  a sm all stream which i s  
freq u en tly  l o s t  in  the marsh, as fa r  as a w ater-h o le  named 
D ig u ila b a  and a conflu en ce w ith  another l in e  o f  marsh 
running more to  the South in  the d ir e c t io n  o f  Wasa rook*
( 1?) lhenoe going on and m eeting the bed o f  a b e tte r  
d efin ed  stream  cro ss in g  the marsh o f  Kulu^ia and Kodo as 
fa r  as a marsh named Agzabame*
( 14)
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(14) lh en oe c r o ss in g  t h i s  marsh where i t  reaohes a 
r iv e r  p a ssin g  q u ite  o lo se  to  the v i l la g e  o f Limanti 
(Limanl) to  a  con flu en ce a t about two k ilom etres to  the  
North West o f  t h is  v i l la g e *
(15 ) lh en oe fo llo w in g  the Lim anti)W abisei (U agisa) 
road as fa r  as a brook s itu a te d  about a k ilom etre to  the
East o f  W abisei and p assin g  through the middle o f  the
v i l l a g e s  o f  Bangimami and Imohide and lea v in g  the v i l la g e  o f  
Dj&randloua to  France*
( 16) Thenoe fo llo w in g  t h is  brook as far a s  a  marsh 
s itu a te d  about th ree  k ilo m etres  to  the West o f  W abisei*
( 17) Thence c ro ss in g  t h i s  marsh to  a p o in t where i t  
m eets th e  r iv e r  Ro’lo f a t a  and fo llo w in g  t h is  r iv e r  as fa r  as 
i t s  co n flu en ce  w ith  the r iv e r  Gwanje or Keraua*
(18) Thence fo llo w in g  th e  Keraua as fa r  as i t s  
co n flu en ce  in  th e  mountains w ith  a  r iv e r  coming fro® th e  
West and known by the "sardis" In h ab itin g  the mountains under 
the name o f  Kohom (shown on M o ise i's  map under the name o f  
G atogule) c u tt in g  in to  two p a r ts  the v i l la g e  of Keraua and 
sep a ra tin g  the two v i l la g e s  o f  Ish igash iya*
(19) Thenoe i t  runs from t h i s  confluence a s fa r  as the
top  o f  Mount N gosi in  & so u th -w ester ly  d ir e c t io n  g iv en  by the
course o f  th e Kchcm (O atagule) whioh i s  taken as the n a tu r a l  
boundary from i t s  con flu en ce as fa r  as i t s  source in  Mount 
N gosi; th e v i l la g e s  o f  Matagum and H ij ie  being l e f t  to  
Franoe# and the S e c tio n s  o f  Uledde and o f  Laherre s i tu a t e d  to  
the north  o f  the Kohom to  England; th ose lo h id o u i (Kiduwe) 
s itu a te d  to  th e south  o f  Kohom to  France*
0  (2 0 ) Thenoe on a  l i n e  in  a South W esterly d ir e c t io n
fo llo w in g  th e top s o f  th e Mountain range o f  Ngosi le a v in g  
to  France the p arts o f  Ngosi s itu a te d  on tlie  E astern sli&pes, 
end to  England the p a rts  s itu a te d  on the Western s lo p es*
to
to  a p o in t s itu a te d  between the source o f  the r iv e r  zimunkara 
and the source o f  the r iv e r  Devuruaj the watershed so  
d efin ed  a lso  lea v es  the v i l l a g e  o f  B ugelta  to England
and the v i l la g e  o f  luru to  France.
S ou t h
(21 ) lhenoe in  a South/W esterly d ir e c t io n  
le a v in g  the v i l la g e  o f  Dila-. on the B r it is h  s id e ,  the  
v i l la g e  o f  Libam on th e French s id e  to  the h i l l  o f  Matakam,
(22) Thenoe running due West to  a  po in t to  the South 
o f  th e  v i l la g e  o f  f t is ik  where i t  turns to  the South on a 
l in e  running along th e  w atershed and p assin g  by Mabas on 
th e French s id e , a f t e r  which i t  le a v es  Y/ula on the E n glish  
s id e  running South and bounded by c u lt iv a te d  land to  the 
E ast o f  th e l in e  o f  th e w atershed.
( 23) Thenoe p a ssin g  Huraunsi on the French s id e  the  
boundary l i e s  between the mountains o f  J e l  and Kamale Mogode 
on th e  French s id e  and running along the w atershed.
(24 ) Thenoe p a ss in g  Humsikl in c lu d in g  th e farmlands 
o f  th e  v a lle y  to  the w est o f  the v i l la g e  on the French 
s id e ,  th e  boundary c r o sse s  Mount Kuli*
(2 5 ) Thenoe running due South bet ween & ikta (B r it is h )  
and Muti (French) the in o o rreo t l in e  o f  th e  watershed
shown by M oisei on his' aisp b ein g  adhered to  le a v in g  Bourha 
and D ih i on the Frenoh s id e ,  Madogoba. Gamdira on the B r i t i s h ,  
B ugela  or Bukule, Madoud^i, Kadanahanga on the Frenoh, ouda,
TU& and issm bourga on the B r i t is h  s id e  and Buka on the  
Frenoh a id e .
( 26) Thenoe the boundary runs through Mount M ulik ia
(named a lso  Lourougoua).
(27) Thenoe from th e top  o f  Mount fcSulikia. to  the source
o f  th e  T sik& kiri le a v in g  Kotoha to  B r ita in  and Dumo to  France 
and fo llo w in g  a l in e  marked by four p r o v is io n a l landmarks 
ereo ted  in  September, 1920, by Messrs Vereker and P it io n .
(28) Thenoe a long tho ooui'ue o f  the T s ik a k ir i as i t  
e x i s t s  in  r e a l i t y  and not as i t  i s  shown on M o ise i's  map 
to  i t s  confluence w ith  th e  E iver  T ie l .
(29) Thenoe the course o f  the Mayo T ie l as fa r  as
i t s  confluence w ith  the Benue*
( 30) Thenoe along the course o f  the Benue upstream  
as far as I t s  confluence w ith  the Faro*
( 31) Thence along the course o f  the Faro as fa r  as 
the mouth o f  i t s  branch the Mao Hesso s itu a ted  about four 
Kilometres south o f  Chikito*
( 32) Thenoe along the course o f  the Mao Kesso as far
as landmark No. 6 o f  the o ld  B r it is h  German fron tier*
H 1$ (35) Thence a l in e  s ta r t in g  from Beacon 6 ,  p assin g
Beacon 7 f in is h in g  at the o ld  Beaoon 8 «
( 34) Thence from th is  mark 8 placed on the l e f t  bank 
o f  th e  Mao Youwsi a Bmall stream flow ing from the west and 
emptying i t s e l f  in to  the Mayo Faro , in  a s tr a ig h t . l in e  
running towards the South w est and reaching the summit o f  
Wsmni Range a very prominent peak to  the North o f  a chain
o f  mountains extending towards the A lsn tik a  Mountains and 
s itu a te d  to  the East o f  the o ld  Frontier Mark No. 10*
(35) Thence the fr o n t ie r  fo llow s the watershed from
the Mao V/ari to  the West and from th e Mao Faro to  the
East where i t  r e jo in s  the A lantika Range, i t  fo llow s the
l in e  o f  th e  w atershed o f  the Benue to  the North w est and
o f  th e Faro to the South East as far  as the South Peak o f  the
A lan iik a  Mountains, to  a point two K ilom etres to  the North
o f  th e  source o f  the River k a l i .
. ( 36} Thenoe from th is  Peak by the R iver S a s s ir i ,
le a v in g  Kobi to  France and Kobi Leinde to  Great B r ita in ,
Tebou and Tsoho to  France, as fa r  as the confluence w ith
the f i r s t  stream coming from th e Balakossa Range ( t h i s  
confluence touches the Kobodji Mapeo Track) from th io  
stream towards the South leav in g  Uro Belo to Great B r ita in  
and Nanaoua to  Franca* ■
( 37) Thenoe the boundary rejq in s  the o ld  Boundary about 
Lapao in  Frenoh T erritory  fo llow in g  the l in e  o f  the w ater­
shed o f  th e  B alakossa range as fa r  as a point s itu a te d  to
■ -  6 -
it
! the West o f  the souroe o f  the Labidje or Xadam r iv er  which
i
! flow s in to  the R iver Deo and from the r iv er  Sampee flow ing  
in to  the River Baleo to  the North West*
(38) Thenoe from th is  p o in t along the l in e  o f  the water- 
shed between the r iv e r  Baleo and the River Noumberou along the
i
o rest o f  the Tschapeu Range, to  a point two K ilom etres to the 
North o f  Namberu turning by th is  v i l la g e  which i s  in  N ig er ia , 
going up a v a lle y  North East and then South West whichoorosees 
the Banglang range about a K ilom etre to the South o f  the source 
o f  the Xordo r iver*
(39) Thenoe from th is  po in t on a s tr a ig h t l in e  running 
towards th e confluence o f  the r iv e r s  Ngomba and Deo u n t i l  the 
l in e  meets the R iver Kolob.
(40) Thence along a l in e  p a r a lle l  to  the Bare Fort Laiiy
v,‘'
Track and to  two K ilom etres to  the West o f  th is  track  whioh . 
remains in  Frenoh terr ito ry *
(41) Thenoe a l in e  p a r a l le l  to  and d is ta n t two K ilo ­
metres to  the West from th is  road (which i s  approximately that
0  f t /9  marked Faulbom  January 1908 on Moisei*© map) to a poin t on the 
Moio T ip sa l (T iba, T ibaat or Tussa on M oisei*s map) two K ilo ­
m etres to  the South West o f  the point at whioh the road cro sses  
sa id  Metio T ipsal*
(42) Thenoe the course o f  the Maio T ip sa l upstream to 
i t s  conflu en ce w ith the Maio Mafu, flow ing from the West, to  a 
p oin t some 12 K ilom etres to  the South West o f  Kwahoha town*
(43) Thenoe a s tr a ig h t l in e  running South West to  the 
h ig h est peak o f  the Hoscre Jongbi (Dutschi -  n -  DJorabi o f  
M oisel*s map).
(44) Thence the watershed between the b asin s o f  the 
Maio larab a  on the West and the Maio Deo on the East to  the 
Second from the North o f  the four peaks o f  the Hosere Dakar 1 Be 
(iX itsohi -  n -  Bertua on M o ise i's  map)* These four peaks run 
from North to  South p a r a lle l  to  and about three Kilom etres to  
West o f  the road from Bare to  Fort Laity*
(43) From t h is  second peak issu es  the Maio l&pare which,
flow ing
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flow ing Bast to  the Maio Deo, forms the boundary between the 
D is tr ic t s  o f  Kwancha and Dodeo.
This peak i s  the source o f  the Maio Tapore, and i s  two 
m iles due tfest o f  the Maio ‘fapare R est-house. This lin e  
leaves the v i l la g e s  o f  Mofou and Kountl in  French T err ito ry .
(46) Thence fo llow in g  the watershed between the Maio 
Tapare (and i t s  a ff lu e n ts )  and the Maio Deo (and i t s  a ff lu e n ts )  
along, s u c c e s s iv e ly , the two remaining peaks o f  the Hosere 
Bakari Be (running from North to  South), the three peaks o f  
the Hosere I^Yamboli, the two peaks o f  the Hosere Maio B a jl, 
Hosere Lainga* These three l i t t l e  groups o f  Hosere N'Yamboli, 
HOBere Maio B aji and Hosere Lainga run South West and form 
the Bapai range. Behind the Bapal range i s  the Sapbe Kanyel 
which i s  in  B r it is h  T erritory .
(4 7 ) Thenoe across the saddle connecting the Fapai range 
and the Imposing Genderu Mountains. From t h is  saddle the 
Frontier clim bs to  the f i r s t  prominent peak in  the Genderu 
Mountains (known as Hosere Jauro Gotel or as Hosere Jagam), 
thence along the remaining three peaks o f  Hosere Jauro Go t e l  
(or  Hosere Jagam), thence along the four peaks o f  Hosere 
Sango^i to  Sapbe M 'Balla^i. These la s t  three groups o f  h i l l s  
c o n s titu te  part o f . the watershed between the Maio Tar aba and 
the Maio Y in.
(4S ) Thenoe to  Hosere Lowul which i s  w e ll over two 
K ilom etres from tho Kwanoha — Sanyo main road. This peak 
(Hosere Lowul) l i e s  on a magnetic bearing o f  296 from the apex 
the Genderu Pass on the above—mentioned main road. From 
tfhis apex, which i s  d is ta n t 3a m iles from Genderu R est-house, 
and which l i e s  between a peak o f  Hosere M 'BailaJi ( to  the tfest) 
and a sm aller  h i l l ,  known as Hosere Burutol, to  th e East,
Hosere M’B a i la i i  haB a magnetic bearing o f  43 and Hosere 
Burutol one o f  I 85,
(49) Thenoe a l in o , oroaaing the Maio Yin a t a point some 
four K ilom etres to  the West o f  the figu re 1,200 (d en oting  
h eig h t in  m etres o f  a low co n ica l h i l l )  on M o is e i s  map E 2 , 
to  a prominent co n ica l peak, Hosere Gulungel, a t tho fo o t o f
which
—■—- — iimnTn>iiimiLuiijj_iLi
l ^
8 which ( i n  French T e r r i t o r y )  i s  a sp r in g  impregnated w ith  po tash  
£
f which i s  well-known to a l l  oa tile-ow n ers in  the v ic in i t y ,  
f This Hosere Gulungel has a m agnetic bearing o f 228 from 
! the point (5 m iles from Genderu Rest-house which i s  known
5 ' *
e n j| lo c a l ly  as Kampani Massa on the main Kwancha -  Banyoi
I road where i t  (Hosere Gulungel) f i r s t  comes in to  view .e
; From th is  same poin t the mf\gnet l °  bearing to Hosere Lowul
i
i s  11. The S a lt  l ic k  o f  Banare l i e s  in  B r itish  T err ito ry .
(50) This peak, Hosere Gulungel, i s  the f i r s t  o f  s ix  
forming th e l i t t l e  chain o f  the Hosere Golurde (not "Gorulde" 
as on M oise i’ s map £ .2 )  • The fr o n tier  runs along th ese  s ix  
Qolurde peaks, thence to a l i t t l e  is o la te d  peak (Hosere 
Bolsumri) lea v in g  the Bolsumri Potash spring on the B r it ish  
side# The magnetic bearings from Maio Lelewal (otherw ise
known as Yakuba) R est-house a r e : -  to Hosere Gulungel 3
C h a i n
to the s ix th  peak o f  Hosere G olurde/323, and to Hosere 
Bolsumri 302# Hosere Bolsum ri, the nearest peck on the  
Frontier to  the Kwancha *» Banyo road, i s  over two K ilom etres 
from th is  road.
( 2l )  Thence along the chain o f  h i l l s  known as Hosere
hf /
N 'G ettl, which form the watershed between the Maio Gangan 
and the Maio Yin (and Taraba), and which ends in  a high  
f l a t  peak on a magnetic bearing o f  248 from Maio L elew al 
(or Yakuba) Rest-H ouse.
(52) Thenoe a l in e  over a high p lateau , orowded w ith  
m ountain-tops, forming the watershed between the Maio Gangan 
to  the West (B r itish )an d  tho Maio Dupbe to East (French) 
and- the Maio Banyo to West (French). These two last-nam ed  
r iv e r s  flow in to  the Maio M'Bamtl. Tho ’.vhdle o f  th is  lin o  
i s  e n t ir e ly  uninhabited fo r  fu l ly  f iv e  m iles on e ith e r  s id e ,  
and i t  extends for some 13 or 14 m iles in  length* I t  i s ,  
moreover, im p assib le  &t ibo very height o f the ra in s . I t  l i e s  
on a very lo f ty  and d eso la te  p la teau , and, s ta r t in g  f i r s t  in  a 
southerly  d irection :-, swings to the South v/est as i t  winds among 
a sea  o f  mounta.ln-tops forming in  succession  the groups known
lo c a l ly
lo c a l ly  as Koaere h'Yamn'Yeri, Sapbe Bnokni, Sapbe Pelraali 
Sapbo Wads, Sapbe G a lla l and Sapbe S irgu .
(23) Sapbe S irgu , known to  the lo c a l  Pagans as "Yawin'’ , 
and c a lle d  lo o se ly  rtG otel Bergo!! on M o ise i's  map £ 2 , i s  the 
l a s t  part o f  the watershed hetween Maio Gungan and Moio Banyo,
The Banyo-Gashaka-Ibi road Climbs s te e p ly  ux> th is  Sapbe Sirgu  
and outs the F rontier  at the apex o f  the pass s ix  m iles to  the 
North West of. the Gandua R est-house (th e  la s t  rest-h ou se  on th is  
road in  French te r r ito r y )  *
(54) Thenoe to  a p o in t a t the south west end o f  the G&pbe 
Sirgu, two K ilom etres to  th e North o f  the le t t e r  ’*!' i n  the 
word rti ‘ukobirt on M o ise i's  map E 2 . T his point in  on the oomajon 
watershed between the three so ts  o f  he&d-waters o f  the Maio 
G&shaka (B r it is h ) ,  tho Maio Donga (or Karl) B r it ish , and a lso  
o f  the Maio Tam a (French)*
(22) Thenoe a l in e  running, g en era lly , due South, to
'£.1
? cross the Eanyo-Kuma road two m iles  to  west o f  tho 1 ,630  metres 
h i l l  on M o ise i's  map B 2*
( 36) Thenoe the F rontier swings to the E ast, fo llow in g  
the watershed between the Maio Donga (o r  Kari) and the Maio 
Teram, thenoe to  the South B ast, among the Hosere N’lem. 
heaving the ^abri potash spring in  the G&shaka D is tr ic t  in  
B r it ish  T err ito ry . Thenoe south South West through, su ccessiv e ­
ly ,  the c r e s ts  o f  the Hosere if'Danganl, Hosere Kewal, Hosere 
Wejuru, and the Hosere JB&ngaro which l a s t  l i e  to the West North 
West o f  the Pagan v i l la g e  o f  Bangaro, to a point on a saddle  
which connects the more W esterly o f  the two p a r a lle l r id g es  
forming the Hosere Bangaro w ith th e  h igh er Sapbe Ma ( s t i l l  
fu rther to  the West)* This saddle forms the watershed between 
the source o f  the Mai N'Gum (French), which la te r  ^joins the  
Maio Teram s ix  m iles  South o f  Banyo Town, and the source o f  the  
Maio Kensue which i s  one o f  tho head waters o f  the Maio Donga.
The Maio was traced for s ix  m iles  from i t s  source as i t
flowed Bast towards th e large Pagan v i l la g e  o f  Kabri. The 
above-mentioned saddle i s  four m iles from Bangaro v i l la g e ,  and
i s
iJ
— lo  *■
t s  on th e  Banyo-Kabrl path* Thus the prominent rocky b lu f f ,
H oiere Tangbau, l i c e  e n t ir e ly  in  French T err itory*
(57) From t h is  saddle th e F rontier fo llo w s  the water filled 
t o  *  prominent peak, the second o f  the Sapbe Ma group o f  
iikftmtains* This peak i s  on a magnetic bearing o f  215 from 
th e  above-mentioned point where tho Banyo-Kabri path ou ts the 
Watershed between the Maio N*Gum (French) and th e  Maio Kerime 
. (B r itish )*
-w.--. (55) Thence the watershed runs g en era lly  south West along,
in  .su ccession , the peaks o f  the Sapbe Ma, the Hosere J in  ( in  
* fro n t.o f which range I s  a  very prominent, detached, fa n g - lik e ,  
q ?Z&!S |  rooky peak -  a lso  c a lle d  J in  -  v i s ib le  fo r  many m iles from the  
North, East and south , which i s  e n t ir e ly  in  French T e r r ito r y ) ,
; the Hosere Maio D a lle , and th e Hosere Geaumi* Infront o f ,
1
~«fcd p a r a l le l  t o ,  the, Hosere Gesumi i s  the chain o f  tho l e s s  
lo f t y  HOsere Hibao, These Hosere Ribao are c lo se  to, and 
overlook , th e  Ribao R est-house ( th e  th ird  R est-house from 
Banyo) and are w holly in  French Territory*
(59) Thence the F rontier continues amongst the peaks o f  
the Hosere Gerumi, fo llow in g  tho watershed between the head* 
w aters o f  th e  Maio Donga to  th e  North, and th e  Maio Kwi (French) 
-to the South, and th e Maio Mabe (French) to  tha South* These 
head-watere o f  the la t t e r  two (French) r iv e r s  ©merge .from 
between th e  Hosere Chemc, th e Hosere Du, th e Hosere A lta , end 
th e Hosere songkorong which, in  su ccessio n , form the f o o t - h i l l s  
to  ih e  l o f t i e r  Geeumi range behind them to  th e  North w est North 
of. Songkorong v i l la g e , which i s  on the B anyo-i£umbo-Bamenda road,
• th ese  Hosere G ecu mi are c a lle d  by th e  i^ o a l Fagans Hosere 
H&mbera*
( 60) Thenoe, th e Frontier fo llo w s the w atershed amongst 
th ese  Hosere Hambere (o r  Geeumi) to  the North of. the sources o f  
the Maio Kou&e, Mate and Maio Malam.to a  f a ir ly  prominent,
^.pointed peak w hich l i e s  on a  m agnetic b ea r in g  o f  l ^ f r o m  a  
c a ir n  o f  a to n e s , © f e e t  h i g f y  e r e c te d  on Septem ber 15th , 1920, 
on th e  South s id e  o f  ,tha  above Bany^kUJiho-Bamonda, road a t  ft . . .. |
p oin t
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m ile from N'Yorong Rest-camp and Qi m iles  from 
Songkorong v illa g e *
( 6 l )  Prom t h is  peak in  the Hosere Hambere (o r  Gesumi), 
which i s  s itu a te d  ju s t  to  the East o f  th e v i s ib l e  source o f  
ilifa jfcaio'H'Pi (o r  Baban) , the F rontier fo llo w s  the watershed  
v £ itb ie  a l l  the way from the Cairn, between the Maio Malam to  
Hast (French) and th e  Maio U*Fi (or  Bab an) to  West (B r it ish )  
t i l l  i t  cu ts th e  B any o-ftwbo-B amends road a t th e Cairn. This 
.Cairn i s  imm ediately under th e  h ig h est peak o f  the Hosere 
Hftrtgban, which i s  shown on M oisei*§ map F 2 as Hosere J a d j i ,
' *"iv\u S buVJfidji i s  r e a l ly  the narta o f the Pagan head o f  H’Yorong
V illa g e .
( ба) Thenoe the Frontier ascends t i l l s  h ig h est peak o f  
Hosere Nangban, fo llo w in g  the watershed beiVeeh the Maio 
Monchar and the Maio Nimaju, which are both to  the East and 
which both flow  in to  th e  Maio Malam (French), and a s e r ie s  
Of l i t t l e  burns on th e  West which flow  in to  th e Maio M*Fi 
(or Baban), B r it is h .
( 63) Thenoe the F rontier, fo llow in g  th is  watershed up 
end over t h is  h ig h es t peak o f  the Hosere Nangban to  i t s  fa r , 
o r  South West s id e , a t oho* s tr ik e s  the source o f  th e Maio Mafu.
v‘ (64) Thenoe th e  Frontier i s  formed by the median l in e  o f
. . the Maio M&fu, going downstream, to  i t s  confluence w ith  the 
Male Male (o r  N 'Sang). This confluence a lso  marks the end o f  
the F ron tier  between Y ole Province (Kwancha D iv is io n ) and th e  
o irco n scr ip tio n  o f  N'Gaunderc.
( 65) Thence th e median o f  the Maio Ilabe going upstream  
to  i t s  confluence w ith  the Kiver N ketitup.
( бб) Thenoe th e course o f  the River N ketltup upstream to  
i t s  $oui*oe at th e fo o t o f  Mount Batfang (Banco) or Kouetnana 
( a ^ c t i n )  *
( 67) Thence a  l in e  ^puth-westwards to  theravine s itu a te d  r 
* a t  the head o f  th e pass separating the two peaks o f  Mount 
Batfeng (Banso) or  kouetnani* (Baaan),
. ( 6b) Thenoe a l in e  South-aouth-eastwards to the w estern­
most p o in t o f  Lake Keban (Banso) op Tatufi (Bamn) aotss to
leave
it 'V:
’ v5 . vi
W ,’i
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leave ibis laKe. entirely to France.-. ; •7f.v. j _. tf ■ •.;■ .;
- ($9 ). Thenoo a l in e  Southwards to the suninit o f  Mount 
:an«
(7p) Thenoe a lin e  South-south-westwards to the foot 
jtf, Mount Bantiwan so as to leave th is h i l l  en tirely  to
J f c A ^ s v V  V>: ‘
v» A * I
u
V ( 7 Thenoe a lin e  South-westwards to the surnnit o f
..........................................
(72) Thenoe & l in e  westwards passing through the centre
to  the Weetom edge o f  the salV-spring called by the Bansos
jija I  ^P..&hd by the Barauna You.
(7}) Thenoe a lin e  West-aouth-westwards to the sudden- i :  v7
end,towards the South in  the River Mbui (Banso) or Mvi 
(Bosun)f which i s  shown on M oisei's map and i s  situated  at 
.gxaot point where th is  river enters the p lain  from
sant i
J
*«■
tiuA---# : between the mountains o f  Zemboui to the South and Njosnjom
>(Battso) or Mveng (Bansun) to the Nor tin
i*  ■». .. .
i .i 0 ) ( 74) Thenoe the river Mbui or Myi upstream to i t s
^jehfluenoe. with the River Molier (Banso) or NRou (Bamun).
/ iT5) Thenoe the fliver Molier. (Banso) upstream to a
jZQfC !<f ^ i n t  20Q yards Jbelow the ford on the path between the
V illages o f Koubofeam and fCoutopi so as to leave the Baiun 
^Village and plateau o f  Kcubofc&m to France and the area 
ca lled  by the Bansos Mbo&us to Great Britain.
.. . ( 76) Thenoe a lin e  para lle l to the Koubokam ~ Koutopi
rpath on i t s  Northern aide u n til the stream Moinum (Banso) ^r"' . j: i * “ .-.i .. . • . * •,. ■ ■ • ■
or Ketchouperin (Baaun) i s  reached thus leaving the K.oubokam -  
Kouiopi path wholly in  French territory,
, . . ( 7 7 )  Thenoe the stream Ketchouperin or lioinun u n til i t s  
dunetion^with the River Moinum (Banso and Bamun) or Upper Nun.
( 78) Thenoe the Moimm to i t s  function with the River
*im > ' v,‘i'....... ......................
: ' (79) ; Thenoe the River Nun to i t s  junction with the River
Ngwanonsia or Chavmga or chawga.
^  (80) Thenoe the River Ngwanonsia upstream to the point
where i t  i s  crossed by the NiavciU-43ambalang Hoad.
( 61)
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(81) Thence a l in e  Westward through the swamp to the 
Northern extrem ity o f  the is la n d  o f  Nkwefu (an e ld er  o f  the 
Bag am v i l la g e  o f FombefU).
(82) ihenoe a l in e  westward through the swamp to the 
point where the FombefU -  NkweiU path outs the r iv er  u  
or 1 ant am.
( 8^) 'thenoe the R iver lantam upstream to i t s  confluence  
w ith  the River Sefu or Mekatigo,
(84) 'ihenoe the River Sefu upstream to  i t s  source.
(85) ihenoe a l in e  South-westwards to the apex o f  the 
la rg e  is o la te d  rook c a lle d  Ngorna Fominyam.
( 86) Thenoe a l in e  Southwards to the source o f  the r iv e r  
Webinga near poin t 1300 in  M o ise i's  map and to the East o f  i t
( 87) ihenoe the River webinga to i t s  confluence w ith the 
Mbonso (B a li -  Bagam) or Momogo (Bagam).
( 88) Thenoe the River Mbonso to  i t s  confluence w ith the 
R iver M ifi.
( 89) Thenoe th e  River M ifi upsteam to  i t s  confluence  
w i th  th e  River Mogo or Doohi.
( 90) Thenoe the River Mogo upstream to i t s  confluence
w ith  the stream Dugum (Bali-flagam) or Mousete -  F on toh ili 
(Begem) which i s  s l ig h t ly  above where the Bagam -  Bali-Bagaa  
road cro sses  the R iver Mogo.
(91) Thenoe the stream Dugum to  i t s  source which i s
marked by a ca irn  o f  .stones on th e Eastern aide o f  Mount Ngenkoa
(Bali-Bagam) or Koungo (S again)
( 92) Ihenoe a l in e  to a ca irn  o f  stones at the top o f  
the d e f i l e  between Mount Ngenkoa in  the South and Mount la b ir a  
(Bali-Bagam) or Koumenou (Bagam) in  the North,
(93) Thenoe a l in e  to  the bend in  the River Bingaa (B a l i -  
Bagam) or sopor0 (Bagain) about s ix ty  yards from the above 
mentioned cairn .
(94) Thence the River Bingwa to  i t s  confluence w ith  
the R iver M ifl,
( 95)
A.o
tl014
?. A V
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( 95) Thence the R iver M ifi upsteam to i i s  confluence  
w ith  the R iver Kongwong.
( 96) ‘ihenoe the River Kongwong upstream to i t s  ju nction  
w ith  the River lo o lo o  or Ntoulou.
( 97) Thenoe the R iver Tooloo to a ca irn  a t the top o f  
the w ater f a l l  about one Kilometre above the conflu en ce o f  the 
R ivers Tooloo and Kongwong.
(98) Thence a s tr a ig h t  l in e  on a magnetio bearing o f on 
hundred and th ir ty  degrees to  the summit o f  a c ir c u la r  peak 
im m ediately to  the North o f  the d e f i le  Zemerabi through which 
pass©3 the Babadju-Bapinyi path*
( 99 ) Thenoe the l in e  o f  h eigh ts overlooking to the East 
the v a le  o f  Babadju and to  the West the v a lle y  o f  the Meso to  
the peak Asimi where th is  l in e  o f  heights ends.
(100) Thence a s tr a ig h t l in e  to the cen tre o f  the marsh 
shewn on M o ise i's  map as Mbstecho and ca lled  K if i by tho natives 
o f  Babinyl and Tchinbintcho by those o f  Babadju.
(101) Thenoe the o rest o f  tho watershed between the 
Cross R iver on the West and the River Noun on the East to a 
beacon in  the centre o f  a sm all area o f  fo r e st  named Mepong 
about 400 metres South East o f  Mount Lekonkwe or Etcheintankeu 
on the o rest o f  the w atershed.
to  if 3  (102) Thence the stream 1 ant ohempong, which has i t s
source about twenty f iv e  metres South West o f  the above men­
tion ed  beacon, to  i t s  confluence w ith  the stream Mintchemach&r- 
leo .
(103) Thence the stream Mintchemecharlee upstream to  
the p oin t where i t  most nearly reaches two small rocks named 
l o l e s e t  which mark the boundary between the w il ls g e s  o f Fossong 
E le len  and Fongo Tongo or the road between those v i l la g e s ,
(104) Thenoo a l in e  p assin g  through the two rocks 
named l o l e s e t  to  the source o f  tho stream Monchenjemaw or 
Mont ch i Zemo*
s tream
(lOp) Thenoe th is  stream to  i t s  oonfluenoe w ith  t h e , /
Munchiscmor or lAontoM Zemoua v/hich has i t s  source about f i f t y
m etres West o f  the la r g est o f  the three rocks c a lle d  Melogomar 
le e  or Melegotnele* ( 106)
~ 15 -
( 106) ihenoo the streean Munohisemoia to  i t s  source,
(107) Thence a l in e  p a ssin g  through the centre o f  the
la r g e s t  of the three rooks c a lle d  Uelogomalee to  the source o f  
the stream Monohita or Montohi Menlo about one h u n d r e d  m etres 
South South East o f  the above named rook,
(108) Thenoe the stream  Monohita to  i t s  confluence w ith
the River Bamig*
(109) Thenoe the R iver  Bamig upstream to i t s  source on a 
fo r e s t  covered h i l l  c a l le d  Itonehop ( the poin t where the River 
Bamig crosses the Dsohang-Fontem Road i s  marked by a beacon) •
( HO) Thence a l in e  through the o rest o f the h i l l  Nkenohop 
to  the o rest o f  a fo r e s t  covered h i l l  c a lle d  Siambi*
(111) Thenoe a s t r a i g h t  li**e to  a beaoon p la ce d  on the  
watershed a t  a  p o i n t  known as  Rtohoumgomo*
(112) Thence a  l in e  fo llo w in g  the cre st  o f the watershed  
between the Cross R iver on tho West and the River Nkam on the 
East through the summits o f  Mounts Ngoma and Joinen to the 
summit o f  Mount wencoon#
(U 3 )  Thence a s tr a ig h t  l in e  running South South West to  
Join the R iver Ngwe*
(114) Thenoe th e  R ive r  Ngwe fo r  a d i s t a n c e  o f  th re e  
Kilometres to  i t s  a f f l u e n t  the  s tream l i p l o ,
(115) Thence the stream L lplo  to a point f iv e  hundred 
metres west o f  tho Moangekanr*Lo track*
(116) Thenoe a l in e  running p a r a lle l  w ith th is  track  
and f iv e  hundred m etres West o f i t  u n t i l  th is  l in e  reaches 
the orest o f  Mount Njimba*
( i iy )  Thenoe a l in e  along the crest o f  Mount RJimba to i t s  
suosnit which l i e s  to  the ®est o f  the French v i l ia g e  o f  Moangekam* 
(118) Thenoe & l in e  through the summit o f Mount Ngokela 
to the p la in  o f  slu n g  le a v in g  the Muanya compound o f  Nyan in  
B r it ish  terr ito ry *
<119) Thenoe a traok cut aoross the p la in  and marked w ith  
p osts  so as to  lea v e  the v i l la g e  of Nyen in  B r it is h  te r r ito r y  
and the v i l la g e  o f  Po-Wassura in  French te r r ito r y  u n t i l  th is  
track  reaches the stream E’didio*
( 120)
(120) Thence th i3  stream u n t i l  i t  i s  crossed by the Poala- 
Muangel trade*
(121) Ihenoe a l in e  running South South West along the 
sunmit o f  Mount Manenguba to  the r id ge surrounding the b a s in  
o f  the lakes*
(122) Thenoe a ourved l in e  along the Eastward sid e  o f  the 
rid ge  u n t i l  the p oin t where the Muandoar-Poala track cro sses  
the ridge*
(1.2}) Thenoe the Mu«ndon-\Poala track in  a W esterly  
d ir e c t io n  down the s lo p es  o f  Mount Hahin and Mount Ebouye 
u n t i l  I t  reaches the R iver Mbe*
(124) Thenoe tho R iver Mb© whiob runs p a r a lle l  w ith  Mount
ttueba, u n t i l  a  l in e  o f ca irn s and p osts  i s  reached.
(125) Thenoe th is  l in e  o f  oairns and p o s ts , which marks 
the boundary between the French v i l la g e s  o f  Muaminam (Grand 
Chef Naasso) and the E nglish  v i l la g e s  o f the Bakes s i  tr ib e  
(D is tr ic t  Head Ntoko) and the Hinong tr ib e  ( D is t r ic t  Head 
Makoge), to the point where an unnamed tribu tary  from the 
North Joins the R iver Eko*
(126) Thence a  l in e  touching the two westeramoat p o in ts
o f  the boundary o f  the former German p la n ta tio n  o f  N goll to
the o rest o f  Mount E lesioag*
(127) Thenoe along the o rest o f  Mount E leaiang to the 
Northern most p o in t o f the tobacco p lan ta tion  o f  Nkolonkote*
 (128) Thenoe a l in e  running South South West along Mount
Eddon* so  as to  leave  the p la n ta tio n  o f  Nkolankoie in  French 
te r r ito r y  and the p la n ta tio n  o f  Essosung in  B r it is h  te r r ito r y  
to  the summit o f Mount Coupe*
(129) Thenoe a s tr a ig h t l in e  running South South West 
to  a ca irn  o f ston es on the Luor-Ngab Road at a po in t s ix  
thousand nine hundred and th ir ty  metres along th is  road from 
the Railway track*
(130) Thence a s tr a ig h t l in e  in  a South w ester ly  
d ir e c t io n  to  the source o f  the River Bubu.
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( 131) 'Ihenoe the R iver Bubu to  a point twelve hundred 
m etres downstream from a p lace  c a lle d  Muanjong farm.
(132) Thence in  a s tr a ig h t  l in e  in  a W esterly d ir e c t io n  
to  the source o f  the Hiver Ediminjo.
(1 33) Thenoe the River Ediminjo to i t s  oonfluenoe w ith  
the R iver Mungo#
U 54) Thenoe the R iver Mungo to  the point in  i t s  mouth 
where i t  meets the p a r a lle l  4 °2 f 30* ftorkh*
(135) Thence th is  p a r a lle l  o f  la t itu d e  Westwards so as 
to reach the coast South o f  Tauben Island#
( 136) Thenoe a l in e  fo llo w in g  the c o a st , passing  South 
o f  R eiher Island to  Mokola Creek thus lea v in g  the whole o f
/tfpteel* map
&#1* the Moewe See infB ritish  Territory
(137) Thenoe a l in e  fo llo w in g  the Eastern banks of the 
Mokola Mbakwele, NJubanannJau, and Matumal oreeks and c u tt in g  
the mouths o f  the Mdossa-Bombe, Mikanje, Tende, V io to r ia  and 
o th er  unnamed oreeks to the Junction  o f Matumal and V ic to r ia  
creaks#
( 138) ihenoe a l in e  running 35 degrees West o f  true 
South to  the A tla n tic  Ocean#
(Sgd#) GRAEME iHOMSOK •
Governor o f  tho colony 
and P r o t e c t o r a t e  o f  N iger ia*
(Sgd) Marohand 
GOVERNOR 
Conmissa ire  do l a  
Republ ique Francoise  an Cameroon,
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B etr .t  Kamerun, Tabak-Plantage Esoeung 
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren!
1 . Mein Vater, Herr C.F. Raethke, hat in  den Jahren 1905*14 
in  Kamerun ira Bakossiland (Regenwald-Gebiet) am FuGe des Mont 
Coupe ein e Tabak-Plantage aufgebaut: hochwertige Zigarren-DuQk-- 
b lo t te r , fu r  d ie  damala in  Bremen hdchste P re ise  (und Auszeibh* 
nungen) e r z i e l t  wurden. Das Gelhnde l i e g t  in  1 ,060  m Hohej bebaut 
waren b is  1914 120 ha. Noch heute b efin d et s ic h  dort e in  grades, 
huGerst s t a b i le s ,  aber renovierungabedU rftiges e in -  b ia aw ei- 
etd ek iges Haus m it K ellergesohoS.
2. Unterhalb des Fnrmgel&ndes in  oa. 2 km Entiernung l i e g t  das 
Dorf Ndom, das tiber Loura -  Tombel (von Tombel m it Eandrover oa.
,JE2 Jfea.Uher liyasaso) ^rreiehbar 1 s t .  Die Bewahner d ie s e s  D orfes 
s t e l l t e n  damale d ie  A rbeiter ftir d ie  Farm, d ie  nach dem 1 . W elt- 
k rieg  von Englhndern Ubarnoramen, aber 1969 auigegeben wurda*
3. Ala ic h  Ndora M itte Pebruar b esuchte, s t e l l t e  ioh  f e a t ,  daiB dae { 
r ie s ig e  Gelhnde (gewiS 1 Qkm) m it E lefantengras sowie Buach- blew. " 
Baumwerk zugewachsen i a t .  Baa Klima dort 1 s t ,  v er g le ich sw e ise  *• 
mit Douala) gesund und angenehm; kaum M oskitos. Die B o rfleu te  
bauen p riv a t K affee, Tee, Banan&n u .a . an; Tabak habe ich  n ic h t  \ 
gesehen. Man bat mioh sehr, dort zu b le ib en , und d ie  Farm wieder » 
in  Schwung zu bringen (p rak tisch  sind d ie  Keute a e i t  1969 a r b e itf  4* 
lo s  und rech t arm). Schon wegen meinee A lters  (65) mu/3te ic h  das i> 
ablehnen, Ich  verBprach aber, den Versubh zu unternehmen, jfilr I 
d ie se s  P rojekt in  Deutschland In terea se  zu erweoken. j
4* N attirlich sind v ie le  Sohw ierigkeiten , ss.B. Tr&naport-Pr'obieme 
und d ie  Vermarktungsfr&geh, zu Idbeft* Gepruft warden mUBte uuK% 
auch, ’ N . ■
-  welche P la n -P r io r ita ten  warden von der Kameruner A dftin i¥tratit 
v e r fo lg t  -
-  sind g le ich g ew ich tig e  Partnerbeziehungen zwiechen Investoran  
und A dm inistration  zu erwarten?
-  wie sind d ie  blirokratiechen HUrden beachatten (Xd^patbna- 
Wi rrwarr ) ?
-  Klhrung der Steuerfragen und des e v t l .  Cewinntransi’e r s .
5 . Ich bin  mlr a lso  k lar darUber, w ie v ie le  Fragen zunhohst o ffen  
sin d , sehe a n d ererse its  aber fUr einen jungen, ta tk r h ft ig e n  land  
w ir tsch a ftlich d n  Faohmann auoh e in e  e v t l .  groQe Chance, p r a k ti-  
eche E ntw ick lungeh ilfe zu l e i s t e n  und Bich zu g le ich  ein e  gute  
E xietenz aufzubauen: wachsen werden dort v ie le  tropiBohe
b.w.
E r z e u g n ie a e , n i c h t  n u r  T abak.
B i t t e  prU feri S i e ,  ob S ie  e in e  M d g l ic h k e it  s e h e n ,  d ie a e n  V o r e c h la ^  
a u f z u g r e i f e n  und i n  I h r e  A k t iv i t & t e n  e in z u b e z ie h e n .  M it dem C h ie f  
o f  C o u n c il  yon  ?fdom, H errn  M ukete Max M a io g e , N d o m /B a k o a s i, 
T o m b e l-S o u th  D i v i s i o n ,  s t e h e .  ic h . i n  V erb i^ d u n g ; e r  h a t  JCopie d ie a e  
S c h r e ib e n s  e r h a l t e n .
Flir e i n e  A n tw o rt d a n k t  Ih n en  im vorau ^  .
o  ux
j  ‘t I.# .* i. e . .  i •. t* % A 1} ;%.. . »■ • • V . . .t • ' . !  . i  I » y  • l . a. \ t  % .J  i  i I .
a’-eVO‘ii/iu*ti ,'auj i  ..Mj-w w* * • — - . -  'rj i *''•
Assembly in Yaounde—a thing which is unknown in the British 
sector of the Camerooos.
It must be added that the statute of these French nations has 
given the inhabitants of the French Cameroons greater means 
of economic security than it has in the British Cameroons and 
this makes their ties with France well-nigh inseparable. . . .
As we have already pointed out in this memorandum, unifi­
cation of the two Trust Territories will lead to a lot of complica­
tions because of divergent forms of administration and different 
economic systems. Difficulties in blending the two forms of 
local government systems, two forms of legal and educational 
systems and, worst of all, the harmonizing of the British and 
French cultures are factors to be reckoned with.
We are not prepared to forgo the benefits we have derived 
from the British Government and neither will the French Cam­
eroonians be prepared to sever their connexion with the French 
Union.
The bulk of the indigenous population of Kamerun is within 
the French sector. They number over 3 millions, and in the 
Southern Cameroons there are only 750,000 people. It follows, 
therefore, that the greater stakes lie on the other side of the 
border. In other words, the weight of choice will lean more 
to the side of those whose sector has the greater population.
We have studied the problem of unification very closely and 
carefully and are fortified in the decision we have taken by the 
arguments already advanced. Our views about unification have, 
therefore, been modified according to circumstances of the 
time, and our present attitude is summarized in a policy state­
ment made by the Hon. E. M. L. Endeley, O.B.E., M.H.A., 
Premier of the Southern Cameroons, during a state banquet 
held in Buea on 29 May 1958, to mark the introduction of the 
ministerial system of Government in the Southern Cameroons, 
to wit, "We of this Government, however, having the political, 
economic and social well-being of the Southern Cameroons upper­
most in our minds, are convinced that far from being a priority 
issue, unification should only be achieved by evolutionary means, 
that is, when an independent French Cameroons outside the 
French Union, and an independent Federation of Nigeria of 
which Southern Cameroons will form a part, would be in an 
unfettered position to explore the possibilities of union as part of 
the movement towards the creation of a United States of West 
Africa ".
Since 1953 the Southern Cameroons has been faced with three 
general elections. Another general election is expected to take 
place early next year which will be followed by a federal election. 
Elections, apart from anything else, are expensive and necessitate 
the withdrawal of staff from their normal pursuits. The Visiting 
Mission will recall the Statement by Her Majesty's Secretary of 
State for the Colonies at the Nigeria Constitutional Conference in 
London in 1953 when he made the separation of the Southern 
Cameroons from the Eastern Region of Nigeria conditional 
upon the outcome of a general election which was then pending 
in this Territory. Since the circumstances which have now arisen 
are essentially similar, we would urge that the same test of 
opinion be applied, and if our party wins the majority of seats 
in the House of Assembly, then it would be taken for granted 
that our party policy has the full support of the majority of our 
people.
In the event of it being finally decided, however, to hold a 
plebiscite as recommended by the British Administering Autho­
rity, we would, for the reasons advanced above, suggest that the 
referendum be as simple as possible and be conducted with the 
minimum of expense and inconvenience to the illiterate masses 
of our people. Moreover, we want safeguards to prevent the 
infiltration of saboteurs from the French sector into our 
sector in order 'to influence the referendum in favour of the 
unificatiouists.
Finally, we need hardly emphasize the fact that the Southern 
Cameroons is one of the under-developed areas on the west 
coast of Africa and needs extensive external financial aid if 
the Territory is to keep pace with her neighbours in all fields of 
human endeavour. The Mission will recall that we have repea­
tedly laid strong emphasis on this unenviable situation during 
each visit of representatives of the Trusteeship Council, but to 
no avail. In this connexion, we are constrained to invite the 
attention of the Visiting Mission to the findings and recommenda­
tions of the Mission organized by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development which visited Nigeria and 
Southern Cameroons in 1 9 5 3 . We would, therefore, enlist the 
earnest and sympathetic consideration of the Trusteeship Council 
with a view to the competent organ of the United Nations orga­
nization being asked to afford us the financial aid we sorely 
need.
(Signed) E. M. L. Endeley (KNC) 
N. N. Mbile (KPP)
B. E x t r a c t s  f r o m  a  m e m o r a n d u m , d a t e d  2  N o v e m b e r  1 9 5 8 ,
b y  th e K am er un  N ational D emocratic P ar ty  (KNDP)
The Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) attaches 
the greatest importance to the fourth United Nations Visiting 
Mission to the Cameroons because its report will influence major 
decisions affecting the political life of the people forever. We 
understand that the most important business of the Mission is 
to make recommendations to the United Nations on the method 
which the people of the Cameroons should adopt to determine 
their political future in relation to Nigeria. The second reason, 
which will come as the consequence of the first, is our relation 
with Northern Cameroons and Cameroons under French admi­
nistration. We are much concerned in indicating the method 
we would like to employ in determining our future and, while 
leaving the Mission free to take its own decision, it should be 
the method which will set the Cameroons free from its entan­
glement in the Federation of Nigeria.
Secession
{a) The KNDP is fully certain that the people of the Cameroons 
under British administration want secession from the Federation 
of Nigeria. Our brothers of the northern sector have been silent 
over the question of secession from the Federation of Nigeria 
and union with us not because they do not want to be with us 
or because they are more akin to the people of Northern Nigeria 
than to us, but simply because they have no true representatives 
due also to the fact that the degree of literacy among them is 
very low. They therefore are not aware of what is happening to 
them. For these reasons we shall say very little about them, 
but would like the Mission to understand that they need to be 
properly educated on the present political changes and to give 
them time to understand the grave situation of having themselves 
implicated in an independent Federation of Nigeria. We therefore 
regret that we must confine our recommendations in the main 
to the Southern Cameroons and to encourage our brothers in the 
north to fight out their own salvation separately.
(6) Secession, as the Mission will note throughout its tour of 
the Southern Cameroons, has its origin in the masses and has 
influenced the stand now firmly taken by the KNDP. It is 
not the other way round, as asserted by the few advocates of 
integration who said that it was the KNDP which was influencing 
opinion in favour of it. Secession is not motivated by grievance 
as a result of ill treatment from Nigeria, but purely for the purpose 
of maintaining national identity. There can be therefore no 
question of appeasement either from the Administering Autho­
rity or from the Nigerians. Because the masses of our people 
desire to leave the Federation of Nigeria and seek a means of
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building a Cameroons nation, we have decided to respect their 
wishes, and have to ask that the.Mission be convinced that there 
is no alternative. The Kamerun National Congress (KNC), which 
has been the ruling party since 1954, gained its popularity because 
of the policy of secession and reunification which it  has now 
unceremoniously abandoned. Its new policy of integration, 
which the leaders seek to hide under the cloak of " Association 
with the Federation of Nigeria ", has been fully resented by the 
chiefs of the Southern Cameroons. This new doctrine is of 
very recent date and cannot be taken to mean that any reas­
onable number of the people support it.
Reunification
(а) Reunification is consequential upon secession. That is 
why for the time being, while we are still a part of the 
Federation of Nigeria, it is proper to make secession the beginning 
of reunification.
(б) Reunification is a matter in the hands of the people 
of those sections of Kamerun whose people, acting freely and 
knowingly, desire to unify. It cannot be imposed. The two 
Administering Authorities and the. United Nations are requested 
to take note and to co-operate to see its realization in time. That 
the desire for reunification is there is obvious from the dramatic 
change of the Government of the Cameroons under French 
administration, and its swift advance to independence. The 
House of Assembly there has already sanctioned the wishes of 
the people for reunification. The next pronouncement remains 
to be made in the Southern Cameroons and Northern Cameroons. 
If the KNDP comes into power as a result of the pending general 
election to be held in early January 1959, a motion will be passed 
to confirm the consent of the people on this side for reunification. 
'When the two Governments shall have spoken in favour of the 
move, it should be the place of the two Administering Authorities 
and the United Nations to lend us their co-operation. If reuni­
fication there is being approached as a matter between two self- 
governing States, we see no obstacles in our way.
(e) The KNDP feels that federation will suit a unified Kam­
erun. This will be a matter to be discussed between the Govern­
ments of the sections of the Kamerun.
Method of determining the wishes of the people as to secession 
or integration
The United Nations Visiting Mission is charged with the re­
sponsibility of making recommendations as to the method to be 
adopted in determining the wishes of the people as to their 
future relations with the Federation of Nigeria. We advance 
the following as most suitable in certain circumstances;
(a) Plebiscite. A plebiscite is necessary when the Mission 
feels that there is not sufficient proof from the people in favour 
of secession or integration. If the people do understand the 
issues involved, we consider that the Mission is right to rule in 
favour of the opinion which seems to them to be of the majority.
(A) Election issue. Where the people are sufficiently educated 
as to the issues involved in a contested general election, the result 
could be taken to reflect the wishes of the people provided that 
there is a big majority in favour of one of the two issues and 
provided that such a general election was fair and just and free 
from fraud. If it is so free, them a plebiscite following the result 
of the election will therefore be of no use.
(c) Public opinion and the result of a general election. Where 
the Mission is convinced that there is an overwhelming public 
opinion in favour of one of the issues, and this is supported by 
the result of a general election, we consider it proper if the Mission 
resches its conclusions accordingly.
While hoping that the northern section will vote in favour 
of secession, we wish to recommend that the result of any ple­
biscite should be judged separately. This is because both sec­
tions of the Cameroons under the British administration have 
wide variations in the degree of attaining political status. The 
result of a plebiscite in the Southern Cameroons will mean simply 
that the people want secession to achieve reunification. A simi­
lar result in the northern sector would mean a host of other 
things. It will mean in the first instance that the people wish 
to secede from, the Northern Regional House of Assembly or 
that they want to unify with the Southern Cameroons to form 
a State within a unified Kamerun. There are consequently 
more problems to be solved in the Northern than in the Southern 
Cameroons, and we do not wish to minimize our chances of seces­
sion and reunification by bringing both sections together as if 
they were one. We wish further to point out that in the event 
of a plebiscite being conducted, the people should be prepared 
for it, village by village, throughout the whole of 1959 and part 
of 1960, and the issues carefully explained. The United Nations 
knows this, but we wish also to add that we shall take part in 
canvassing the north for success in favour of secession and li ni~ 
fication with us, or otherwise according to' their choice.
The pending general election
We wish to make it abundantly clear to the United Nations 
Visiting Mission that the KNDP will undertake to carry out 
secession from the Federation of Nigeria if we come into power 
as the result of the pending general election. We have made this 
stand clear to the British delegation and the Nigerian delegations 
at the Nigeria Constitutional Conference held in London between 
29 September and 26 October 1958. The Mission will appreciate 
this in view of the fact that Nigeria will also be preparing for 
its independence in 1960, and therefore if we should secede, we 
must do so before the United Kingdom Government hands over 
power to the Federation of Nigeria.
Development. We wish to recall that the previous United Nations 
Visiting Mission received petitions requesting direct financial and 
technical aid from the United Nations to make it possible for 
roads to be pushed through to connect the Benue and Adamawa 
sections of Northern Cameroons. This inability to meet our 
brothers has tended to create the opinion that they were a differ­
ent tribe and that they want to remain part of Northern Nigeria. 
In addition, trade in the Southern Cameroons has flowed mainly 
from Nigeria because of lack of an all-season road to connect 
the Territory with our little ports at Victoria. We therefore 
strongly hope that the United Nations will include, in its pro­
gramme for 1959, the Cameroons among those areas of the 
world which need financial and technical aid.
In conclusion, we wish to say that we have shelved other 
problems facing this Territory because we wish priority to be 
given to the ways of deciding the destiny of Kamerun as a nation 
at this crucial stage of its political history. Regarding 1959 as 
a transitioinal period, we request that the Administering Authority 
should enquire into all subjects affecting the existing relations 
between Nigeria and the Southern Cameroons financially, admi­
nistratively and otherwise, and make recommendations on how 
to sever these services without difficulty when the time comes.
(Signed) J. N. Foncha 
National President
C. E xtracts from a m em orandum , d a t e d  10 October 19&8, 
b y  the P r e sid en t  of th e S o u t h er n  Cameroons Ch ie fs’ 
Co nfer enc e
It will be appreciated that the- repeated appeals of the 
Southern Cameroons people have always been for economic, 
educational, social and political developments ; but this time, our
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permanent concern—" our future relationship -with an indepen­
dent Nigeria *'—has been made complicated, upsetting and 
ruinous not by the United Nations organization, not by the 
Administering Authority and not even by the Nigerians 
themselves, but by a few Cameroons beneficiaries. At 
the present level of developments, the people of this Territory 
honestly and relentlessly demand secession from the Federation 
of Nigeria in order to concentrate on much harder work towards 
self-government and independence outside the Federation of 
Nigeria as a direct member of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations. In th™ connexion, it must be stated that the demand 
of Mr. Endeley to associate this Territory with the Federation of 
Nigeria administratively and politically does not in any case 
reflect the wishes of the masses of the Territory. A plebiscite 
will be the only medium through which the free wishes of the 
people on their future can definitely be ascertained.
The Government of the Kamerun National Congress (KNC) has 
completely lost the confidence of the people of thi3 Territory 
for inconsistency and unreliability and cannot therefore claim 
to speak for Southern Cameroons. This Government got into 
power because of its secession doctrine in the event of Nigeria 
becoming independent. Eventually Mr. Endeley, the leader of 
this unpopular party, changed from ** secession " to “ integration " 
and •* association ", This Territory is not prepared to tolerate 
this inconsistent and rather dictatorial Government. Neither 
is it prepared to achieve independence within the Federation 
of Nigeria. Under the circumstances it  must be noted that 
Mr, Endeley’s demand for the termination of the Trusteeship 
Agreement is not in keeping with the desire of the people of this 
Territory. This demand has been made only in the interest of 
a negligible few beneficiaries, Mr. Endeley himself not excluded.
(Signed) Achirimbi II, 
Fon of Bafut,
President of the Southern Cameroons Chiefs' Conference
D .  E x t r a c t s  f r o m  a  m e m o r a n d u m , d a t e d  2 9  O c t o b e r  1 9 5 8 ,  
f r o m  Mr. J. I. K a m s i  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  O n e  K a m e r u n
PARTY
[Original text: French]
With regard to the national independence of Kamerun,
The Kamerunians of both zones and of all classes of society 
have decided in favour of the unity and independence of the 
country:
(a) Three nationalist movements, pioneers in furthering the 
lofty aims of the Kamerunians, have been dissolved and their 
leaders deported solely because they favour the unity and inde­
pendence of the Kamerun;
(b) On 1 9  February 1 9 5 8  the Legislative Assembly of Buea, 
Southern Kamerun, adopted a motion calling for the indepen­
dence of the country in 1 9 5 9  ;
(c) From 13 to 14 March 1958 the briefing Assembly of 
*' One Kamerun " (OK) adopted a resolution calling for the reuni­
fication of Kamerun and the immediate proclamation of its 
independence;
(d) On 6 April 1 9 5 8  the traditional chiefs from all corners 
of the western part of the country unanimously adopted a reso­
lution calling for the immediate secession of Kamerun from the 
Federation of Nigeria and further declaring their support for 
the immediate independence of the country;
(«) The Assembly of Kamerunian Women, held at Kumba 
on 1 9  May 1 9 5 8 ,  adopted a resolution in favour of the immediate 
unity and independence of Kamerun;
(/) The Legislative Assembly of Yaounde adopted a resolution 
on 20 October 1953 asking for the termination of the trusteeship 
in a reunified Kamerun on 1 January 1950.
All levels of society in Kamerun have amply expressed their 
desire for the unity and independence of Kamerun.
In the light of Article 76b of the United Nations Charter, 
appropriate action should be taken towards that end.
Consequently,
1. There should be a joint Assembly of all representatives of 
the north and south of Western Kamerun under British admi­
nistration. However, since the chief aim of the Administering 
Authority is to annex Kamerun to Nigeria, the representatives 
of Northern Kamerun attend only the Assembly of the Northern 
Region of Nigeria; that indirect annexation threatens to deprive 
the Kamerunians of the north of their national identity.
2. Bearing in mind article 6 of the Atlantic Charter, the United 
Nations and the Administering Authorities should make a serious 
study of the natural frontiers of Kamerun, for a large portion 
of our land is included in the French and British colonial empires 
and another portion has been absorbed by Spain namely, " the 
island of Fernando Po
3. We note with deep regret the malevolent way in which 
the Administering Authorities, States Members of the United 
Nations, disregard the resolutions of the United Nations, the 
provisions of the Charter and the principle of the right of peoples 
to self-determination.
4. We request;
(а) That the right of freedom of speech, assembly, association 
and expression should be respected;
(б) That articles 9 and 14 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights should not remain a dead letter;
(e) The unconditional return of the Kamerunian nationalists 
deported for no valid reason;
(d) Compliance with Article 87 of the United Nations Charter.
6. We emphatically denounce the joint French-British policy 
of imprisoning political refugees without reason, the arrest by  
night and the removal at a late hour of Comrade Noubi Janvier, 
and we protest vigorously against the transfer to the French 
authorities of the four prisoners who had taken refuge in Bamenda.
We again point out that the repressive measures carried out 
by armed troops are continuing in Eastern Kamerun; the most 
flagrant example, revealed by the French authorities themselves, 
is the shooting of Mr. Ruben Urn Nyobe and three other Kam­
erunians in the forest near Boumnyebel (see Presse du Cameroun, 
issue No. 2515, of 16 September 1958).
Referendum
6. In the interest of the United Nations, for the sake of eco­
nomy and in order to avoid too much travelling, the referendum 
or plebiscite on the secession of Western Kamerun from the 
Federation of Nigeria and on the immediate reunification and 
independence of the Kamerun should be held as one single 
operation and should be couched in the following terms:
" Are you in favour of the secession of the western zone
from the Federation of Nigeria and of the unification and
independence of Kamerun? "
There will be only two candidates competing, namely, ” yes " 
and " no ”.
Should the United Nations insist upon holding separate ple­
biscites, the one on the separation of the western zone of our 
country from the Federation of Nigeria should be carried out in 
two parts i.e., the results in Northern Kamerun should be kept 
separate from the results in Southern Kamerun. That procedure
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would make it possible to avert the fate which befell Western 
Togoland. Thus each region will have to be responsible for its 
actions. This popular consultation should be held under the 
supervision of the United Nations.
7. The future of our country should in no event be decided 
by an election.
In conclusion, the will of the people and the right of peoples 
to self-determinatioa must not be stifled.
The United Nations, the international tribunal guaranteeing 
the security of nations, must be equal to its task.
Long live friendship and peaceful coexistence among peoples* 
Long live the United Nations!
Long live the young Kamerunian nation of tomorrowl
(Signed] Joseph Innocent K am si
A n n e x  III
Decisions of the resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference} 1958, 
concerning the Southern and Northern Cameroons
The following are those sections of the “ Report by the Resumed 
Nigeria Constitutional Conference, held in London in September 
and October 1958” ( Federation of Nigeria: Federal Government 
Printer, Lagos)  which relate particularly to the Trust Territory.
A. Co nc er n in g  th e  So u t h er n  Cameroons 
XV. The Southern Cameroons
65. Before Southern Cameroons affairs were considered by 
the full Conference, the Secretary of State held preliminary dis­
cussions with all delegates and advisers from the Southern Cam­
eroons. The representatives of the Kamerun National Congress 
and the Kamerun People's Party stated that the major political 
objective of their parties was the attainment by the Southern 
Cameroons of the status of a region equal in all respects with 
the other regions in an independent Nigeria. They were accord­
ingly anxious to achieve rapid constitutional progress to prepare 
themselves to take their place in an independent Nigeria.
66. The representatives of the Kamerun National Democratic 
Party said that their party did not wish the Southern Cameroons 
to become a permanent part of an independent Nigeria. Their 
objective for both the northern and southern sections of the 
British Cameroons was secession from the Federation of Nigeria. 
They were therefore opposed to further constitutional advance 
for the Southern Cameroons in any form which led to, or had 
as its objective, closer association with Nigeria,
67. The Secretary of State took note of the difference of view  
expressed. He said that, although the undertaking given in 
1953 to accord self-government to any Region that requested 
it had applied only to the Regions existing at the time and there 
was therefore no commitment on the United Kingdom to agree 
to further constitutional advance, he was nevertheless prepared 
to accept in principle that the Southern Cameroons should become, 
at the appropriate time, a Region fully equal in status to the 
other Regions of Nigeria. Such a development, by preparing 
the people for full self-government, would be in fulfilment of 
one of the basic objectives of the Trusteeship Agreement while 
it would in no way commit the Southern Cameroons to permanent 
association with Nigeria, about which it would be for the people 
of the Territory to express their wishes at the right time. In 
view of the Trusteeship Agreement it would be necessary for the 
United Kingdom to retain in the hands of a representative of 
Her Majesty reserve executive and legislative powers in respect 
of the Southern Cameroons.
68. It was accordingly agreed with the Southern Cameroons 
representatives, and subsequently approved by the Conference, 
that no immediate constitutional changes should be made but 
that it should be open to the Southern Cameroons Government
which would be formed after the elections to be held in January 
1959, to request the United Kingdom to bring into effect all or 
any of the following changes. The Secretary of State undertook 
that the United Kingdom Government would then give effect 
to these changes forthwith in so far as they could be made 
without constitutional amendment, and that the necessary legal 
instruments should be prepared as soon as possible.
(а) The Executive Council:
(1) The Deputy Commissioner should cease to be a member 
of the Executive Council and the House of Assembly.
(2) The Legal Secretary (or Attorney-General) should continue 
to be a public officer and to be a member of the Executive Council 
and the House of Assembly.
(3) At a convenient time after the 1959 budget the post of 
Financial Secretary should be abolished and instead a Minister 
of Finance should be appointed.
(4) There should be provision that the number of Ministers, 
in addition to the Premier, should be not less than four nor more 
than seven. Provision should be made for the appointment in 
addition of not more than three Parliamentary Secretaries.
(5) The Commissioner should appoint the Premier and should, 
on his recommendation, appoint other Ministers and Parliamen­
tary Secretaries.
(б) The Commissioner should continue to • preside over the 
Executive Council, but this arrangement should be reviewed 
towards the end of 1959. The legal instruments should be so 
drawn as to make this possible without further amendment.
(5) The reserve legislative and executive powers:
These should be directly vested in the Commissioner, although 
there should continue to be provision empowering the Governor- 
General as High Commissioner for the Southern Cameroons to 
give the Commissioner directions as to the exercise of the powers 
vested in him. If and when the Southern Cameroons becomes 
a self-governing Region the position of its constitutional head 
would be similar to that of the Governors of the existing Regions 
in an independent Nigeria.
(c) Assent to legislation:
Subject to the High Commissioner’s power to give him direc­
tions, the Commissioner should assent to legislation.
(i) The Judiciary:
One of the judges appointed for the High Courts of Lagos 
and the Southern Cameroons should be specifically assigned to 
the Southern Cameroons so that he would spend as much of the 
year as was necessary in the Southern Cameroons and be avail­
able in Lagos only for such time as he was not required in the 
Southern Cameroons.
elected members of the Assembly as the person best able in his 
opinion to command a majority in the Assembly and who is 
willing to be appointed. The Premier presides over the Council. 
The Northern Region is to obtain on 16 March 1959 the same self- 
governing status, which is open also, as explained in the Mission's 
report, to the Southern Cameroons if the people decide that 
they wish to remain part of the Federation after independence; 
while the trusteeship status existed, however, reserve executive 
and legislative powers would be retained by the Administering 
Authority in respect of both the Northern and Southern 
Cameroons.
At the head of the pyramid of government in the Region there 
are Governors representing the Crown. In the self-governing 
Regions the Governor occupies a position approaching that of a 
constitutional ruler, acting on the advice of popularly elected 
Ministers in all but a limited category of subjects; the occasions 
on which the Governor is empowered to act in his discretion are 
limited principally to the exercise of the power of pardon and of 
responsibilities in relation to the police force delegated by the 
Governor-General. Certain types of legislation may be disallowed 
by the United Kingdom Government.
A t present the Governor-General presides over the Council of 
Ministers of the Federation. Certain powers are reserved to 
him by the Constitution and by his Royal Instructions: for 
example, he retains responsibility for the armed forces and for 
external affairs. H e is also responsible, in his discretion, for the 
use and operational control of the Nigeria Police and is empowered, 
in his discretion, to  give directions to  the Governors of the Regions 
for the purpose of ensuring that the executive authority of the 
Region is not exercised in such a way as to prejudice the exercise 
of the executive authority of the Federation or to endanger the 
continuance of federal government.
The United Kingdom retains certain over-riding powers until
independence. These include the power to amend or to n 
the constitution, the power to disallow certain categori 
legislation, and the power of the United Kingdom Paxlia 
to legislate for Nigeria.
Nigeria is expected to attain independence with this fe 
form of constitution, suitably modified. The Secretary of 
for the Colonies declared at the resumed London Confe 
in 1958 that he was authorized by the United Kingdom Go 
ment to say that if a resolution was passed by the new Ft 
Parliament early in 1960 asking for independence, the L 
Kingdom Government would agree to that request and \ 
introduce a Bill in Parliament to enable Nigeria to becc 
fully independent country on 1 October 1960.
A number of important provisions were recommended L 
Conference for inclusion in the constitutional instruments, 
included provisions for fundamental rights and freedoms, ■ 
fications for citizenship, procedures for changes in rei 
boundaries, powers to safeguard the nation, and provisioi 
the control of the police. Procedures for the amendment i 
constitution, including the regional constitutions, after ind 
dence were also recommended. The Conference agreed that 
the units of a federal structure were interdependent, no 
unit, including the Federation, should be able to amer 
constitution in a way contrary to the general interests < 
whole of Nigeria. Those parts of the Federal and Re; 
constitutions which were primarily of internal interest s 
•therefore be amendable by a comparatively easy procedm 
requiring the concurrence of any other unit of the Fedei 
But the parts of the Federal and Regional constitutions 
were of general concern should be entrenched and the proc 
for their amendment should require the concurrence of 
units of the Federation. Detailed provisions were re comm' 
accordingly.
A n n e x  VI
Election speeches by the principal political leaders 
of the Southern Cameroons, January 1959
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A. E lection broadcast  b y  M r. P . M. K ale, leader  
o f  th e  K a m er un  P eo pl e 's P a r ty  (KPP), 16 J an u a r y  1959 
As we are approaching the third General Election into the 
Southern Cameroons House of Assembly, which was created in 
1953 following the dissolution of the Eastern House of Assembly, 
I take this opportunity of addressing myself to the electorate 
of the twenty-six constituencies of the Southern Cameroons 
through the medium of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation 
on the stand of the Kamerun People's Party. But before I go 
further let me first of all give you a background of the KPP. 
The KPP was bom in 1953 just at a time when there was a serious 
political crisis in Enugu which ended in the dissolution of the 
Eastern House of Assembly, during which time the Cameroons 
was attached to the Eastern Region. Thirteen Cameroonians 
were then legislators in the Eastern House of Assembly. After 
the crisis they broke off into two factions, forming two political 
parties, the KNC and the KPP, Since its inception the KPP 
has dedicated itself to the propagation of truth, the service of 
the Cameroons people and the preparedness to pay even the 
supreme sacrifice on behalf of our Fatherland, in order to bring 
home to our people those things that make for prosperity, health 
and happiness amongst civilized mankind. In the pursuit of 
these ideals, the KPP advocated this period of mingled goodwill 
and peaceful coexistence between Cameroonians and non- 
Cameroonians, irrespective of racial or tribal affinity. In other 
words, right from the word go the KPP adhered to the principle
that the unity of the Cameroons with Nigeria was vital t 
political progress and healthy development of the Came 
These ideals, lofty as they are, were misunderstood b 
enemies of the Kamerun People's Party, who painted them 
as saints and saviours of the Cameroons. The result wa; 
everything was done to discredit the Party's leaders and foil 
before the people throughout the length and breadth t 
Cameroons. In spite of that, however, we held our g 
firmly. Today, barely six  years later, the cause of the KP 
been more than vindicated. A cross-section of the people 
begun to view matters from the right perspective. The fut 
the Cameroons is clear to them now in the Ught of constitu 
arrangements and/or changes. Others, for sentimental or 
reasons are sceptical or rather pessimistic, and therefore 
divergent views as to the future of the Cameroons in relati 
the Federation of Nigeria.
In plain language let me discuss the main differences, • 
seem to be purely ideological, between the KPP and its oppo 
There are really only two of these opponents, the KND1 
the OK—that is, On6 Kamerun. As to the KNC, there i 
no ideological difference between it and the KPP. The two p. 
programmes are basically the same, because they have n 
that there can be no brighter future for the Cameroons th 
continued association with Nigeria. There is, howevc 
element of political opportunism in most of the KNCers, 
rather relentless attack on the leadership of the KPP by i
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sequential followers of the KNC. The seeds of these were, of 
course, sown by the entire pyramid of the KNC in 1953, but 
things have changed through the magnanimity of the leadership 
of the KNC, so I can afford to ignore that. The KPP believes 
in parliamentary democracy, Britain's proudest system of govern­
ment; and to believe in democracy one must appreciate what 
Voltaire meant when he said " I disapprove of what you say, 
but will defend to the death your right to say it We believe 
in freedom of speech and the right to appeai. We hold it as a 
fundamental human right that our opponents have the right 
to exist and to express their views as they see fit, so long as they 
do not impinge upon the rights of others. It is with that at the 
back of my mind that I am discussing the other political parties, 
and addressing myself strongly to the Cameroons electorate to 
be wary when the clock strikes for them to cast their votes on 
Saturday, 24 January this year of our Lord, 1959.
During the two Constitutional Conferences held in London, 
which I attended, the leaders of the K PP and the KNC agreed 
that the political life of the Cameroons, for reasons of administra­
tion and other arrangements concluded since forty years ago, 
was better secured by its continued association with Nigeria.
The last Constitutional Conference upheld this view by agreeing 
that, all things being equal, the Cameroons would constitute a full 
Region in the Federation of Nigeria, equal in all respects with the 
other Regions. As a practical step towards that goal the political 
status of the Cameroons has been enhanced by the introduction 
of the ministerial system of government. The attainment of 
self-government has also been agreed upon by constitutional 
arrangements to take effect as from October this year. These 
are some of the major achievements, amongst several other ones, 
which the combined efforts of the KPP and the KNC have borne 
for the benefit of Cameroonians, irrespective of creed or tribal 
connexions. In other words, the KPP is demonstrating to the 
world in a humble way the capacity of the black man to rule 
himself in his own country. Our stand to remain as a component 
part of the Federation of Nigeria is compatible with world 
opinion—an opinion which supports unity and not fragmentation 
of African races or groups, and it is also based on the indisputable 
fact that Cameroons political evolution has been greatly influenced 
by our association with Nigeria. That is so because for the forty 
years or more of the administration of the Cameroons as an 
integral part of Nigeria, Nigerian politicians and other leaders 
of thought, in their struggle to free Nigeria from the yoke of 
foreign rule, have always been conscious of Cameroonian national 
aspirations, have sympathized with same, and encouraged our 
growth towards becoming a self-governing territory. In fact, 
political parties in Nigeria have always had the Cameroons in 
their programme: for instance the National Council of Nigeria and 
the Cameroons and Dr. Mbadiwe’s new political party, the 
Democratic Party of Nigeria and the Cameroons. But contrary 
to what the KPP maintain is contemporaneous with world 
opinion, the KNDP holds the view that the salvation of the 
Cameroons lies in its secession from Nigeria. Another political 
party, One Kamerun, holds the same view, and demands also 
unification of both the French and the British sectors of the 
Cameroons. The fundamental issue at stake, as I see it, is not 
who is right, but what is right. Having reached puberty somehow 
from British tutelage in so far as to achieve Regional status, 
having a Legislative Assembly with a Premier and Ministers, and 
guaranteed equal rights in the Federation of Nigeria, is it  right 
for us to secede now and constitute the Southern Cameroons 
into a minute nation of three-quarters of a  million people against 
33 million strong of Nigeria, East, West and North, and four 
and a half millions of the French sector—or, having seceded, 
join the French sector with its four and a half millions and 
thereby throw overboard a culture that we have imbibed for 
forty years, and then embrace an entirely new one and start it 
all over again? Because however the protagonists of secession 
and unification argue the case, British political culture in relation 
to colonies is different from the French, and it  is unthinkable
that four and a half millions tutored French Cameroonian3  would 
surrender to three-quarters of a million British tra in s Cam­
eroonians.
Or is it better to remain as a component part of the Federation 
of Nigeria, and keep what we already hold for ourselves, the 
living ones of today, and for sons and daughters of the Cameroons 
yet unborn, bearing in mind that a bird in the hand is worth 
two in the bush? The choice is before the Cameroons electorate. 
May the footprints on the sands o f tim e which have guided 
great nations like Great Britain and the United States of America 
to build a heritage of freedom, guide you all in casting your votes.
B. E lection broadcast b y  J. N. F oncha, P r e sid e n t - 
Gen eral  of th e  K am erun  N a t io n a l  D emocratic P arty 
(KNDP}, 16 J a n u a r y  1959
Cameroonians and friends of the Cameroons, in a few days you 
will be called upon to perform the most important of the civic 
duties you owe the Southern Cameroons. The forthcoming 
general election to be held on 24 January 1959 is an opportunity 
for us all to choose the party which has proved itself to be 
devoted to the preservation of the national identity of the 
Cameroons. I have spoken to many of you right In your village 
gatherings and have given sufficient warnings as to the snares the 
KNC Government was preparing for us. Now that your time 
to give judgement against them is drawing near, I wish to recall 
some of the reasons why you should be careful to make a proper 
choice.
When in March 1955 I took the decision to go on the Opposition 
I had foreseen that the KNC would abandon our cherished policy 
of secession from the Federation of Nigeria. The alliance 
concluded with the Action Group without consulting the opinion 
of the National Executive Committee was a direct reversal 
of the famous " Benevolent Neutrality *' declaration of April, 1953, 
and was a piece of insult to democratic-minded Cameroonians. 
It was an indication that worse decisions would be taken again 
unless something was done to curb the emerging dictators within 
the party. Those who now remain within the KNC have stooped 
so low to policies propouded against their own conscience that 
they have accepted serfdom as their lot. This is the time to 
shake off the chains of dictators from your hands and conscience 
and so help the nationalist party to regain freedom of thought 
and speech for you.
I  have tasted the bitterness of being in opposition to a Govern­
ment which works against the wishes of its people, but I have 
been the more happy for it because I have held up the national 
aspiration of Cameroonians from being bartered away secretly. 
A t the Bamenda Summit Conference of May 1956, the KNDP  
stood firmly for secession from the Federation of Nigeria, thus 
forcing the KNC to take refuge under the platform of the KPP, 
The two hitherto bitter enemies found room for a compromise 
and together they signed a common resolution to remain part 
of an independent Nigeria, and requested that only a full regional 
status be accorded. This first submission of the NKC to the 
KPP was a betrayal of the trust imposed upon it by well meaning 
citizens of the Southern Cameroons and an eye opener to my 
prediction that it was heading towards integration.
It was a happy issue that the disagreement created at the 
Bamenda Summit Conference was carried to the Nigeria Constitu­
tional Conference held in London in 1957. Here, the KNC/KPP 
continued to present a united front against the KNDP, but 
ideology rather than numerical strength was the deciding factor. 
The result of the Conference, as could be seen, proved to be more 
favourable for the KNDP than the allied parties; for the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies being between and betwixt had to rebound 
the matter to the Cameroons people at home. He, however, 
gave the two options to chose between remaining a permanent 
part of an independent Nigeria or to secede from it and to
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continue under the Trust Administration of the United Kingdom 
Government for a time before our own independence as free 
Cameroons people. He then added the warnings that Her 
Majesty’s Government would be bound to follow the wishes of 
the majority whichever way they might choose to go.
The resumed Conference made no marked change in the stand 
of the two opposing parties. However, the KNDP delegation 
was able to -force an agreement for the time for holding the 
general elections, an achievement which is all the more appre­
ciated in view of the diiatoriness and unwillingness on the part 
of the KNC/KPP Government to go to the polls.
Each succeeding conference revealed some hidden aspects of 
the KNC plans for integration and hastened its fall. The Bamenda 
Conference prepared the way for the 1957 general election in 
which :the KNDP rose from two to five, thus reducing the KNC 
from ten to six, and enabling the K PP to increase its lone 
member to two, thus forcing a patched-up government formed 
by using the six Native Administration nominated members. 
The Second Conference caused a further internal strife which 
resulted in the formation of two factions within the KNC Govern­
ment. The Secessionist faction later on broke off and joined the 
KNDP. To maintain a majority at least in the House of Assem­
bly, a  huge concession had to be offered to the KPP to enable 
it to agree to a coalition government. Meanwhile the KNC 
had become so depleted that the few members remaining had to 
be kept up by false promises. Some of them have been appointed 
members of boards which do not exist and they now know only 
too late that they have been deceived.
You can now see how much we of the Opposition have done to 
sustain the fight for freedom for the Cameroons. By delaying 
tactics we have given Cameroonians the opportunity to mobilize. 
It is now the business of the whole nation to strike with a mighty 
force the final blow. Therefore let us all be ready for the zero 
hour, which is 24 January 1959.
Why must the KNDP capture the next Government of the 
Southern Cameroons? We all know the answer only too well. 
I mentioned earlier that I have for the past four years tasted the 
bitterness of a government which works against the wishes of 
its people. The future of the Southern Cameroons to me looks 
gloomy and I am determined to set things right with the goodwill 
of the thousands of Cameroonians now ready to contribute their 
shares for the success of a KNDP Government.
I wish therefore to ensure all citizens and friends of the Cam­
eroons that once the KNDP is voted into power they will have 
justice and the respect due to them. The implementation of the 
recommendations of the resumed Conference would be a regret­
table thing if it were left in the hands of the KNC/KPP Govern­
ment. Cameroonians, if  they would be considered for higher 
appointment at all would have to bend low, cap in hand, and 
consent to the meanest orders against their conscience. If they 
now rule with an iron hand even when the soil has been removed 
beneath their feet, how much more if they were given another 
opportunity to carry on for the next five years? Intimidation 
and victimization of the civil servants had been the order of the 
day, and I fail to see how in a democratic world of today human 
beings would continue to work under such conditions.
A KNDP government would liberate our workers from fear 
and an uncertain future and would enkindle in them the spirit 
of patriotism and self-respect which are essential for success in 
any business. Employment and promotion shall be on merit, 
and efficiency shall be obtained by mutual respect and trust which 
are essential between the legislators and the civil servants. The 
establishment of a Cameroons Civil Service this year would mean 
nothing to Cameroonians if this were done by a KNC/KPP 
Government. The KNDP as the nationalist party will be the 
one to follow our policy of Caraeroonizing the Civil Service of this 
Territory. While strangers continue to have chances for employ­
ment, this will be limited to the very few, special ones with
special technical knowledge necessary for continuing the presei 
establishment.
Another important constitutional change which must not b 
allowed to fall in the hands of a dictatorial government is tli 
inauguration of the House of Chiefs. The K NDP regards tli 
House of Chiefs as an additional authority for the building up of 
peaceful and stable government. Its inauguration will disclos 
the valuable practice gained through long experience of villag 
politics which should be directed to fit in with the running < 
modern Governments. The only party fitted to direct such 
body is the KNDP, which has long been interested in it.
Let me now draw your attention to our economic potentialitie 
and say what a KNDP Government would do about them. Th< 
integrationalists have since the inception of the Southern Cam 
eroon Regional Status fed us with the alleged poverty of tin 
Territory, but we were never discouraged because we know th- 
facts. We maintained that this was not true, but that th> 
shortcomings in our yearly estimates were due to the arbitral 
award of 1 per cent to the Territory as its own share of th. 
constitution grant, and we continued to say that it was quit, 
below our just contribution. How far we were right was provei 
by the Fiscal Commission, an impartial body which quickly sav 
the matter in its correct perspective. Instead of I per cent i- 
proved that our share was 5 per cent. Thus, instead of receivinj 
from the Federal Bank only ,£200,000 in a good year for th. 
Southern Cameroons, we were due £ l  million and a balance o. 
,£800,000 was retained in error. Secession, we maintain, wil. 
bring the Southern Cameroons an era of prosperity, for instead 
of receiving only a part of our income, we shall retain the whole
Indeed, we are poor in the midst of plenty. Our soil is compa­
rably richer than that of any Region of the Federation. Oui 
banana crop, the easiest source of wealth available for everybody, 
refuses to grow in other Regions of the Federation. In addition 
oil palm, cocoa, coffee and rubber, the main source of the wealth 
of the Eastern and Western Regions, grow almost uncultivated in 
the Southern Cameroons. Tea, pepper, castor oil, citrus, soya 
beans etc. are proved to grow luxuriantly in the Territory. 
Vegetables are of numerous varieties. Our timber resources 
are great.
It is our plan that once we come into power we shall liberate 
the funds of the Regional Development Agency and give suitable 
loans to those farmers who are desirous of making use of our 
rich soil. The KNC/KPP government has failed in its promise 
for loans.
And now, Ladies and Gentlemen, the general election and its 
purpose: You have been warned of the consequences of your vote 
on the 24th. You will choose between freedom or eternal subor­
dination. The KNC and K PP stand for permanent subjugation 
of your right for a Cameroons nationhood to that of Nigeria. 
The return of the KNC/KPP to  power would mean submission 
to the regime of approved dictators. It shocks right-thinking 
people to imagine it could happen again. If you do, apart from 
giving , up yourselves, your children, the land and its wealth to 
an independent Nigerian Government, you would be giving 
yourselves Once more to brutal rebuke as well as restoring a 
regime of terror to the peaceful, loving people of the Cameroons.
But if you vote the KNDP to power, you will secede from the 
Federation before 1960. You will then work for real freedom for 
the Cameroons as a nation. You will build up the economy 
of the Southern Cameroons on a better footing under the guidance 
of United Kingdom Government as the Administering Authority. 
The freedom loving peoples of the world will admire you and will, 
through their representatives in the United Nations organization, 
give us the assistance necessary for a new, emerging nation. 
Under the KNDP government you will enjoy the sympathy of 
those who have suffered injustice in order to make you free and 
happy.
Secession from the Federation of Nigeria will place the Southern 
Cameroons in a position to negotiate terms for reunification with
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Encouragement in this field has been sustained by advancing 
moderate short-term loans to farmers through their co-operative 
societies and the recent inauguration of the nucleus of a Co­
operative Bank. This will lead to a definite policy of establishing 
a genuine spirit of self-help among Cameroons peoples.
Educationally, and in spite of our limited resources, we speeded 
our scholarship policy and sent more Cameroonians who other­
wise could not afford education abroad to study the professions, 
and in a few years started reaping the henefit by seeing young 
Cameroonians take up Senior Service or European posts in the 
country. The first girls’ secondary school has been introduced to 
save our girls from the difficulties they experienced in going 
abroad for secondary education, and it is a pleasure to see that 
Cameroons girls are quickly taking their place as workers in 
various fields. A vigorous programme for teacher training is 
being pursued.
In the sphere of roads, a great deal has been achieved in the 
last four years as compared with the state in which we were 
before 1953. There are now permanent bridges throughout our 
Federal network, and a programme of widening and surfacing 
is going on.
A plan to improve our feeder roads into the productive areas is 
being pursued and the Tombel road is to be made all-season by 
the end of this year. Work on the Mamfe road is in progress 
and survey work on the Bakabe-Foatem road is being carried 
out now. By I960, we shall not suffer the seasonal handicap of 
having our roads closed in the wet season.
We are now proud of having at least one hospital in every 
Division and are also improving and are expanding old hospitals 
as well as extending maternity and welfare services into the rural 
areas.
Flans are afoot for introducing pipe-bome water into all our 
important towns in the Territory, and towns like Kumba, Buea, 
Tiko, Bamenda, Nkambe have already been served.
I could go on like this the whole evening, and I can say categori­
cally that in spite of handicaps, the face of this Territory has been 
more greatly changed in the last four years than it was ever 
dreamt of in the first forty years under British administration 
as part of the Eastern Region.
There has been vigorous commercial activity and expansion 
following in the wake of this political advance and both banking 
and commercial houses have opened up expensive branches 
throughout the Territory. Investment in timber business and 
plantation industry have not lagged behind. All these have meant 
more opportunities for employment and training for Cameroonians 
in their country, especially as the Government has insisted on 
providing adequate safeguards for their welfare in their interests.
These and other things has my party planned and done for 
you. The programme stretches far into the future until greater 
prosperity and better living standards become the order of the 
day in the Southern Cameroons and our people can hold their 
own and command respect and recognition in the ever growing 
community of Independent West African Territories.
What do our newly fledged and untried adversaries like the 
Kamerun National Democratic Party and One Kamerun offer
the people? Nothing but the never-ending and meaningless 
slogan of secession from the Federation of Nigeria. They simply 
have no faith in the capacity of the Cameroons people to progress 
at the pace of other Regions or manage their own affairs efficiently. 
They stated quite categorically before the Secretary of State last 
October that the Cameroons people are too backward to have 
absorbed the constitutional changes introduced in 1958 adequately 
and warrant the new proposals asked for by KNC/KPP Alliance 
which include:
(1) A full African Minsterial Cabinet (excepting the Legal 
Secretary);
(2) An independent Judiciary and Public Service for the 
Territory;
(3) Regional self-government this year;
(4) Independence with the other Regions of the Federation 
in 1960 on a basis of full equality.
They advocate secession and unification with the French 
Cameroons and a blank future. Their reasons for this is that 
they fear enslavement by Nigeria but wouldn’t mind enslavement 
under a French Cameroons which would have been independent 
in January 1960 and therefore politically more advanced than the 
Southern Cameroons. They talk glibly of wishing to retain the 
Cameroons identity. What other identity do we want besides 
the one offered by the independence of our legislature and the 
power to manage our domestic affairs in the way we want?
They have allied themselves to One Kamerun party, the 
reincarnation of the notorious UPC, which was very fitly rejected 
in 1957 elections.
If the French Cameroons is in such a happy state over their 
political future, why do French Cameroonians now resident here 
not pack up en masse and go home to rejoice as Ghananians and 
Guineans did? Why do they cling like leeches and flock daily 
to this Sector?
The issues before you all are clear as crystal. The Kamerun 
National Democratic Party has neither the men nor the pro­
gramme for the next government of this country.
If you allow yourselves to heed their emotional and alarmist 
cry of " Wolf, Wolf " when there is no wolf about, you may live 
to regret it for generations yet to  come. But I trust in the sound 
and independent judgement which is characteristic of the South­
ern Cameroons electorate and which has weathered you through 
the trials in the early years of our political struggles, and I call 
on you to return the KNC in greater strength than ever, for you 
have all the worthy sons of the country contesting on the KNC 
platform and the rest in the KPP platform. Reject the KNDP 
as political imposters who want to reap where they did not sow.
A new KNC government assures you of fearless and thoughtful 
leadership, continued progress and a secure and peaceful future. 
A KNDP or One Kamerun government means nothing but noise, 
a blank and uncertain future and a possible plunge back into 
barbarian tribal law and the stone age,
I am confident that as usual you will vote for the " Banana 
and the house " and return your party, the KNC, to power to 
take good care of your future.
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Avoiding trouble along the 
Cameroon frontier
A  D E L I C A T E  T A S K  F O R  B R I T A I N
Politically West Africa is almost 
as explosive as any part of that 
continent. In the Cameroun 
Kepublic, which became indepen­
dent on January 1, there are an 
estimated fifty. thousand people in 
revolt against the Government and 
an average of two hundred killings 
every month.
Although the revolt is in former 
French trusteeship and the French 
Army has been asked back to 
help to put it down, its repercussions 
in the neighbouring British trusteeship 
of the Southern Cameroons are likely 
to involve the British Army before 
long. We may well be vilified In West 
Africa for imperialist machinations in 
an area that, paradoxically, we have 
never taken any real interest in and 
that we are only too anxious to leave.
Arbitrary division
. The trouble is centred ■ on the 
Barriileke tribe, which' lives along the 
range of hills and low mountains run­
ning down to the Cameroon mountain 
and the volcano island of Fernando Po. 
This tribe was divided, as arbitrarily 
as Germany , has more recently been, 
when the German colony of Camerun 
was made a League of Nations trus­
teeship after the Great War. But as 
the frontier run5 in some places along 
remote mountainsides and in others 
through almost impenetrable jungle 
and thick banana plantations it is 
almost uncontrollable. This never used 
to matter. Natives crossed freely to see 
their relatives, to trade and smuggle. 
The British always crossed to use the 
French roads when driving long dis­
tances, because the ones on their own 
side are so appalling.
However, the two parts of the. tribe 
were inevitably under very different 
Administrations. The Colonial Office 
put the Southern Cameroons'under the 
wing of Eastern Nigeria, made a 
mental note that it was a nicely remote 
spot to send badly behaved- district 
officers, and then quietly forgot about 
the place. Law and order were main­
tained, but except in the South there 
was virtually no development. The 
Bamileke lived on in primitive happi­
ness, largely uneducated, talking the 
pidgin-English so well reproduced by 
Gerald Durrell in “ the Bafut Beagles.” 
It is still a colonial never-never land. 
When I was there recently a O.O. I 
know had been asked by a distant 
village if he would please collect their 
back taxes for the past ten years.
On the former French side, where 
there are far more Bamileke, a curious 
mixture of development and reaction 
has produced a veritable powder keg. 
The Bamileke there are the Hardest 
working tribe in the country and they 
form a sixth of the total population of 
three millions, but they occupy a dis­
proportionately small amount of land. 
The French ruled through the chiefs, 
who retained completely . feudal 
powers, yet roads,' good primary educa­
tion, and the money put into the 
couptry by France all combined to 
make the Bamileke wake up. Resent-
B y Bichard Cox
ment against the chiefs and land 
hunger -were strong when the U.P.C. 
party was founded. This party 
demanded independence, and union 
with the British Cameroons, ■ so it 
naturally appealed to the Bamileke. 
When, in 1955, it was declared illegal 
and its leader, Dr Felix Moumie, fled 
abroad, the Bamileke were just in the 
mood to run wild. Dr Moumie ordered 
a terrorist campaign to force the 
French out, and the slaughter began. 
Aided by. Czech arms and advice— 
there are undoubtedly Communists
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with both-Moumie and the rebels—it 
has continued ever since, undeterred 
by the achievement of independence, 
the likelihood of Cameroon unity, and 
the legalisation of the U.P.C.
It is In fact largely out of Dr 
Moumie’s control. The burning of vil­
lages and the' mutilation of women 
and children has resulted in vendettas 
between villages, while “ young intel­
lectuals ” have taken their chance, 
formed their own bands, and set about 
destroying the power of the chiefs. 
The countryside is in anarchy. Moumie 
dare not return to lead the U.P.C. and 
could not stop the violence if he tried. 
French troops are doing their best, 
but are due to leave on June 30, and 
will be happy to do so.
Naturally all this has affected the 
Bamileke on the British side. Not only 
have they been alarmed and distressed, 
they have been forced to shelter their 
terrorist cousins, who need somewhere 
quiet to hide out and plan new raids. 
In January this year internal security 
and the apprehensions of the popula­
tion demanded some action by the 
authorities. So the Nigerian Army sent 
two battalions to police the frontier 
and deport terrorists.
Quite apart from the difficulties of 
physically catching suspects who move 
along mountain tracks up to two days’ 
march from the nearest road, there is 
the problem of positively identifying 
them. The policemen who accompany 
every patrol to make the arrests can 
usually tell a French Bamileke from a 
British one, but often only the pos­
session of terrorist rings, badges, or
passes can complete the proof. Some 
terrorists go unhindered still, hut 
many come up before a magistrate. 
They are, declared, illegal immigrants 
and are taken to the frontier and 
handed- over, ■ where the French 
security forces most probably make a 
quick clean end of the matter against 
the nearest wall, When you have seen 
the destroyed villages and children 
with no hands and feet you cannot 
blame the French either. You can only 
marvel at the patience with which the 
Nigerian Army patrols go out, carry­
ing Bren guns, rifles, and no ammuni­
tion, and successfully arrest the 
terrorists without incident or violence. 
Confidence has been restored in the 
administration of the Southern 
Cameroons remarkably quickly.
Withdrawal of troops
Far from being pleased, Mr Foncha, 
the Premier of the Southern 
Cameroons, has asked for the removal 
of the troops by October 1, when they 
will be withdrawn anyway, as an 
independent Nigeria wisely wants to 
keep out of the affair. The Premier 
proposes to -replace them with a 
Southern Cameroon Army not yet in 
existence, but supposedly to be 
manned by the numerous Cameroon­
ians now serving with distinction in 
other West African armies. This would 
sound better if anyone were able to 
name these said soldiers. Admittedly, 
it placates the Opposition, over whom 
M-r Foncha no longer has a majority, 
and who would fiercely oppose the 
arrival of British troops. But it does 
not solve the problem.
It is difficult to see how Britain can 
avoid the responsibility, at least until 
the plebiscite in April, when the 
Cameroons will decide whether to join 
Nigeria or the Cameroun Republic.
While the Colonial Office seems to 
have .ceased to bother about the 
administration of the country, it is 
certainly now worried about this 
military question. But if the Colonial 
Office feels it ought to do something, 
the Foreign Office must hope devoutly 
that it will not. When the Northern 
Cameroons voted in its plebiscite three 
months ago to remain with Britain 
there were howls throughout West 
Africa. I have had it seriously put to 
me by Nigerian Ministers that we 
influenced that plebiscite in order to 
keierp the area for a future military and 
nuclear base. It would be exceptionally 
ironic if, 'having decided not to give 
the Southern Cameroons such an 
option of remaining under British 
rule, the Government should in its last 
six months of tenure be forced to give 
apparently solid evidence of our mili- 
tantly imperialist designs on a 
strategically useless corner of Africa.
Indeed it would be easy to regard 
the whole affair as a traditional farce, 
in which all the events combine to 
force the Colonial Office into the’very 
position it has been trying to avoid 
from the start, were It not that for the 
ordinary people of the Southern 
Cameroons it is serious. For the entire 
time of our trusteeship we have done 
the absolute minimum for them and 
now, whatever their politicans may 
say, they do need our help.
from New 
Republic
BUEA, Southern Cameroons, 
fa June 18 
lyTORE than-700 refugees from 
the ‘ Cameroon Republic 
have crossed the border into the 
Southern Cameroons in the past ■ 
two- days, according to official 
sources here.’ Men, women and 
children have arrived carrying! 
on their heads the few belongings ! 
that they have been able to j  
bring away, i
Over 5 , 0 0 0  refugees from the| 
new republic — independent since 
January if ter 4 0  years of French 
rule—hive already settled, in this 
British, trusteeship territory, which 
is to vote next year on whether to 
join the Cameroon Republic or 
N i g e r i a . .
' T he increased flow of refugees, 
according to the same sources, is due 
to increased activity by Cameroon 
Republic security forces In the dis­
turbed Bamileke region. They are 
driving terrorists towards the villages 
near the border, and the villagers in 
turn  are fleeing from the terrorists.
Europeans Killed,,
Europeans, mostly French in 
D ouala, asked the Cam eroon prime 
M inister for increased protection 
when he visited the town this week, 
according 'to  reports.
Six Europeans are said to  have 
been  killed by terrorists in D o u a la ! 
this m onth. A ttacks are being m ade 
in daylight on  Europeans and on ' 
shops. Europeans and Africans 
working for E uropean Arms have 
gone on strike in protest. Nearly ail 
shops in 'D ouala  are closed and 
tension is high, added the reports.— 
Reuter.
'V—
huM for
'an 
terrorists
’ From Pieter Lessing
DO U A L A ,  Cameroun Republic, Tuesday.— French and Camerounian i 
troops this morning began 
a mass sweep through 
terrorist-held North-West 
Camerouns.
This follows the latest 
series of bomb outrages 
which In two weeks have 
claimed seven European and 
countless African dead.
British troops are standing by 
near the border to prevent terro­
rists fleeing into the British 
Cameroons. >
R e v o lt
Documents captured during 
recent raids suggest , that 
Moumie, who is directing the 
terrorist campaign from the 
safety of Guinea, may be pre­
paring , to return to the 
Camerouns. to lead a general 
revolt of the Baileke tribe to 
establish an autonomous Com­
munist regime in the North- 
West Camerouns. ,
The Frencn have'accused the 
British authorities of allowing 
terrorists to take refuge In the 
British Cameroons where they 
can rest and regroup.
The total number of dead 
since the terror campaign 
started 13 months ago is esti­
mated a t well over 4,000. The 
savageness of the terrorist 
attacks is similar to tha t of 
Mau Mau in Kenya,
I  was taken to mass graves 
where women and children were 
• indiscriminately hacked to 
pieces and buried together.
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EVENING NEWS, FRIDAY, JUNE 27, 1958
CAMEROON 
ATROCITIES
Are these revelations true?
A UNITED Nations Visiting Mission is due in the French Cameroons to determine the true aspiration of the people and feverish 
preparations are being made by the Nationalists to present one united 
front for the total liberation of the territory from the shackles of 
French imperialism.
The following are information collected from reliable 
source in Douala and we are asking the French Ambassador in Accra 
to  answer the following questionnaires which are indeed very shocking1 
treatments and a troc ities: .
IS IT TRUE THAT :
1. On 1 7 /7 /S 7  in Douala, early in the morning all children on 
their way to  school have been arrested and taken to the nearest 
Police Headquarters for Identification. Only 3 students were 
released. All others were murdered and thrown into the Wouri 
river ?
2. On 8 /1 1 /5 7  in Douala, in the New-Bell quarter, 300 people 
were arrested and taken to Makak concentration camp and 
since then, nothing was heard about them ?
3. On 5 /1 /5 8  in the Dinde quarter, in Dauala, 30 women were 
arrested and raped by French soldiers before being carried off 
to unknown places.
4. On the same date, more than 60 people arrested and barri­
caded inside a  house, were burnt alive by French soldiers. A 
new treatm ent for political prisoners was inaugurated on that 
same day : Forcing them to swallow a great amount of salt and 
to drink urine.
5. 1 0 /2 /5 8 —-3 7  students who had gone fishing on the banks of 
Wouri River were murdered by a French patrol and their bodies 
thrown into the  river. In the evening, in all quarters of Douala, 
French soldiers closely watched the victims parents who were 
not allowed to  cry over the loss of their children.
6. On 2 /3 /5 8 — Six army trucks full of prisoners were driven to 
the banks of the River Sanaga and returned empty. There 
were no survivors. On th a t same evening, four other trucks 
took patriots to the Mokollo concentration camp, 1,200 kms. 
from Douala. Their families remained without news from them.
7. On 9 /4 /5 8 — All children under fifteen years of age were 
gathered from the Ngodi quarter of Douala. There were nine 
trucks full of them . No one knows what happened to the poor ' 
little ones. J
(To Be Continued)
Le President de la Republique Francaise,
Vu les ddcrets des 23 mars 1921 et 21 Fevrier 1925 determinant les 
attributions du Commissaire de la Republique Francaise dans les 
territoires du Cameroun;
Vu le rdglement sur la comptabilite*du 14 janvier 1869 ;
Vu le d£cret du 30 decembre 1912 sur le regime financier des colonies;
Vu le ddcret du 31 decembre 1925 fixant le regime monetaire du 
Cameroun;
Sur la proposition du Ministre des Finances et du Ministre des Colonies, 
Decrete:
Article 1. L’acceptation en paiement des monnaies anglaise dans les 
caisses publiques est autorisee dans les regions du Cameroun designees 
par arrSte'du Commissaire de la Republique. Le cours de ces monnaies 
sera fixe'par arr&e^dds promulgations du present decret, et 
ulterieurement, au moins une fois par mois, apres avis du Tre*sorier- 
Payeur.
Ce cours fixd  ^en principe, d’apres le cours commercial local, devra 
tenir compte des frais eventuels de retour des monaies anglaises dans 
leurs pays d’origine et des frais ou commissions de banque en vue de leur 
echange en monnaie francaise ou en cheque.
Ces monnaies ne pourront, sauf autorisation speciale de Ministre 
des Finances, servir qu’au paiement des depenses publiques qui doivent 
etre acquittees en territoire britannique, et a condition que la somme a 
payer soit mandatee en francs.
/  s
Article 2e. Les comptables justifient leurs entree^en monnaies anglaises 
par une mention a la souche et auverso des quittances ou recepisses 
ddlivres aux parties versantes. Les sorties sont justifiees par la production 
des bons de retrait delivres par l’ordonnateur.
Le tresorier-payeur tient un registre auxiliaire representant le detail des 
entrees et des sorties des monnaies anglaises.
Article 3 . Les pertes ou benefices de change qui resulteront 
eventuellement des variations du taux d’acceptation des monnaies 
anglaises seront imputes au budget du Cameroun.
Les augmentations ou diminutions d’encaisseprovenant des 
benefices ou pertes de change devront etre inscrites a un compte ouvert 
parmi les operations hors budget du budget special sous la rubrique 
« Frais et benefices provenant de Fechange des monnaies anglaises. Les 
operations effectudes au titre de ce dernier compte seront soldees 
mensuellement par le comptable, soit par versement au budget si elles 
laissent un benefice, soit, dans le cas contraire, par un versement par le 
budget.
Article 4 . Le Ministre des Finances et le Ministre des Colonies sont 
charges, chacun en ce qui le conceme, de 1’execution du present decret, 
qui sera insere au journal officiel de la Republique Francaise et au 
Bulletin Officiel du Ministere des Colonies./.
Fait a Paris, le
Par le President de la Republique : 
Le Ministre des Finances,
Le Ministre des Colonies,
THE THIRD ALL-AFRICAN PEOPLE’S CONFERENCE 
CAIRO, MARCH, 1961 
(Resolution on Cameroon)
Considering that there exists in the Kameroun strong French, 
British and West-German military bases, in conformity with 
the agreement signed between the Kameroun Government 
and these powers,
Considering that a popular consultation was organised in this 
country in the presence of a foreign army and at the moment 
when all democratic freedoms were suppressed and when the 
population did not express itself freely,
Condemns the agreement signed between Mr. Philips and the 
French Government eliminating national sovereignty and 
practically converting this territory into a French department 
in Africa;
Strongly stands against the bombardment o f numerous regions 
in the Kameroun by the French artillery and the repeated 
executions of Kameroonese people struggling for independence;
Strongly protests against the arbitrary division into two parts, 
not only the Kameroun as a whole but o f West-Kameroun;
Hails the result of the plebiscite on February 11th and 12th this 
year as a victory of the Kameroonese people and the fruit of 
manyyears of struggle for a true unity and independence;
Regrets that numerous frauds were organised by the British 
imperialists to prevent the Kameroun from regaining it 
political entity;
Requests all Independent African States to consider the gravity 
of the situation in the Kameroun and to support the following 
propositions which answer the profound aspirations o f the people
of the Kameroun both in the UN and outside it:
1. The immediate and complete withdrawal of French and British 
Military troops and technicians in the Kameroun.
2. The abrogation o f French, British and other agreements.
3. The restoration and respect of democratic and syndical freedoms 
and the liberation of political prisoners in the two zones.
4. The immediate and complete Africanisation of management posts; 
Invites all the popular forces of Africa to support the Kameroonesse people 
in their just struggle for true unity and independence.1
1 Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism, A short political guide. London: Pall Mall Press, pp. 47-8.
EVENING NEWS. TUESDAY, JULY I, 1958
ATROCITIES IN THE1 
FRENCH CAMEROON
10:4:58—The r e s i d e n c e  of Mr. Ruben 
Umnyobe, Secretary General of the U.P.C. 
was beseiged, whilst all his furniture and 
personal belongings were seized. All his 
neighbours were arrested driven out of town, 
and killed.
3:3:58 — In th e  
N e w-Bell quarter, 
around s e v e n  p.m. 
more than 500 pat­
riots were arrested 
and t a k e n  to un­
known places.
14:4:58 — An im­
portant military de­
tachment composed 
of five t r u c k s ,  
arrived in the Pitti 
village, a b o u t  20 
k i l o m e t r e s f r o m  
Dwala.
BAMILEKE 
REGION
13:2:58 — Follow­
ing the assassination 
of an i m p o r t a n t  
“ l a c k  e r y  ” Wafo 
Bafang, 15 followers 
of the U.P.C. arrest­
ed were imprisoned 
in the concentration 
camp of this locality.
One of them was ex­
ecuted without trial.
28:3:58 — The po­
pular l e a d e r  of 
Bagang, Ngankam 
Mathias, was arrest­
ed an d  imprisoned 
together with all the 
f o l l o w e r s  of his
movement. All they 
get as daily ration, 
is salt-water.
25:4:58 — In the 
Fokoue village 249 
p e o p l e  out of 251 
gathered in a tradi- 
t  i o n a 1 assembly, 
w e r e  arrested by 
police forces, taken 
to the Dschang con­
centration camp and 
their throats were 
severed.
It should be added 
t h a t ,  on this very 
same day, t w e n t y  
soldiers raped preg­
nant women and a 
ten-year old girl.
Four man-nurses 
w e r e  put u n d e r  
arrest, and turtured 
in the hospital of the 
Protestant church of 
Bangwa, in the mid­
dle of the religious 
s e r v i c e .  No one 
knows what happen­
ed to them.
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